Month: February 2024
Serbia is the problem, Serbs the solution
Where did they get this nice photo in my living room?
I did this interview for Arlinda Rrmoku of Pristina outlet Sinjali yesterday:
Dialogue
1. What progress has been made towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in recent years?
A: Very little. Acceptance of documents and license plates. Payment of electricity bills. Good things that should have happened long ago.
2. What are the main obstacles hindering the normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The main obstacle is Serbia’s resistance. But Kosovo has also failed to do all it could to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, which is a vital part of normalization.
3. How do you assess the role of the European Union in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The EU has failed to use its leverage with Serbia. It has used leverage with Kosovo, but inappropriately and without results.
Politics are an obstacle
4. What impact could the recent political changes in Kosovo and Serbia have on the normalization process?
A: Not much. In Serbia, Vucic remains very much in charge. In Kosovo Kurti and Osmani remain in charge.
Washington has been too
5. How do you see the role of the United States in promoting stability and peace in the Western Balkans, particularly regarding Kosovo-Serbia relations?
A: Washington has done poorly in recent years. It was a serious mistake to prioritize the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which in my view can only come with recognition.
6. What steps should be taken to address the remaining issues in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, such as the status of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo?
A: Pristina should be taking unilateral action to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, as indicated above. This will require much greater effort to meet their needs, allow Serbia’s legitimate subsidies to flow, and protect their property, in particular at the monastery in Decan/Decani.
As is Russia
7. How do you view the involvement of other regional actors, such as Russia and Turkey, in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process?
A: They don’t really play directly, but Russia is supporting Vucic’s illiberalism at home and irredentism with his neighbors. Turkey I see as a relatively minor player, though it occasionally will weigh in.
8. What are the potential implications of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on the broader stability of the Western Balkans?
Security is at risk
A: The dialogue as conducted in recent years has not been a factor for stability. Its difficulties have echoed in the region.
9. How can economic cooperation and integration initiatives contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I believe it can: having populations and companies that prosper could lessen hostilities and open new possibilities. But Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo makes this difficult.
10. How do you assess the security situation in the Western Balkans, particularly in light of recent developments?
A: It’s shaky, due mainly to Serbian malfeasance.
11. What are the main security challenges facing the region and how can they be addressed?
A: Serbia and Russia are the main security challenges in the region.
12. How do you see the role of NATO and other international organizations in ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans?
A: NATO is the guarantor in Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as well as the backup guarantor to the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That makes it pretty important to the region. The EU has the primary role in Bosnia.
13. What impact could unresolved disputes and ethnic tensions have on the security situation in the region?
A: I don’t worry about a big war or a long one, but localized instability and ethnic cleansing is a serious threat in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
Borders need improvement
14. How do you assess the effectiveness of border management and security cooperation among Western Balkan countries?
A: More would be better. Trade delays at the borders are too long, migration and trafficking too easy, and the border between Serbia and Kosovo too porous.
15. What role can the European Union play in promoting security sector reform and institution-building in the Western Balkans?
A: You’ll have to ask the EU, but my understanding is that the EU does a great deal on border management.
16. How do you see the potential for increased cooperation between Western Balkan countries and neighboring EU member states in addressing common security challenges?
A: I’d like to see more, especially between Croatia and Bosnia as well as Bulgaria and Macedonia, but political issues make that sometimes problematic.
Reciprocal reassurance is key
17. What are your recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to promote peace, stability, and reconciliation in the Western Balkans, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Kosovo needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb population, Serbia needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Albanian population, and the two countries need to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. When they do those things, peace, stability and reconciliation will be far easier than today.
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Stevenson’s army, February 11
– Opposition wins in Pakistan.
– Senate resumes voting today on foreign aid package
– WSJ reports Hamas tunnels beneath UNRWA HQ
– Egypt threatens end of Camp David accords
– WaPo has background on Abraham Accords
– Venezuela builds troops on Guyana border
– Trump questions NATO treaty, encourages Putin
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 9
– Zelensky fired his top general. Eliot Cohen seems sympathetic to Zelensky
– Senate may miss Super Bowl for foreign aid fight
– Russia spreads disinformation in Africa
– Russia messages US civil war
– Biden stresses international law from aid recipients
– Army cancels helicopter program
– Europeans tell how to Trump-proof Europe
– Treasury sanctions some Ecuadorans
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Time to turn the policy around
There is no exaggeration in what Albin is saying. President Vucic financed, supported, and orchestrated the terrorist attack of September 24. The Kosovo police the EU wanted (and continues to want) withdrawn from northern Kosovo responded professionally, killed three of the perpetrators, and prevented worse from happening. Washington and Brussels know this but won’t say it. They prefer to allow Vucic to get off scot-free.
