Category: Bridget Gill
Countering the ISIS narrative
The Brookings Institution hosted “Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks” Wednesday afternoon. Former ambassador and vice president of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Alberto Fernandez, presented his major findings and policy recommendations from his research into ISIS’s propaganda operations. Richard LeBaron, non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, provided comments, while Brookings’ Will McCants, who has recently published The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, moderated.
Fernandez examined how ISIS propaganda developed, the reasons for its appeal, and efforts being made to counter its narrative. He observed that the crisis in Syria gave ISIS a window through which it could become more global and creative in its propaganda efforts, which had previously been inward-looking and somewhat amateurish. Syria historically and culturally holds much significance for Arab Muslims, and the city which holds apocalyptic significance, Dabiq, falls within its boundaries. ISIS’s English-language magazine is called Dabiq, after al-Zarqawi focused on it in one of his speeches.
Syria is also the first social media war, or tweeted war, according to Fernandez. So 2013 became a turning point for ISIS propaganda, as it also then began expanding into English.
ISIS’s appeal is based on four things: emergency, agency, authenticity, and victory. In Fernandez’s view, all propaganda stems from a political reality. To be successful, it must remain connected to that reality. ISIS exploits the sense Muslims have of being besieged and slaughtered everywhere. It provides the aggrieved with the opportunity, the invitation, to do something about this. Its character – grim, austere, brimming with zealotry and brutal violence – underscores its claimed authenticity. Finally, it is able to show that it gets results: it wins battles, takes cities, and expands its territorial control.
Efforts to counter ISIS need to be as comprehensive as ISIS’s approach. Fernandez has five recommendations:
- Recognize that ISIS is a political problem with a media dimension: the phenomenon is not reducible to social media, but is a real war.
- Counter volume with volume: efforts need a comprehensive network, including the information and experience of Syrians on the ground.
- Content needs to be multifaceted: different focuses and styles should be used, rather than attempting to find a single silver bullet that alone will undermine ISIS.
- Efforts must account for the personal dimension of radicalization and seek to replicate the tight personal relationships ISIS creates.
- There is value in better policing of space online.
LeBaron by and large agreed with Fernandez, while also highlighting that many counter-propaganda efforts don’t provide any alternate options for people who may be susceptible to ISIS’s message. LeBaron believes that “We are the counter-narrative,” that is, Western liberal capitalism and democracy, the way people live in a Western country like the US.
This may be true for young Muslims who have little familiarity with the West and grew up under autocratic regimes and weak economies. But it hardly seems a likely counter-narrative to the hundreds of young people, Muslims or converts, who were born and raised in Western countries and are nevertheless attracted to ISIS or similar ideologies. Any counter message, like any explanation, must account for the numerous different factors contributing to ISIS’s appeal.
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New Turkish elections
On Wednesday, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research in DC (SETA) hosted a conversation, ‘Turkey Ahead of the November Elections’, featuring Kılıç Kanat, research director at SETA; Ömer Taşpınar, non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Andrew Bowen, senior fellow and director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. The executive director of SETA, Kadir Üstün, moderated the discussion. Kanat has just published an analysis paper on the new elections, which have been called for November 1 because of the failure to form a ruling coalition after the June polling.
The June elections were the first in 13 years when no single party won enough votes to create a ruling majority government. Kanat laid out the reasons this occurred and the issues for the upcoming elections. In his view, the causes behind the decline of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) include:
- The ‘Kobani effect’: the battle for the northern Syrian town had a galvanizing effect on Kurds and non-Kurds who voted against Erdoğan, who was seen as wanting ISIS to win;
- Mobilization by smaller parties to pass the 10% threshold for inclusion in parliament;
- For the first time, diaspora Turkish nationalists were allowed to vote in general elections;
- Tactical voting: voters were certain the AKP would win the most votes, but attempted to decrease the margin in order to force a coalition.
Kanat evaluates the shift as a turn to the nationalist parties, whether Turkish or Kurdish: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The HDP saw the biggest gains in support, from those dissatisfied with Erdoğan’s position vis-à-vis Kobani, and the Kurdish resolution process in general, as well as from diaspora voters.
The middle class has also been increasingly worried in a time of slowing economic growth, losing some confidence in the AKP. The AKP since the Gezi Park demonstrations has had to work hard to keep its support base, but the constant effort at mobiliztion may have resulted in election fatigue among some voters.
