Category: Bouela Lehbib
The Berlin Wall is falling in Venezuela
The Atlantic Council held a discussion on January 30 about supporting the new Venezuelan interim government (VIG) led by Juan Guaidó. The panel included Carlos Vecchio, chargé d’affairs to the United States of the interim government of Venezuela, Julio Borges, VIG representative to Lima Group, David Smolansky, former Mayor and exiled activist. They were joined by David O’Sullivan, Head of EU delegation to the US, Manuel Maria Cáceres, Paraguay ambassador to the US, Alfonso Silva, Chile Ambassador to the US, and Edward Royce, former chairman of the House International Relations Committee.
Vecchio spoke about three types of pressure to make President Maduro quit power: internal pressure by the opposition; pressure from the National Assembly, which Vecchio sees as the legitimate democratically elected institution; and pressure from the international community. The regime has always tried to play the dialogue card to get enough oxygen and to divide and manipulate the international community. But unless Maduro is gone, the sociopolitical condition will not change and constitutional transition to a stable democracy will not be possible.
Borges spoke about three intersecting factors that prevented Maduro from falling quickly: the military, oil, and Cuba. Nowhere in Latin America have these three factors ever coincided. Maduro came to power and led Venezuela to ruin, including the economy. A few generals along with Cuba are keeping hold of the country. According to Borges, two dynamics persist in Latin America: the axis of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela still play the Cold War card and the rest of the countries, who follow the post-Cold War rules of freedom and democracy. But Borges is optimistic the Berlin Wall is falling in Latin America thirty years later, opening the door to a new system of democracy, human rights, and freedom.
Exiled in Washington DC for almost eighteen months, Smolansky described Guaidó as the interim president, head of state, and commander of arm forces, promising fair and democratic elections. Almost 3.5 million migrants are the result of the current crisis, the largest in the history of Latin America. Venezuelans are fleeing to neighbors: Colombia has one million, Ecuador seven hundred thousand, Chile two hundred thousand, Brazil more than one hundred thousand, and US more than half a million. For Smolansky, the most viable way out to this crisis is by restoring democracy in the country, regaining its freedom and establishing rule of law.
O’Sullivan presented the EU’s position, which supports transition in Venezuela. The EU did not accept the May election results and decided not to attend the inauguration, preferring to back the National Assembly and interim president Guaidó in restoring democracy. Alarmed by the humanitarian crisis in the country and its implications for the region, the EU provided $66 million for humanitarian support. EU countries have allowed Maduro some time to hold democratic elections, and the member states continue to engage with each other to have one stand on the issue.
As the first country recognizing the interim government, the newly appointed ambassador of Paraguay to the US, Cáceres, stated it was the right thing to do as Venezuelan people are suffering beyond imagination. Cáceres added that upon his recent inauguration, the president of Paraguay gave a pledge to support the people of Venezuela. A few days later, Paraguay broke diplomatic relations.
Silva stressed the commitment of Chile to the freedom in Venezuela. Although losing the resolution to recognize the interim government by one vote at the Organization of American States (OAS), Silva stressed the importance of more diplomacy to convince countries in the region and elsewhere to recognize Guaidó as legitimate. Venezuela needs humanitarian aid; pressure should be brought on Maduro to allow it in.
Royce painted the humanitarian situation as dire. Maduro’s military controls the importation of food and medicine. He also brought in the Chinese ZTE cooperation to run the social credit system, which makes Venezuelans rely on a card from the government to get food, pension, medicine, and basic services. ZTE, which belongs to Chinese intelligence, tracks people who write on social media through a database, and if you are against the regime, you will end up in jail. Jails are at over capacity. Out of 83,000 people in jail, 60% do not have potable water, leading to malaria and tuberculosis outbreaks.
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Hard to know how to please the US
The Middle East Policy Council hosted a discussion January 25 assessing Trump Administration mid- term policy on the Middle East, with Philip Gordon, Fellow in US Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was joined by Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute and Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President and Director of the Middle East Program.
