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Beyond ceasefire, what can really happen?

The Gaza ceasefire went into effect today, after a few hours delay. Reports are that humanitarian supplies are entering. Hamas and Israel are arranging or exchange of hostages and prisoners. This phase is to last 6 weeks, after which a more permanent cessation of hostilities is to commence. What are the prospects for a longer agreement?

The next phase

Secretary of State Blinken helpfully outlined the Biden Administration’s plans for phase 2 at the Atlantic Council last week:

We believe that the Palestinian Authority should invite international partners to help establish and run an interim administration with responsibility for key civil sectors in Gaza, like banking, water, energy, health, civil coordination with Israel. The international community would provide funding, technical support, and oversight. The interim administration would include Palestinians from Gaza and representatives from the PA—selected following meaningful consultation with communities in Gaza—and would hand over complete responsibility to a fully reformed PA administration as soon as it’s feasible.

The administrators would operate in close cooperation with a senior UN official, who should oversee the international stabilization and recovery effort.

An interim security mission would be made up of members of partner nation security forces and vetted Palestinian personnel. Its responsibilities would include creating a secure environment for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and ensuring border security, which is crucial to preventing smuggling that could allow Hamas to rebuild its military capacity. We would stand up a new initiative to train, to equip, to vet a PA-led security force for Gaza to focus on law and order and gradually take over for the interim security mission.

These arrangements would be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution.

Some of our partners have already expressed their willingness to contribute troops and police for such a mission—but if, and only if, it is agreed that Gaza and the West Bank are reunified under a reformed PA as part of a pathway to an independent Palestinian state.

This depicts a fairly conventional late 1990s style “integrated” intervention. The UN Security Council authorized interim administrations like this in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), East Timor (1999), and Kosovo (1999). They were not brilliantly successful, but they markedly improved the situation in all three places. Blinken omits one essential ingredient for success: executive authority. The UNSC will need to empower the interim authorities to issue laws, arrest people, and use force to protect civilians.

One new wrinkle here is the Palestinians, who are divided politically and geographically. Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas has already declared its readiness to take on its assigned role. I don’t know anyone who would agree with that proposition, as he has done little to reform it. Besides, it is going to have trouble gaining traction in territory ruled by Hamas for almost two decades. Hamas has said it is prepared to give up its governance role. But at least some of the remaining Hamas militants are going to make sure the PA has a hard time.

Other new wrinkles

I see little prospect that the current Israeli government will accept what Blinken proposes. Netanyahu will not want the ceasefire to last past 6 weeks. That would mark the beginning of the end for him. His right-wing coalition partners had a hard time accepting the ceasefire. They will not accept an international administration whose mandate includes eventual creation of a Palestinian state. In addition, if the war ends or his government collapses, Netanyahu will have to face prosecution and elections. He doesn’t want that.

It will not be possible to start up an international administration without Israeli cooperation. Neighbors are vital factors in determining the success or failure of post-war stabilization and reconstruction. Arab Gulf states won’t agree to contribute troops, police, and money without Israeli approval.

What remains of Hamas will also oppose the next phase, which threatens to end its rule permanently. After 6 weeks of recuperation and attempts to re-arm, extremists in Hamas will try to derail the process. It will only take an attack or two on innocent Israelis to restart the war.

The final new wrinkle

If ever we get to the next phase, it will be in the Trump Administration. In his first term, Trump gave the Israelis 100% support. He abandoned support for the two-state solution and moved the US embassy to Jerusalem. He accepted annexation of the Golan Heights and West Bank settlements as legal. His negotiators put forward a peace plan that paid little attention to the Palestinian goal of statehood.

Trump is reputed to have played a key role in getting the ceasefire. But he did that by threatening Hamas, not the Israelis. Blinken in his remarks at the Atlantic Council suggested that

Israelis must abandon the myth that they can carry out de-facto annexation without cost and consequence to Israel’s democracy, to its standing, to its security.

Trump isn’t going to tell them that. It will happen only if Israelis go to the polls and elect a government committed to Israeli democracy. That is what Netanyahu and his right-wing allies will try to prevent. If they succeed, the war will go on.