Going forward, Kanat stated, the upcoming elections will be determined by voters’ perception of who holds the responsibility for three things: resolving the Kurdish question, as well as dealing with PKK terrorism; maintaining public stability on a nation-wide level; and economic growth or decline.
Taşpınar zoomed out, examining two long-term trends that have contributed to the current political situation. First is the personalization of political power: political analysis and action stems from an understanding of Erdoğan’s plans. There are fewer enduring institutions in this post-Kemalist era, and no unified ideology undergirding the state.
Second, there is increasing polarization in Turkish politics. This has been driven by personalization, as well as the Kurdish question and the identity of Turkey as a country – will it be democratic or autocratic? The Gezi protest was a very real demonstration of this polarization, as was the failure after last weekend’s terrorist attack in Ankara for political leaders to produce a unified vocabulary to bring the nation together.
The theme of personalization ran through Bowen’s comments as well, in particular because of the personalistic nature of foreign policy decisions, for Obama as well as for Erdoğan. Theirs is a bad marriage. One of the key sticking points is the difference in the way they prioritize threats: for Erdoğan, the PKK takes pride of place, with ISIS far behind. Obama, on the other hand, urgently prioritizes defeating ISIS.
The Syrian crisis has drawn out many of the tensions in this relationship, which will be difficult to repair, even after the July agreement on air bases in Turkey. The US is perceived in Turkey as not standing by its allies, but new political leadership in both countries could change the situation, especially if the US focuses again on the Middle East.
According to polls, 15% of Turkish voters are still undecided about the November 1 elections. Only a few percentage points are required to re-cement the AKP’s position of power. The Ankara terror attack, depending on who is understood to be the perpetrator and how the government deals with the aftermath, could be decisive.
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Reform, not revolution
On Friday, the Middle East Institute and Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted Tarek Masoud, the Sultan of Oman Associate Professor of International Relations at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, to discuss a new book he co-authored, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform. I. William Zartman, SAIS Professor Emeritus, moderated the discussion. Masoud concentrated on deriving policy implications for the US from his structural analysis of why some Arabic-speaking Muslim-majority countries experienced revolts in 2011, why some regimes were able to rebuff protests, and why the results of revolts have been dismal, with the tentative exception of Tunisia.
The talk comes at a fortuitous moment, as the Nobel Peace Prize winner was just announced on Friday as the Tunisian Quartet, which contributed vitally to achieving democratic progress and stability since the mass mobilization that sparked the so-called Arab Spring and led to the departure of Tunisia’s autocrat, President Ben Ali. But personality is the least of it. Masoud and his co-authors take the position in their book that the Arab Spring was “a drama whose script was written long before its dramatis personae took the stage.” That is, there are deeply entrenched structural causes that determined the success or failure of Arab Spring movements.
Masoud suggested five policy implications.
First is that the absence of democracy in the Arab world is overdetermined; there are several decisive reasons why there hasn’t been a wave of democratic transitions. Many people have made a (questionable) cultural argument The most persuasive in Masoud‘s view is economic underdevelopment. Development generates competing political and social forces that are vital to preventing a single hegemonic power. This is one reason for Tunisia’s relative success, evidenced by the civil society-generated Quartet.
Second, Masoud views policies directed at establishing democracy as wrongheaded. What the Arab world needs are states that are durable, no matter what the regime. The effectiveness of many Arab states, which govern by fear and patronage, is rated low by the World Bank. Masoud highlighted the recent provenance of many of them, especially Yemen, as well as Muammar Qaddafi’s strikingly libertarian attitude towards governance, which led him to dismantle many Libyan state structures and atomize society. Tunisia in 2010 had a relatively effective government in 2010.
The third implilcation was simply stated: US military intervention often collapses the state, which is not useful.
Fourth: there is no pragmatic way forward without incorporating elements from the former regimes into future governments. Otherwise, there is the risk of alienating a significant cohort, which will seek to cause the new order from which it is excluded to collapse. Tunisia was advantaged in this respect as well. Its current president was associated with the previous regime.
In Syria, Masoud thought it will be necessary to reach some sort of compromise with Bashar al-Assad if a political solution is going to be achieved. Like other hereditary regimes, his is one in which the coercive and executive apparatus is tightly intermeshed. This has caused many of the monarchies to be more stable than Egypt or Libya, where there was a separation. But once armed conflict begins, this intermeshing may ensure that Assad will not stop fighting until there is no one left to fight.
