Month: October 2022
Stevenson’s army, October 31
– Punchbowl explains why crypto legislation is under the jurisdiction of the Senate Agriculture Committee.
– NYT has its last polls in key Senate races.
– NBC says Biden may slow military aid to Saudis.
– WaPo notes Russian gains in west Africa.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A lot to fear this Halloween, but…
The tragic and deadly stampede in Seoul during a Halloween celebration reminds us that there are real things to fear this year. Here is my list:
- Russian President Putin’s desperate efforts to prevent defeat in Ukraine.
- Chinese President Xi’s equally desperate efforts to exert hegemony in East Asia before his country’s inevitable demographic and likely economic decline.
- A delegitimized American election November 8, leading to more political violence.
- A deep recession that renews identity-based populism.
Putin’s last stand
Russian forces in Ukraine are retreating. The Ukrainian Army routed them in the northeast. In the south, the Russians are holding, but just barely. Ukraine’s air and sea drone attack on Russian naval ships in the Black Sea was a success. But it prompted Moscow to suspend the agreement that allowed export of Ukrainian grain. That will reduce revenue to Kyiv and jack up food prices in many of the most food insecure parts of the world.
Moscow has accused Kyiv of planning a “dirty bomb” attack using radioactive material. This is not a credible accusation, but it likely reflects what the Russians themselves are thinking of doing. The ultimate Russian threat is use of nuclear weapons. Putin has implied as much. That would bring a US conventional response of massive proportions. It can’t be ruled out, because the decisions of a single person are always subject to uncertainty. But it would spell the end of the Russian Army in Ukraine. Putin doesn’t want that.
Xi’s danger zone
Hal Brands and Michael Beckley argue in their new book that the threat from China to US regional and global hegemony will peak in the 2020s. After that Beijing will be preoccupied with internal demographic, social, and economic problems. Impending decline, after a long period of advance, will motivate Xi to challenge the US sooner rather than later. Xi consolidated autocratic power at the recent 20th Communist Party Congress. There will be few checks and balances to offset his inclinations.
We’ve seen in Ukraine how catastrophic the decisions of one man can be. We saw it also in George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq, which went virtually uncontested within the US. China has already swallowed Macau and Hong Kong. Xi wants to do likewise with Taiwan. But Taiwan is vital to the US capability of protecting its allies in East Asia, in particular South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. The US would need to do its best to support Taiwan. A China/Taiwan war will make the stakes in Ukraine, and the violence, seem relatively small.
The American election at risk
On November 8 the US will go to the polls to elect a new House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate, in addition to many state and local officials. Right-wing election deniers are threatening the integrity of the election in many ways. These include disinformation about the process, threats against voters and election officials, and election officials and candidates who themselves are deniers and prepared to tip the balance. There is a real risk of violence if the election returns Democratic majorities to either the House or Senate, or both. There is also a real risk that Democrats will view Republican wins as illegitimate, though electoral violence from the left is less likely.
This election has significance beyond November 8. It is a dress rehearsal for 2024, when the election-denier-in-chief, Donald Trump, hopes to return as the Republican candidate for President. If he does, it is hard to picture a peaceful election. It is likely he will be indicted for national security violations and possibly also for tax fraud before 2024. Justified though those indictments may be, they will not improve the prospects for stability in the next two years.
An impending recession
The Federal Reserve Bank has been raising interest rates sharply to curb inflation, which has peaked around 8% on a yearly basis. While the US labor market is still tight and modest growth continues, the rest of the world is heading into a recession. The strong dollar, the war in Ukraine, and tension in East Asia are major factors. It is hard to believe that a global downturn won’t come home to roost in the US as well.
Inflation has already become a major issue in the November 8 election campaign. But if a recession hits in 2023, as many predict, the 2024 election could also be affected. Republican prospects will be better if Trump is not the candidate, but in any event American elections are often a referendum on the economy. An aging President Biden will find it hard to get re-elected if the downturn persists into 2024.
Scary Halloween
It’s a scary Halloween, even without the masks. But the defeat of President Bolsonaro in Brazil is a contrary indicator. Let’s hope it is an early indication that prospects are better than they appear!
