Cold comfort is better than none at all

“Above all,” he says (at 18:49), “Iran must face a credible nuclear threat.” This is Prime Minister Netanyahu implicitly acknowledging, whether intentionally or not, Israel’s own nuclear weapons and stating against whom they are targeted. At the same time, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is making it clear that he intends to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities:

Turkish President Erdogan has made a similar pledge.

This raises the disturbing question: are we at the brink of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? I had a look at this question last spring with two Middle East Institute interns. Our conclusion then was that the situation needs monitoring. I can say a bit more now.

Can a Saudi nuclear capability be blocked?

While it is rarely mentioned in public, an amped-up Saudi non-proliferation commitment is likely a key part of the Biden Administration’s current negotiations with Riyadh for a bilateral security agreement. That wouldn’t be a popular proposition on its own in the U.S. Congress. But if it comes with a Saudi commitment not to develop sensitive nuclear technology (especially enrichment, reprocessing, and weaponization), it might be more attractive on both sides of the aisle. American security relations with both Japan and South Korea, on which the press reports the Administration is modeling a possible agreement with the Kingdom, include de facto commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. West Germany’s entry into NATO included such a commitment as well.

But the US/Saudi negotiations aim primarily at formal normalization of Saudi relations with Israel, for which in exchange the Saudis want concessions to the Palestinians. The Crown Prince is sounding soft on that score. He wants improvement in the life of the Palestinians. Netanyahu is not going to find it easy to get his ultra-nationalist coalition partners to offer even that. Nor is it clear he wants to. A substantial non-proliferation commitment from Saudi Arabia could however sweeten the deal from Netanyahu’s perspective. He won’t want some future, less friendly, Crown Prince to wield nukes.

The Saudis have indicated they intend to upgrade their non-proliferation safeguards agreement with the IAEA. That is a good step in the right direction, but it falls short of the strictest arrangement known as an Additional Protocol. That is where the U.S. should want the Kingdom to arrive.

What about Turkey?

Erdogan already has American nuclear weapons in Turkey. Were he to push for Turkey’s own nukes, those might be withdrawn, as they really don’t serve much military purpose. But Ankara is taking risks these days in many directions, exercising its right to a far more independent foreign policy than in the past:

• Participation with Iran and Russia in managing the conflict in Syria.
• Purchase of Russian air defenses, even if now mothballed due to the American reaction.
• Mediation of the grain deal between Russia and Ukraine.
• Opposition to Finland’s and (still) to Sweden’s membership in NATO.
• Support for Azerbaijan’s military operation to take back Nagorno-Karabakh.

It would not be surprising if Erdogan concluded that nuclear weapons would be an appropriate bulwark for this more independent course.

Could Egypt be far behind?

Likely yes, as things stand today. President Sisi has stated that he wants Egypt to be like Germany: a great power without nuclear weapons. Neither Egypt’s economy nor its army are currently in a position to resist American and Israeli pressure against Egypt acquiring nuclear weapons. But if Riyadh and Ankara were to get them, Cairo would want to follow suit. When would then be the question.

Iran sets the pace, but might stop short

Israel’s nuclear weapons, which have existed for more than 50 years, did not ignite an arms race. Iran’s nuclear capabilities, which have been advancing rapidly, could well do so. Israel kept its nuclear program behind a (sometimes thin) veil of secrecy. Iran is unable to hide its progress, as even hindered IAEA inspections provide a good deal of transparency. If Tehran decides to build a nuclear weapons, the world is going to know it, sooner rather than later. Ignoring that development would be difficult for both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the Middle East, Iran is the nuclear pace setter.

But Tehran might stop short of full weaponization. Its own national security is the reason. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, the slightest doubt in Israel about whether a missile is being prepared for launch with a nuclear warhead could lead to Armageddon. It would be far wiser for Tehran to make it clear that it has stopped short of weaponization. Being a few weeks from becoming a nuclear power would give Iran most of the benefits of becoming one without all of the risks.

That is cold comfort. But cold comfort is better than none at all.