Month: December 2022
Trouble in Kosovo comes from Serbia
I did this interview for Spat Blakcori of Pristina’s TV1 yesterday:
Q: It has been more than 2 weeks since there are barricades in the North of Mitrovica. KFOR has yet to make a move and remove the barricades. Do you think they should act immediately?
A: They should not have allowed the barricades, but now that they are there they need to proceed with caution.
Q: What do you think about the criminal groups in the North of Mitrovica. Should Vucic be responsible for their actions?
A: Yes, they are agents of the Serbian secret service for which he is responsible. None of this would be happening without Vucic’s approval. Brnabic’s tweets are confirmation of that.
Q: Do you think that the approach of the West is too soft towards the Serbian president?
A: Yes. I don’t understand why the West has failed to react appropriately to Vucic’s provocations, which are blatant and obvious. I fear there are those in both Washington and Brussels who sympathize with Belgrade’s effort to establish separate governance for Serbs in northern Kosovo.
I also did this one for Luli Gajtani of RTV Dukagjini:
Q: How do you see the situation created in the north of Kosovo, what do you think would be a long-term solution that would no longer produce tensions?
A: The long term solution will be mutual recognition and decentralized governance in Kosovo, which already exists.
Q: Should the forces of KFOR or the Police of Kosovo forcefully remove the barricades located in the northern municipalities of Kosovo, or do you see another solution?
A: They should not have allowed construction of the barricades, but now they need to be cautious in removing them. Negotiation from a position of strength would be my preference.
Q: Serbia has admitted that the barricades were placed with their permission, how do you think the international community should act?
A: There should be consequences. Brussels and Washington are better equipped than I am to figure out what those should be.
Q: Do you think that Miroslav Lajcak and Josep Borrell should intensify the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue? Do you think that the dialogue would speed up the solution of the problems in the north of Kosovo?
A: I doubt they can speed up the dialogue without levying consequences for Belgrade, which has intentionally destabilized northern Kosovo in order to block progress in the dialogue.
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Don’t let aggression by destabilization pay
Northern Kosovo is in its third week of chaos. Serb houligans block the roads, attack journalists, and shoot at police and KFOR troops. The houligans are not random thugs. Belgrade pays and controls many of them. Whatever the initial justifications for this rogue behavior, the net effect is to undermine the dialogue with Pristina and prevent serious consideration of the still unpublished and therefore hazy French-German proposal for interim “normalization.”
What Belgrade wants
What Belgrade wants is Pristina’s commitment to its much-vaunted Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) inside Kosovo. But the disorder is proving beyond any doubt that yielding on that point under current conditions would be disastrous for the Kosovo state. The powers behind the barricades would then become the powers running an institution the Kosovo state had recognized and accepted. It would be beyond foolish to do that. Not least because those powers are criminal and tied to Serbia’s secret services.
The US and EU should be embarrassed
This should embarrass all those American and European diplomats who have pushed the ASM. Prime among them is Gabe Escobar, the State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Western Balkans, but State Department Counselor Derek Chollet and EU Foreign and Security Policy chief Josep Borrell share in the ignominy. They thought giving Belgrade the ASM would moderate its views. That was foolhardy. What they got instead were Vucic’s efforts at destabilization. They also got a series of truly offensive tweets from his Prime Minister, aimed at the Germans and other Europeans. These include a push to deploy Serbian troops to Kosovo and make it clear Belgrade is uninterested for now in pursuing its declared ambition of EU membership.
What is to be done now
Hotter heads in Kosovo want KFOR to tear down the barricades, in cooperation with the Kosovo police. Unless carefully prepared and executed, that could make a first-rate mess and bring opprobrium on all involved. Far better, is to build up the forces in the north and negotiate an end to the disorder from a position of strength. Only if that negotiation fails should force be used, decisively and effectively. The ringleaders of the disorder should be arrested and either tried in Kosovo or expelled to Serbia, provided Belgrade promises convincingly to prosecute.
That is not enough
Europe and the US need to make it clear to Serbia that the promotion of disorder in Kosovo has consequences. I like Jasmin Mujanović‘s proposal:
Specifically, the 5 EU non-recognizers must see how they’re facilitating Serbia’s brinkmanship. Fully recognizing Kosovo’s sovereignty and allowing it to begin its EU/NATO membership processes is something the West can do today, req no input from Belgrade, Moocow, or Beijing.
This makes sense. Even if one or two of the non-recognizers were to proceed as Jasmin suggests it would make a big difference to Belgrade’s belligerency. This way or another, the West needs to show that destabilization is not in Serbia’s interests and should never be repeated.
Why should anyone care?
Even I find it hard to focus on Kosovo while Ukraine is suffering a Russian war of aggression. We should however care about Kosovo, because Vucic is pursuing in Kosovo Vladimir Putin’s 2014 strategy in Donbas. Putin was challenging Slobodan Milosevic’s 1993 strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any ambiguity about the Western reaction in Kosovo will feed similar moves elsewhere. Vucic has chosen to align himself with Russia in the tradition of Milosevic. Aggression by destabilization anywhere cannot be allowed to pay.
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Stevenson’s army, December 26
– WSJ has good summary of current factors in Ukraine war.-
– WSJ also reports on US military activities in Syria.
