Month: January 2023
Stevenson’s army, January 31
– WaPo says US likely to get new Philippine bases.
– NYT describes WH procedures for classified materials.
– In FT, Gideon Rachman says culture wars are now part of foreign policy
– FP notes Biden donors who have become ambassadors.
SAIS grad John Gans has a review of Chris Whipple’s book on the Biden administration in NYT Book review. I’m a little less enthusiastic because it’s mostly interview quotes with officials with little new information. Whipple did succeed in getting many attributed quotes compared to a Bob Woodward book. So, yes, read Whipple.
Avoid, however, the new Mike Pompeo memoir, an angry, nasty book, full of venom even for most of his Trump administration colleagues, but not the former president. He brags about firing CIA analysts who said good things about JCPOA; he calls State the “worst platoon,” meaning it needed substantial reforms; he calls FSO’s “overwhelmingly hard left;” he savages Nikki Haley and John Bolton; he says Jim Mattis “was not a sound fit” for the administration and criticizes his views on Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and China; he expresses gratitude that Hillary Clinton was willing to talk to him about the SecState job, but then blasts her for being “the center of the Russia Hoax.” Turn these pages only with protective gloves. Burn after reading.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Put the ball in Serbia’s court
State Department Counselor Chollet and Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar have published a strong appeal for Kosovo to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) it committed to in 2013. The piece is intended to pressure Prime Minister Kurti to drop his opposition to the ASM, which he has been willing to consider only in the context of Belgrade’s recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kosovo state.
Serbia has refused to do that. The Chollet-Escobar appeal is consequently one-sided. It offers nothing at all to Pristina in exchange for satisfying one of Belgrade’s primary negotiating objectives. It essentially says “America is your best friend, you owe us this because of all the support we’ve given you, your government in the past pomised it, we’ll make it come out all right.” This is diplomatic bullying. Similar moments in the past have led to disappointments for Kosovo.
The Americans are offering lemons. Is there a way for Kosovo to make lemonade?
What is Serbia after?
What President Vucic seeks is official blessing for its hegemonic control of the Serb population in Kosovo. That control already exists, especially in the four northern municipalities contiguous with Serbia. Belgrade has for two decades controled their governments, education and health systems, police and courts. Money flows directly from Belgrade into these institutions and their employees. Little happens in the northern Serb communities that Belgrade could not change if it wanted to do so. That includes the ample organized crime activities.
Serbia wants the international community to accept this ethnic control. Belgrade often tells Western diplomats that the objective is a better deal for the Serb community in Kosovo. It is pursuing similar objectives in Bosnia and Montenegro as well. But inside Serbia this extension of Belgrade’s control to ethnic Serbs beyond Serbia’s borders is called “the Serbian world.” Comparable to the Russian world President Putin is pursuing inside Ukraine, this is an irredentist effort to deny the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries that have significant Serb populations. Vucic is tying to construct de facto if not de jure the Greater Serbia that Milosevic failed to create in the 1990s.
What is Kosovo after?
Prime Minister Kurti wants a sovereign country with equal rights for all its citizens and no ethnic privileges on its entire territory. That would leave authority unequivocally in the hands of Albanians, as they constitute more than 90% of the population. Kosovo however starts constitutionally far from that objective, as there are reserved seats for minorities in parliament as well as requirements for minority participation in its government. There is also a Council of Communities that gives minorities direct access to the President. Some of the Serb-majority municipalities were created explicitly to give Serbs more local control. All have the extensive powers provided for in Kosovo legislation. None of that is going to change.
Albanians are no less attached to their ethnicity than Serbs. They are concerned about the welfare of Albanian communities in southern Serbia, which have been under significant pressure from the Serbian security forces for decades. Nor are those communities offered anything like the privileges Serbs have already and are seeking inside Kosovo. Reciprocity is rule one of diplomacy. Belgrade should not ask for anything it isn’t willing to give.
Squaring the circle
The question is whether there is any way to satisfy, at least partially, both Vucic and Kurti. The Americans view the ASM as a coordination mechanism. They are promising that it will have to be consistent with the Kosovo constitution, include non-Serbs living in Serb-majority municipalities, make financial transfers from Belgrade more transparent, and better integrate the Serb population into Kosovo. Those are worthy objectives. Can they be achieved?
I suspect so, but they will require something different from the Serb-dominated ASM assembly and executive that Belgrade envisages. That structure would lend itself to infringements on Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which the Americans say they don’t want. Instead, the “Association” should be a bilateral enterprise, one that includes active participation by both Belgrade and Pristina as well as American and European guarantors. If Belgrade wants to pay for education or economic development in Serb-majority municipalities, the transfers should require the approval of Pristina as well as input from the communities involved, not just Serbia’s unilateral decisions.
Coordination among the Serb-majority municipalities should also take into account the needs of their neighbors in Kosovo’s Albanian-majority municipalities. So one requirement might be active Serb participation in the already existing Kosovo municipalities association.
Pristina should consider its options
Chollet and Escobar invite the Kosovo government to put forward its own proposal for the ASM. Prime Minister Kurti should accept that challenge, designing an international structure that meets Kosovo’s constitutional and other requirements while rendering Serbia’s role in the Serb majority communities more transparent and accountable. Kosovo should ask that a comparable structure be created inside Serbia for th Albanian-majority communities.
Nothing designed in Pristina is likely to please Belgrade, but it would at least satisfy the Americans that in the context of recognition Kurti is prepared to move forward on the ASM. That would put the ball in Serbia’s court, which is where it belongs.
