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Kosovo is democratic but complicated

Kosovo voted yesterday. The electoral mechanism seems to have worked reasonably well except for a cyberattack. That appears to have been overcome. Prime Minister Kurti (LVV) got 41%, his PDK opposition 22%, the LDK opposition 18%, and AAK (Ramush Haradinaj) 7%. Minorities will hold 20 seats. Turnout was relatively low (around 40%), despite a lively campaign. I haven’t yet seen how the preliminary percentages translate into parliamentary seats. That could change the picture.

For background, here is a primer. So far as I can tell, the EU observer mission has not yet reported its findings.

The winner loses…but the losers didn’t win

The Prime Minister led by an almost a 2/1 margin over his nearest competitor. But he lost his absolute majority in parliament. While minority votes could put him in the majority, he won’t get enough of them. He will now need the seats of either the PDK or the LDK to regain the majority. The freewheeling way he has governed will make that difficult. Both the PDK and AAK have said they are unwilling to govern with VV. Still, it can’t be ruled out, especially if he is willing to give up the prime ministry. The LDK seems more open to the idea.

The PDK, LDK, and AAK did not win either. Even if the PDK and LDK join together in coalition, they won’t have enough seats to gain the majority. Putting together a 3-party coalition isn’t going to be easy. Resentment of Kurti might help. The three opposition parties were united during the campaign in criticizing him. They don’t like his handling of the economy and blame him for strained relations with the US and EU.

What next

Parliamentary systems that produce ambiguous results of this sort generally need some time to work things out. Despite strains between them, I suppose President Osmani will give Kurti a chance to forge a parliamentary majority. If he fails, the PDK may get a chance to bring in a government that includes the other opposition parties.

If Kurti keeps the prime ministry in coalition with an opposition party, the US and EU will pressure him to consult more. They want him to show more flexibility in dealing with Serbia. That isn’t likely to produce results, given past experience.

Almost any conceivable alternative prime minister will try to reduce strains with the US and EU. All the other political parties have criticized Kurti for inflexibility.

But all have governed in the past, with not much better results when it comes to dealing with Serbia. Belgrade is likewise is inflexible in dealing with Pristina. It demands creation of an Association of Serb Majority Municipalities inside Kosovo with no quid pro quo.

The broader context

Kosovo’s future depends today more on what happens beyond its borders than on this ambiguous election result. Ric Grenell, Trump’s former envoy, is telling everyone in the Balkans he will again be in charge of the region. He loathes Kurti. Last time around, he tried to partition Kosovo. Likely he’ll try again. Or at least insist on self-governance for the Serbs in the north that compromises the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. And he’ll wield control over NATO accession as a stick. He’ll also wield USAID assistance, which will need to be unfrozen.

Even without the American push for partition, any discussion of partition of Ukraine will open the question in the Balkans. Russia and Serbia will encourage Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. They will also try to get the Serb-majority north to leave Kosovo. Moscow and Belgrade will figure the US and EU will be unprepared to defend either country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

While the Trump Administration is bad news for Kosovo, so too are future elections in Europe. Further strengthening of the right in Germany this month will stymie EU expansion, already slowed to a crawl.

Kosovo is a good example of successful democratization in the Balkans. But it is also complicated, both internally and in the broader geopolitical context.