– Lawfare summarizes and comments on Jan 6 committee report.
– Jim Fallows, a former presidential speechwriter, analyzes Zelensky address.
– More Jan 6 interview transcripts here.
Learned something new: USG allows nonprofits to fund temporary government jobs. Politico reports; GAO assesses.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, December 24
– President Biden issued a signing statement on the new NDAA, indicating he would narrowly construe several provisions in accordance with his views on executive authority.
-NYT has a long ticktock on the operations of the January 6 committee.
– Hill notes DC national guard wasn’t purposely delayed on Jan. 6.
– Law profs praise passage of new law giving Congress greater role in executive agreements.
– For your viewing pleasure, Politico lists best political movies and television shows of 2022.
Happy Holidays! CS
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, December 22
– The president has sent Congress his twice-yearly report on troops abroad under the War Powers law. The letter says the US has combat-equipped forces in 15 named countries, plus 90,000 in NATO and others “postured outside Afghanistan.”
– CFR has good data on US & other support to Ukraine
– CRS reports on Ukraine aid from State/Foreign ops
– AP reports that Zelensky took train to Poland, accompanied by US ambassador, then flew in USAF plane to DC.
– NYT says analysts forecast stalemate in Ukraine.
– WaPo notes Biden/Zelensky differences.
– Politico reports GOP opposition to future aid.
– RollCall lists biggest earmarkers.
– Vox summarizes new Electoral Count Act in omnibus.
– Defense News says some Taiwan aid was changed from grants to loans.
– Intercept says Twitter whitelisted unacknowledged Centcom accounts.
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The north is not Kosovo’s only problem
Naile Ejupi of Bota Sot asked questions, I replied Monday:
Q: One-on-one attacks on police officials, EULEX, and journalists from Kosovo, now since Saturday, the border points of the north of Kosovo with Serbia have been blocked by groups of Serbs, how do you comment on this situation?
A: This is Vucic pursuing his ambition of the “Serbian world.” The criminals conducting these operations in northern Kosovo are under Belgrade’s control.
Q: Kosovo has postponed the elections in the north of the country, which is why the attacks in the north first started, but Serbia still continues to block that part, now they demand the release of the ex-policeman arrested as a suspect for the attack on the Kosovo policemen and on the officials of the CEC. What is the Serbian president, Aleksander Vučić, trying to achieve?
A: He already has de facto control over the north. He is trying to ensure impunity for his criminal gangs and continued Belgrade control in the north.
Q: The Serbian president, Aleksandër Vucic, has threatened to send the Serbian army to that part of Kosovo, why does Serbia continue to be pampered by internationals and do not respond to its actions?
A: You’ll have to ask the “international community,” but in my opinion they have unfortunately a good deal of confidence in Vucic’s good intentions. I have no reason to confirm that. Certainly there is nothing about the current behavior of criminals in the north that confirms good intentions.
Q: The Russian Embassy in Tirana has supported Serbia for these actions, are we at risk of another war?
A: Not another war, but some serious instability. Russia has only a few troops in Serbia and the Serbian Army won’t want to enter any Albanian-majority parts of Kosovo. But Serbian security forces exist throughout the Serb-majority municipalities, especially in the north. They can cause a lot of trouble.
Q: On the other hand, Serbia’s actions have been condemned by European countries, even the Netherlands has voted in the Parliament to restore Serbia’s visas, how do you see this Dutch action, would this be an appropriate punishment?
A: You will have to ask the Dutch this question.
Q: The EU’s special envoy for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue met with Prime Minister Kurti on Tuesday and requested the implementation of the Association of Serbian municipalities, as a solution to the situation. The Association of Serbian municipalities gives competence to the Serbs and contradicts 23 points of the Kosovo constitution, how should Kosovo act?
A: I think the Association is something that cannot be implemented until Serbia recognizes Kosovo. If done earlier than that, there is a serious risk to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Q: The Franco-German proposal, initially unacceptable to Serbia, now with improvements. It is not yet known exactly what it contains, but it is reported that it is one of the other reasons that the situation in the north is tense, how do you evaluate this proposal?
A: I find it hard to evaluate something I haven’t seen. An earlier published version wasn’t so bad from Kosovo’s perspective. It did not include the Association or recognition.
A: Before the situation in the north happened, Prime Minister Kurti declared for a comprehensive agreement with Serbia in March 2023, can there be a solution to this dialogue and what would be the best solution?
A: Yes, there can be a solution, but someone will have to tell Serbia to pay attention to its own problems and leave Kosovo to deal with its problems, including those of its Serb population.
Q: The leaders of Kosovo have submitted the document for membership in the EU on Wednesday, how do you see this action and how much support will Kosovo have on this path.
A: It is an important symbolic gesture that reflects the real ambitions of Kosovo’s citizens. Support for Kosovo will depend on two things: Pristina instituting the necessary reforms and convincing current EU member states, including the non-recognizers, that the EU will be better off with Kosovo than without it. Those are tall orders.
Q: How do you evaluate the governance of Prime Minister Kurti and President Osmani, what should they do more for Kosovo?
A: It is not for me to evaluate their governance. Kosovo’s citizens will do that at the next election. But the two things I just cited will be important factors in that evaluation: reforms and diplomacy within the EU.
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