Month: December 2024
Getting to Syria’s next regime
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria was swift. Now comes the hard part: building a new regime that is an improvement. We know from past experience some of the elements required. Let’s review those, in light of the discussion among Syrians above.
Safe and secure environment
Above all, a safe and secure environment free of large-scale violence is a prerequisite.
The biggest threat for now is in the north. Turkish and Turkish-supported forces there are pressing hard against Kurdish and Kurdish-led forces. Turkiye President Erdogan wants the Kurds east of the Euphrates and at least 30 kilometers from the border. An American-mediated truce between the Turks and the Kurds has broken down. There is a real risk of a major conflict between them. Turkiye says its objective is eliminating the Kurdish forces. But Ankara and its allies don’t seem to make much distinction between specific Kurdish forces and Kurds iin general.
In other parts of the country there are also risks. It would be a mistake to assume that Assad did not organize “stay behind” forces. Even if not organized, they may emerge spontaneously, or Islamic State sleeper cells may awaken. In Iraq, the Saddam Fedayeen originated the insurgency against the American occupation that the Islamic State continued. There is still the possibility of revenge killings. A single mass grave near Damascus apparently holds 100,000 bodies. That means close to one million people with motives for seeking revenge.
Unifying the many armed groups under the new Syrian government will be a major challenge and priority. HTS has announced its intention to do this. But it will need to convince rebel leaders and find the resources to pay the fighters. Eventually it will need to demobilize many of them and integrate them into civilian life.
Rule of law
While there was some looting of government offices in Damascus, most Syrians have maintained law and order. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the leading force in the revolution, has kept police and government officials in their positions. Opposition forces in the south and other parts of the country have done likewise. There has been no sign, yet, of widespread revenge killings.
It will be years before Syria can reform its laws. In the meanwhile, there are urgent issues. Perhaps first among them is establishment and protection of property rights. In Idlib, HTS had a serious system for property issues. Expanding that to the national level will be a major challenge. Without that, it will be hard even to start reconstruction. According to the World Bank and the European Union, Syria has suffered an enormous amount of infrastructure damage. In 14 cities, they estimate damages of $8.7-11.4 billion.
Syria’s judicial sector was not independent of the Assad regime. It did what it was told. Judges and prosecutors will need to be vetted and new ones trained and named. Prison officials and guards will need to be likewise vetted and many replaced. Lawyers will need to be trained and retrained.
Accountability will be a priority. Identifying those responsible for Assad regime abuses will be easy at the top levels. But most of those people will have fled. Europe and the US need to be alert for their entry and capture them sooner rather than later. At the lower levels, many perpetrators will try to melt into the general population. It will be difficult to ferret them out and put them on trial quickly. Doing so will take years of concerted effort. It is not easy to gather the evidence a serious jury trial requires.
Stable governance
While Assad’s Syria conducted elections and had a parliament, it operated as an autocracy. The Assad family, the Ba’ath party, and Alawite military officers were pillars of the regime. It showed no respect for the rights of others. The new regime should reflect what Rafif calls a core commitment to human rights, including freedom of expression and religion. The mantra today is “inclusion,” which ultimately will require political pluralism, including full participation of women and minorities.
That will not be easy. HTS is also an autocratic organization, with little respect for women’s equality and dubious commitment to equal rights for minorities. It has appointed an interim government with little “inclusion” and has been less than clear about the role of women.
Political parties and civil society organizations are emerging quickly, but elections are still far off. It may be possible and desirable to convene a national dialogue of notable citizens. Russia and Iran, the foreign mainstays of the Assad regime are calling for one. Choice of participants would of course be problematic. But a national dialogue may provide common ground not only for Syrians but also for international powers interested in Syria.
Ultimately Syria will need a new constitution. Lots of constitutional proposals already exist. But Syria will need a constituent assembly of some sort to draft a democratic and inclusive document. Many of the issues involved have been discussed, but difficult choices lie ahead.
In the meanwhile, local governance will need to suffice. Syrians have practiced it a good deal in opposition-held areas in recent years. It won’t be a bad place to start.
Sustainable economy
Syrians are destitute. Their most immediate needs are food and fuel. Humanitarian assistance should flow as soon and as quickly as possible. This means using the United Nations and international relief organizations, which are already overburdened by Gaza and Lebanon.
