Category: Bouela Lehbib
Similar interests, opposing views
The Middle East Institute (MEI) held a panel discussion on February 26 about potential future geopolitical scenarios in the Middle East with Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, Senior Vice President at MEI and Rolf Mützenich, Member of German Bundestag and Deputy Parliamentary Leader for Foreign Policy, Defense, and Human Rights.
Feierstein gave an overview of Trump priorities in the Middle East: defeating the Islamic state and violent extremism around the world, containing Iran’s ballistic missile program and interference in internal affairs of its neighbors, and advancing an Israel/Palestine “deal of the century.” According to Feierstein, the US and EU allies hold similar views on challenges Iran poses to regional security and stability.
But there are different views on the way to address those challenges, and in particular whether to reimpose sanctions on Iran. On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the US and Germany agree on the importance of resolving it but disagree on whether the Administration was correct in its decision to formalize the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. While the US has cut off fund for UNRWA, Germany made a big move by stepping in to replace it.
Regarding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Feierstein dwelt on the long history of cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia in establishing peace and security in the region. During the 1960s, Washington and Riyadh worked together to contain the expansion of the Soviet communism. In the 1980s, they stood up against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Today, they still share fundamental interests on global economy security, the energy market, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and concern over Iran. Despite these shared interests, the US and Saudi Arabia hold different values, especially in attitudes towards their citizens, reflected in their views of the Khashoggi affair.
Mützenich emphasized that solving the current crisis in the Middle East requires that people participate in socio-economic progress, not the conclusion of big arms deals. It is imperative to encourage the governments of the region to respect human rights and invest in their people, particularly young people. The killing of Khashoggi aroused a dispute in the EU over arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While Chancellor Merkel decided to no longer export arms to Saudi Arabia, France and Britain did not.
Mützenich expressed concern about ran’s behavior in the region, stressing the importance of international community pressure on Iran’s elite.
The deal with Iran was a great success because it limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities. There is no viable alternative.
While agreeing that the response to ISIS needs to be military, Mützenich argues that ISIS can only be defeated by social and economical inclusion. In Europe, there is a wide debate on whether human rights are a core value or just rhetoric. It was not only Merkel’s position to stop providing arms to Saudi Arabia; the issue was even raised during the negotiations over the coalition government. Ironically, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has allowed women to drive, but women who fought for this right are still behind bars. Mützenich welcomed discussions in the US Congress to try to make the Administration change its position on exporting arms to Saudi Arabia.
There are no grandiose solutions for the big problems facing our world, but humanitarian aid for internally displaced people and refugees can make a difference. The German BundeStag allocates every year €2 billion to humanitarian aid.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Dim future
The Wilson Center held a panel discussion on February 26 exploring the future of the US-Iran relationship . The panel included Robin Wright, journalist and USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, Michael Singh, Managing Director and Senior Fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Robert Malley, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group.
Wright claims that Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif wanted to resign for several reasons. Internally, jealous rivals surround him and sought to impeach him in the parliament (but the issue never came to a vote). He is realist but does not represent the majority; the Supreme Leader and the hardliners are on top of him. Zarif was upset for not being invited when Bashar Assad turned up in Tehran for a meeting with the Supreme Leader. Externally, he failed to sustain the nuclear deal and prevent the Trump administration re-imposition of sanctions. He was also unable to respond to the pressure of Western governments to release a dual national American detainee in Iran or get Iranian banks to comply with international banking standards that were imposed post 9/11.
Singh pointed out that US administrations from Jimmy Carter until now had some engagement with Iran, but it was President Obama who took relations in a different direction with the nuclear agreement. At odds with US policy and interests, Iran does not operate according to conventional norms. It resorts to proxy wars in Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain. These destabilizing actions in the region seek to keep Israel and Saudi Arabia focused on border problems and not Iran itself. Iran has wanted the US out of the region. Obama sought a balance of power in the Middle East between US friends and Iran. That did not happen, and more chaos is coming . While there are shared interests between the US and Iran on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan and ensuring a stable government in Iraq, the ways they pursue those interests tend to be diametrically opposed.