They are likewise allowing him to avoid responsibility for the unfair national and fraudulent Belgrade elections of December 27. The European Parliament has called for a commission to investigate. But so far the European Commission, the Council, and most of the Member States are keeping their mouths shut about an election that wouldn’t pass muster in any EU country. It didn’t come close to the relatively free and fair elections in recent years in Kosovo, including two that installed Kurti in office.
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil
Why this “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” approach to someone who is taking an EU candidate country into ever closer alignment with Russia and China? Many tell me the ammunition Serbia supplies to Ukraine is a factor. But Belgrade surely ships as much ordnance or other military supplies to Moscow as it does to Kyiv. It is unlikely Vucic would cut off Kyiv out of spite for Western criticism. Inat only goes so far when it is a question of profits for your arms manufacturer friends.
Support for “stability” is another possible explanation. But Vucic has no viable opposition, either on the liberal democratic side of Serbian politics or the ethnic nationalist side. Serbia’s problem is a lack of political competition, not an excess of it. He is the destabilizing force both in his country’s politics and in its relations with its neighbors.
The internationals are part of the problem
Lack of international political horsepower is another explanation. EU negotiator Miroslav Lajcak is exhausted and at the end of his rope. The dialogue he has led for more than three and a half years has played out. Belgrade has repeatedly and loudly renounced supposed “legally binding” agreements reached there. Yesterday he refused to sign them at the Security Council. Without real progress on de facto if not de jure recognition, Pristina refuses to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities that Lajcak and American negotiator Gabe Escobar unwisely made their top priority.
Many hope things will improve with Assistant Secretary of State O’Brien in charge. He has been appropriately blunt with the Bosnians. But it is not clear whether he is prepared to dial up the heat on Vucic about the Serbian elections, the dialogue with Pristina, Belgrade’s September 24 terrorist attack, or the kidnapping of three policemen on Kosovo territory. Jim recognizes the difficulty of any political settlement and tries to steer his efforts in the economic direction, hoping to flank the recognition issue.
So who cares?
None of this is a big problem, at least as seen from Washington or Brussels. But it isn’t a big problem until it is. Vucic is increasingly serious in his efforts to destabilize the neighboring countries with irredentist and self-victimizing claims on behalf of their Serb populations. The Russians will be pushing him in that direction, to echo and amplify their own claims in Ukraine. The atmosphere in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo is increasingly tense. It would not take much effort to provoke instability even in all three, then justify the movement of Serbian tanks to protect the local Serb population from false rumors of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Even without revanchist moves into his neighbors, Vucic can exploit the Serbian domestic scene to promote violence. His security forces have been arresting and beating dissenters who dare to apologize for Serb atrocities in the 1990s. They have even lain flowers on the grave of a young girl killed by Serb security forces in Kosovo. The repression intimidates the Serbian opposition and ensures it will not retreat from hard-line Serbian nationalism on Kosovo. It is admittedly inclined not to do so anyway, but Vucic wants to make sure no one gets any fancy ideas about acknowledging the malfeasance of the Milosevic era. As Information Minister then, he was a mainstay of that regime.
What is to be done?
The right approach to this situation is to recognize failure and turn the policy around. I thought when he first came to power Vucic might be the guy to take Serbia in a democratic direction. He has chosen not to be. He instead decided not to befriend the West but rather to ally with the East. He dishes out just enough goodies to Washington and Brussels to keep them from calling his bluff. It doesn’t take much.
It is time to call him out, loudly and clearly. The US should insist on the transfer of the September 24 perpetrators to Kosovo for trial. As the European Parliament has proposed, the EU should stop its ample financing of Serbian efforts to prepare for accession until new elections are held, at least in Belgrade. The dialogue should be refocused on the economic issues O’Brien prefers. The EU and US should call out high-level corruption in Belgrade. The EU should lift the “consequences” it levied on Kosovo and acknowledge Pristina’s anti-corruption efforts. That would be a Balkans policy worthy of President Biden’s claims to supporting democracy.
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Stevenson’s army, February 8
– From Netanyahu
– From Senate GOP
– From House GOP
– From Cong. McCaul on Derek Chollet
– Ukraine worries, says NYT
– WaPo sees troop shortage in Ukraine
– Politico tells where money would go
– CBO says deficit is shrinking
– NYT updates us on Ecuador
– Ian Bremmer says Chancellor Scholz is “toast”
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What is needed to stop the fighting in Gaza
As Shibley Telhami underlines, the priority right now is to end the fighting in Gaza. But war is an enterprise with political objectives. So we need to consider what the parties involved want and what might bring the fighting to a negotiated end.
