Category: Bridget Gill
Building peace from the ground up
On Wednesday, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted Dr. Samir Altaqi to discuss the prospects of national reconciliation in Syria as well as the fight against ISIS. As general director of the Dubai-based Orient Research Center, Altaqi conducts research on locations throughout the Middle East. He has also founded two initiatives, the Arab-Kurds Dialogue in 2013 and the Save Syria Initiative in 2015.
Altaqi, based on reports conducted by his Center, posited that the situation on the ground in Syria has reached the point that it is more logical and practicable to set up a confederal system. The different regions have gravitated toward their neighbors and become more localized, not just in terms of security, but economically as well. Northern Syria is more integrated with the Turkish economy, while the land east of the Euphrates is increasingly turning towards Erbil.
While 76% of the Syrian economy formerly passed through Damascus, the capital has been displaced and now sees only 17%. We are witnessing the collapse of the system of loyalties that used to support the state, and autonomous regions are crystallizing and fusing socioeconomically. In Altaqi’s analysis, the ministry of finance, the central bank, and the electricity network are the sole remaining central structures. All other state institutions have devolved, and ‘state’ employees operate on a local basis.
What is therefore needed, Altaqi believes, is a national reconciliation pact, with incentives for all parties, under the cultural and historical banner of ‘Syria’ even if politically no more than a confederation. Even if Bashar al-Assad goes, Altaqi believes the conflict won’t come to an end. Reconciliation needs to be built from the parties on the ground, with horizontal Syrian-Syrian dialogue.
Necessary steps include determining which parties are classifiable as internationalist terrorists, and eliminating the local incubator for Jabhat al-Nusra and other al-Qaeda-leaning groups. Engagement, especially with the Syrian fighters in these groups, is essential for moderating extremists. The conflict needs to be frozen, instituting local ceasefires within a larger framework for a national ceasefire.
As for international involvement, Altaqi does think that a Vienna process of some sort is necessary, but there is no agreement between the US and Russia as yet. For the US in particular, he believes officials still entertain illusions about the conflict. These include the illusion that the conflict can be contained; that an alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Iran is possible; and also that ISIS will not come to the US.
There is a lack of a Yalta-style master plan between international actors to solve the crisis. Each is pursuing its own agenda in Syria, using the pretext of fighting ISIS. Tensions among them are strong – Turkey is afraid of Russia and isn’t sure NATO will back it up if the tensions increase.
The US also needs to take Sunni Arab actors seriously on the ground. As it stands, Washington has no leverage over them, though both Turkey and Saudi Arabia do. Echoing a common view, Altaqi states that it is Sunni Arabs who can effectively confront and defeat ISIS, given the right resources and opportunities.
Trained as a cardiovascular surgeon, Altaqi formulates the crisis in a medical analogy: there has been a loss of immunity because in weak states of the region. An infection has thus entered this regional body, in the form of ISIS. No matter what antibiotic you use to combat it, it will not have the desired effect without rebuilding the immune system.
Thus, national reconciliation is essential first and foremost. It would stabilize Syria, free up resources, and create bodies who can then confront the ISIS threat. In Altaqi’s view, this is what must be done.
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Arabs casting votes, not stones
On Wednesday, the Palestine Center hosted Member of Knesset Aymen Odeh, the chairman of the Joint List, to give a talk entitled ‘Palestinian Citizens of Israel Lead Toward Justice, Freedom, and Equality. The Joint List is a political alliance of the four Arab-dominated parties and currently the third-largest faction in Israel’s parliament.
Odeh makes an argument for changing Israeli public opinion and politics through Palestinian citizens’ action and participation. Palestinian citizens of Israel constitute 18% of the population, and therefore possess some electoral weight when working together. After 1948, it was important for the Palestinians who remained not to get stuck in nafsiyyat al-Nakba – a Nakba mentality. Early activists, especially in the Communist Party, pushed back against the government, for instance during celebrations for the 10th anniversary of Israel’s founding, in an effort to instead cultivate a mentality of ‘confrontation and challenge’.