Malley asserted that Democrats and Republicans have engaged with Iran using a mix of coercion and engagement. Both have failed to establish normal relations with Tehran. Even Trump tried to meet Rouhani at the UN. Historically, the US relationship with Iran was not built on a strong basis: take for instance the hostage crisis, the ousting of Mosaddegh, and US support for the Shah.
Most importantly, the Iran-Iraq war, in which almost every country including the US backed Iraq, had a psychological impact on Iran’s attitude toward the US and the region, which is not only polarized between Iran and Saudi Arabia but also between Iran and Israel. Iran wants to play a key major role, but the US has deep strategic interests in oil, support for Israel, and counter-terrorism. Iran believes US backing for Tehran’s foes is an obstacle to its natural weight in the region: Iraq in the past or Saudi Arabia and Israel today.
According to Malley, the one agreement that could have sustainably changed Iranian behavior is the JCPOA. It was better to have that agreement, defuse the nuclear crisis, and prevent a catastrophic war. The JCPOA succeeded because there was pressure and a realistic outcome that Iran and the US with difficulty could accept. Without it, the future is dim.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Have the Taliban changed?
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted a discussion on February 21 about understanding what the Taliban wants, with former Ambassador Omar Samad, Nonresident Senior fFellow with the Atlantic Council. He was joined by William Maley, professor of diplomacy at the Asian-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Candance Rondeaux, professor in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University, and Ahmed Majidyar, Senior Fellow and Director of Iranobserved at MEI.
Samad gave an overview of the emergence of Taliban twenty-five years ago, emphasizing that it is not known how they evolved and gained support inside and outside Afghanistan. Nor is it known how much control Pakistan has over them, their agenda, and their connection with terrorism. Taliban leaders reside outside Afghanistan; some of them go back and forth. The group grew from madrasa system in Afghanistan and Pakistan, supported by foreign fighters from Central Asia and the Caucasus. While they have updated their beliefs on women rights, democracy and governance, the Taliban’s current intentions remain to be tested and verified. They are proclaiming victory, claiming to have won the war and thus wanting to have a say in any future political settlement in Afghanistan.
Maley thinks the US as a wrong approach to the Taliban based on a Western model of leadership. he Taliban wanted to negotiate directly with the US and other international interlocutors to delegitimate the Afghani government. But since the death of Mullah Omar, the Taliban no longer have a leader whose word will bind the rest of the group. Little is known about what is needed now to negotiate effectively with the Taliban.
Evolving in a network of networks, Rondeaux thinks the Taliban do have a strong command structure, as demonstrated during the recent ceasefire. They gave a pledge and kept it, which showed they have control over their groups. Their command and control has grown, with lines of communication stretching from Peshawar to the interior of Afghanistan as well as to Doha and Turkey. This is considerable progress compared to 2001 and 2012, when they were on their back foot and fleeing across the borders. Now they have military courts and a justice system. Because of their cohesiveness, they are having meetings with the UN, ICRC, and other stakeholders.
Majidyar claims that after the US intervention in Afghanistan the Taliban military structure has become more decentralized and shifted from a disorganized insurgent movement to an organized shadow government. Having their leadership inside Pakistan, the Taliban counts on a cabinet that includes a Ministry of Education, a Ministry of Religious Affairs, and a Ministry of War, among others. They have also set up shadow governors and different committees running the day-to- day affairs. Along with the help of NGOs and the UN, they attend to the needs of the population in terms of health, education, and other sectors. Taliban recruitment comes from refugees inside Pakistan, madrasas, and the local community. Their area of influence has expanded from the south and east all across Afghanistan. With growing legitimacy, the Taliban had deepened ties with Russia, China, and the Gulf States.
According to Majidyar, the Taliban have not changed their connection with national and international terrorist groups. Despite the pledges given to the US, they still maintain ties with Al Qaeda active in the region. While pledging to respect human rights and international law once in power, the Taliban’s views on women’s and other human rights have not changed.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What northeast Nigeria needs now
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a discussion on February 13 about risks and resilience in Nigeria as well as the way to advance nutrition and security. The panel included Adesoji Adelaja, Professor at Michigan State University and Fellow at Wilson Center, Dina Esposito, Vice President of Technical Leadership at Mercy Corps, Philip DeCosse, Vice President of Chemonics, and Greg Collins, Deputy Assistant Administrator and Resilience Coordinator at the US Agency for International Development.