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Stevenson’s army, October 30
– NYT says UFOs are foreign spies or trash.
– Brookings lists what election deniers want to change.
– WaPo says general who resisted sending army to Capitol denied promotion. [While article blames Biden, I suspect Hill people sent word of opposition.]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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You won’t hear sorry from me, Mr. President
Courtesy of Kosovo Online and Googletranslate:
The president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, commented on the statement of Danijel Server, a professor of international law [sic], which he gave to the Voice of America, which is that he “expects that Serbia will refuse the introduction of sanctions against Russia, and that it is more realistic for Serbia to turn to China than to the West.”
– Serbia is on the European road. I believe that Serbia will go more strongly on that path and that’s why there are people there who are less tired than me, and they will have my support, to pull Serbia towards Europe. As for our Chinese partners, we tell our Chinese friends that we are on the European path and we have no problem with that – said Vučić and added:
– With that, he wanted to say: the Serbs might leave the Russians, but they might look for someone else just so they wouldn’t be in the West. Well, this is the man who said that we are a danger in the region and that we are just waiting for someone to attack, on Putin’s order, but for 250 days now, that has not happened. I listened to those senseless stories and lies about Serbia and read and saw them in many Western countries.
But I’ve never heard the word “sorry” from anyone when none of that happens. We are continuing our path, the European path, and we will try to preserve our traditionally good relations with China and principled positions in relation to the conflict in Ukraine. In any case – Let Mr. Server do his job, we’ll do ours. May God bless him, and above all, may he bless our beautiful Serbia.
https://www.kosovo-online.com/vesti/politika/vucic-odgovorio-serveru-srbija-nastavlja-svoj-evropski-put-28-10-2022
Note two things:
- He confirms that Serbia will continue to refuse to impose sanctions on Russia. That is its “principled position,” though what principle it maintains I am not sure.
- He confirms that Serbia will keep its good relations with China. That is crucial now that Russia is pursuing partition of a sovereign state inconsistent with Serbia’s claim to Kosovo.
In any event, China wants to use Serbia as a trade and investment route into the EU. Of course it doesn’t object to Serbia’s European ambitions.
Vucic will implement the acquis, but not the Copenhagen criteria
The question is whether you can do these things and still pursue membership in the EU. The answer is yes. I expect Serbia to do its best to implement the acquis communautaire, which is necessary but not sufficient for EU membership. Much of the acquis consists of technical requirements, down to curb cuts on city streets. Vucic should have no problem with allowing Brussels to decide things Serbia has little capacity to deal with on its own.
The harder part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria and aligning its foreign policy with the EU. The former require a democratic political system, an open economy, free media, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights. This is the part Vucic ignores. Serbia’s media are not free, its economy is far from open, its judiciary is not independent, and the political system is semi-autocratic.
On all of these dimensions, Serbia has gotten worse, not better, since Vucic first became President in 2017. In addition, his affection for what his minions term the “Serbian world” threatens the territorial integrity of three of Serbia’s neighbors: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, each of which have Serb populations advocates of the “Serbian world” want annexed to Serbia. Doing that is not “good neighborly relations.” The fact that it has not yet led to large-scale violence should be no comfort.
The crucial test
The crucial test is likely to come in Kosovo. The Europeans and Americans have backed off the demand for immediate diplomatic recognition. They are now toying with the idea of transitional steps short of that. These would include recognition by the five non-recognizing EU countries, Kosovo membership in international organizations as well as creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo consistent with its constitution. This is sometimes referred to as a “two Germanies” scenario, but that is a misnomer. Both Germanies were members of the United Nations. Even without Belgrade’s opposition, Moscow and Beijing are certain to veto Kosovo’s UN membership.
Serbia is skilled at heaping blame for the lack of progress in the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue on Kosovo. The question is whether it will be prepared to go in a more accommodating direction. A clear indicator will be its response to Kosovo’s decision to phase in over three months the requirement that Serbs in Kosovo’s north start using Kosovo license plates rather than Serbian ones. The Americans wanted a longer delay–10 months. But Belgrade’s obligation to allow this long-delayed exertion of Pristina’s authority is clear.