The fifth and final implication is that the US should seriously consider working with Russia and Iran in Syria. Arguably, the three have more in common in this conflict than the US does with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Saudi Arabia has made it its project to undermine many different states, through the funding and arming of radical Islamists – and it is exactly this type of radical Islamism that the US is seeking to combat on a global scale. Syria needs a strong state and a stable society, not increased weaponization and battlefields drawn on ideological lines.
Though Masoud expressed hope for the region, and a desire for justice for Syria, the study he has conducted in this book with his co-authors has been one focused on the structural constraints set in place decades ago that governed political action during the Arab Spring and continue to do so now. Exploring these constraints has led him to call for a conservative policy towards the Arab world, where the state is more likely to collapse towards a state of nature than transition to democracy. We need to build states and promote economic development in the hope of producing more lasting stability.
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Peace picks, October 12-16
- JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War | Tuesday, October 13th | 2-3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the fall of 1962, President John F. Kennedy faced two great crises: the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian War. While Kennedy’s role in the missile crisis has been thoroughly examined, his critical role in the Sino-Indian War – and the crisis itself – have been largely ignored. In his new book, JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), CIA veteran and Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project Bruce Riedel details several facets of the October 1962 crisis: the invasion of Indian-held territory by well-armed and equipped Chinese troops; Prime Minister Nehru’s urgent request for direct American Air Force intervention in the war; Kennedy’s deft diplomatic success in convincing neighboring Pakistan to remain neutral during the affair; and the ultimate unilateral Chinese cease-fire that brought an end to the conflict. Riedel also analyzes the CIA’s clandestine support of the Tibetan people in their resistance to Chinese occupation, a matter that had partially precipitated the Sino-Indian War. Finally, Riedel highlights the intriguing role First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy played in her husband’s South Asian diplomacy. On October 13, the Brookings Intelligence Project will launch Riedel’s new book with a conversation about this crisis, how it played an important role in forming Asia’s current balance of power, and the resultant regional arms race that still prevails to this day. Brookings Institution Nonresident Senior Fellow Marvin Kalb will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. Following their remarks, Kalb and Riedel will take questions from the audience.
- Addressing Crisis, Supporting Recovery: The Central African Republic at a Crossroads | Tuesday, October 13th | 3-4:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The citizens of the Central African Republic (CAR) have endured political instability and episodes of extreme violence since the country’s independence in 1960. Recent clashes between sectarian militia in the country’s capital of Bangui have displaced at least 30,000 residents from their homes and prompted renewed concern about the CAR’s peace process and transition back to democratic rule. The CAR’s recovery efforts hinge on the success of immediate stabilization and peacebuilding priorities, including national elections—which were recently postponed due to the ongoing violence and overwhelming logistical challenges—as well as the need to promote long-term civic inclusion and inclusive economic growth. The Brookings Africa Growth Initiative will host a discussion on immediate efforts to stabilize the CAR and long-term strategies for the country’s economic recovery. His Excellency Ambassador Stanislas Moussa-Kembe, the CAR Ambassador to the US, will give remarks, followed by a moderated panel discussion with the experts Ambassador W. Stuart Symington, US special representative to the CAR; Sandra Melone, executive vice president at the Search for Common Ground; and Madeline Rose, senior policy advisor at Mercy Corps. After the discussion, panelists will take audience questions. Amadou Sy, Director of the Africa Growth Initiative, will moderate.
- Is U.S. Missile Defense Aimed at China? | Thursday, October 15th | 2-3:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The United States has been pressing South Korea to accept a very powerful radar that is allegedly intended for South Korea’s defense against North Korean ballistic missiles. However, North Korea is likely years away from building an intercontinental ballistic missile, and the radar is much more powerful than necessary for such a purpose. Is U.S. missile defense policy actually intended to defend against threats from China, rather than North Korea? Join us as Theodore A. Postol explains his research findings in answer to this question, joined by Tong Zhao as a discussant. Carnegie’s Toby Dalton will moderate.
- Turkey Ahead of the November Elections | Wednesday, October 14th | 10:30-11:30 | SETA Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After negotiations to form a governing coalition produced no results following the June 7 elections, Turkey will return to the polls on November 1. Heading to this snap election, Turkey confronts renewed violence in its southeast and challenges as a member of the U.S. led anti-ISIL coalition. Uncertainty remains as to whether this new round of balloting will result in an AK Party single government, or lead to a fresh round of coalition negotiations. Please join us for a panel discussion on Turkey’s current domestic and foreign policy challenges ahead of the November 1 elections. Speakers include: Andrew Bowen, Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies, Center for the National Interest; Omer Taspinar, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; and Kilic B. Kanat, Research Director, the SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.. The discussion will be moderated by Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, the SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.