Adelaja explained the fact that it is taking some time for Nigeria to recognize the significance of resilience, countering violent extremism, and economic development strategies as ways to transform conflict. Much of the focus in the past was on the military approach, overlooking the socio-economic root causes. Since coming to power four years ago, the current government did its utmost to deal with those issues, but security and economic problems are still there. Adelaja stressed the importance of educating leaders who make critical decisions on stabilizing society, investing in think tanks, and empowering NGOs. With their support, Adelaja suggests, the government will be ready to face those challenges.
Many businesses left because of the conflict in the northeast of Nigeria. Internally displaced people do not have the capacity to continue their businesses. Others have just relocated and are ready to move back if the security conditions improve. According to Adelaja, the rebuilding will cost billions of dollars as schools, water systems, and delivery mechanisms need to be reestablished.
Just back from northern Nigeria, Esposito spelled out the Mercy Corps resilience and risk assessment, which identifies how people cope and adapt in crises settings. There is still a huge reliance on old and new social networks like family, friends, and savings groups. People are relying much more on local markets than on government or NGOs to survive, making incentivizing and stocking the markets a crucial element in building resilience. Young people in Nigeria are asking for access to education, employability, startup capital, access to information, and personal mobility as ways to create flourishing businesses.
Regarding the resilience of the market, DeCosse spoke about the challenges in convincing players to move to conflict zones. He stressed the importance of the large private sector investors, but also smaller enterprises in revitalizing the local economy. He said that tremendous efforts had been made in trying to figure out how risk reduction can happen in conflict zones, and whether microfinance is the most feasible approach, or it is time to start thinking of establishing banks. With the experience available, DeCosse suggested a combination of information technology and outreach agents as well as working with banks to address the challenges.
Representing Feed the Future organization, Collins perceived what is happening in Nigeria as part of a broader phenomenon manifested in other countries in the Sahel such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Somalia. Perennial humanitarian risks are a development challenge. Without development, little progress will be made in northeast Nigeria. People who escape poverty end up falling into poverty again due to their exposure to a range of stresses and shocks like climate change, environmental degradation, population growth, and conflict volatility. In Ethiopia, from 1999 to 2009, 60% of the people fell back to poverty and in Kenya 40% over a similar period. Instead of access to financial services and markets, Collins suggested a diverse, comprehensive portfolio to address the problems in northeast Nigeria and elsewhere by combining different sectors like health, conflict and governance, water and sanitation, etc.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Needed: better Arab armies
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted a book talk on February 14 with Kenneth Pollack, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), former CIA intelligence analyst, and the author of Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness.
Pollack argues that since the second world war, Arab armies had underperformed. He believes that the size, material factors and the weaponry with which they waged war could have enabled Arabs to win easily, but instead they lost catastrophically. The few times they won were modest victories. Reflecting on the core reason for Arab military backwardness in the last seventy years, Pollack attributes it to Arab society itself. He argues that what defines a good and bad military in the industrial age warfare is a hierarchy based on mission-oriented orders in which the general gives the subordinate a sense of what he is trying to achieve and leaves it to them to figure out how best to do it. Arab culture’s educational system, though, inculcates a rigidly top-down system of organization and hierarchy.
Pollack explained that every culture develops in response to its own circumstances. And Warfare is usually a competitive activity against the organization of another society that organizes itself differently. Arabs were trying to fight industrial warfare in a way that their culture and society did not equip them to do, against foes who were way better equipped l(ike, for instance, the Israelis).
Strikingly similar patterns of underperformance in Middle Eastern wars suggest recurrent problems. Descriptions of Egyptian performance in 1948 and Iraqi performance in 2014 read like plagiarized versions of one another. Arabs have not experienced the industrial revolution, or the information revolution of today.