There is thus a legacy of Palestinian political action in Israel. Odeh moreover continuously highlighted the themes of “remaining” and citizenship. Palestinians, in his formulation, are a national minority, but a minority stemming from an indigenous population, a portion of whom is now under occupation in their own country. The Joint List is thoroughly politically committed to ending that occupation, but they – and the minority of Palestinian citizens – do not want to isolate themselves from the rest of Israeli society.
The method is political and social action, including the more gradual and nebulous approach of changing Israeli public opinion about the situation in the West Bank and Gaza. The Joint List faces considerable challenges, including balancing the many different political leanings of the members of the alliance. It also faces deliberate slander from Netanyahu, who has called Arab members of the Knesset “ISIS,” and attempts from the religious right to exclude them from politics.
The Joint List is also committed to advocating for other underrepresented or marginalized groups in Israel, such as Mizrahi Jews and disabled persons. The aim is to use the full 18% to maximum effect, but also to collaborate with other groups in Israeli society. The imperative is to advance a moral alternative to the status quo to for all of Israel’s citizens.
Odeh drew comparisons with other historic struggles, particularly with the civil rights movement in the US. He finds more sympathy with the method of Martin Luther King, Jr., than with Malcolm X, at least until the latter changed his politics later in life. For Odeh, the joint struggle of both white and black Americans toward a more just and equal society was the most effective orientation. The Joint List has its work cut out for it, but it may be that its members can use this method to good effect in advancing the causes of justice and equality in Israel, too.
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Peace picks November 30 – December 4
- Renewed Violence in the Central African Republic: The Roots of a Political Crisis | Monday, November 30th | 12:30-2:00 | US Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Leaders and citizens of the Central African Republic, with the support of the international community, are currently focusing resources and energy on laying the groundwork for a peaceful constitutional referendum and elections in the coming months. But sustained peace in in the country will require longer-term efforts as well, because the recent crisis is rooted in decades of poor governance and persistent insecurity. After the elections, Central African Republic policymakers and the international community will be challenged to lay the groundwork for the new government by addressing the longstanding grievances that contribute to the cyclical nature of the violence in CAR. The panel will bring together some of the foremost experts on the Central African Republic’s recent history of rebellion and instability, including the two most recent coups, international intervention efforts, the country’s political economy, and the ongoing series of United Nations and regional peacekeeping efforts. The experts will draw on their contributions to Making Sense of the Central African Republic, published by Zed Books, to make policy recommendations for the crucial remaining steps in CAR’s political transition and beyond. Panelists include: Louisa Lombard, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Yale University; Tatiana Carayannis, Deputy Director Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF), Social Science Research Council (SSRC); Ambassador Laurence Wohlers, Senior Fellow, Meridian International; Ledio Cakaj, Independent Consultant, Expert on the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Séléka; Roland Marchal, Senior Research Fellow, National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), based at the Center for International Studies (CERI), Paris Institute of Political Studies; and Faouzi Kilembe, Independent Researcher, Expert on Central African Civil Society and Local Development. Nancy Lindborg, President of USIP, will moderate the discussion.Pose questions for the panel on Twitter with #CARUSIP.
- 3-D Printing the Bomb? The Challenge for Nuclear Nonproliferation | Tuesday, December 1st | 10:30-12:00 | The Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND |3-D printing has opened the world to a revolution in manufacturing. But this new technology may enable the most sensitive pieces of a nuclear weapons program to be more easily produced and transferred undetected around the globe. The United States should lead an international effort to prevent a 3-D printing-enabled cascade of nuclear weapons proliferation before it is too late. Tristan Volpe and Matthew Kroenig will launch their new article, “3-D Printing the Bomb? The Nuclear Nonproliferation Challenge,” and explore how the United States can adopt both top-down and bottom-up strategies to combat this threat to international security. Bruce Goodwin will moderate.