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It’s all over but the fighting
Winter has mostly frozen the front lines this winter in Ukraine. But preparations for the spring are well under way.
Dozens of recent-model NATO tanks are heading for Ukraine. Its air defenses are already taking down most Russian missiles and drones. More and better are on their way. Ukraine still needs longer-range artillery and missiles, but the US is resisting sending those that could target Crimea or Russia proper. Ukrainian war aims are clear: to regain control of its entire sovereign territory.
In Russia, a second mobilization (read “draft”) is under way. This will increase Moscow’s manpower by perhaps 200,000 untrained personnel. Iran has been sending drones to Russia, but China is sending little. It is unlear whether the weekend attack on Iranian drone-production facilities will have a signifiant mipact. Signs of Putin’s desperation are apparent: changing commanders, recruiting prisoners for cannon fodder, attacks on civilian infrastructure rather than military targets, crackdowns on dissent and economic protest at home. Russia intends to outlast Ukraine and hold on to Crimea and as much of Donbas as possible.
On the merits
The military, legal, and moral merits of the case favor Ukraine. Its military has proven far more capable, far better led, and far better motivated than anticipated a year ago. Russia attacked Ukraine on the basis of demonstrably false claims that its Russian-identifying population was at risk. President Putin’s “special operation” is patently a war of aggression, whichis a war crime. Ukraine’s efforts to regain control over its entire sovereign territory are a legitimate exercise of force, so long as they are conducted in accordance with the well-established laws of war.
Russia’s forces have proven a shadow of their reputation. They are poorly equipped, supplied, motivated, and trained. Their manpower is low quality, including a substantial number of convicts released from prison in order to fight. Their leadership is divided and competitive. Russia has conducted its war of aggression without regard for civilian casualties. It denies Ukrainian identity and has plundered Ukrainian cultural artifacts, kidnapped Ukrainian children for adoption in Russia, and ethnically cleansed territory it seizes.
On the battlefield
This war’s outcome will not however be settled on the merits, but rather on the battlefield. Neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians have concluded it would be better to negotiate. The Ukrainians are now racing to master and absorb all the new kit they are receiving from NATO members. The Russians are racing to incorporate their new recruits.
Ukraine will likely allow Russia the first offensive move this spring, as fewer forces are needed to defend. Only after destroying part of the attacking Russian forces will Ukraine launch its own offensive. If I had to guess the spearhead would aim somewhere along the Sea of Azov coast between Mariupol and Crimea. Dividing the Russian forces along the coast would enable Ukraine to target either Donetsk or Crimea. Russia might even have to decide between defending one or the other.
The home front
Russia is simmering with discontent. While the Kremlin maintains its dominance of the information space, Russian citizens know the war is not going well. Military bloggers are focusing on ineptitude. Even television is rife with complaints about military performance. The economy is sputtering. Increasingly, non-Russian citizens are doubting why they should be involved in invading Ukraine. Many would prefer to seek more autonomy from Moscow for themselves.
Ukraine is in better shape on the home front. The economy is in smithereens, but morale is high. Ukrainians support President Zelensky’s anti-corruption campaign. They want to regain control over Ukraine’s entire sovereign territory, including Crimea. There is little appetite for compromise. Ukrainians know all too well that would leave them exposed to future aggression.
Our home front
Perhaps even more important is the home front in the US and in Europe. American and European support is vital to Ukraine’s prospects in this war. In Washington, some philo-Russian Republicans would like to cut or end American support for Ukraine. Their only real opportunity will be in the budgetary battles to come this year. The outcome is unpredictable, but the Demcrats remain united and the Republicans divided. That bodes well for aid Ukraine. In Europe, solidarity with Ukraine has remained strong, despite serious differences among the allies on whether and when to negotiate. Putin has long hoped the US and Europe would crack. They haven’t yet.
It won’t be over until it’s over
States fight wars because their outcome is uncertain. On the merits at home and abroad, this one should be a win for the Ukrainians. But we’ll have to wait until at least mid-summer to know whether the merits will prevail. It’s all over but the fighting.
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Stevenson’s army, January 29
– WaPo has a ticktock on the M-1 decision, giving credit to SecState Blinken.
– WSJ warns of European concerns that time may favor Russia.
– Brookings’ Michael O’Hanlon, drawing on his new book, warns that most leaders underestimate war duration and deaths.
– CRS has some good new reference materials — on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the State/Foreign Ops appropriations for FY 2023, and where to look in the Constitution to satisfy the new House rule requiring a Constitutional basis for each bill.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stephenson’s army, January 27
– Politico notes Biden’s “supercharged Africa policy”
– Historian reminds us of Russia’s 18th century military adventures
– In NY Review, Fred Kaplan reviews new book on Putin
– Ben Wittes says the Jan 6 committee report has very valuable footnotes
-FP analyzes France’s withdrawal from Burkino Faso
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 26
– Several insider stories about the tanks for Ukraine deal reveal bureaucratic politics at work. DOD did not want to send M1s for many reasons. Biden overruled the Pentagon to meet German demands. But DOD will contract to build the tanks, not send them from current stocks. Politico has the diplomatic angle. Fred Kaplan explains DOD. NYT has the Biden perspective, and NYT also details the broader Ukraine arms issue.
Ross Douthat has a powerful insight, that Washington and Moscow are both escalating to reach a peace settlement that is likely just to ensure stalemate.
BU study sees China changing its overseas development approach.
DOD”s Defense Innovation Unit brags in its annual report.
USNews explains America’s broken classification system.
CFR has a bunch of historical resources.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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