Month: April 2023
Trump isn’t the only accused president
While the United States is understandably obsessed with judicial proceedings against Donald Trump, another president and his one-time comrades in arms is on trial in The Hague: Kosovo President Hashim Thaci. There is one common thread: Jack Smith was the prosecutor in The Hague before taking up his position in Washington to conduct investigations and possibly prosecute Trump. An expansive view of his mandate seems to be his trademark.
As the trial at the Specialist Chambers in The Hague started on Monday, Deutsche Welle‘s Elona Elezi asked some questions and I responded:
Q: Mr.Serwer, how do you consider the trial against Thaçi and other three former commanders of KLA?
A: The Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office “have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under Kosovo law in relation to allegations reported in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report of 7 January 2011.” I am not a lawyer, but in my layman’s way of thinking the trial has departed markedly from this mandate. It seems to have forgotten the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly report.
Q: Does it diminish the role of Kosovo Liberation Army?
A: I’d say it exaggerates the role of the KLA in the abuses committed in Kosovo. The main allegations in the Council of Europe report appear to be unfounded and have been left out of the charges against the accused. The prosecutor is pursuing other, less specific, allegations against the KLA leadership quite unrelated to the CoE report.
Q: Will there be any implications if the court finds them guilty?
A: Certainly there will implications for the accused. They will be punished. But it will be a long time before there is a verdict. Their pre-trial detention seems to me unjust.
Q: In a macro perspective, does this trial affect the relationships between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The trial is already exacerbating resentments in Kosovo, soothing consciences in Serbia, and making it harder for Pristina to normalize relations with Belgrade. That will get worse.
It was a mistake for Kosovo to agree to establish this court without a reciprocal arrangement with Serbia, that is a court with jurisdiction over “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes” inside Serbia, where three American brothers were killed shortly after the 1999 war. Serbia was the main miscreant in the 1990s. The one-sided nature of the Specialist Chambers and Prosecutor’s Office prevents it from doing justice to the crimes Belgrade committed.
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Stevenson’s army, April 4
– $2.6 billion more for Ukraine.
– Axios reports a new approach to Iran nukes.
– WaPo on Biden’s approach to foreign policy is consistent with my own observations.
-FA article tells of newly declassified materials on Cuban missile crisis
-Defense One has quotes from Gen Milley here and also here.
Brookings’ Sarah Binder has these suggestions for following Congress:
Sarah Binder: Want to be a Congress nerd? I start my day with Jamie Dupree’s Regular Order – an indispensable daily summary of what’s happening on Capitol Hill. Dupree has covered the Hill since 1986 and brings deep historical and institutional knowledge (and some occasional snark) to bear in explaining legislative politics. Saturday morning on the way to the farmers’ market (where fellow TMC’er Danny Hayes can be found with his cute kids in tow), I listen to David Lerman’s CQ Budget podcast. Really! It’s great! I also recommend the Congress: Two Beers In podcast, a healthy mix of legislative politics and political science. A recent episode with Dave Hopkins on changes in the Democratic and Republican parties is especially worth a listen. Finally, I love The Wire, especially for its lessons on parliamentary procedure.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Nukes could make things worse
Today the journal Survival: Global Politics and Strategy published a paper on “Assessing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.” I prepared it with two talented MEI research assistants, Aya Khan and Zuha Noor.
I have been concerned with nuclear issues since even before my professional career. My first participation in public protests was against fallout from nuclear weapons tests in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I wrote my doctoral thesis at Princeton on the history of radiation protection. When I joined the State Department in 1977, it was as a science and technology specialist. I spent seven years abroad as a Science Attache’ and Counselor in the US embassies in Rome and Brasilia. My main concern was Italian and Brazilian transfers to Iraq, as well as the possible military goals of the Brazilian nuclear program. I’ve visited many nuclear labs, reprocessing facilities, and power plants.
Nonproliferation in the Middle East
One of the interesting questions about the Middle East is why there has been little proliferation there in recent decades, despite the presence in the region of Israel’s nuclear weapons. Part of the answer is that Israel destroyed facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) that might have allowed those countries to develop nuclear weapons. Libya, under American pressure, abandoned its nuclear program (2003). But why haven’t the heavier weights in the region, namely Turkey and Saudi Arabia, gone the nuclear route along with Iran?