- Developmental Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism | Tuesday, December 1st | 11:00-12:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | RSVP to PPD@csis.org | Join us for an expert discussion on the role of development actors in addressing the drivers and manifestations of violent extremism. Although the events and aftermath of September 11, 2001 forced governments around the world to develop new counterterrorism tactics, the rise of ISIS and other violent extremist groups has focused international attention on the underlying risk factors and risk processes that make young people, in particular, vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment.
Development actors have invested significant time and resources into understanding the drivers of violent extremism and developing an evidence-based approach to address these factors. Yet, many questions remain about the most salient development-related drivers and the viability of taking a holistic, developmental approach to violent extremism. Panelists will discuss the contributions that development actors can play in preventing violent extremism and uncovering the limitations to these approaches. Daniel F. Runde, director of CSIS’s Project on Prosperity and Development, and William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, will give opening remarks, followed by a panel discussion featuring: Farooq Kathwari,Chairman, CEO, and President, Ethan Allen Interiors, Inc.; and Susan Reichle, Agency Counselor, U.S. Agency for International Development. The discussion will be moderated by Shannon N. Green, director of CSIS’s Human Rights Initiative. - Berets are OK, Headscarves are not | Wednesday, December 2nd | 12:30-2:00 | Georgetown University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Relations between the French state and public visibility of religion, particularly Islam, became openly confrontational in the late 1980s with the infamous “headscarf affair” in public schools, where Muslim students were expelled from school for wearing a hijab (Islamic headscarf). With respect to public displays of religion, the initial response of public authorities was a lenient application of laïcité towards the general public but a rigid one towards civil servants. In the 2000s, there were escalating public struggles between public manifestations of religious affiliation and politicians increasingly fighting for a restrictive application of laïcité that regards religious displays as a violation of public order. This increasing politicization of laïcité, where religious freedom was seen as an assault on cultural and republican values, has resulted in a toughening of the legislative speech on religious signs, particularly against Muslims who were seen as more openly violating French cultural norms. While restrictions of expression of religious affiliation of students began in public schools, we are now observing an extension of this control to people in public spaces. This expansion of repressive policies will end badly not only for Muslim minorities in Europe, but also the overall legitimacy and integrity of modern European liberal values. Rim-Sarah Alouane, Ph.D. candidate in Public Law at the University Toulouse-Capitol, will give a presentation on the subject, in the Intercultural Center, room 270.
- Examining the Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy | Tuesday, December 2nd | 12:15-1:45 | The Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Many people in non-Western countries say that they want a democratic system of governance—but just not Western-style democracy. Yet what is meant by non-Western democracy often remains unclear, and at times is merely a cover for non-democratic practices. A new book by Carnegie senior associate Richard Youngs, The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy, examines the growing search for variation in democratic practice and the implications of this search for Western democracy assistance providers. Youngs argues that it is most useful to focus on the common challenge of democratic renewal in both Western and non-Western countries, and he identifies areas of democratic variation that may help to productively channel efforts for such renewal. Richard Youngs will present the core arguments of his book in a roundtable event. Shadi Hamid, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Sandra Pepera, director for gender, women, and democracy at the National Democratic Institute, will offer comments on the different regional applications of these issues. Thomas Carothers will moderate the discussion.
- 6th Annual Conference on Turkey | Thursday, December 3rd | 9:00-4:15 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Center for Turkish Studies at The Middle East Institute and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation are pleased to present the Sixth Annual Conference on Turkey, held at the National Press Club. The conference will assemble three expert panels to discuss the country’s tumultuous domestic politics following recent elections, the future of democracy in the country, and Turkish foreign policy. The keynote speaker for the conference will be the co-leader for Turkey’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, in discussion with MEI’s Gönül Tol. The full program can be viewed here.
- U.S. and Western Policy Towards Russia: Cooperation, Containment, or Something Else Entirely? | Thursday, December 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Center for Strategic and International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Russian annexation of Crimea has led to over two years of debate regarding Washington’s strategy towards Moscow. Today, with Ukraine somewhat quieter and seeming progress towards cooperation on Syria, are more cooperative approaches possible? What should be Washington’s goals in engaging with Russia, or responding to it on the global stage? Are there tools that have not yet been tried, and what can they attain where other efforts have failed? Vladislav Inozemtsev, prominent Russian economist and visiting fellow at CSIS, will outline his views of what’s possible, what’s likely, and what should be done by the United States as it reevaluates its Russia policies. Olga Oliker, Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, will provide commentary. The event will be moderated by Jeffrey Mankoff, Deputy Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia.
