Month: September 2022
Stevenson’s army, September 11
In remembrance…
– The Hill notes how Biden is reshaping war on terror.
– NYT says pro-war Russian bloggers are criticizing the conduct of the war.
– NYT has more updates on Ukraine offensive.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Strategic failure has consequences
9/11 produces lots of reflections. Here are mine.
Tactical success, strategic failure
The Al Qaeda attacks using commercial aircraft were largely successful. Three of four hit their intended targets and killed lots of people. But that tactical success did not lead to strategic victory. The Americans and others have hunted Al Qaeda for 20 years, killing not only its two leaders and many foot soldiers but destroying much of its organizational capacity.
But that tactical success has also not led to strategic victory. Al Qaeda has splintered and metastasized, spinning off the Islamic State and other extremist jihadi insurgents fighting in many more countries than two decades ago. This includes not only the imploded Middle Eastern states of Syria and Yemen, but also the African states of Libya, Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia.
Thus the prospect of tactical success tempts those with the capacity for violence into enterprises that end in strategic failure. This happened to the US in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We invaded because we could. Tactical success however saddled us with burdens we did not want. It took 10 years to extract most US forces from Iraq, and 20 from Afghanistan. The failure of state-building in Afghanistan has vitiated most gains from the initial military success. In Iraq, the failure is not complete, but the costs have been high.
It’s Russia’s turn
The Russians are now facing their own consequences of strategic failure. Their initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely successful. They annexed Crimea and occupied most of Luhansk and Donetsk using proxies. But President Putin wanted more. This year he tried to take Kyiv, complete the conquest of Donbas, and expand Russian control in the south. The Ukrainians fought off the attack on their capital and are now pushing the Russians back rapidly in Kharkiv province as well as more slowly around Kherson.
The ultimate military outcome is still uncertain. The Ukrainians could over-extend themselves. The Russians could succeed in regrouping and stop the Ukrainian advances or even return to territory they have lost in the past week.
But the strategic failure is already apparent. The Russian army, air force, and navy are in tatters. A reinvigorated NATO is expanding to Finland and Sweden as well as the troop presence on Russia’s borders. Sanctions are sapping the Russian economy. Europe is weaning itself rapidly from Russian oil and gas. States on Russia’s periphery are looking for opportunities to expand ties with the West. Nationalists in Russia who advocated the Ukraine war are turning on Putin. The war is solidifying Ukrainian national identity, increasing support for President Zelensky and the Ukrainian state even among Russian speakers.
The lesson
What should we learn from these strategic defeats of great powers? Confident of their military superiority, they go to war for reasons they think worthy. But war is a political as well as a military enterprise. Tactical military superiority makes it difficult to consider the consequences of strategic failure. Strategic failure is however always a possibility even if you win a war, as the Americans did in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Russians did in 2014 in Ukraine. This failure to take into account the real possibility of strategic failure is a major source of the blunders that lead to war.
Apply it to Iran
A quick footnote on applying this lesson to Iran. Israeli and American military superiority is overwhelming. But Iran is a big country, more or less the size and population of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. No one should be thinking about an invasion. Even hawkish thinking is limited to attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities and supporting infrastructure. Tactical success in that enterprise is not certain, as the Iranians have put a lot of their enrichment facilities deep under ground.
But strategic failure is almost certain. An Iran that has suffered an attack on its nuclear facilities will surely redouble its efforts to get nuclear weapons, as that would make repeat of the attack unthinkable. Sure, the attack could be repeated ad infinitum, “mowing the grass” as the Israelis say. But sooner or later Tehran would succeed in getting nuclear weapons. What then? Tactical success guarantees nothing. Strategic failure has consequences.
Stevenson’s army, September 10
I like Josh Rogin’s phrase that Putin is building an “axis of autocrats.”
– WSJ reports on the Ukrainian offensive.
– WaPo has videos of Ukraine fighting.
– CRS has new reports on how committee assignments are done — in the House, and in the Senate.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, September 9
– CIA director calls Russian invasion of Ukraine a failure.-
– Fred Kaplan says not to worry about latest Putin announcement.
– North Korea allows preemptive nuclear war.
– WOTR article sees dangers in dual-use technologies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Turning point, but no timetable
@IAPonomarenko tweets:
This is incredible, folks. Balakliya has been retaken. I think the next main goal is Kupyansk — the key railroad and automobile transportation center between Russia and northern and central Donbas. Sever this GLOC and Russians are in the world of shit.
The Northeast
Russian forces are reportedly collapsing southeast of Kharkiv. Moscow thinned its forces there to prepare for a much-ballyhooed Ukrainian offensive in the south near Kherson. That southern offensive has relied however less on infantry and more on artillery. The Ukrainians apparently kept their infantry in place in Donbas and appear to have snookered the Russians into a serious defeat.
Of course a few nights advances do not make a victory. The Ukrainians will need to be careful not to overextend themselves. Russia still has massive capabilities that have not yet suffered the kind of defeat that would make them turn around and head back to Moscow. Kupyansk and Izyum are close to the Russian border, making it relatively easy for Moscow to reinforce its troops there.
Putin’s hollow defiance
President Putin is still projecting defiance. Yesterday he said:
We haven’t lost anything and we won’t lose anything. The main gain is the strengthening of our sovereignty.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/07/putin-threatens-to-tear-up-fragile-ukraine-grain-deal-in-bellicose-speech
I wonder how the tens of thousands of families of Russians killed and wounded feel about that, not to mention the destruction of a good part of the army, navy, and air force. Russia’s far right bloggers have already foreseen Moscow’s defeat.
The South
The Ukrainians have also made small gains near Kherson, but the big challenge in the south is the fighting near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant:
The Russians are using it to shield military operations. The big risk is that a stray shell from either side could damage non-nuclear electrical or cooling systems at the giant nuclear facility, precipitating a loss of coolant and a meltdown of the fuel within the reactor. Such an event could easily rival or exceed the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, which killed only hundreds because of heroic efforts on the part of the Soviets that would not be possible under today’s conflict conditions.
The IAEA, which now has experts at the power plant, is calling for a demilitarized zone around the plant. Putin isn’t likely to go for that. My guess is the Ukrainians will in due course try to surround it and await Russian withdrawal.
Defeat is certain, timing is not
However the tactical advances of the Ukrainians work out, it has been clear for some time that the Russians have suffered a massive strategic defeat. Their forces and supplies are severely damaged. They may be able to hold on to part of Ukraine when the fighting stops, but they have no capability to populate it or develop it. Their best bet is Crimea, not Donbas, but even that may prove a (Kerch) bridge too far. Unless the Americans and Europeans call a halt, the Ukrainians are likely to make further incremental progress. I might hope the Ukrainians could celebrate their Christmas (January 6) in Luhansk, Donetsk, Mariupol, Kherson, and Sevastopol, but it might not be in 2023.
Stevenson’s army, September 8
– NYT notes shock waves to global economy.
– A former student who is a China watcher recommends this article on Xi Jinping by a longtime professor at the CCP’s party school.
– NYT notes widely disparate punishments for the few cases of voter fraud.
– Journalist Josh Barro has an interesting explanation for why Biden’s low approval ratings don’t seem to hurt Democrats much.
– SecState Blinken in Kyiv announces more military aid.
– DOD wants military testing facility in Saudi Arabia.
– AP says Retired LTG Flynn is building a political movement.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
