Month: July 2023
The West needs to rebalance Balkans policy towards tough love
The US Congress has now conducted hearings on the Balkans in both the Senate and House. Members from both sides of the aisle evinced discomfort with Biden Administration policy. It has leaned heavily towards appeasement of Belgrade and has failed to react strongly to secessionist moves in Bosnia. What is the alternative?
The US is oblivious to the obvious
Administration officials are fond of reiterating the laudable 1990s strategic objective: Europe “whole and free.” They are oblivious to the obvious. It is not happening anytime soon. President Putin has forced the drawing of a new line in Europe. The Russian-dominated parts Europe will remain for now on the Eastern side of the line. This includes Russia and Belarus as well as parts of Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria). The remaining questions are about Ukraine and the Balkans. Will the line go through them, or will they join the West?
In Ukraine, conventional warfare will answer the question. In the Balkans, it is already decided. For the foreseeable future, there is no serious prospect that Serbia or Republika Srpska (the Serb-dominated part of Bosnia and Herzegovina) will join the West.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
For the RS, that is obvious. Its president, Milorad Dodik, is a wholly-owned Russian proxy. He is doing his best to end any accountability to the Sarajevo “state” government. The RS parliament has already passed legislation denying the validity of Constitution Court decisions. It is only a matter of time before it passes legislation claiming state property, which the RS needs as collateral for its international loans. The international community’s High Representative will presumably annul all secessionist legislation from now on, but how he will enforce his decisions is not clear.
Dodik may not proceed all the way to declaring independence, as even Serbia would be reluctant to recognize the RS. But whether he does or not, RS will remain attached to the East so long as he is in power. The only hope for getting rid of him is to bankrupt the entity and bail it out with Western financing, conditional on his resignation and an end to secessionist ambitions. It is not yet clear whether Washington and Brussels have the stomach for that.
Serbia
Serbia is different. President Vucic is hedging between East and West. He plays Washington and Brussels off against Moscow and Beijing, hoping to get all he can from all four. Belgrade has a policy of military neutrality, for example, and conducts exercises with both NATO and Russia. Serbia buys weapons from both East and West. It ships weaponry to both Russia and Ukraine. Belgrade has refused to align with EU sanctions against Russia, but it votes against Russia on some General Assembly resolutions denouncing Russian aggression.
This Yugoslav-style “non-aligned” foreign policy is linked with ethnic nationalist domestic politics and ambitions for regional hegemony. Judging from ongoing anti-Vucic demonstrations, there are a lot of Serbs who aren’t happy with the current regime, which they view as violent, corrupt, and repressive. But the only viable electoral opposition to Vucic stems from his Serbian nationalist right. He has all but obliterated the liberal democratic opposition, which was weak to begin with. He controls most of the popular media and judicial system in addition to the executive. The Serbian security services and their allies in the Serbian Orthodox Church are wedded to Moscow.
In the region, Vucic aims to create the “Serbian world,” analogous to Putin’s “Russian world,” an idea that supported the invasion of Ukraine. In its weakest form, the goal is Belgrade political control over the Serb populations in neighboring states. Belgrade has already achieved that in Montenegro and Kosovo. In Bosnia, only Dodik, whose interests are not congruent, stands in the way. In its stronger form, the Serbian world entails annexation of territory Serbs occupy in neighboring countries and creation of Greater Serbia.
Rebalance the policy
Belgrade has not moved one inch closer to the West in the six years of Vucic’s presidency, despite consuming a truckload of diplomatic carrots. Strengthening of his links to Beijing has more than compensated for any weakening of his links to Moscow. The RS has spent 17 years moving towards secession. It is not going to reverse course without vigorous pushback. This situation requires a more realistic Western policy in the Balkans.