- The State of Religious Freedom in the US and Europe | Thursday, December 3rd | 2:00-4:00 | KARAMAH | REGISTER TO ATTEND | It has become increasingly clear that even countries that champion international religious freedom still apply laws and regulations that restrict religious minorities’ rights with respect to many issues including their dress, their ability to have places of worship, and even the validity of their religious marriages.During this event, we will discuss how countries around the world, especially those that ostensibly defend religious freedom, can uphold these values and make sure they are fully reflected in their respective societies. Please attend and discuss with global leaders and advisers how violations of international religious freedom are impacting marginalized communities, especially the fundamental rights of Muslim women and girls. Speakers include David N. Saperstein, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom; Aisha Rahman, Esq., KARAMAH executive director; and Engy Abdelkader, Esq., Adviser with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The event will be held at The General Board of Church and Society 100 Maryland Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002.
- Building Regional Stability: Addressing Pakistan’s Conflict – Displaced Persons | Thursday, December 3rd | 3:30-4:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Given the recent international attention on global refugee issues, including the flow of Afghan and Syrian refugees to the European Union, efforts to keep conflict-displaced persons in their home countries and repatriate them quickly and effectively has become more significant. Pakistan has over 1 million people still displaced from the conflict in FATA that could join those refugee outflows if an effective and resourced strategy is not in place. Recognizing this, Secretary Kerry announced a $250 million US commitment to help resettle and sustain civilians displaced by the Pakistani military’s campaign against militant group, and this month a $30 million USAID-supported FATA livelihoods and education recovery program launched as part of that pledge. John Groarke, USAID’s Pakistan Director, will join us to discuss this challenge facing Pakistan and the region. Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, will moderate the discussion.
- Yemen between War and Political Solution | Friday, December 4th | 9:30-11:00 | The Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Yemeni conflict is in its 8th month with no end in sight. What are the prospects for a solution, military or political? If the conflict is nothing more than a proxy war for Saudis and Iranians, what are the prospects for third party solutions? Finally, what are the long-term consequences of this conflict down the road for the region and beyond? Speakers include Mohammad Al-Shami, a youth activist and advocacy trainer in Yemen, and former Leaders for Democracy Fellow, Maxwell School of Syracuse University; Amat Alsoswa, founder of the Yemeni National Women’s Committee, first Yemeni female ambassador, former Human Rights minister, and former UN Assistant Secretary General; and Barbara Bodine, Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, The Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and former Ambassador to Yemen. Henri J. Barkey, director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Middle East Program, will moderate the discussion. There will be a live webcast of the event.
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Is there a best option for Syria?
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted ‘A look at the policy options in war-torn Syria’, a panel discussion featuring Daniel Byman, Senior Fellow and Research Director at Brookings’ Center for Middle East Policy; Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at Brookings; Will McCants, Senior Fellow and Director of Brookings’ U.S. Relations with the Islamic World project; and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director at Brookings’ CMEP. Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Research Director for Foreign Policy at Brookings, moderated as well as contributing his own views.
Each of the panellists proposed a policy for Syria. As the discussion wound up, Pollack acknowledged that though each argued that their policy was the best for future action, and could present numerous pieces of evidence to support their argument, ‘best’ in the case of the Syrian crisis is a relative term. The only real locus of disagreement between the panellists is how they evaluate risk, possibility of implementation, and potential for success, rather than over the meat of what must politically and militarily be accomplished for the country. No one wants to see the conflict endure, nor does anyone wish to see ISIS given the space to breathe or the humanitarian crisis to wear on.
Some of the policies proposed differ pretty significantly.
