peacefare.net

Clarified aims betoken longer war

Secretary of Defense Austin clarified US war aims yesterday:

We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/

Meanwhile, the Russians have clarified theirs. They want control not only of all of Donbas in eastern Ukraine but also the southern coast. That would allow them to link up with their long-standing military presence in the Transnistria region of Moldova. The pretext for the Moldova campaign is already in the works.

Ukrainian war aims have long been clear. Kyiv wants to roll the Russians back at least to their pre-February 24 control of Crimea and part of Luhansk and Donetsk. President Zelensky would no doubt like to rid Ukraine altogether of Russian troops.

These different war aims are strangely compatible. Stretched thin already, the Russians have set themselves goals that will be difficult to achieve and will attrite their remaining forces. The Americans and NATO allies are pouring supplies into the Ukrainian army in an effort to give it the resources needed to withstand the Russian offensive and to push back when the time comes.

A longer war

The result will be a longer war than Russia anticipated or Ukraine wants. The Russian army has stalled in its western push from Kherson for the better part of two months. Resistance at Mykolaiv has been stalwart. The Ukrainians have retaken most of the now ruined areas north of Kyiv that the Russians had occupied earlier in the war. In Mariupol, vital to Russian consolidation of control along the Sea of Azov, Ukrainian fighters are still making their last stand. Agreements to allow the evacuation of civilians are breaking down faster than they can be negotiated.

The question now is whether the Ukrainian army can begin to retake some areas, or at least destabilize Russian control in the south. The Russians have lost a lot of men and armor, but they remain far stronger in artillery and airpower. The Ukrainians have acquired some armor but their air defenses and artillery still remain relatively weak. Offensive guerilla operations will be far more difficult for the Ukrainians in the relatively flat and cleared areas of southern Ukraine than in the wooded and hillier north.

War has consequences

Already about one-third of the pre-war Ukrainian population of more than 41 million is displaced, 5.1 million outside the country and 7.7 million inside. Poland has received more than half the refugees. Romania, Hungary, and Moldova have received most the remainder. The vast majority of Ukrainians are fleeing west, not towards Russia or Belarus. They are voting with their feet. Political consequences in the receiving countries so far have not been dramatic. The welcome mat is still out. Relief efforts inside Ukraine are falling short of requirements.

Ukraine and Russia are major grain suppliers to world markets. Their exports will fall dramatically this year, both due to the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. This will create a price problem more than a physical supply problem. That will be felt more strongly in poorer countries that susidize bread prices, like Egypt, than in the US or other rich countries. China, a big importer, is shifting its purchases to Russia, which may help to reduce the impact on world prices.

The broader political consequences of the war are already clear. With the exception of Hungary, NATO is more unified. Western forces on NATO’s eastern flank are increasing. Finland and Sweden appear likely to join the Alliance sooner rather than later. Many countries in Africa and Asia have tried to avoid “taking sides,” but still Russia is increasingly isolated in the United Nations when it comes to discussion and voting on humanitarian issues. China has so far backed Russia, but awkwardly given its position on sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is still unclear whether Beijing is supplying the weapons Moscow has sought.

Meaningful negotiations aren’t likely

Both sides in Ukraine are hurting, but there is as yet no stalemate. It will be weeks if not months before it is clear whether one side or the other can make significant progress in the continued fighting.

Nor is there any indication of a “way out.” The war aims are compatible only if the war continues. The Ukrainians have emphasized from the first their willingness to talk. Their aims in doing so have been limited to humanitarian issues and re-establishing sovereign control of Ukrainian territory. The Russians have met with the Ukrainians repeatedly, but with delegations that don’t appear to have authority over military forces. Supposed agreements break down while President Putin threatens the use of nuclear weapons if the West continues to aid Ukraine.

That threat is one the Americans have to take seriously. The only way of deterring it is to make clear that it would trigger an American response, not in Ukraine but against Russia. There is enormous peril embarking on a course that leads to mutually assured destruction, but it is the only known route to preventing nuclear war. Extension of the American nuclear umbrella to Ukraine would, ironically, make Ukraine all but a de facto member of NATO, precisely what Russia claims it wants to avoid.