Going much beyond humanitarian relief will require relief from sanctions and de-designation of HTS as a terrorist group. This will take time and convincing. The Americans and Europeans will want to be sure they are not snookered. They won’t want to provide reconstruction assistance to a new regime that fails to meet reasonable criteria. The big money will come from the World Bank and the Gulf. Washington and Brussels control the former and influence the latter.
Assad’s regime was dependent on production and trade of Captagon, an amphetamine. That will have to stop. HTS will crack down hard, but it will need also to generate economic opportunities to replace the drug trade. Syria is a country with limited oil and gas resources, big agricultural and tourism potential, and a good geographic location. Where its future livelihood will come from is unclear. Like Jordan and Egypt, it will need international assistance for decades into the future.
The World Bank has found that disruption of social networks has caused most of the economic damage in Syria. Restoring trust will take time and effort.
Social well-being
Half of Syria’s population is either refugees or displaced within the country. Many will want to return home. Others will not. Compensation for destroyed or expropriated property will be a major issue. Some communities will never return to their pre-war composition. Others will want to make an effort to do so.
The health system in Syria has imploded. Even in areas where the Russians and Syrian did not attack hospitals, sanitary supplies and equipment are limited. Many doctors and nurses have fled. Technical capabilities are not up to modern standards. Rebuilding will be a major enterprise.
The education system still functions in most of the country. Children go to school in both government and opposition controlled areas. But many buildings are destroyed and students will be behind in learning. Efforts were made to keep the education system in some opposition-controlled areas compatible with Syrian government requirements. But the culture of the schools and the experience of the students will be dramatically different.
The international dimension
Syria now faces two main challenges from neighbors. One is the Turkish effort to destroy the Kurdish institutions in the northeast. The other is the effort to destroy the strategic assets of the Syrian Arab Army, which Israel is bombing. Additionally, Israel has seized a UN-patroled buffer zone on the Golan Heights. HTS leadership is not prepared to fight Israel, even though some of its cadres would like to do so. HTS wants to bring the Kurdish institutions under Damascus authority. The Kurds are amenable. They do not advocate independence or union with the Kurds in Iraq. But Turkiye has vowed to try to destroy the Kurdish institutions. This is a serious threat and could vastly complicate the post-war situation.
Russia appears to be withdrawing much of its military assets from Syria. Iran has already done so. The US for now is maintaining its troops in support of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. The Americans will want to withdraw, but will not do so before Donald Trump takes office in January. What he will do is not clear.
United Nations Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) is still the main international community statement on political transition in Syria. It is not a bad one.
Grenell’s special missions
President Trump has announced that Ric Grenell will be Presidential Envoy for Special Missions.
Ric, he says, “will work in some of the hottest spots around the World, including Venezuela and North Korea.” To my knowledge, this is a new job definition. In the past, presidents have often named special envoys for specific issues, not for “special missions” in general.
What he did in the past
Grenell was notorious in the first Trump Administration for mucking up several tasks. As Ambassador in Berlin he had a terrible relationship with the Germans. Without discussing the issues in private, he slammed German companies publicly for doing business with Iran and Russia. As a special envoy, Grenell tried to negotiate partition of Kosovo, transferring its Serb-majority northern municipalities to Serbia. That effort failed. He then spent several months as a highly partisan but interim Director of National Intelligence. In that job, he declassified documents he thought would embarrass Democrats.
Openly gay well before that was widely acceptable in the US, Grenell has been politically labile. He has worked for Mitt Romney, criticized Donald Trump, and lobbied for Hungarian autocrat Viktor Orban. He did not register with the Justice Department after signing a contract with Orban.
Venezuela and North Korea
President Trump in his first term notably failed in diplomacy with Caracas and Pyongyang. He recognized opposition candidate Juan Guaido as the rightful President of Venezuela. He even introduced him as such during a State of the Union address. But he failed to make it stick. President Biden is in a similar situation now. The US recognizes opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez as the winner of the July presidential election. But Nicolas Maduro remains in power.