O’Hanlon has opted for a confederal model, or an ink-spot approach. Taking some inspiration from the Bosnian case, he envisions autonomous zones of governance with their own security forces, in order to combat Assad and ISIS both. He believes these zones will allow for bridges to be built with both Turkey and Russia, as they can prioritize relations with the zones closest to them politically, e.g. the Russians with an Alawite sector in the northwest, where Assad potentially could stay in power as well. This model would require moderate numbers of NATO boots on the ground.
Pollack, meanwhile, operates within the assumption of a unified Syria. Having analysed third-party resolutions to other civil wars, he proposed building an alternative army: large, conventional, trained outside Syria, and only good enough to face off the so-so forces of ISIS and Assad. This falls within a three-step program. First, with this army we need to create a military stalemate; then a power-sharing agreement needs to be forged, reflecting the relative power of all parties. Finally, long-term guarantees need to be established, including protection of minorities’ rights. The key is not to withdraw once military success is achieved, and to ensure the maintenance of those guarantees.
Byman, concerned with implementing policies only half-way in such an unstable environment, opts for a less intensive one: containment of local instability. This includes the more conventional border security, counterterrorism assistance, and weakening ISIS through limited air support for local ground troops. It also means better management of refugee camps, policing them with an eye to extremist threats, and providing for refugees, aiming for their integration into society in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. He acknowledges this only ‘staunches the bleeding’ rather than ends the conflict, but this at least is lower in cost than other policies.
McCants provides the ISIS view, noting that since the Syrian crisis began, the fledgling state has deployed the same tactic several times to gain control of cities and regions. It infiltrates, assassinates or imprisons those who oppose it, and proceeds to impose its rule through brutally violent tactics. These are laid out in a terror theorist’s manual, The Management of Savagery. ISIS has been able to take advantage of regional governments collapsing, as in Iraq after the US withdrawal. Previously it had been driven underground by the US army and nearly destroyed. It is able to exploit power vacuums. McCants added that a weakness of the confederal model is that it increases the enclaves’ vulnerability to ISIS tactics, especially if regional allies (e.g. Jordan, Turkey) are not sufficiently committed.
Wittes reviewed Obama’s foreign policy, noting that all his strategies have ‘foundered on the realities of a disordered region’. There has long been a gap in understanding between Washington and local actors: for instance, the Obama administration has always discounted Syria, while in local view, it is of utmost strategic and political importance. Wittes traces the current regional crisis to two underlying problems, of order and of authority. ISIS also springs from these underlying problems, which are reflected in the conflict over the role of Islam in politics. She proposes convening a regional security dialogue. The Vienna talks focus on external actors’ interests, sacrificing an accounting problems within the region.
There was indeed broad agreement across the panel on the need to incorporate local actors and local political realities into the solution, whether that meant Sunni Arab tribes, the opposition forces (including moderate Islamists), or regional governments. It is important as well that these policies include long-term political reconciliation and guarantees, whether through federated autonomy or power-sharing. Though generally unified on the need to combat ISIS militarily, the panelists also recognized that the underlying problem in Syria is Assad, his brutal war, and the power vacuum to which he has contributed.
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US in MENA
On Friday, the Middle East Institute hosted its 69th annual conference: ‘The Search for Stability & Opportunity: The Middle East in 2016’. The opening panel ‘Obama’s Mideast Legacy and the Next Administration’ discussed the President’s policies in the region and key issues for the next administration.
The panel featured Prem Kumar, vice president of the MENA Practice at Albright Stonebridge Group; Robin Wright, joint fellow at the US Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Michael Singh, Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Tamara Cofman Wittes, senior fellow and managing director at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy. The discussion was moderated by Elise Labott, global affairs correspondent at CNN.
Labott noted that Obama began his presidency saying he would not engage in military interventions globally, but wound up presenting a different face to the UN General Assembly in September 2013. US policies abroad, he stated, are protecting allies, including with military force, maintaining safe access to oil and gas, pursuing counterterrorism goals, and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Kumar pointed out that Obama’s policy changed in response to the Arab Spring. The conflicts stemming from that event fundamentally are not about the US, but they made Obama identify the most vital national security interests, and where intervention was necessary. Considering risks and available allies, there was opportunity to intervene in Libya, but not in Syria. Obama’s most important legacy, in Kumar’s view, is the Iran deal, and its implementation will influence rebuilding the security architecture of the region.