Gordon described Trump Administration policy in the Middle East as based on a core contradiction. On one hand, it sets out to constrain Iran from meddling in the region, to defeat ISIS, to achieve a Palestinian/Israeli peace, and show US leadership. On the other hand, the President regards the Middle East as only sand and death where the US has spent around $6 trillion without getting anything in return. The US thus wants to leave and make others pay for the expenses incurred.
Two years of trying to inflict pain on the Iranian economy did not make Iran change its behavior in the region. However costly and risky the mission might be, Gordon thinks the US should have maintained troops in Syria to prevent a Turkish invasion, giving the Kurds the leverage they need in negotiations with Damascus, and finishing the job against ISIS. Trump wants Gulf states to invest invest in the US, buy US weapons, and fight ISIS in return for backing them on countering Iran. This policy has signaled a green light to do what they want to boycott Qatar, continue the bombing campaign in Yemen, and repress dissidents.
Doran offered a different assessment of Trump Administration policy in the Middle East based on what the President promised during his election campaign: doing more with less. Trump’s approach is totally different from Obama’s of no enemies or friends, only stakeholders and problems. The US works to reach an agreement accepted by all friendly parties. Trump looks after US interests and seeks to save blood and treasure by working with allies who accept the US security umbrella in the region, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This policy favors a coalition of allies to contain Iran. Doran claims this policy is much better than Obama’s.
Ultimately, it’s all about how you read the Iranians for Doran. Obama downplayed Iran’s aspirations. Trump thinks Iran wants to destroy the US alliance system and kick it out of the Gulf region and the Middle East.
Confused about US policy in the Middle East, Alterman pointed out what he sees as Trump’s contradictory policies in the region. John Bolton, National Security Adviser, stated the US is staying in Syria, while the president contradicted him by declaring the withdrawal. Trump said it would take thirty days to pull out and now it’s six months. In Gulf states, Trump disengaged on Yemen, embraced Saudi Arabia, and ignored the GCC conflict. The president is divorced from his government and has a poorly functioning staff. That said, Trump’s three main objectives are reasonably clear: building close ties with Saudi Arabia, countering Iran (and reversing Obama strategy of engaging it), and holding the Middle East at arm’s length.
But this strategy, Alterman argued, is not working. It is bizarre for Trump to make Iran the core of the Middle East strategy, since Tehran is weak. Its GDP is between the state of Maryland and Michigan. Mississippi, which has the lowest income per capita in the US, has seven times the income per capita of Iran. Iran has no allies in the Middle East. It can be a spoiler in the region but cannot be a winner.
For Alterman, the biggest mistake the US is making is an idiosyncratic embrace of some Middle Eastern states and the abandonment of many, rendering it hard for countries to understand how to please the US.
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The foreign policy process is broken
The Center for Strategic and International studies ( CSIS) held a discussion January 23 focused on effects of the US withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan there, in the region and on US national security. The panel included Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President and Director of the Middle East Program, Melissa Dalton, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security Program and Director of the Cooperative Defense Project, Seth G. Jones, Harold Brown Chair and Director of Transnational Threats Project and the Senior Adviser to the International Security Program, and Nancy Youssef, National Security Correspondent for The Wall Street Journal.
Alterman claims that what is troublesome about the US moving out of Syria is reduced control over what it leaves behind, compromising its leverage in the negotiations about the future of Syria. Trump could have negotiated terms of US withdrawal to get concessions from Syria, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Kurds. The immediate and unconditional exit makes the parties do their own deals, with US interests ignored. President Trump has wanted to withdraw but people surrounding him did not. National Security Adviser John Bolton announced last September that the US is staying in Syria as long as Iran troops are there. Alterman added that this shows the broken system: the president does not consider the various options presented to him, and the government does not follow his directions. The President is issuing tweets or making statements that generate reactions because policy is not agreed.