The first Trump Administration likewise failed in its effort to reach an agreement with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Trump tried both threats and flattery to get Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons, to no avail. North Korea is a de facto nuclear power with about 50 nuclear weapons. It also now has the fissile material needed to build at least another 50. The Biden Administration has not made any progress on the nuclear issue. It has also been unable to prevent Pyongyang from helping Russia with missiles and other conventional weapons.
So Grenell is taking on at least two difficult portfolios. Venezuela might be the easier, as Maduro appears weak and vulnerable. He allowed an election in which he was soundly defeated but claimed victory and refused to leave office. Kim Jong Un has not made that mistake. But even apparently strong regimes can be brittle and fall, as we have seen these last two weeks in Syria.
Good luck!
Good luck and timing are important factors in diplomacy. It’s possible Grenell will not fail this time around. I wish him good luck. America would be better off if Maduro concedes the presidency in Venezuela and Kim Jong Un surrenders nuclear capabilities.
The Balkans will be fortunate if Grenell stays busy with Venezuela and North Korea. He came close to precipitating disaster there in the first Trump Administration. Since 2021, Grenell has been involved with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner in hospitality investments in Serbia and Albania. It would be a gross abuse for him to get involved now in the Balkans. But in an Administration that doesn’t know what “conflict of interest” means, it could happen. Kosovo and Bosnia would be the victims.
Ukraine should also count itself lucky that it was not named as a “special mission”:
What the US should do in Syria
I found the above MEI event informative, especially Wael al Zayat’s proposals for shifting American policy. Starting about 39:30, he proposes:
- A general license for export of some priority goods and services to Syria, including in the finance and energy sectors. He says such licenses were issued for six months of earthquake relief in 2023.
- Humanitarian assistance for the Syrian people.
- Support to Syrian organizations concerned with transitional justice.
- Encouragement to the UN to return to Damascus for humanitarian, development, and political purposes.
These seem to me good ideas, if somewhat scattershot in presentation. Charles Lister goes on to note that the US is trying to engage. But he says delisting HTS as a terrorist organization will not happen quickly. It will be strictly conditional on HTS behavior.
US conditions
Secretary of State Blinken has outlined the conditions:
The United States reaffirms its full support for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition. This transition process should lead to credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance that meets international standards of transparency and accountability, consistent with the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254.
The transition process and new government must also uphold clear commitments to fully respect the rights of minorities, facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to all in need, prevent Syria from being used as a base for terrorism or posing a threat to its neighbors, and ensure that any chemical or biological weapons stockpiles are secured and safely destroyed.
All this sounds reasonable, though it omits explicit insistence on pluralism. That will be a major issue, as HTS is an authoritarian organization that won’t readily tolerate political competition. While making friendly noises, it has already appointed a less than inclusive interim government to serve until March 1.
The Kurds, the Turks, and the Americans
Syria’s Kurds pose a knotty problem for the United States. The Americans have relied on Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against the Islamic State. The Kurds involved are affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Both the US and Turkey have designated the PKK as a terrorist group.
Turkey wants the PKK at least 30 km from its border and east of the Euphrates. Turkish-supported forces called the Syrian National Army are pushing the SDF in those directions now. The Kurds have lost their last stronghold west of the Euphrates (at Minbij). They fear that the Turkish-supported forces are aiming for Kobani. The Kurds made a bloody and successful stand at Kobani against the Islamic state in 2014 and 2015.
Meanwhile, HTS and the Kurds are making nice. HTS has sent conciliatory messages and the Kurds have agreed to use the Syrian opposition flag on territory they control. But HTS is heavily dependent on Turkish good will. The Americans are less than reliable backers. They have used the Kurdish alliance against IS but don’t want to clash with NATO ally Turkey. The outcome of this menage a trois is not yet clear. Time is fleeting, as future President Trump has said he wants Syria left to the Syrians. If he means it, the Kurds will then be to the mercy of the Turks. That won’t be a good place to be.
Breaking the Iran connection and working the Russia angle
The success of HTS in toppling the Assad regime was a big defeat for Russia and Iran. But Moscow is already negotiating with HTS to continue its air and naval bases in Latakia and Tartus, respectively. Iran is hoping the HTS success will be temporary. Tehran is no doubt doing all it can to make it so.
HTS will have little use for the Iranians and will not let want them back in Syria. They may have property and contracts that will need to be respected. But Damascus will no long welcome the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Lebanese Hezbollah, or the other Iranian proxy forces.