Singh took a broad view: presidents have, from administration to administration, neglected to build a long-term strategy for the Middle East. Instead, it has been a series of tactics, as presidents simply react to their predecessor’s foreign policy. But these foreign policy issues are not partisan issues. We need to address the dual collapse of states and of the regional security architecture going forward.
Dwelling on military intervention and collapsed states, Wittes does not believe the current problems in Libya were created by NATO’s campaign, but by 42 years of Qaddafi rule – there was no true political system in Libya for decades. The US was wary of putting more investment into Libya post-intervention because of the example of Iraq. Wright disagreed: after its military success the international community fell through in ensuring political transition and sustained reconstruction. Libya should have been a success story, because of its small population and oil resources.
Tunisia, also with a small population, is comparable, but even its success has been limited. Lingering issues stem from long-term social, economic, and political problems, which certainly were not solved by the Arab Spring. Wright stated that the US has failed to address these in its foreign policy. The US needs to determine what the priority is: stability, or a new political order in the Middle East, stemming from more liberal values?
Syria is a central issue. Wittes pointed to the need to learn from past civil wars: we need to reach a negotiated settlement, enforced by outside parties, but with Syrians at the table. The Vienna talks can’t accomplish this. Wright stated the need for a three-pronged process: ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra need to be pushed back, so that Aleppo can be unified. Then a legitimate political process can take place, with local councils managing the liberated territories. Finally, the state needs to be rebuilt.
Wright also stated that the US needs to seriously consider the question of whether it wants to use its military and economic muscle to hold states like Syria (or Yemen, or Libya) together. If so, how would the US do that, in a regionally comprehensive manner?
None of the panelists believe the US no longer has interests to protect in the Middle East. There is fatigue, but the region has to be ‘rebuilt’. Local conflicts, as we continue to witness, have been globalized, and bring repercussions on a global level. Whether because of oil, economic and social development, conflict resolution, or the humanitarian refugee crisis, the US will need to continue to be involved.
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Beware the monopoly of power
To many in the West, the Kurds have long seemed the sanest group left in Syria, as well as the safest and most effective option as an ally in the fight against ISIS. They appear organized, united, secular, and pluralist, standing out against the backdrop of the fragmented factions of the Syrian opposition, including Islamist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.
However, the political situation within this community, and their ties to the rest of Syrian society, are more complex than this image suggests. Their dominance of the new ‘coalition’ of the Syrian Democratic Forces engaged in the offensive against Raqqa makes it important to elucidate this complexity.
The Syrian Kurdish party PYD (Democratic Union Party) is the entity that makes the news. It is running the show throughout the north and northeast of the country. Their affiliated militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG, and the women’s equivalent, the YPJ), made headlines last summer in their battle for Kobani against ISIS, and then again in another border town, Tel Abyad, this summer.
The YPG is also leading the fight against ISIS in Raqqa now, with grudging cooperation from Sunni Arab groups. After the US decided to suspend its train and equip program, it airdropped ammunition with the intention of supporting an offensive against Raqqa, but the Sunni Arab groups participating in the newly-formed coalition, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), say they have seen none of this material aid. The YPG dominates the SDF.
Taking advantage of their military successes, the PYD established the Democratic Autonomous Government of Western Kurdistan (i.e. within Syria, as opposed to the well-established Kurdistan Regional Government inside Iraq) in January 2014, consisting of three cantons under a federated ‘Rojava’ government. Afrin canton lies to the northwest of Aleppo, Kobani on the Turkish border east of the Euphrates, and the third canton, Qamishli, falls in the northeast corner of Syria, bordering Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. The PYD in addition claims towns in the region between Afrin and Kobani, including A’zaz, Manbij, al-Bab, and Jarablus, as parts of historical Kurdistan.
