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Goat rope

I arrived in Pristina yesterday and have enjoyed two days of intense conversations about Kosovo’s international relations, which are enormously complex for a country of less than 1.8 million inhabitants.

Let’s review the bidding.  Kosovo declared independence in 2008, after almost nine years of UN administration following the 1999 NATO/Yugoslavia war.  Serbia, of which Kosovo was at one time a province, did not concur in independence and has not recognized the Kosovo state’s sovereignty.  But 90 other countries have, including the United States and 22 of the 27 members of the European Union (EU) and 24 of 28 members of NATO.  Russia has blocked approval of UN membership in the Security Council, at the behest of Serbia.  An International Civilian Office (ICO) will supervise Kosovo’s independence until September, when it plans to certify that the Kosovo government has fulfilled its responsibilities under the international community “Ahtisaari plan”  (the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement).  That was intended to be the agreement under which Kosovo became independent but was implemented unilaterally (under international community pressure) by the Kosovo government when Serbia refused to play ball.  Belgrade and Pristina talk, but almost exclusively in an EU-facilitated and US-supported dialogue limited to resolution of technical, not political, issues.

Even after the ICO closes, Kosovo will be under intense international scrutiny (for a fuller account, see the Kosovar Center for Security studies report).  NATO provides a safe and secure environment and is training its security forces for their enhanced roles after the July 2013.  An EU rule of law mission monitors Kosovo’s courts and provides international investigators, prosecutors and judges for interethnic cases.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provides training and advice on democratization, human and minority rights.  The Council of Europe (CoE) administers programs on cultural and archaelogical heritage, social security co-ordination and cybercrime.  The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) continues despite its inconsistency with both the Ahtisaari plan and the declaration of independence, which at Serbia’s behest the International Court of Justice has advised was not in violation of international law or UN Security Council resolution 1244 (which established UNMIK).

Kosovo’s many complications get even worse north of the Ibar river, in the 11% of the country’s territory contiguous with Serbia that is still not under Pristina’s control.  It may not really be under Belgrade’s control either, but that makes the situation there even more difficult.  Partition of that northern bit, which Belgrade authorities have pursued, would likely precipitate ethnic partitions in other parts of the Balkans:  Macedonia, Bosnia and Cyprus would all be at risk if Kosovo were split, an outcome neither Europe nor the U.S. wants to face.  Serbia’s President-elect Nikolic suggested last week that Belgrade might recognize the Georgian break-away regions of South Ossetia and Abhazia, a move that would simultaneously deprive Serbia of its heretofore principled stance against Kosovo independence but at the same time reinforce Belgrade’s hope for partition of northern Kosovo.

What we’ve got here is a goat rope, as the U.S. military says.  The situation seems hopelessly tangled.  It is a miracle that the Kosovo government gets anything done with so many foreigners people looking over its shoulders.  It naturally also has to meet domestic expectations, which are increasingly in the direction of more independence and fewer non-tourist foreigners, though Americans seem always to get a particularly warm welcome because of their role in past efforts to protect Kosovo from the worst ravages of Slobodan Milošević.

Kosovo unquestionably continues to need help.  OSCE recently organized Serbian presidential elections in the Serb communities of Kosovo, a task that would have proven impossible for the Pristina or the Belgrade authorities.  NATO has a continuing role because it will be some years yet before Kosovo can defend itself for even a week from a Serbian military incursion, which is unlikely but cannot be ruled out completely until Belgrade recognizes the Kosovo authorities as sovereign.  The Kosovo courts would still find it difficult to have their decisions fully accepted in many cases of interethnic crime.

But the time is coming this fall for this overly supervised country to struggle on its own, making a few mistakes no doubt but also holding its authorities responsible for them.  Kosovo needs a foreign policy that will take it to the next level.  That means not only untangling the goat rope (or occasionally cutting through it) but also achieving normal relations with Belgrade and UN membership.  There is no reason that an intense effort over the next decade cannot take Kosovo into NATO and perhaps even into the EU, or close to that goal, provided it treats its Serb and other minority citizens correctly and resolves the many outstanding issues with Belgrade on a reciprocal basis, and peacefully.