This is an especially pertinent question right now, as Tehran approaches the nuclear threshold, at which it will have enough highly enriched uranium to build one or more nuclear weapons. The answer is at least in part that until recently Turkiye and Saudi Arabia have been largely content to rely on US security guarantees. Turkiye is a NATO member and has US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Saudi Arabia has until recently regarded the US as a reliable security partner. Ankara and Riyadh complain loudly about Israeli nuclear weapons, but so far as we know they have not tried to reply with nuclear weapons programs of their own.
Things are changing
But the strategic environment is changing for both of those countries. Turkiye and the US are trapped in frictions over Ankara’s purchase of Russian air defenses, the American reaction to (and alleged role in) the 2016 attempted coup, and Turkiye’s hostility to the Kurds who are allied with the Americans in Syria. Saudi Arabia resents the American failure to react strongly to the 2019 Iranian attack on its oil production facilities. Nor did it like President Biden’s criticism of Saudi human rights abuses and American efforts to lower oil prices. Security guarantees that once seemed ironclad are now doubtful.
At the same time, Russia and China are making inroads in the Middle East. Moscow has collaborated with Saudi Arabia in maintaining oil prices the Americans think too high. China is importing a lot of Saudi oil and offering to build nuclear power reactors in the Kingdom. Beijing has also mediated an agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Rosatom is building nuclear reactors in Turkiye. Russia and China both have good reasons to fear nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. But is not clear that they will be as exigent on that score as the Americans.
Rosatom is also building power reactors in Egypt.
Leadership matters
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdogan have both said that if Iran gets nuclear weapons their countries will follow suit. It is not clear whether deeds have followed those words. Saudi Arabia’s technological capabilities in that direction may be limited. It only recently started up its first research reactor and is thought to be seeking US nuclear power reactors, which come with strong nonproliferation constraints. But we really don’t know. The Kingdom is opaque in that direction. The Turks are likely farther advanced, as they have had research reactors for many years. But there is no public evidence of enrichment or reprocessing research in Turkiye.
Egypt’s President Sisi has said his country doesn’t need to have nuclear weapons to achieve great power status. But what will he do if Turkiye or Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons? And what will his successor do in that case?
Prevention is better than cure
My colleagues and I argue in our piece that prevention is better than cure. We need to be monitoring the nuclear capabilities of possible nuclear proliferators assiduously as well as building a regional security architecture that discourages nuclear weapons. We will also need to collaborate with Europe, Russia, and China in ensuring that other Middle Eastern states don’t follow Israel and Iran down the nuclear path. The Middle East is already a mess. Nuclear weapons would make things worse.
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Montenegro begins a test that won’t be easy
Last time I talked with Montenegrin President Djukanovic, maybe 7 or 8 years ago, I told him he lacked only one thing: a pro-European opposition that could alternate with his own coalition in power. Yesterday’s election will determine whether Montenegro has in the interim acquired it. A recently elected candidate for mayor of Podgorica, Jakov Milatovic, won with 60% of the vote, defeating Djukanovic after he had dominated politics in Montenegro for more than a generation.
There are serious doubts
Milatovic leads a party with the right name, “Europe Now!,” and the right professional career. He has been Economy Minister, after a stint in various private banks as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He holds an Oxford MPhil in economics and has spent time in the US and Austria as well.
But there is good reason for doubt. Milatovic’s supporters include the pro-Russian and pro-Serbian segment of Montenegrin politics. Many opposed independence and NATO membership. Some celebrated with Serbian flags, not Montenegrin ones. Those are Serb ethnic nationalists and resent Montenegro’s minorities, who have long supported Djukanovic. Even if Milatovic is seriously pro-Europe, it is not clear whether that will be the direction he can lead the country in.