We need to lower expectations and raise incentives. Dodik’s RS and Vucic’s Serbia are not going to voluntarily embrace the West. The US, UK, and EU will need to starve the RS of all Western funds in order to end Dodik’s secessionist ambitions. They will also need to end Serbia’s immunity from Washington and Brussels criticism. Washington recently sanctioned Aleksandar Vulin, Director of Belgrade’s Security Intelligence Agency, for corruption, drug and arms trafficking, and supporting Russia’s malign influence. That was a step in the right direction. The EU should do likewise. A public demand for Vulin’s removal as well as for the arrest and extradition to Kosovo of the thugs who attacked NATO peacekeepers in May would be another.
Possible benefits
Rebalancing toward Serbia and the RS would have the great virtue of testing not only their intentions, but also Moscow’s and Beijing’s. Moscow under current conditions is not going to want to increase funding to the RS. China hopes to use Serbia as an entry point to Europe. Beijing might think twice about investing in a Serbia that is on the outs with the EU. We could well be happily surprised if China and Russia decide to cut their losses and leave Serbia and the RS on the Western side of the new division of Europe. If they don’t, we will at least have saddled them with significant burdens.
Rebalancing could also help to revive the moribund dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Washington and Brussels have focused their pressure on Pristina, which has no hedging option and has traditionally bandwagoned with the West. There is a long history of Pristina responding better to carrots than sticks. Even longer is the history of Belgrade responding better to sticks than carrots. If Vucic saw Washington and Brussels coming after him with a stick rather than carrots, he would be inclined to hedge more in their direction. Tough love would bring better results than appeasement.
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Stevenson’s army, July 24
– WSJ says China has greatly reduced its FDI in the US
– Politico says China has sent a lot of military hardware to Russia.
– NYT calls Ukraine war a violent stalemate
– Spanish elections end in deadlock, not the right wing takeover predicted
Today is the 75th anniversary of Truman’s executive order desegregating the US armed forces. Yes, good policy can be good politics.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, July 23
I haven’t seen the movie yet, but I plan to. Here’s good additional information from Fred Kaplan and New York magazine.
I’ve read many books on the Manhattan Project and want to suggest 3 novels and one nonfiction about life in Los Alamos. Joseph Kanon wrote one. Ellen Klages another.
TaraShea Nesbit’s is fun. And Jennet Conant’s nonfiction is revealing.
The bulletin of the atomic scientists has a collection from its archives.
On other matters, David Ignatius has a good piece on China and space.
WSJ questions whether Japan would support the US over Taiwan.
On Lawfare there’s a good piece on fixing the Bumpers amendment on military coups.
– And my favorite budget wonk Kevin Drum has the fix for Social Security.
I also came across this article explaining why pollsters and political ad writers clash so often.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, July 21
Several items caught my eye this week. More to come later.
– NYT had a big story — a welcome change from the usual campaign horse race stories — on Trump plans for a stronger, more assertive presidency.
– New Yorker had good interview with a law professor on how it might work.
– WSJ sees a visceral clash among Americans in the 2024 elections. Too much hate and fear.
– Anne Applebaum wonders whether Tennessee is still a democracy.
-New Yorker tells how the House Administration committee is the “traffic cop”
– House & Senate appropriators differ on foreign aid including Taiwan.
– National Security Archive has documents on the president’s nuclear “football”
– RollCall explains the administration’s new cybersecurity strategy. Here’s the document.
– SIGAT summarizes its reports on Afghanistan in reply to Senators.
– CRS has new report on covert actions and congressional notifications.
-AEI’s Kori Schake comments on NATO summit
And since ChatGBT seems capable of passing Harvard courses, I’m sticking with my oral exams.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A good hearing, if the Administration were listening
The House Foreign Affairs Committee raised the alarm in a hearing yesterday about the situation in the Balkans. Member after member cited concerns. They worried about escalating ethnic tensions and instability, Russian malfeasance, Chinese inroads, failure of Serbia and Kosovo to implement agreements, failure to implement court decisions and secessionist moves in Bosnia and Herzegovina, endemic corruption, and flagging economies. They might also have cited substantial migrant outflows from the region.
