Month: December 2022
Stevenson’s army, December 31
– CFR lists the big anniversaries coming in 2023.
– Dan Drezner gives his list of the best writing on political economy in 2022.
– NYT on effects of polling on the 2022 elections.
– Defense News on Sweden & Finland’s efforts to get into NATO.
– WOTR on Turkey’s policies toward Russia and Syria.
Best wishes for 2023. CS
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Problems and solutions: perceptions matter
What you do about a problem depends on how you perceive the forces at work creating it and the possibilities for solution. Perceptions often diverge. Here are some issues in the Balkans today where that is the case, including my own views:
Did President Vucic control this month’s Serb rebellion in northern Kosovo?
He claimed not. He told Western diplomats that if they press him too hard about northern Kosovo without offering him something he might lose control there. That would presumably make things worse. Vucic is expert at playing this game. What he wants is the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). That would be an institutional vehicle for maintaining Belgrade’s control over the Serb population in Kosovo permanently.
In my view, it’s nonsense to pretend Vucic doesn’t control what happens among the Serbs in northern Kosovo. It is true Vucic is not liked by many of them, because he has delivered nothing they want. But the barricades erected there in recent weeks came down the day, nay the hour, in which he said so. The Serbian security services and organized crime they control are the main instigators in the north. Anyone who bucks them will be arrested, beaten up, fired, or worse.
Is the problem Kurti?
Many American and European officials dislike Albin Kurti, the prime minister of Kosovo. There are several reasons for this. In opposition, he was a firebrand and his political movement used violence both inside and outside the parliament. He has advocated a referendum on union with Albania, something Washington and Brussels won’t permit. He is often uncompromising, or as he says “principled.” He does not, as his predecessors did, bend easily to American and European preferences.
In my view, Kurti is a sovereigntist. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, but it is still not completely sovereign. A NATO-led force defends its territorial integrity. Foreigners still play roles in its judicial system. Kurti wants to establish Kosovo’s sovereignty, in part by reaching a “final” agreement with Serbia that includes strict reciprocity in all matters and mutual recognition. He doesn’t want to settle for the half measures Washington and Brussels encourage. That frustrates their diplomats.
Can KFOR solve the current crisis?
The NATO-led force in Kosovo, KFOR, now has about 3800 troops from 27 countries. In principle, that force concentrated in the north and properly equipped and trained could have readily taken down the barricades and calmed the situation. Its responsibilities also include Kosovo’s territorial defense. Serbia mobilized its forces along the border/boundary with Kosovo. Were the Serbian Army to enter Kosovo, KFOR (not the still nascent Kosovo Security Force) would be responsible for pushing them back.
In my view, KFOR is lacking what it needs for both its civil and territorial defense roles. Its troops are not all in the north, they are not all trained and equipped for civil unrest, and many of the troop-supplying countries would not want to see their forces in violent conflict. Belgrade understands this and exploits KFOR’s weaknesses. KFOR needs more capacity, not just to push back demonstrators (Albanian or Serb) and the Serbian Army but also to negotiate from a position of strength.
Is the solution two Germanies?
Paris and Berlin have been working for months on a proposal for a half measure that is usually referred to as the “two Germanies” model. The Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic in the early 1970s agreed to live and let live, without mutual recognition. The idea to use this as a model for Kosovo and Serbia has been around for a long time. A version of the French-German proposal leaked in November, but there is said to be a more recent version that includes the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
In my view, the leaked document isn’t too bad, but it is not two Germanies. Both Germanies became members of the United Nations in 1973. No one thinks Serbia will concede on UN membership for Kosovo. Even if Belgrade were to cave, Moscow won’t without exacting a high price from the West. The model discussed is “two Germanies minus.” It might have some virtues, but the ASM should be included only in a final agreement that provides for mutual recognition. In that context even a sovereigntist like Kurti should be open to considering the proposition.
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Stevenson’s army, December 30
I have a piece in the Hill about the NDAA.
I’ve been reading a lot lately about the foreign policy debates during 1939-43. In many ways, the emerging split in the GOP is like the earlier one.
David Brooks in NYT calls attention to several long articles during the year, including this about the generational split among progressive groups.
WaPo says Venezuelan opposition has given up on Guaido.
Belarus blames Ukraine for attack.
AP reports on today’s Xi-Putin talks.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A 10 point peace outline for the Western Balkans
Veton Surroi writes:
In the last week of 2022, the Western Balkans again produces narratives about unfinished conflicts and about those that are expected to happen. I will not go delve into the explanation neither why nor since when nor who is responsible. The fact that this is happening 21 years after the last war (North Macedonia), 23 years after the NATO historic intervention in Europe (Kosovo and Serbia) and 28 years after the first genocide in Europe after World War II (Bosnia and Herzegovina) speaks for itself. It also speaks that there are many ways for perpetuation of conflict and war, but that the way of peace has not yet been found. And in the hyper-production of scenarios for one or the other solution (how to remove the barricades, how to solve the constitutional impasse in this or that country, how to unlock the ethnic veto…) here is a (perhaps) simple ten-point outline for peace for the entire region of the Western Balkans.