The Russia angle is more equivocal. HTS will want the Russian air force out but may want to keep the Russian navy in. That would strengthen its bargaining position with the West. The US and Europe will want the Russians completely out. They’ll need to ante up to make it happen. Delisting could be part of the price.
A lot of moving parts
Diplomacy is difficult even when there aren’t a lot of moving parts. Add the change of the American administration into the mix and it becomes worse than the Three Body Problem. But there are big opportunities in Syria to make a better life for Syrians. Not to mention to weaken Russia and Iran.
More remains to be done, but credit is due
Opposition and Turkish forces now control Syria’s northwest, northeast, north, south and the main cities of its north/south axis. But most of the west–the provinces of Latakia and Tartus–are still not fully in opposition control. Ditto much of the center.
The Alawites
The Alawite sect to which Bashar al Assad belonged constituted only about 10% of Syria’s population before the civil war. But Alawites are a plurality in the west. They live more in the countryside than in the main cities. The leader of the opposition, Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), has named a military commander for the west. He met with Alawite notables in Latakia Tuesday. @GregoryPWaters cites an Alawite professor present, who reports:
The broad, summarized headlines that we all felt were true:
– No to sectarianism absolutely
– No to violating the property of individuals and institutions
– No to division
– No going back, everyone was harmed by the previous regime in one way or another
That is as friendly a message from HTS as possible. It is not entirely surprising. HTS has been reaching out to Syria’s minorities to preserve Syria’s unity. The Alawites of Latakia and Tartus suffered a great under their co-religionist Assad. They lost a lot of young people in the war. They had to toe the line or risk the full weight of his repression. Many Sunnis and others resented their access to privilege and power.
The trick now is to somehow hold individuals who committed abuses accountable while not mistreatinthe rest. Many of Assad’s henchmen, Sunni as well as Alawite, will have fled to Latakia and Tartus. Ferreting them out and giving them fair trials will not be easy.
The Russians
Besides the Alawites, the Russians are a problem in the west. They operate the Syrian Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia and lease a naval base farther south in Tartus. The air base has since 2015 launched thousands of sorties against opposition forces and civilians. The naval base is Russia’s only naval facility in the Mediterranean. Turkey has closed the Bosporus to military traffic due to the war in Ukraine. So the Tartus base is particularly important to the Russians. The air base is not, as its role has been overtaken by events.
Still, Moscow is insisting on keeping both. Russia will be arguing that the Syrians shouldn’t rely too heavily on Turkey. HTS has not signaled that it wants them out. Putin will be lucky to retain the naval facility.
The Islamic State
Much of the white area on the above map is sparsely populated. But it hosts Islamic State cells. HTS will now have to shoulder the burden of eliminating them. It should be willing to do so, as the Islamic State is a rival, not an ally. But it isn’t easy. The Americans could be helpful from the air and might be willing. Someone should ask, or offer. Once HTS gets that done, the Americans will not want to stay in Syria. And future President Trump won’t want them to.
A remarkable job
HTS-led forces have done a remarkable job in a short time. The risks of fragmentation are still there, but lower than a week ago. Abu Mohammed al Jolani has sent the right political signals. There is still more to be done, but credit is due.
For now, Netanyahu is succeeding
Israel’s air force is destroying Syria’s navy, weapons manufacturing sites, chemical and other weapons depots. It is undertaking hundreds of sorties per day. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) has also seized control of the UN buffer zone on the Golan Heights. That was created in a 1974 agreement.
Location, location, location
None of this should be surprising. Syria for the moment can’t defend itself. Its longtime enemy is trying to weaken it further. Among many other advantages, Israel now occupies the peak of Mount Hermon. That has unimpeded electronic visibility over a good part of Syria, including the capital, and Lebanon. This is valuable real estate.
The Israelis can do this because the Syrian Arab Army has disintegrated and the Russians are not preventing it. While Assad was in power, Israel raided Syrian sites, but only with a wink and a nod from Moscow. Now it is unclear whether Moscow has no objection or is simply unwilling or unable to object. Syrian and Russian air defenses have not reacted to the Israeli attacks.