Syria remains crucial for the US, according to Dalton. She claimed that what happens in Syria has wide implications elsewhere. The terrorism threat is still looming, along with the refugee and humanitarian crisis. It is thus hard to forecast the negative effects of this conflict on the region and Europe. US competitors like Russia and Iran can easily fill the gap left behind, increasing their sphere of influence in the region. Worse, the long-standing principle prohibiting the use of chemical weapons against civilians and facilities is eroding. Dalton asserts that the recent public opinion polling by Pew shows that half of Americans do not believe the US has achieved its objectives in Afghanistan. The majority also suggests US should be pulling out of Syria.
Jones noted that in a recent C-Span appearance he found it striking that all people who called in– Democrats, Republicans and Independents–were supportive of the withdrawal. They were wondering why the money spent in Syria and Afghanistan is not being used at home. Americans seem in favor of withdrawal. Trump’s doctrine for foreign policy looks like restraint: minimizing the use of military force in some areas which he sees not as a strategic interest, such as the Middle East and Asia.
Yet the US is not talking about bringing the 2000 troops back home. Youssef said they are thinking of placing them in Iraq, Kuwait, and other neighboring countries. The risk in this is that when the US is not present, and instead relying on Kurds who feel abandoned, the ability to understand the situation and shape events shrinks. Russia and Iran have long-standing influence in Syria. Neither the US presence nor withdrawal will affect them much. The US is not the dominant force Syria, as the Israeli strikes against Iran and its proxies there suggest. Youssef too noted a major change in how the US makes decisions. In the past, the US deliberated all possible options and the costs associated with them, and then announce its policies. Now it’s the opposite. The policy is announced first, and deliberation comes later.
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Buffer zone in northern Syria
The Foundation of Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) hosted a discussion on January 18, about the US withdrawal from Syria, with Mark Kimmitt, retired General and defense consultant. He was joined by Hassan Hassan, Senior Fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy and Andrew Tabler, Martin J. Gross Fellow in the Geduld Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. They addressed the US withdrawal from Syria, and its implications for the region, mainly Turkey, Syria and the Kurds.
Pointing out the reasons for the US withdrawal from Syria, Kimmitt believes ISIS is no longer an existential threat to the US. It has not been completely defeated, but it has been degraded. The caliphate is gone. The mission has been accomplished. He claims that asking the US to stay in Syria to finish off ISIS would entail a US presence in the twenty-three other countries where ISIS operates.
YPG, Kimmitt asserts, are brave and allies of the US. But working alongside them to fight ISIS was, quoting US envoy James Jeffrey, “temporary, transactional and tactical.” Having given no expectations or promises to the YPG when the mission is over, the US is off the hook. Turkey’s concerns about the Kurds pose a serious challenge. Kimmitt suggests a safe zone in Syria, like the one set up as part of the Dayton Peace Accords between the Serb and Federation forces. The YPG can be protected while also honoring Turkish national security concerns.
Hassan is still concerned with ISIS. Besides sleeper cells and ISIS members who got tired of fighting, sympathizers with the group are everywhere in the region. They can return to violence at anytime. He considers the hasty US withdrawal from Syria at odds with the slow defeat of ISIS. But ISIS is not the only problem. Peace in Syria is still fragile and can crumble at any time. If the fight gets renewed, ISIS and Al-Nusra will benefit the most, as moderate groups have been completely decimated.
These facts get ignored because the U.S withdrawal from Syria has been hijacked by two arguments. One calls into question the role 2000 US troops can play against Iran. The other questions what they can possibly do to confront ISIS. Hassan considers these flawed arguments, as the mission was never to fight Iran and US troops were not the spearhead of the fight against ISIS. It is possible for the US to pull the troops from Syria while fighting ISIS, and decide with other countries the fate of the one-third of Syrian territory they have controlled.
Acknowledging the complex nature of the conflict in Syria, Andrew offered an overall perspective to understand its intricacies. Assad, with the help of Russia and Shiite militias was able to take over 60% of the territory. Syrian opposition backed by Turkey played a major role in freeing some areas, including Idlib. In the eastern part of Syria, the US partnered with YPG to defeat ISIS.