Apart from the cultural piece, Pollack identifies a set of problems Arab armies suffer. Most Arab generals were inexperienced and did not know what they were doing. Junior officers are passive, inflexible, unimaginative, and unable to respond to battlefield developments. At the bottom of Arab chain of command, personnel had difficulties handling their weapons and maintaining them properly. The more sophisticated a weapon it is, the harder for them to handle. For instance, All countries who trained Arab armies (the Russians, French, Americans, and British) attest that they performed better with the older Soviet MIG 17 and MIG 21 than they did with American F4 and F16. Providing Arab armies with sophisticated weapons did not improve their combat capability.
In addition, the Arab world is replete with bad civil military relations. Many regimes lacking legitimacy tend to be concerned the generals surrounding them, as the leaders themselves came to power by overthrowing others. They seek therefore to hobble the military so that can not do likewise. Saddam Hussein was an outstanding example, as he put people in charge whom he knew to be incompetent. The golden rule has thus always been loyalty over competence.
It is important for those who want the US out of the region that it not to be replaced by Iran, Hezbollah, ISIS, or Al-Qaeda. Without the US, it is imperative to leave behind a strong Arab army able of defending against these threats.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Keeping rigor in a shallow environment
The Middle East Institute hosted a discussion on Thursday 30 about the role of think tanks in shaping Middle East policy, with Randa Slim, Senior Fellow and Director of Conflict Resolution at MEI. She was Joined by Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Paul Salem, President of Middle East Institute, Steven Kenney, Principal of Foresight Vector LLC, and Sami Atallah, Director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.
Katulis stated that Thinks Tanks are in an existential crisis; the weak and incoherent policy planning process inside the US government has affected the analysis they are doing. There is also a growing tendency towards advocacy as opposed to analysis, reflecting Trump’s disruptive style of politics and decision-making. This approach has created an incentive for many think tanks just to react to the latest decisions without examining more holistically what is going on. Katulis claims the sectarianism and tribalism that exist in the Middle East are also echoed in DC in the sense that think tanks tend not to bring together people with different views. Worse, the media has affected the way policy and politics are conducted, making scholars too reactive to events and statements coming out of the current Administration.
Slim mentioned that there is too much Track I dialogue and not enough emphasis on Track II. She stated that Track II diplomacy had become a growing field of study, to which MEI has devoted particular attention. The work done by Herbert Kelman on the Arab -Israeli conflict has fertilized this field in the Middle East. The Taif agreement for Lebanon was negotiated in a three-year Track II process that started before the official negotiations, subsequently producing an outcome that translated into Track I official negotiations. When there is no working policy process as in the current US administration, or when there are no relations between the antagonists in a conflict such as the Saudi-Iranian conflict, there is no Track I to hook to.
Reflecting on the role of thank tanks in the Middle East, Salem gave an overview of how the civil society organizations fuel of these research centers. They have had a significant impact in producing policy ideas and creating young leaders who are empowered, informed and moving into public space. Think tanks were part of the awakening and empowerment that led up to the Arab Spring. For Salem, that impact had two effects; it empowered civil society, but at the same time it drew government antagonism. In the US, it is challenging to impact the government due to the lack of a political process that is real, meaningful, and coherent. The same thing can be said about the resurgent authoritarian regimes in the Middle East inspired by China and Russia and encouraged by the current illiberal president Donald Trump.
Atallah described the political environment thinks tanks are operating in as not inclusive or transparent, leaving little chance for them to influence decisions. There is also a problem of financial sustainability. Think tanks need a long-term income stream to hire senior staff to deal with emerging issues. According to Atallah, through research, advocacy and conferences think tanks have been able to introduce key ideas and influence decision-making in Lebanon.
Kenney spoke about the few mainstream think tanks tjat are employing the methods of foresight in a concerted way, alongside the other research and analysis they have traditionally done. For Kenney, the rigor, comprehensiveness and objectivity of think tanks and the methodology behind them do not often get recognized. The misconception many have is that think tanks are the equivalent of looking into a crystal ball and trying to predict the future. Kenny clarified that think tanks explain why things are the way they are today and extrapolate forward from that.
RSS - Posts
