US policy reset in the Western Balkans

Friday, Serbia President Vucic announced measures intended to reverse Kosovo independence. He is no longer content to refuse to recognize Kosovo but wants instead to take at least part of it. Meanwhile, the American Embassy in Belgrade continues to profess confidence that he is moving Serbia toward the West.

Jasmin Mujanovic tweeted week before last:

US policy in the Western Balkans is clear as mud. The US supports Vucic despite his pro-Russian associations, whereas it opposes Kurti despite his pro-Western positions. In Bosnia, the US opposes Vucic’s proxies, whose counterparts in Montenegro it helped depose a pro-NATO govt.

All this is true. The State Department has lost the bubble. It is time to find it again.

Long-term objectives

US objectives in the Balkans should be clear, not confused. They should apply separately to all the states of the region, while recognizing that interactions among them may affect progress. Let me offer these longer-term goals for those countries that want a good relationship with the US:

1. Democratic governance based on equal rights, with reasonable guarantees for minorities;
2. Secure sovereignty and territorial integrity without use or threat of force.

These goals are consistent with NATO and EU membership for any state that wants to join those institutions.

Where we stand now: Bosnia and Serbia

Things are headed in the wrong direction.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb and Croat nationalists are reversing the progress made in the first decade after the 1995 Dayton accords. “Dayton” ended the war but left the warring parties in power. For a decade thereafter, bold international intervention forced ethnic nationalists to accept reforms that pointed towards sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as equal rights.

Since 2006 however ethnic nationalists have been unraveling the prior progress. The Americans this year pushed the leading Bosniak party out of power, claiming it inimical to statebuilding. Ironically, that party supported democratic governance and territorial integrity. The main Croat and Serb opponents of Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are still waging their fight from position of power.

In Serbia, President Vucic has taken over a weak democratic regime and turned it into a de facto semi-autocracy. He holds a majority in parliament but more importantly has concentrated power in the presidency. From there, Vucic wields the police and other security forces against a weak and fragmented opposition. He has also aligned Serbia with Russia on Ukraine sanctions and bent over backwards to attract Chinese investment in sensitive areas like telecommunications and security technology. He buys off Western criticism by supplying ammunition to Ukraine, purchasing French warplanes, and selling lithium to Germany.

Where we stand now: Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia

Kosovo, where alternation in power has occurred several times, has a popular prime minister who exerts sovereign authority in Serb-majority northern Kosovo in ways that give the Americans and European qualms. They want him to consult and get permission for anything he does that might upset either the Kosovo Serbs or Belgrade. He hasn’t been willing to do that. But Prime Minister Kurti nevertheless aligns unequivocally with the West. He has no alternative.

Friends of Putin now run Montenegro, which became a NATO member in 2017. NATO-member Macedonia, to its credit, peacefully alternated political parties in power earlier this year. Some in the current majority lean towards Russia, but the Albanian partners in the coalition are more reliably Western-oriented. That however is no guarantee, so Macedonia requires careful watching.

The threat

None of these places is top priority in a world where Russia has invaded Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, and Iran and its proxies are at war with Israel. But if something goes wrong in the Balkans, it will spread rapidly to other places.

The biggest threat is Belgrade’s increasing devotion to what it terms “the Serbian world.” This is Greater Serbia, de facto if not de jure. Vucic wants to control the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. His security services pursue this goal actively and aggressively, with support from Moscow. He has been successful de facto in Montenegro. In Kosovo, many Serbs are not devoted to Vucic, who has demonstrated little concern for their welfare. But he maintains control through finance and intimidation. In Bosnia, Vucic has gradually gained more leverage on the main Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, who is sanctioned by Washington and has driven his 49% of the country into arrears with Moscow while espousing secessionist intentions.

Partition of Bosnia and Kosovo would serve Vucic’s irredentist goals. That would greatly cheer Moscow and revivify its ambitions in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, if not also Kazakhstan. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Western Balkan states stands as a counter to what Putin is seeking elsewhere. That has encouraged him to use Serbia as a proxy. Last year, Belgrade kidnapped two Kosovo policemen, rented a riot against NATO peacekeepers, and sponsored a terrorist incident in northern Kosovo. Serbia intended for that incident to give Belgrade an excuse to move its military into the north. That would have cheered Moscow and encouraged its efforts to take all of Donetsk.

The current approach isn’t working

The Biden Administration has tried to appease Serbia to prevent Belgrade from acting on its irredentist goals and to win it over to the West. It has lavished praise and money on Vucic while withholding both from Kurti and denouncing and sanctioning Dodik. This is incoherent. Vucic and Dodik are aligned with Moscow and share the goal of Greater Serbia. Kurti’s commitment to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is a main barrier against their ambitions.

Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Europe, has recognized that northern Kosovo and Dodik’s secessionist threats are the main security threats in the Balkans. But he looks to the peacekeeping forces in both places to meet them.

That has proven a temporary expedient, but the European force (EUFOR) in Bosnia is weak and deployed in ways that would prevent it from reacting in a timely way to a determined secessionist move. The NATO-led force in Kosovo is stronger and better positioned, but would it be able or willing to prevent Serbian armor from rolling in to take northern Kosovo? It is 25 years since the NATO war that liberated Kosovo from Serbian rule. It is high time Kosovo–like any other sovereign state–be able to defend its own territorial integrity.

The reset needed

Appeasement of Serbia isn’t working. Chastising Kosovo isn’t working either. Montenegro is lost for now. Bosnia and Macedonia are at risk.

Washington needs to reset its Balkans policy in more coherent directions:

1. It should support Pristina’s efforts to govern in equitably in northern Kosovo and help plan the next moves in that direction.
2. It should end appeasement of Serbia, publicly criticize Vucic’s irredentist and anti-democratic intentions, and end the lavishing of praise and money on Belgrade.
3. The US should encourage the redeployment of EUFOR to the northeastern Bosnian town of Brcko, where it would represent a serious deterrent to secessionism.
4. Washington should insist that Bosnia implement the European Court of Human Rights decisions that would end the country’s ethnic-based politics.
5. Washington should lead an effort to isolate Montenegro’s russophiles from sensitive NATO information.
6. It should also warn Macedonia that it will be next if the russophiles there remain in power.

Kamala Harris is as clear as she can be about Putin’s perfidy in Ukraine:

Countering Putin in the Balkans by diplomatic means would not be nearly as costly or hard. Doing so would weaken Moscow and strengthen NATO at relatively low cost. The time has come to do it.