- Is the Bear Back? Russian Foreign Policy and the Conflicts in Ukraine and Syria | Wednesday, October 14th | 12:30-1:45 | Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Russia-Eurasia Forum invites you to a lecture by Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff of the Center for Strategic International Studies on “Is the Bear Back? Russian Foreign Policy and the Conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.” The Russia-Eurasia Forum is moderated by Professor Bruce Parrott. Guests may bring their lunch to this brown bag series.
- Attribution and Accountability for Chemical Weapons Use in Syria | Wednesday, October 14th | 1-3 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Two years after the dismantlement of Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile, there is mounting evidence that chemicals continue to be used as weapons of war with over 30 allegations of use in Syria. In September the United Nations Security Council established a Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Please join us for a discussion on the Joint Investigative Mechanism, the international response to continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, and the effort to hold perpetrators accountable and uphold the norm against chemical weapons use. Speakers include: Wa’el Alzayat, Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Mallory Stewart, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emerging Security Challenges and Defense Policy, Bureau for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, U.S. Department of State. The discussion will be moderated by Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS.
- Human Rights in Iran after the Nuclear Deal | Wednesday, October 14th | 2-3:30 | Project on Middle East Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon, the international community has begun to focus on the implementation of the nuclear deal. During the course of negotiations, the human rights situation inside Iran failed to improve, and it remains unclear how such issues may be affected by the signing of the nuclear agreement. It also remains to be seen whether the nuclear agreement will now create any additional space for the international community to address its human rights concerns. What changes can we expect to see in Iran’s domestic politics as sanctions are relieved and attention moves beyond nuclear negotiations? What role can the international community play in addressing human rights concerns in Iran? What changes might we expect in U.S. policy toward Iran post-nuclear deal, and how—if at all—can the United States play a constructive role in helping open space for domestic activists? Join us for a conversation with: Nazila Fathi, Author, The Lonely War: One Woman’s Account of the Struggle for Modern Iran; Dokhi Fassihian, Senior Program Manager, Freedom House; and Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution. The conversation will be moderated by Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED). This event is held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Understanding Iran Beyond the Deal | Thursday, October 15th | 4-5 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After surviving a review by a bitterly divided Congress, the Iran nuclear agreement is now a done deal. And yet, with regional conflict intensifying, the question of Iran continues to loom large in the American foreign policy debate. As Iran gears up for elections in early 2016, and as world leaders – in business and in politics – flock to Tehran, understanding Iran after the deal becomes an increasingly complex and urgent task. On October 15, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a conversation with Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the Brookings Foreign Policy program, and author of the recently released book, Iran’s Political Economy since the Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Maloney will be joined by Javier Solana, a Brookings distinguished fellow and former EU high representative for the common foreign and security policy; and Vali Nasr, dean of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings. The three experts will discuss Iran today, the implications of the nuclear agreement, and more. Bruce Jones, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will give introductory remarks. After the program, we will welcome questions from the audience.
- Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Region | Friday, October 16th | 9:30-11 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The complex relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is an ongoing source of instability in the South Asia region. Only this past spring, the first round of discussions between representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership gave even skeptics some reason to hope that President Ghani’s efforts to open talks with the Taliban on peace might come to fruition. After a period of improved contacts and rhetoric, relations between the Afghan and Pakistani governments have again become strained under the burden of high profile Taliban attacks under the new leader, Mullah Mansour. A lasting substantial dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains difficult to achieve, but necessary for stability and for both countries. With the arrival of Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif in Washington later this month, the panelists will explore the challenges faced by the Pakistani leadership, the prospects for its relationship with the Afghan National Unity Government, and the implications for the US- Pakistan relationship. Join us for a conversation with Mr. Shuja Nawaz, Distinguished Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council; and Dr. Vali Nasr, Dean, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The conversation will be moderated by the Honorable James B. Cunningham, Senior Fellow and Khalilzad Chair, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
- Erased from Space and Consciousness: Israel and the Depopulated Palestinian Villages of 1948 | Friday, October 16th | 1-2 | Palestine Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A dramatic transformation took place in the landscape and demography of Israel after the 1948 war, as hundreds of Palestinian villages throughout the country were depopulated, and for the most part physically erased. How has this transformation been perceived by Israelis? Author Noga Kadman suggests some answers, based on a research that systematically explores Israeli attitudes concerning the depopulated Palestinian villages. She focuses on the most ordinary, everyday encounters of Israelis with the memory of the villages, their representations and their physical remains, exploring the naming and mapping of village sites, and the ways depopulated villages are dealt with in tourist sites and Jewish communities established on their remains. Aided by statistics, original quotes, photos and maps, she will discuss her findings, which reveal a consistent pattern of marginalization of the depopulated Palestinian villages in the Israeli discourse, in the context of the formation of collective memory and of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A light lunch will be served from 12:30.