There was a single witness: Gabe Escobar, Deputy Assistant Secretary. Despite the availability of many credible people who hold contrasting views, the Congress has unfortunately chosen in this and the previous recent Senate hearing on the Balkans to hear only from the Administration. Congressman Issa (R-CA) was at pains to lament this.
Say it fast and confidently
Gabe quickly cited EU accession as the US objective, without noting the diminished credibility of that prospect and unlikelihood that would happen any time in the foreseeable future. He averred that the “breakthrough” normalization (Ohrid) agreement reached in February and the annex added in March are critical. But he failed to note that Serbia refused to sign both and quickly violated them.
He insisted on the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASMM) to coordinate culture, education, and public services as the keystone. But he failed to explain why the US has not insisted on the quid pro quo also agreed in 2013. That was the extension of the Kosovo constitution to the Serb majority municipalities of the north. Belgrade has repeatedly blocked that in many different ways.
Gabe noted the supposed agreement of Kosovo and Serbia to recognize each other’s documents and national symbols. But he neglected to note that this is a problem principally in Serbia. He repeated the canard that Serbia would no longer lobby against Kosovo’s international integration. Serbian President Vucic has pledged not to fulfill that provision. Belgrade failed to observe it at the Council of Europe days after signing the agreement.
In Bosnia, Gabe cited Milorad Dodik’s anti-Dayton activities. But he was at a loss to explain how the US would get Europe to join in the sanctions against him. He cited excessive reliance in the region on Russian energy. However, he failed to note that Serbia is the prime culprit in that respect.
The questioning was good
Chair Kean (R-NJ) wanted to know whether the US will bring strong pressure to bear on President Vucic if Kosovo Prime Minister proceeds with the ASMM. Gabe said a quick and confident “absolutely” and went on to claim that the agreement requires Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This it clearly does not do. He added that Serbia has agreed to remove the protesters and participate in new elections for mayors in northern Kosovo.
I suppose that might be true in diplomatic channels, but where is the evidence in public? Would you believe it just a few months after elections held because Belgrade agreed the Serbs would participate but that they then boycotted? Gabe went on to say that those demonstrators who attacked journalists Kosovo police and NATO should be punished. Where is the public US demand that Belgrade, which ordered the rioting, turn them over to the Kosovo justice system?
Ranking Member Keating (D-MA) focused on China. Gabe rightly emphasized Beijing’s political conditions but placed his hope entirely in the EU to institute (some day) contracting procedures that would counter Beijing and keep projects open to US competitors.
Sanctions
Representative Wagner (R-MO) underlined her bipartisan “Upholding the Dayton Peace Agreements Through Sanctions” Act. Gabe pledged to support it and to prevent financing from reaching those who are trying to dismantle Bosnia (in addition to support for EUFOR and the HiRep). That sounded serious. Maybe State has finally realized that staying silent on Dodik is not a winning strategy. The Congressman made it clear she wanted Hungary bent into allowing EU sanctions on Dodik.
Congressman Titus (D-NV) focused on Russian disinformation and the free press. Gabe skipped the opportunity to focus criticism on Serbia, which has seen a long decline in press freedom and a dramatic rise of Russian disinformation.
Congressman Huizenga (R-MI) asked about Serbia buying Chinese and Russian arms. Gabe claimed Serbia had curtailed its purchases from Russia “significantly” in response to the threat of sanctions but has increased procurement from China (which is not covered by the “CAATSA” sanctions in question). Huizenga also asked about the five EU nonrecognizers. Gabe took the opportunity to claim vaguely that action on the ASMM would be helpful.
Congressman Self (R-TX) focused on President Vucic’s incitement of the election boycott and import of heavy weapons from Russia. Why don’t we have sanctions on Serbia now? Gabe squirmed out by claiming that he didn’t control CAATSA sanctions and that other sanctions had been used in the Balkans, neglecting to mention they have not been used against Serbia. Self made it clear he regards Serbia as a Russian proxy in the Balkans.