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 11. The outcome will likely determine whether Europe Now can deliver. Dritan Abazovic, the current caretaker prime minister, is hoping to lead a centrist coalition thereafter. But Abazovic himself has been beholden to the pro-Serbian political parties in the past. He signed an agreement that privileged the Serbian Orthodox Church and has cozied up to Belgrade, while offering himself to Washington and Brussels as a sincere, Western-oriented reformist.
Keep the pressure on
Montenegro was until recently the Balkans front-runner for EU accession. Now Western pressure and incentives will be vital to ensuring a pro-European outcome. The Serb nationalist minority in Montenegrin politics is large and well-funded. The Russians will try to use it to destabilize NATO and poison the relationship with the EU. The all too necessary corruption investigations will cast doubt on many in the former governing coalition and damage its prospects.
Alternation in power is the ultimate test of any democracy. Montenegro has so far passed, ironically due to Djukanovic. He managed the transitional governments of the past two years skillfully. Now that Djukanovic will be out of the picture, Milatovic should aim to do as well, while keeping the country moving in the European direction. It won’t be easy.
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Stevenson’s army, April 2
– Is Bulgaria next to tilt toward Russia?
– What does Hungary want from Sweden?
– How much is enough for defense? Prof. Cancian analyzes.
– Why do the Saudis want nuclear power?
-Why does China want a port in Croatia?
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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An agreement without agreement
I did this interview last Tuesday for Arbnore Zhushi of Kosovo daily Bota Sot:
Q: Mr. Serwer, on March 18, Kosovo and Serbia agreed at the Ohrid meeting on the implementation plan of what is known as the Agreement towards the normalization of relations between them. How do you see this Agreement?
A: The March 18 agreement is devoid of substance and focuses on procedure, without however setting deadlines. It is a weak agreement, if it is any agreement at all.
Vucic has been clear on one point
Q: How did you see the opposition of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic to sign the Ohrid “agreement” on paper, do you think that this will be a stable and applicable agreement for both parties?
A: No. Vucic has made it clear he will not implement parts of the February agreement, which is the main one.
Kurti hasn’t been clear yet on the Association
Q: The parties agreed on one of the most important points – the immediate launch of the creation of a self-management mechanism for the Serbian community in Kosovo. How will this mechanism be implemented, since Serbia wants an Association with executive powers, while for Kosovo this constitutes a constitutional violation?
A: The agreement provides for immediate launch of negotiations on the self-management mechanism. I see no possibility of an “association” with executive powers. Kosovo municipalities already have a good deal of self-management authority. I’d be interested to know what more Serbia is asking for, provided it complies with the Kosovo constitution, and whether Belgrade is prepared to offer reciprocal arrangements to Albanian communities in southern Serbia.
Q: How do you evaluate the whole role of Prime Minister Albin Kurti, in this agreement, what should Kurti have (not) done that he has not done, in your opinion?
A: I’m not going to play professor to the prime minister, but I think the time is coming when a proposal on “self-management” is in order. Kurti says it won’t be territorial or monoethnic. I am interested in learning what he has in mind.
The EU will go easy on Serbia
Q: How do you think it will affect the integration processes and visa liberalization for Kosovo, if the latter does not implement the point related to the self-management of the Serbian community in Kosovo?
A: That is up to the EU, which hasn’t been generous with Kosovo.
Q: Although European diplomats confirmed that the parties are obliged to fully implement every article of the Agreement, Vucic warned that he will not implement the part of the agreement related to Kosovo’s membership in the UN. Do you believe that there will be sanctions against Serbia for the “red lines,” or will the “caress” from the EU continue?
A: No. Appeasement will continue. There seems to be no limit.
The Church needs a settlement
Q: How do you see the request for officializing the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo from Article 7 of the European plan? Do you think this represents a danger for Kosovo?
A: No. I think the Church’s status is an important issue that needs to be resolved, including the property of the monastery at Decan/Decani.
De facto recognition is better than nothing
Q: Although it does not include mutual recognition, the Franco-German plan was described as very beneficial for both sides, especially for Kosovo. In your opinion, is this plan expected to lead to mutual recognition and when?
A: My view is that Serbia has already de facto recognized Kosovo, but not de jure. I can’t predict when it will cross that barrier. Likely only after Vucic is gone.
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