- Understanding ISIS | Friday, October 16th | 3-4 | Center for American Progress | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, has shaken the foundations of an already fragile Middle East. The potency of the ISIS threat has galvanized one of the largest global coalitions in warfare history. More than one year into the anti-ISIS campaign, the results have been mixed, and ISIS has demonstrated surprising resilience. How do we understand ISIS as an organization, and what are its main strengths and weaknesses? Please join the Center for American Progress and the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy for a discussion with Will McCants, Director at the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and Fellow at Brookings’ Center for Middle East Policy, and Hassan Hassan, Nonresident Fellow at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, on the emergence and proliferation of ISIS. Will McCants’ recently published book The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State draws extensively on primary Arabic language sources and letters from Al Qaeda and ISIS. It is a comprehensive investigation of the group’s religious grounding, motives, strategy, and leadership. Hassan Hassan’s book ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, written with The Daily Beast’s Michael Weiss, traces the evolution of ISIS from its origins on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan through interviews with intelligence and military officials, as well as religious figures and fighters, explaining why the group will remain with us for a long time. Opening Remarks will be given by William Wechsler, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.
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The West turns a blind eye
On Thursday, the Center for Strategic & International Studies hosted a discussion on “Domestic and External Threats to the Euromaidan Revolutionaries in Ukraine.” Taras Kuzio, Senior Research Associate at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at University of Alberta as well as a non-resident Fellow at SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations, gave a presentation centered on his new book, Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism. The discussion was moderated by Jeffrey Mankoff, acting director and senior fellow at CSIS’s Russia and Eurasia Program.
As Russia has expanded its intervention in Syria, Western attention to the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region has waned. Kuzio’s book presents an in-depth analysis of economic, governance, and rule of law issues in Ukraine grounded in historical perspective concerning the country’s relationship with Russia. Kuzio starts with Stalin’s death in 1953, traces socialization of new Ukrainian elites in the 60s-80s, and describes the disappointments of the late 80s, which would lead to independence in 1991. There are many marked continuities over the past 20 years between the 2013/14 Euromaidan demonstrations, the Orange Revolution of 2004, and independence.
The Euromaidan revolutionaries’ face serious challenges:
- Rotating elites have dominated the government for the past 20 years (current president Poroshenko included);
- Disgruntled masses use anti-elite populist rhetoric;
- There are no real political parties;
- The judicial system rewards criminal activity;
- Oligarchs rule the slow-growing economy;
- The middle class is small;
- The shadow economy is large – up to 50% of Ukraine’s GDP.
These factors hamper reform. US and EU efforts to promote it have not been focused on the right things. The disgruntled public supports only some of the necessary economic, fiscal, and energy reforms because they would also lead, for example, to higher utilities bills for citizens.
The issue of oligarchs, corruption, and static elites is central. President Poroshenko himself has been a significant business figure, and oligarchs in general have many ties to power, including owning large television channels that often guide political support and mobilization. What is needed are strong messages in favor of judicial and anti-corruption reform. Oligarchs and corrupt officials should go to prison for their crimes, but the route to this cannot be internal. The current Prosecutor’s Office is one of the most significant sources of corruption in Ukraine today. It protects elites. The fact that Poroshenko – and other leaders before him – not only has not disbanded it, but appointed two incompetent heads, is worrying. Western European countries have often been a safe haven for oligarchs, financially and sometimes politically.
The recent conflict has helped shape Ukrainians’ attitudes toward the EU and NATO, with a majority now viewing them positively and wish to join. However, there is little support for this in Western Europe, and Ukraine – having received less funding from the EU than Eastern Europe did – is slow to implement real reforms. This makes it near impossible for integration to occur.