Congressman Moran (R-TX) asked about Montenegro. Sadly, Gabe was unaware of the newly contracted coastal road there that the Chinese will build and mistakenly thought it was the already built north/south highway. He also took the opportunity to emphasize that Montenegro’s new government will make Podgorica a fast-achieving candidate for EU membership and that its new president as “pro-American.” I don’t yet see any guarantee of those two propositions.
A well-briefed committee, but the Administration isn’t listening
Well-briefed, the members of Congress asked good questions. The Administration responses were less convincing. They consistently avoided any serious criticism of Serbia and continued to hold Kosovo principally, if not exclusively, responsible for the current train wreck. There was no sign that Gabe was listening to the repeated indications that a tougher approach with Serbia is needed.
Two notable omissions. Gabe did not mention Open Balkans, a Belgrade initiative that appears to have died a merited death. But bad ideas never die in the Balkans. They return like zombies to haunt the region. Just wait a few years, or maybe months. It will be back, along with partition.
Unless I missed it, Gabe also failed to mention the recently sanctioned Serbian Director of the Security Intelligence Agency. No one asked what we are going to do about Aleksandar Vulin. That was an unfortunate omission.
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The Americans are satisfied with less rather than more
The United States sanctioned Serbia’s intelligence chief last week for arms and drug dealing as well as facilitating malign Russian influence in the Balkans. I’ve applauded that move.
Vulin is a symptom
But stopping there will be less than half a loaf. Aleksandar Vulin is symptomatic of far deeper maladies. There is no way he could have engaged in drug trafficking without at least the tacit nulla osta of President Vucic. Any arms dealing he has done would have required something more than that, including the cooperation of his intel people. It would be hard to miss his loud advocacy of Russian interests in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Vulin is also Serbia’s prime exponent of “the Serbian world,” the idea that Serb populations in neighboring countries should at least all respect Belgrade’s direction. He would prefer to see them all incorporated into the Serbian state. This is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia Slobodan Milosevic sought in the Balkan wars in the 1990s.
President Vucic is his top cover
Vulin has served in government with Vucic for the past 11 years. He started with the Kosovo portfolio in 2012 and moved on to Social Affairs, Defense, and Interior before becoming the intel director last year. Though they belong to different political parties that are coalition partners, Vulin and Serbian President Vucic are like peas in a pod: politically far more similar than different. Vulin made his way during the Milosevic regime affiliated with Mira Markovic, Milosevic’s wife. Vucic was tied more to Milosevic himself.
Now Vucic is Vulin’s protector. In reaction to the sanctions, Vucic has asserted the US is really concerned with the Russia connection, not with the arms and drug dealing. This is convenient for him, as it makes the issue not one of legality and morality but rather politics. In Serbia, both the government and public opinion regard wanting good relations with Moscow as a virtue, not a vice.
No action yet
There is no sign yet of what, if anything, Vucic is going to do about Vulin. He has announced an investigation, but it would be surprising if one were really needed. Vucic has tight control of his government and no doubt has known whatever business Vulin is involved in. Vucic has publicly backed Vulin’s advocacy of the “Serbian world,” though he is careful not to mention the idea often.
The American Ambassador has been mincing his words about the sanctions, emphasizing that they target Vulin, not on Serbia’s institutions:
That presumably means Washington intends to try to preserve its intelligence liaison relationship with Belgrade. The US may want to see Vulin fired, but it won’t be seeking any more far-reaching reform.
Now what?
That is too bad. “Serbian institutions” unquestionably have known what Vulin is up and have failed to act against him. They are still failing, though of course it is only days since the sanctions announcement. Washington should be pressing for Vucic to fire not only Vulin but all his cronies. The US should also be seeking a much wider reform that frees Serbian media from state dominance, ensures independence of the judiciary, makes space for a serious opposition, and detaches the country from its strong intelligence, political, and military connections to Moscow. How about starting with alignment to the EU Ukraine-related sanctions?
There are lots of other opportunities in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro for Serbia to signal serious changes in Serbian policy that would bring Belgrade closer to the West. But the Americans seem satisfied these days with less rather than more.
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