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Is the sun setting on the West?

These are the thoughts I offered at today’s University of Tetovo conference on “The Future of the Western Balkans after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”:

1. It is a great pleasure to be with you here in Macedonia, and in particular at the University of Tetovo.
2. Yes, I said I am in “Macedonia,” because article 7 paragraph 5 of the Prespa agreement protects my personal right to call the country what I want. The “North” part is for official usage. I hope your new President will respect that.
3. But her reluctance is part of the issue I want to talk about today: is the sun setting on the West? By the West, I mean those countries that are liberal democracies that base their open political systems on individual rights safeguarded by independent judiciaries.
4. Lest I be misunderstood, let me say at the outset that my answer is “no.”
5. But there are certainly a lot of reasons why someone might come to the erroneous conclusion that liberal democracy as a governing system is in trouble.
6. First, there is the US: Donald Trump is seeking re-election on the false premise that the 2020 election was “stolen,” his recent trial was “rigged,” and everyone but him is “corrupt.”
7. His campaign is anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and anti-Muslim. But the pollsters are telling us he may do relatively well among immigrants, minorities, and Muslims, all of whom are important in the “swing” states that will decide the election.
8. He will certainly lose the popular vote. He did last time by about 10 million.
9. But because of an 18th-century compromise embedded in the U.S. constitution he could still win in the Electoral College, where less populous, former slave states of the south get greater weight than their populations.
10. Yes, the U.S. constitution contains an illiberal system for electing the president that makes some individual votes count more than others.
11. A Trump win will unquestionably put liberal democracy as a governing system on the ropes. He has promised to govern as a dictator on day one. If he gets away with that, you don’t have to ask how he will govern on day two.
12. He is skeptical about NATO, friendly to Vladimir Putin, and an enemy of free trade and international agreements and institutions in general.
13. A Trump victory would have inevitable repercussions in the Balkans. He and his minions are ethnic nationalists. They will favor ethnic nationalists in the Balkans, in particular of the Serbian variety.
14. Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, will have good economic reasons to do so once he has his hands on prime property in downtown Belgrade.
15. Richard Grenell, Trump’s handmaiden, has made no secret of his political allegiance not only to Trump but also to President Vucic.
16. So yes, if Trump wins you can expect his second administration to back genocide-deniers, Serbian world supporters, and pro-Russian miscreants throughout the Balkans.
17. But I don’t really think Trump will win. The campaign has begun but won’t peak until fall.
18. One of the good things about American elections is that we don’t know the outcome until after the votes are cast. Polls this early mean little.
19. The media loves the campaign horse race they create, but only Election Day counts.
20. Whatever the outcome, the fate of Ukraine will be important to you here in the Balkans. Trump would no doubt surrender Ukraine, or part of it, to Putin. Biden will not.
21. America is not the only uncertainty.
22. The European Union election results forebode a shift toward ethnic nationalism in Europe this year and next.
23. Germany and France are at risk of bringing to power people who would abandon Ukraine and, like Trump, befriend ethnic nationalists in the Balkans.
24. That would make support for Ukraine and resistance to its partition more difficult.
25. A partitioned Ukraine would promote similar ambitions elsewhere, including the Balkans.
26. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be at risk. So too would Kosovo and Macedonia.
27. The return of Trump, resurgent ethnic nationalism in the EU, and the outcome of the Ukraine war are the big far-away problems for the Balkans, but the nearer problems in the Balkans are worth noting too.
28. First and foremost is Alexandar Vucic’s Serbia.
29. I was among those who hoped when Vucic first came to power that he would turn Serbia in a definitively Western direction.
30. I arranged his first public appearance in Washington at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where I teach.
31. I went to see him a year later in Belgrade, after writing a paper on the things Serbia needed to do to consolidate its democracy: free the media, establish the independence of the judiciary, and commit itself to the reforms required to accede to the European Union.
32. He has done none of those things. Quite the opposite.
33. The media in Serbia are not only under government tutelage but are also blatantly pro-Russian and racist, especially towards Albanians and Bosniaks. They are not much better towards me.
34. The judiciary is little improved, if at all.
35. And progress on implementing the acquis communautaire has been minimal.
36. Vucic today rules a Serbia that is ethnic nationalist, irredentist, and increasingly autocratic. It can’t even pretend to administer a decent municipal election in Belgrade.
37. The Serbia Against Violence movement is courageous, but Vucic has for now no viable Western-oriented opposition.
38. And Serbia is aligned increasingly with Russia and China on the international stage.
39. In addition, Vucic has managed, without firing a shot, to take over the governments in Podgorica and Banja Luka, thus realizing de facto the first stage of the Serbian world.
40. He won’t be able to do that in Kosovo, but he has tried with violence: the kidnapping of two Kosovo police, the rent-a-riot against NATO peacekeepers, and the September 24 terrorist action.
41. All those efforts failed, but he will continue trying.
42. Unfortunately, the Americans and Europeans are still seeking to pacify Serbia and have not done anything to punish its resorts to violence in Kosovo.
43. Vucic will likely also be active here in Macedonia. Increasing tension between Macedonians and Albanians will be his preferred mode of operating.
44. Russia will back these efforts. But I think it a mistake not to recognize that in addition to serving Putin’s purposes Vucic has his own reasons for stoking ethnic strife in the Balkans.
45. A successful, democratic Kosovo next door that respects the rights of Serbs is unwelcome to Vucic.
46. So too is a successful, democratic North Macedonia that can aspire to EU membership before Serbia.
47. Exacerbating ethnic tensions in Macedonia could help Vucic to gain de facto control of Skopje, which would need Serbian backing if it steps back from the West.
48. I hope that day does not come. But if it does, I hope the citizens of Macedonia will do as they have in the past. At critical junctures, they have chosen to support the Macedonian state and ensure that it treats all minorities with respect.
49. That in my view is the right reaction to Serbia’s ambitions. Macedonia has little to gain from Serbia or Russia.
50. It has a great deal to gain from NATO and eventually EU membership.
51. The problem in Macedonia is common throughout the Balkans, as well as in the United States and the European Union. Our Western systems leave the electoral door open to people who don’t support liberal democracy.
52. They prefer ethnic rule without any serious possibility of alternation in power.
53. The counterweights to autocratic ambitions in liberal democracies are strong institutions, especially the justice system, and vigorous civil society.
54. Both should be focused mainly on individual rights, which make the political system far more fluid and more difficult to dominate.
55. But even in a long-established democracy like the United States institutions can be hijacked and civil society repressed.
56. Doing that is easier in relatively new democracies like Serbia, which can no longer claim to be one.
57. Montenegro is headed in the same direction: a democracy in form but an autocracy in practice.
58. Bosnia has never really achieved what I would term a democratic system, and 49% of the country is an ethnic autocracy.
59. This is despite the fact that among Bosnia’s citizens there is remarkably little ethnic tension.
60. I came to Macedonia Friday night from Sarajevo, where an enormous gap is opening up between the politics and the society.
61. Ethnic nationalism dominates the politics. Mutual respect and even friendship is more common among the citizens, who however have failed to vote out people who do not really represent their own respect for individuals and their rights.
62. Your challenge as citizens is to prevent something similar happening in Macedonia. The sun will begin to set on the West here earlier than in the United States.
63. I wish you well in meeting your responsibilities to defend the institutions, invigorate civil society, and protect the rights of all.
64. That is what will prevent the sun from setting on the West!