Day: October 23, 2022
Stevenson’s army, October 23
– NYT study finds increased use of “devil terms” in political messaging, far more by GOP.
– Carlos Lozada applies A.O. Hirschman’s analysis of rhetoric to the campaign.
– WSJ says pollsters are still trying to get things right.
– NYT notes words Xi didn’t use as significant.
– Politico says US is losing in Panama.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Iran enigma post-November 8
I am no expert on Iran. I’ve never even visited. But it is an important country that interests me. So let me review what I perceive of its current situation, subject of course to correction by those more knowledgeable.
Widespread protests
The protests are widespread. The initial impetus for the demonstrations was the death of a Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, whose hijab was supposedly not worn correctly. It allegedly did not cover all of her hair. She died after physical abuse in police custody.
This triggered the current wave of protests, which have retained a focus on women’s rights. But they also have a distinct political direction. Some are calling for an end to the Islamic Republic, with slogans that focus on the Supreme Leader (“down with the dictator!”).
The regime has responded with violence against the protesters, killing something like 250, arresting thousands, and injuring many more. Demonstrations and regime violence have been particularly intense in Iranian Kurdistan.
Iran’s economic situation is not a focus of the demonstrations, but it is certainly a contributing factor. Suffering from both international sanctions and internal mismanagement, many Iranians are impoverished while regime supporters thrive. The contrast is glaring.
Power projection
Even as it tussles with domestic unrest, the Islamic Republic is increasing its power projection abroad. Iran joined in OPEC+’s decision to maintain high oil prices as the world economy declines. It is helping Russia use Iranian drones in the Ukraine war and mobilizing forces on the border with Azerbaijan. Tehran has maintained support for Syrian President Assad and continued its assistance to the Houthis in Yemen.
The JCPOA is at risk
These are fairly low-cost operations in financial terms, but they are high-impact in political terms. They signal a growing alignment with Russia, which also wants to maintain oil prices, supports Assad, and favors Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan. The EU, which has a mediating role at the nuclear talks, has imposed new sanctions on Iran because of its drone exports to Russia.
Iran’s current power projection also signals disinterest in renewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (aka Iran nuclear deal). The repression inside Iran and power projection in the region and Ukraine make it difficult for the Biden Administration to revive the JCPOA even after the November 8 election.
Failure to renew the JCPOA will leave Iran free to continue to enrich uranium to levels needed for nuclear weapons. It is already at the nuclear threshold. It could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Turkish President Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both stated that they will pursue nuclear weapons if more countries in the region do.
Uncertainties are unsettling
Some hope that the demonstrations will collapse the regime and lead to one that does not pursue nuclear weapons. But hope is not a policy. The relevant timeframe is short. Iran could have the material it needs for a nuclear weapon within 6 months if the JCPOA is not renewed. No one can be sure the demonstrators will succeed. Nor can we be sure the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will not dominate a successor regime. That could lead to an accelerated nuclear program.
If Iran does gain the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons, it will likely want to maintain ambiguity about whether it has actually made them or intends to deploy them. This would mirror the Israeli stance, which has been successful in reducing awareness of its wepons and protests against its nuclear power status. But Iranian adoption of such an ambiguous stance would introduce one more uncertainty into the Middle East.
The Iran enigma
Iran presents a puzzling problem for Washington. Renewal of the JCPOA is certainly the best currently available answer to the nuclear issue. The demonstrations give some hope for internally-generated regime change. But even that would not guarantee a non-nuclear Iran. Meanwhile, the current regime’s commitment to power projection abroad and violent repression of the demonstrations makes JCPOA renewal difficult.
It will be interesting to see how the Biden Adminstration solves the Iran puzzle once the November 8 election is over.
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Life is unfair, so you need a strategy
Bledë Krasniqi from Television Tëvë 1, based in Prishtina, Kosovo, asked questions. I responded:
Q: As an expert on the issues of the Western Balkan, how have you seen the frequent visits to Kosovo and Serbia by the US emissary for the Western Balkans, Gabriel Escobar, and the EU emissary, Miroslav Lajcak? Are these visits an indication that the final agreement between the two countries is near the end?
A: The envoys are trying to deliver a substantial agreement, but I’ll be happily surprised if they deliver a “final” one.
Vucic is not committed to stabiliity
Q: Escobar said that the president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, is committed to regional stability? Do you agree with this statement?
A: No, I don’t agree. I think Vucic is committed to what he calls the Serbian world, in other words de facto greater Serbia. This threatens instability in both Bosnia and Kosovo [I should also have said Montenegro].
Why not ten minutes?
Q: The United States of America has asked the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, to postpone the implementation of the decision on the issue of license plates for another 10 months. In your opinion, should Kosovo take such a step?
A: Ten minutes is too long in my view. What is the reason for this American request?
No, the dialogue won’t end this year
Q: Do you believe that the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue will end this year? If so, under what conditions? Do you see relations between the two countries as tense recently?
A: Relations are certainly tense. I doubt the dialogue will end this year.
Yes, to the Association with conditions
Q: Should Kosovo establish the Association of Serbian Municipalities?
A: Yes, but only as part of a package that includes recognition and only with two conditions: 1) reciprocity for Albanian communities in Serbia and 2) compliance with the Kosovo Constitutional Court criteria.
Q: If the Association of Serbian municipalities is conditioned by the internationals, should the leaders of Kosovo accept this condition or do they have to look for other solution.
A: See my response above.
Q: Recently, the European Commission has also asked Kosovo to implement the Association without delays and obstacles? Should this count as a condition for visa liberalization?
A: I hope not.
Life is unfair
Q: Is it unfair to Kosovo the non-liberalization of visas by the European Council?
A: Yes it is unfair, but life is often unfair. Kosovo needs an improved strategy for getting what it wants from the EU.
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