No apologies
President Vucic is correct to call on me to do my job. What is it? To analyze the parts of the world I know well in realistic terms and to suggest ways of improving their prospects. That is what I did in the interview. The question is whether he is doing his. Is he taking Serbia in the direction of liberal democracy? Or is he hoping the EU will relax its standards and allow Serbia to accede without meeting the Cophenhagen criteria?
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Stevenson’s army, October 28 and 29
– Fed Kaplan critiques the nuclear posture review.
– Atlantic Council team has good menu of options related to Russian nukes in Ukraine.
– Robert Draper worries about the GOP.
– WaPo says Russians are undermining Moldova.
– National Security Archive has more on how JFK lied to keep Cuban missile deal secret.
I failed to post yesterday’s edition:
– DOD released its new National Defense Strategy. Here’s NYT analysis. The Guardian notes the nuclear posture section.
– National Security Archive has JCS documents during Cuban missile crisis.
– House Veterans Affairs Committee warns of extremists in the military.
– House GOP plans tough China policy.
– Somalia wants more US drone strikes.
– Army strategist has good ideas for defense innovation.
NYT has good background on micro-targeting of political ads.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Where the line is drawn matters
I am going to go out on a limb. Broadly speaking, the Ukraine war can end with three outcomes:
- Complete Russian withdrawal from the 2013 borders of Ukraine.
- Partition of Ukraine, with Crimea and perhaps some other slices of the south and east annexed by Russia.
- Russian victory.
Note that these are outcomes. They say nothing about the path, which could include war, political change in Moscow or Kyiv, or negotiations. Outcome 2. looks much more likely today than 1. or 3., but there really is no telling. Let’s assume for current purposes that Russia remains under the control of Putin, or someone with similar territorial ambitions. Let’s also assume that a pro-EU government remains in Kyiv. What are the implications from the American perspective of these possible outcomes?
Complete Russian withdrawal
Complete Russian withdrawal would leave Ukraine still at risk. It would want to join the EU, for which it has already applied, and NATO. The former is a real possibility, provided Ukraine reforms its politics and economy to qualify. But the latter is unlikely. It would require all NATO members to agree. Several will be reluctant.
This circle can be squared, as it has been during wartime. NATO would need to provide security guarantees to Ukraine ensuring the kind of support Ukraine has received since February. This would ideally include not just ammunition and equipment, but also training, intelligence, logistics, funding, and political solidarity. A Ukrainian win will not be cost free.
Partition
The costs will be higher if Ukraine is partitioned. Putin would claim victory. Russia would be an even greater continuing military threat. NATO would need to arm “rump” Ukraine to repel another potential Russian invasion and repress the kind of “hybrid warfare” Moscow would continue to conduct inside Kyiv-controlled territory. NATO would also need to counter Moscow’s intensified hybrid warfare campaigns in member state Hungary or non-member state Moldova.
Partition of Ukraine would also encourage Moscow to expand its support for partition elsewhere, especially the Balkans. There Serbian President Vucic would welcome expanded Russian support for his “Serbian world” efforts, which entail de facto or de jure partition of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kazakhstan, where there is a large Russian population, might also be at risk.
Russian victory
Russian victory, achieved by either military or political means, would entail the incorporation of all of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Kyiv would be, like Minsk, subject to Moscow’s suzerainty. It would loyally follow Moscow’s foreign policy directives. Russia would likely garrison troops in Ukraine, which would be mostly disarmed.
Ukraine’s subjagation would put not just Hungary and Moldova at risk from hybrid warfare but also Poland, the Baltics, and other NATO members (possibly Romania and Slovakia) from Russian conventional as well as unconventional attack. Maintaining NATO solidarity would become more difficult as Moscow threatens these newer neighbors while leaving the older NATO members untouched.
Where the line is drawn matters
American diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has aimed for a Europe “whole and free.” That isn’t happening. The Ukraine war is drawing a new line. The question is whether that new line will go through or encompass Ukraine. If it does, NATO will pay a higher price. The cost will be lower, but still substantial, if Ukraine as a whole can complete its Western ambitions.
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