Hamas objectives
Hamas’s heinous mass murder and mayhem on October 7 likely had several objectives: to claim leadership of the Palestinian movement, to counter the Israeli occupation both in the West Bank and Gaza, to garner credit for a spectacular act of “resistance,” and to block impending Saudi normalization of relations with Israel. Israeli right-wing infringement on the Haram al Sharif (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem and settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank provided an attractive opportunity. All Hamas’ main objectives were at least partially achieved on the day.
But the successes came with consequences. The Israelis have responded by destroying much of Gaza and displacing most of its population, with devastating humanitarian consequences. The IDF has killed, wounded, or captured many Hamas fighters. Saudi Arabia has not entirely forsaken normalization and none of the Arab world has done much more than talk smack about the Israelis. Only Iran and its partners (mainly Lebanese Hizbollah, Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq) have provided any military support. They would like to use this occasion to drive the US out of the Middle East, regardless of the harm to Palestinians.
Palestinian objectives
The war has predictably and understandably rallied Palestinians to their cause, more in the West Bank than in Gaza. On the use of violence, support for Hamas, and disdain for the Palestinian Authority (especially President Mahmoud Abbas) attitudes have hardened. No doubt the Hamas military leadership is celebrating that as success, but the Palestinians desperately need aid and relief. Small anti-Hamas demonstrations have started up and could grow. Ordinary folks unaffiliated with Hamas will want an end to the war sooner rather than later.
Armed groups are not monolithic. Some in Hamas will be starting to worry about survival. As the Israelis push south, they will kill, wound, and capture more militants as well as civilians. Hamas’ “resistance” ideology can survive that push and even prosper, if need be among organizational successors. But its current leadership and at least some of its cadres will be worrying about their own lives and fortunes. Once physical survival becomes unlikely, some will turn to negotiations. They will hope a pause or end to the war will do what continuing seems unlikely to do. Consolidating Hamas’ position as the leader of the Palestinians and the main negotiating interlocutor with Israel would spell success.
Israeli objectives
Israel’s announced objectives are to destroy Hamas so that nothing like October 7 can ever happen again and to free the hostages Hamas and other more militant groups in Gaza still hold. The war is still far delivering those outcomes.
Prime Minister Netanyahu knows that perfectly well. He welcomes it. A hardened Hamas and divided Palestinians help him to justify continuing the war and hold onto power. Israelis so far have not wanted to replace Netanyahu while the fighting continues. Palestinian division, the growth of West Bank sympathy with Hamas, and a hardened Hamas help him to claim that Israel has no viable negotiating partner.
But Israel is a pluralistic society, so not everyone shares Netanyahu’s objectives. The right-wing of his governing coalition (and perhaps Netanyahu tacitly) is using the war as thinly veiled cover for collective punishment, including by blocking humanitarian assistance, supporting the IDF in loosening its targeting, and encouraging the expulsion of Palestinians from both the West Bank and Gaza. While they complain that Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea,” violent Jewish settlers in the West Bank are doing it.
Many in the much-diminished liberal Israeli opposition want to prioritize hostage release. Opponents of Netanyahu, they prefer negotiations sooner rather than later, as they recognize the risks to the hostages of delay. They presumably also understand that negotiations now will allow Hamas to survive. Many will think that inevitable even if the war continues.
American objectives
The US government, in particular President Biden, shares the Israeli objectives of destroying Hamas so that it can no longer attack Israel and ensuring release of the hostages. Most of the Congress supports those objectives, with some also supporting Netanyahu’s remaining in power and collective punishment of the Palestinians.
But President Biden also wants to be re-elected. The widening regional conflict threatens an unwanted war with Iran. The Gaza war is weakening his support among younger people countrywide and among Muslims, most consequentially among Arabs in the “swing” state of Michigan. It no longer suffices to claim, accurately, that the US is the biggest funder of humanitarian assistance for Gaza and that Washington is pressing the Israelis to let more in.
That has made at least a pause in the fighting a priority. It also makes renewed talk of a two-state solution important, because that is the one area in which the Americans can agree with the change in Palestinian attitudes. It in addition provides a welcome area of agreement with Arab and Muslim states, in particular Saudi Arabia:
The spoiler is Netanyahu, as he has made clear in his reaction to the Hamas proposals:
He is dead set against a Palestinian state and has said so. He has also rejected President Biden’s suggestion that the issue can be fudged. It is true, as Biden claimed, that there are many varieties of “states,” some with limited sovereignty, but Netanyahu won’t accept any of them.
The elephants aren’t leaving the room
This puts Biden in a tough spot. He needs Netanyahu and his right-wing sidekicks gone. Only then will it be possible to pursue some sort of more permanent ceasefire. A pause would be an important first step, but negotiations won’t end the fighting until its main protagonist has departed from power. Only Israelis can engineer that. None seem willing yet.
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