Day: April 21, 2022
The odds are bad, but Biden is aiming high
President Biden has often talked about Ukraine in recent days, but he never specifies clear goals. He presumably wants to avoid raising expectations and leave himself the option of settling for less. Can we interpolate his goals from what he and the Ukrainians say and do in public?
The evidence
I think so. Here are some hints:
- He has disappointed the Ukrainians by ruling out a “no-fly” zone. This is intended to avoid a direct military confrontation of NATO with Russia. But one way or another Biden has managed to send all the kit they have asked for. That apparently now includes aircraft or aircraft parts. If there is anything still lacking, it might be air defense systems. But those are complicated and difficult to operate without extensive training.
- The Ukrainians don’t complain about lack of intelligence information. Their success in the first phase of the war appears to have been due in part to an uncanny (and likely well-informed) ability to anticipate Russia’s moves. The Ukrainians anticipated the assualt on Kyiv.
- The sanctions the US and EU are imposing on Russia and Russians are close to the maximum ever. It will not be easy to dial these back so long as Russian troops remain in Ukraine, even if only in Donbas and Crimea. The sanctions are going to crater the Russian economy. That will drive Moscow into economic dependence on and subservience to China, if President Xi is willing. There is no sign the US is planning for a return to the status quo ante.
- Biden has called out Putin as a war criminal responsible for genocide. That rules out any Western negotiation with him as well as any chance for rehabilitation. The President has made it clear his statements were not intended as an official legal determination. But neither he nor any Western leader other than Hungary’s Prime Minister Orban will ever risk meeting with Putin again.
- Biden has explicitly expressed the hope Putin will not remain in power after the war.
What Biden wants
The evidence is clear: Biden is seeking a resounding defeat of Russia, including if possible complete withdrawal from Ukrainian territory and Putin’s removal from office. Of course the Americans may have to settle for less. The human costs to Ukraine of chasing Russia completely from Donbas and especially Crimea could be high. Putin may cling to power, as his pal Bashar al Assad has done in Syria. Though he is still popular in Russia, Putin won’t allow a serious, competitive election. He has murdered and imprisoned his two principal antagonists and shut off the rest from media access.
The laws of politics have not been revoked
Biden himself faces an important mid-term election in Novmber. One-third of the Senate and the entire House are at stake. Current odds favor the Republicans. Biden needs a hat trick to turn the tide in his own favor:
- The COVID-19 epidemic needs to definitively subside.
- The economy needs to continue to grow but inflation needs to decline sharply.
- The Ukraine war nneeds to turn out well for the Ukrainians, or at least seem to be heading in that direction.
The odds for all three of these outcomes are low. At 50/50 for each, we are talking a 1 in 8 chance of success, if I’ve calculated right. But what were the odds that President Zelensky would turn out to be an effective communicator and international statesman? Who knew that Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine would flee away from the Russian invasion? What were the odds the Ukrainian army had learned to fight so well in the years since failing to confront the Russians effectively in 2014? What were the odds that Ukrainians would prove brave patriots?
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Stevenson’s army, April 21
– Putin claims victory in Mariupol.
– Taiwan TV apologizes for false attack report.
– NYT analyzes Solomon Islands pact with China.
– Analysts warn of long Ukraine war.
– Foreign Affairs article describes new warfare in Africa.
– House will vote next week on Senate-passed bill labeled “Lend-Lease.” In fact, it merely waives some sections of existing arms sales laws.
Dan Drezner joins crowd drawing on Thucydides, but adds this less-often-quoted section on what happens during war: Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defense….. The fair proposals of an adversary were met with jealous precautions by the stronger of the two, and not with a generous confidence. Revenge also was held of more account than self-preservation.
Charlie added this later in the day:
Prof. Cohen has a new article in Foreign Affairs urging less concern about grand strategy and more about statecraft, how we do what we want. I couldn’t help thinking about our course when he writes:
More than one might think, sound foreign-policy making rests on the basics of bureaucratic behavior: clear and concise memorandums, crisply run meetings, well-disseminated conclusions, succinct and unambiguous guidance from above. Good process does not guarantee good policy, but it increases the odds of it. With that in mind, the U.S. government should pay renewed attention to the training and career management of security professionals.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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