The outcome was unacceptable to two neighboring countries: Israel and Turkey. Israel is concerned with Shiite militia and Iran-backed units moving heavy weapons into the country. For Turkey, the PKK is an existential threat. US backing for Kurds allied with the PKK, which fights the Turkish government made Ankara feel a huge threat.
The moderator of the discussion, Kadir Ustun, Executive Director at SETA Foundation, spelled out the Turkish position . He claims that Turkey has put a lot of pressure on the US to stop cooperating and empowering what he labeled “terrorist YPG,” who are linked to PKK. Their primary objective is to enlarge themselves and get international legitimacy, not fighting ISIS. Turkey’s operations west of the Euphrates and Manbij were undertaken to limit the movement of the YPG.
Bottom line: US withdrawal is a subject of intense debate among the Americans, Turkey, the PYD and other stakeholders wactive inside Syria. A buffer zone between the warring parties is an option.
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Take the money, ask no questions
The Wilson Center held a discussion this week on “Democratic and International Impacts of Kleptocracy,” with Edward Melon, Kennan Institute Fellow, along with Casey Michel, reporter at Think Progress, and Jodi Vittori, a Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The panelists touched on kleptocracy in Asia, mainly in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and its implications for democracy. They also addressed the implications of financial secrecy as practiced in some states.
Edward Melon diagnosed the political situation in Tajikistan as extremely corrupt, with one leader, Emomali Rahamon, holding a grip on the country for decades. Since coming to power, Rahamon has built an authoritarian regime grounded on nepotism and favoritism. His family controls politics and business all over the country. His eldest son is the current mayor of the capital city. His daughter is the chief of the staff. His sons-in-law and other family members monopolize the biggest companies and projects that render the most lucrative benefits. The also embezzle money embezzlement and export capital. Tajikistan is one of the most kleptocratic countries in Asia, with a highly unequal distribution of wealth.
The state apparatus silences voices of opposition and even, as Melon puts it, engages in “transnational oppression” by targeting its opponents outside the country. This strengthened authoritarianism could revive the civil war that tore the country apart from 1992 to 1997.
Michel focused on the US. It is increasingly a hub of explicit financial secrecy internationally. The small state of Delaware has been in the forefront of implementing financial secrecy rules. Friendly laws and a unique model of “take the money, ask no questions” has captivated myriad corporations. Big companies, embezzlers, traffickers and shady corporations moved there to cloak their money in secrecy. Michel claims, “Delaware now has more corporations than people.”
But Delaware is not the only state exploiting secrecy. Nevada and Wyoming have joined it. According to Michel, in 1991 Nevada loosened its laws to model itself as Delaware of the west. By 2001, it further increased financial secrecy to attract more corporations. The same thing goes for Wyoming; it has adopted similar policies to accommodate corporations. Shell companies find such states a safe haven for their money.
Michel argues the US is ranked as the second contributor to financial secrecy in the world after Switzerland. Delaware, Nevada and Wyoming are at the bottom of the barrel in terms of financial stanadards.
Vittori offered an overview of kleptocracy in Afghanistan. Corruption there has become endemic in almost all segments of the Afghan state. High level officials are involved in payoffs, embezzlement, and drug trafficking, fueling insurgent groups instead of combating them. The insurgents are readily recruiting, as they can provide protection and money. Vittori sees the kleptocratic environment in Afghanistan as becoming normalized, rendering the status quo more beneficial for some than reform would be.
Security sectors in a majority of Third World countries are maintained by loyal people, mostly family members or trusted individuals. Their role has more to do with defending the regime than the borders or citizens. Vittori says around 50% of the budget in sub-Saharan Africa goes to security sector. Transparency and accountability are rarely raised. Patronage and nepotism cover things up.
Bottom line: kleptocracy is inherent in weak states. It undermines democracy and the rule of law. It feeds grievances, terrorism, and criminal groups. But some democratic countries do not care about kleptocracy in other countries, as long as the money flows to them.
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