Since 2007 a tide of extreme nationalism and xenophobia has been rising in Russia, exemplified in Putin, which the West long ignored. It claims Ukraine as its own and Ukrainians as “little Russians.” Russian policy denies Ukrainians self-determination and would institute a semi-colonial state in Ukraine. Condescending or xenophobic Russian attitudes toward Ukrainians have a deep history: while Russia has long sought to claim it, Ukrainian dissenters as far back as 1918 have been accused of collaborating with or being funded by the West, Zionists, the CIA, etc.
Ukraine’s biggest plus is its strong civil society and healthy tradition of dissent. As a pluralist society, Ukraine will not be prone to either ethnic nationalism or authoritarianism. Local elections approach at the end of the month. Democratization will progress. But Kuzio nevertheless finds Ukraine in a difficult position – reforms would have been easier in 2005 before the crash, just after the Orange Revolution, but the elites continually put them off, leading to Euromaidan.
The West has too long turned a blind eye toward both corruption in Ukraine and the worrying development of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia in Russia.
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Egyptian entrepreneurs
Last Wednesday, the Middle East Institute held its 3rd annual Egypt conference, entitled “Reducing Risks, Unlocking Potential,” with three expert panels. Here I focus on the final panel, ‘Economic Development and Entrepreneurial Innovation’, which explored the promise of the Egyptian economy and its human resources, as well as the significant challenges facing it before it can achieve real, wide-reaching development. Moderator Mona Mowafi (co-founder and president of RISE Egypt) anchored the discussion with an introductory question: ‘What kind of society does Egypt want to become?’ Starting from the understanding that Egypt has an underdeveloped economy, with low job creation and miles of bureaucratic red tape, the panelists described a dynamic country with great economic potential, and emphasized that social and political advances are necessarily tied to a more developed, innovative, and democratized economy.
Egypt does not lack either natural or human resources. It has a dynamic ecosystem for economic innovation, a view that perhaps reflects the panelists’ backgrounds. Seif Abou Zaid, CEO of Tahrir Academy, is an entrepreneur focused on education and governance, as well as how to connect the two. Mohamed Zaazoue, a neurosurgeon, founded Healthy Egyptians, with which he hopes to raise basic health education levels for all Egyptians. Their co-panelists are economists: Amr Adly is a consultant at the Carnegie Middle East Center, and Heba Elgazzar is a senior economist in Social Protection and Labor Global Practice at the World Bank. They used their practical experiences of navigating Egypt’s entrepreneurial environment to analyze the country’s potential.
Both Adly and Elgazzar highlighted the informal or personalized nature of several industries in Egypt, where jobs and professional relationships are based on personal ties and social networks. This can be both an asset and a drawback. It encourages practices such as ‘wasta’ – or cronyism (though this has political causes as well). Many people are left doing part-time or casual jobs, rather than full-time employment. But there are many locally-based small industries that thrive in their communities and are ‘entrepreneurial’ in their own sense – low-tech, but creative, as Adly pointed out.
Zaazoue insisted that Egypt’s youthful population and its human resources generally are the country’s biggest resource, which needs to be cultivated and invested in for the future. Elgazzar agreed that the resources are there, and that Egypt’s particularly urban character provides a clustering of skills, knowledge, and information, creating an excellent environment for economic innovation.
Abou Zaid why there hasn’t there been a transformative moment yet. Why aren’t these skills and knowledge being exploited? There are governmental and non-governmental barriers. One of the latter is access to finance. Adly also highlighted that though Egypt’s private sector is quite large, it does not operate within a framework that can transform annual growth into structural development of the economy as a whole.
Both Abou Zaid and Zaazoue are interested in policy-making and want to have an effect on Egyptian society at large, rather than just running successful businesses. But there is a bureaucratic ‘bottleneck’ which makes it difficult to get projects implemented through government ministries. There is also heightened hostility to non-profit organizations under Sisi’s government. So starting new businesses and trying to tie change to the market has been a way for both to pursue their goals.
Zaazoue first tried to speak with ministers about adding health education to school curricula, but when he got nowhere, decided to create games and cartoons about health which could be marketed for kids. Abou Zaid’s school was originally non-profit, but it was shut down under new laws governing funding for such organizations. He has had to explore setting up fee-paying accommodation in order to become a profit-making institution.
Elgazzar thought the government needs to pick one or two priorities and focus on them for the next several years. In her view, these should be education and job creation. Zaazoue would like to see foreign capital directed into education and health systems, instead of military and security budgets. High-quality education, better schools, and more democratized education, will have an effect on growth potential, bring more women into the work force, and serve to change people’s attitudes about seeking out new work.
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