The American position
Former President Trump formally proclaimed in 2019 that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights as “part of Israel.” The Biden administration upheld that policy with a 2021 tweet. It is hard to picture Trump in a second term reversing it. He has signaled, not least with appointment of an evangelical Christian as ambassador, that he will back Israel. Even more than Biden did.
That does not necessarily mean the United States will want Israel to hold on to the UN buffer zone. But Netanyahu will no doubt press Trump hard on that issue. In the past, Trump has given the Israeli Prime Minister pretty much everything he has asked.
The new Syrian government has its hands full
Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has named Mohammed al Bashir as interim prime minister until March 1. He was the head of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). That is the government HTS empowered for several years in the territory it controlled in the northwest province of Idlib. Al Bashir and SSG officials have met with President Assad’s outgoing officials to arrange the transfer of responsibilities. This is far more orderly than one might have anticipated. Let’s hope it can continue that way. Syria’s economy and population need relief. Those are for now top priorities.
But no Syrian leader will fail eventually to claim all of the Golan Heights. Some HTS fighters have declared their next objective is Jerusalem. Their leader’s nom de guerre is Abu Mohammed al Jolani (more or less father of Mohammed of Golan). Least of all one whose parents came from there. Al Jolani’s father was an Arab nationalist and supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Al Jolani himself says the second intifada radicalized him. Netanyahu will no doubt be hearing from him in due course.
But al Jolani has his hands full for the moment. Turkish-backed forces are attacking US-backed Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Al Jolani wants the Kurds to support the new regime. Turkiye President Erdogan, an important HTS backer, wants them pushed away from the Turkish border and east of the Eurphrates. That’s east of Manbij on the map below. The Turkish/Kurdish conflict could explode and weaken the unified effort HTS has tried to construct.
The broader picture
Syria would be weak in the present situation even if the Israelis weren’t contributing to its travail. But Netanyahu’s policy is to burn down his neighbors’ houses. He has done it in Gaza, Lebanon, and now Syria. He would no doubt like to do the same in Yemen. Jordan is already a client state, as the monarchy owes its continued existence to Israeli security cooperation. Egypt is likewise neutralized, even if uncomfortable with Israel’s behavior in Gaza. Netanyahu’s aim is a regionally hegemonic Greater Israel. He wants full control over the West Bank and Gaza and cowed enemies in Lebanon and Syria. For now, he is succeeding.
The fight for justice in a post-Assad Syria
Colleagues at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) have posted this statement welcoming the fall of the Assad regime and looking ahead to a just outcome:
Thirteen years ago, SJAC began preparing for the day after the fall of the Assad government, with the steadfast belief that Syrians would someday have an opportunity to pursue meaningful justice and accountability for the crimes committed against them and to build a state that respects the rights of all Syrians.
Over the past decade, our team in Syria and across the diaspora have collected over two million pieces of documentation of the conflict, conducted extensive investigations of international crimes, and laid the groundwork for comprehensive missing persons investigations. Now, at the start of the first week of a post-Assad Syria, our work has just begun.
In the coming weeks, SJAC’s team will be focused on collecting and preserving at-risk documentation from previously inaccessible, government-controlled areas while ensuring that Syrians have access to clear, impartial sources of information on the immediate justice challenges that will arise in the coming days. As the situation on the ground stabilizes, our team looks forward to working alongside Syrians from across the country to begin to design a meaningful transitional justice process.
While SJAC has long supported Syrian-led justice, the dream of a stable and peaceful Syria can only be achieved with the support of the international community. Over the past decade, as the conflict stalled, many states have withdrawn support for human rights and humanitarian efforts in Syria, while simultaneously disengaging in the peace process. Now, with the dream of a stable and peaceful Syrian at hand, we ask that the international community re-engage in Syria, both through robust funding for reconstruction and justice processes, as well as through political engagement.
As the political makeup of a post-Assad Syria evolves, the international community should reconsider sanctions and reassess Hayat Tahrir Al Sham’s designation as a terrorist organization. In a time of uncertainty, we also ask that host countries continue to provide safe asylum to Syrians around the globe. Syrians themselves will be best placed to assess when it is safe to return.
The future may be uncertain, but the SJAC team is excited to have the opportunity to work for justice and accountability in a post-Assad Syria.