What the US should do in Syria

I found the above MEI event informative, especially Wael al Zayat’s proposals for shifting American policy. Starting about 39:30, he proposes:

  1. A general license for export of some priority goods and services to Syria, including in the finance and energy sectors. He says such licenses were issued for six months of earthquake relief in 2023.
  2. Humanitarian assistance for the Syrian people.
  3. Support to Syrian organizations concerned with transitional justice.
  4. Encouragement to the UN to return to Damascus for humanitarian, development, and political purposes.

These seem to me good ideas, if somewhat scattershot in presentation. Charles Lister goes on to note that the US is trying to engage. But he says delisting HTS as a terrorist organization will not happen quickly. It will be strictly conditional on HTS behavior.

US conditions

Secretary of State Blinken has outlined the conditions:

The United States reaffirms its full support for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition. This transition process should lead to credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance that meets international standards of transparency and accountability, consistent with the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254.

The transition process and new government must also uphold clear commitments to fully respect the rights of minorities, facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to all in need, prevent Syria from being used as a base for terrorism or posing a threat to its neighbors, and ensure that any chemical or biological weapons stockpiles are secured and safely destroyed.

All this sounds reasonable, though it omits explicit insistence on pluralism. That will be a major issue, as HTS is an authoritarian organization that won’t readily tolerate political competition. While making friendly noises, it has already appointed a less than inclusive interim government to serve until March 1.

The Kurds, the Turks, and the Americans

Syria’s Kurds pose a knotty problem for the United States. The Americans have relied on Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against the Islamic State. The Kurds involved are affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Both the US and Turkey have designated the PKK as a terrorist group.

Turkey wants the PKK at least 30 km from its border and east of the Euphrates. Turkish-supported forces called the Syrian National Army are pushing the SDF in those directions now. The Kurds have lost their last stronghold west of the Euphrates (at Minbij). They fear that the Turkish-supported forces are aiming for Kobani. The Kurds made a bloody and successful stand at Kobani against the Islamic state in 2014 and 2015.

Meanwhile, HTS and the Kurds are making nice. HTS has sent conciliatory messages and the Kurds have agreed to use the Syrian opposition flag on territory they control. But HTS is heavily dependent on Turkish good will. The Americans are less than reliable backers. They have used the Kurdish alliance against IS but don’t want to clash with NATO ally Turkey. The outcome of this menage a trois is not yet clear. Time is fleeting, as future President Trump has said he wants Syria left to the Syrians. If he means it, the Kurds will then be to the mercy of the Turks. That won’t be a good place to be.

Breaking the Iran connection and working the Russia angle

The success of HTS in toppling the Assad regime was a big defeat for Russia and Iran. But Moscow is already negotiating with HTS to continue its air and naval bases in Latakia and Tartus, respectively. Iran is hoping the HTS success will be temporary. Tehran is no doubt doing all it can to make it so.

HTS will have little use for the Iranians and will not let want them back in Syria. They may have property and contracts that will need to be respected. But Damascus will no long welcome the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Lebanese Hezbollah, or the other Iranian proxy forces.

The Russia angle is more equivocal. HTS will want the Russian air force out but may want to keep the Russian navy in. That would strengthen its bargaining position with the West. The US and Europe will want the Russians completely out. They’ll need to ante up to make it happen. Delisting could be part of the price.

A lot of moving parts

Diplomacy is difficult even when there aren’t a lot of moving parts. Add the change of the American administration into the mix and it becomes worse than the Three Body Problem. But there are big opportunities in Syria to make a better life for Syrians. Not to mention to weaken Russia and Iran.

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