Nukes could make things worse

Today the journal Survival: Global Politics and Strategy published a paper on “Assessing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.” I prepared it with two talented MEI research assistants, Aya Khan and Zuha Noor.

I have been concerned with nuclear issues since even before my professional career. My first participation in public protests was against fallout from nuclear weapons tests in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I wrote my doctoral thesis at Princeton on the history of radiation protection. When I joined the State Department in 1977, it was as a science and technology specialist. I spent seven years abroad as a Science Attache’ and Counselor in the US embassies in Rome and Brasilia. My main concern was Italian and Brazilian transfers to Iraq, as well as the possible military goals of the Brazilian nuclear program. I’ve visited many nuclear labs, reprocessing facilities, and power plants.

Nonproliferation in the Middle East

One of the interesting questions about the Middle East is why there has been little proliferation there in recent decades, despite the presence in the region of Israel’s nuclear weapons. Part of the answer is that Israel destroyed facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) that might have allowed those countries to develop nuclear weapons. Libya, under American pressure, abandoned its nuclear program (2003). But why haven’t the heavier weights in the region, namely Turkey and Saudi Arabia, gone the nuclear route along with Iran?

This is an especially pertinent question right now, as Tehran approaches the nuclear threshold, at which it will have enough highly enriched uranium to build one or more nuclear weapons. The answer is at least in part that until recently Turkiye and Saudi Arabia have been largely content to rely on US security guarantees. Turkiye is a NATO member and has US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Saudi Arabia has until recently regarded the US as a reliable security partner. Ankara and Riyadh complain loudly about Israeli nuclear weapons, but so far as we know they have not tried to reply with nuclear weapons programs of their own.

Things are changing

But the strategic environment is changing for both of those countries. Turkiye and the US are trapped in frictions over Ankara’s purchase of Russian air defenses, the American reaction to (and alleged role in) the 2016 attempted coup, and Turkiye’s hostility to the Kurds who are allied with the Americans in Syria. Saudi Arabia resents the American failure to react strongly to the 2019 Iranian attack on its oil production facilities. Nor did it like President Biden’s criticism of Saudi human rights abuses and American efforts to lower oil prices. Security guarantees that once seemed ironclad are now doubtful.

At the same time, Russia and China are making inroads in the Middle East. Moscow has collaborated with Saudi Arabia in maintaining oil prices the Americans think too high. China is importing a lot of Saudi oil and offering to build nuclear power reactors in the Kingdom. Beijing has also mediated an agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Rosatom is building nuclear reactors in Turkiye. Russia and China both have good reasons to fear nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. But is not clear that they will be as exigent on that score as the Americans.

Rosatom is also building power reactors in Egypt.

Leadership matters

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdogan have both said that if Iran gets nuclear weapons their countries will follow suit. It is not clear whether deeds have followed those words. Saudi Arabia’s technological capabilities in that direction may be limited. It only recently started up its first research reactor and is thought to be seeking US nuclear power reactors, which come with strong nonproliferation constraints. But we really don’t know. The Kingdom is opaque in that direction. The Turks are likely farther advanced, as they have had research reactors for many years. But there is no public evidence of enrichment or reprocessing research in Turkiye.

Egypt’s President Sisi has said his country doesn’t need to have nuclear weapons to achieve great power status. But what will he do if Turkiye or Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons? And what will his successor do in that case?

Prevention is better than cure

My colleagues and I argue in our piece that prevention is better than cure. We need to be monitoring the nuclear capabilities of possible nuclear proliferators assiduously as well as building a regional security architecture that discourages nuclear weapons. We will also need to collaborate with Europe, Russia, and China in ensuring that other Middle Eastern states don’t follow Israel and Iran down the nuclear path. The Middle East is already a mess. Nuclear weapons would make things worse.