1. The six countries of the Western Balkans (WB6) will become (in 2028) part of the European Single Market, with equal access rights to the four European freedoms. They will be equal to the rights enjoyed today by non-EU countries, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.
2. In order to gain the right of access to the single European Market, the Six Western Balkans must establish (in 2024) the space of the four European freedoms in their own region, i.e. establish the Common Regional Market. It is not about free trade, because that we more or less have. This is about inter-institutional agreements for a shared space.
3. Those WB6 countries that are prepared for EU membership on their own merits will be invited to sign the accession. The six partners are responsible for the preparation of the WB6 for entry into the four European freedoms (that is, group integration into the European Common Market) and at the same time for integration based on their own merits for membership in the EU (based on the regatta principle, where the first the one who is the most prepared) . The principle of regatta and that of “big bang” group action are mutually conditioned.
4. The European Union, in addition to ambitious transformative funds (such as that of the Green Agenda), will establish the Fund for Peaceful Cohesion in the Western Balkans, directed towards the infrastructural, economic, cultural and other cohesion of the Western Balkans. The money of the Fund will also be used to achieve the two concentric circles of the four European freedoms, the Common Regional Market and the Common European Market.
5. Kosovo and Serbia will establish inter-institutional relations derived from the needs of establishing the common regional market and the single European market. The legal format of inter-institutional relations will be equal for all WB6 Six.
6. Kosovo and Serbia will negotiate and agree on the powers of the “protecting state”. This will regulate, according to the best European standards, the necessary role of Serbia for the protection and development of the Serbian people and Serbian culture in Kosovo. At the same time, the role of Kosovo will be regulated for the protection and development of the Albanian people and their culture in the Preshevo Valley and other parts of Serbia.
7. The WB6 will actively participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Countries that are ready for NATO membership and want to do so in 2028 will receive an invitation for membership. The six countries of the Western Balkans, regardless of their status as NATO members or not, will sign the Western Balkan 6 Cooperation and Security Agreement 2028.
8. The six countries of the Western Balkans will establish Common Memory Centers in their capitals under the direct sponsorship of their governments. In all these centers, the memory will be built for the civilian victims of the war, those “on the other side”. The Culture Centers will also serve as points of knowledge of the cultures of the “other side”.
9. The six countries of the Western Balkans will build the compact of the rights of the non-majority peoples, relying on the best practices of the region (such as the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001). The basis of the compact will be the non-territorial rights of the non-majority peoples, that is, the rights that are equivalent wherever the non-majority citizens live.
10. The Roma language will be the language in official use in the municipalities where x percent of the Roma population lives. The sixth of the Western Balkans will create the joint institutional body for the unification and standardization of the Romani language in the region.
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Stevenson’s army, December 29
– E.J. Dionne interviews retiring Cong. David Price of NC, a superb lawmaker and scholar.
– Biden insists new GOP chairmen wait until they have authority to investigate.
– WaPo does deep dive into Ukrainian offensives on Kharkiv & Kherson.
– GW prof says we should stop viewing Middle East as a region.
– NYT says US is working to block Iranian drones for Russia.
– Congress notified of additional $180 million arms for Taiwan.
– Carlos Lozada sees themes in books about Trump.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Aggression needs a firm and effective response
Albioneta Ademi of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I replied:
Q: NATO-KFOR still did not respond to Serbia’ s request on deploying military in Kosovo. Why do you think it took so long to “analyze” such request?
A: I doubt they will ever answer. It’s a question that was asked as a provocation, not to get an answer.
Q: In November, Prime Minister Kurti said that Serbia aims to destabilize the north of Kosovo to cover the EU proposal rejection. Do you agree with Kurti? What’s hidden after the Serbia’s actions?
A: Albin knows better than I do. I think the evidence is in favor of what he says. Nothing is hidden. Serbia is trying to make it impossible for serious normalization talks to occur.
Q: Kosovo is waiting for KFOR to act saying Kosovo Police is ready and capable to take off the barricades but still Kurti is giving time to KFOR. Why so?
A: Because he is wise. It would be far better not to risk his police in a direct confrontation with people whose sole purpose is to destabilize.
Q: N1 (a CNN affiliated media in Serbia) reported on Monday that Serbia deployed its military close to Jarinje cross border. This can remind one what Russia did before Ukraine’s invasion. Is this a ‘benign’ threat, a show of force for internal use in Serbia or Kosovans should be really concerned?
A: Whenever military forces are deployed in an offensive mode, it is wise to take it seriously. There are no benign threats.
Q: Do you think the US and EU are doing enough in de-escalation? DAS Escobar and other EU’s representatives visited Kosovo and Serbia in mid-December. What is your comment on their way of addressing to tensions?
A: The US and EU have tried to appease Serbia by talking up the Association of Serb-majority municipalities. That appeasement has failed to produce moderation. Instead it has whetted Belgrade’s appetite. Brussels and Washington need a course correction.
Q: With all these developments, are you optimistic that spring will come with an Agreement or all of this will lead elsewhere?
A: I always hope to be wrong, but I see no prospect of an Agreement by spring. Serbia is playing the Milosevic/Putin game of threatening a neighbor. We know where that led in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Georgia, and Ukraine. How many lessons before we learn? Aggression needs a firm and effective response.
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