The PYD administers health, education, security, and the judiciary within their cantons. They operate under an umbrella coalition TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society), which runs civil society organizations and ‘peace councils’ – civil courts – in Kurdish population centers, and aids local poor. The ‘peoples’ courts’ in the cantons are staffed by PYD members and take an eclectic approach to established and codified law, like other opposition groups, selecting from Syrian criminal law, Swiss or German legal codes and customary law.
Though the PYD has been consolidating its control of these cantons, they deny that they are seeking an independent Kurdish state, stating their aim of remaining within a whole and united Syria, though one with a higher degree of regional autonomy than before. They have publicly expressed tolerance and inclusion of other ethnicities and sects.
Bassam Barabadi and Faysal Itani reported in August that both ‘Kurdish and Arab senior sources in northern Syria’ confirmed ‘joint or divided Arab-Kurdish rule’ in liberated territories, evidencing some degree of cooperation, which is crucial for stability. The recent move to annex Tel Abyad reflects the PYD’s intentions to unite the three cantons and maintain control throughout the contiguous territories along the Turkish border.
Divisions in the Kurdish community and antagonisms with other Syrians remain. TEV-DEM is not the only coalition on the Syrian Kurdish political scene. Other less militant or nationalist parties have combined to form the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has joined the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and is politically closer to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq than the radical Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. The PYD accepts the PKK’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, as their ideological leader.
One of the more prominent of the KNC parties is Yekiti (Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria), which has often criticized the PYD. In May, for instance, the PYD are alleged to have told two Yekiti members to leave their homes in Qamishli canton because they had criticized the PYD on TV.
In addition to earlier allegations of press intimidation and aggression against other Kurdish parties, last month the Rojava Student and Youth Union, also in Qamishli, raised concerns to local and international human rights organizations about the PYD using Kurdish-language instruction in primary schools for political and ideological indoctrination. Indeed, on Tuesday the KNC called for demonstrations in Hasaka governorate against PYD educational policies. The resulting turnout in Malikiyya (Derek) was forcefully dispersed by PYD’s internal security arm, the Asayış, which also made several arrests.
Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs and Syrian Turkmen have levelled accusations of ethnic cleansing and property confiscation directed at the YPG, after their battles with ISIS in the Kobani and Tel Abyad countryside and their consequent control of new territories. An investigation conducted by Amnesty International affirmed war crimes committed by the PYD in razing Sunni Arab villages.
Cooperation between the Kurdish cantons and rebel-held territories, or the YPG and rebel militant forces, is generally low. Rebel groups distrust the PYD and YPG because their primary goal is driving ISIS out of their territories – showing, in the rebels’ view, lack of dedication to the revolution. The YPG command has stated that they would work with Russia to combat ISIS if Russia were to present the opportunity, which garners further distrust from other opposition groups.
Kader Sheikhmous is the co-founder of an NGO, Shar for Development, which focuses on enhancing civil society, governance, and economic development in Kurdish areas of Syria. Much of its work promotes the unity and good relations of the Kurdish and Sunni Arab communities, including a bilingual magazine that is distributed in the towns of Hasaka.
Sheikhmous highlights the dangers of the international and regional actors offering support exclusively to armed groups, such as the YPG, without investing in civil society actors and economic development. USAID, for example, in 2014 sharply diminished support to Kurdish NGOs in Syria. That risks creating dependence on the YPG not just for security but for other services, in the absence of civil society, will increase the YPG’s tendency toward authoritarian behavior.
These concerns raise the question of the viability of PYD-run autonomous cantons, their suitability as a military or security ally for the US, and their role in a future Syrian state. Exclusive or excessive support for one party in the Syrian Kurdish regions will allow it to consolidate its monopoly on power and violence.
Syrians generally endorse the unity of their country and its people, regardless of ethnic or sectarian background. Kurds, Turkmen, Alawis, Sunnis, and others want to regain their normal lives and continue living together. Though the Kurdish autonomous regions have provided measures of stability and security for the civilians of the north, it will be counterproductive if it comes at the price of single-party rule and exacerbated social divisions.
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