Category: Daniel Serwer
Stevenson’s army, February 17
– Dan Drezner discusses loss of trust in US military.
– Reuters says Biden wants big increase in defense spending.
– WaPo says Bolsonaro moves closer to Putin.
–US & Russian planes come too close in Med.
– FredKaplan notes tradeoffs in possible Russian recognition of Donbas.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Putin still has dirty tricks up his sleeve
Russian President Putin has suggested he is withdrawing some forces from around Ukraine. No Westerner has yet confirmed this. President Biden yesterday cited a new, higher number: 150,000 troops. That is 20,000 more than previously reported in the media. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has said there was no evidence of troop withdrawal yet.
Russian plans
But even if true, Putin’s hint at troop withdrawal may betoken little. He never had enough troops surrounding Ukraine to invade and occupy the entire country. More than likely the Russian plan is to take a relatively small portion. My bet has been on a push in the south to extend the Russian area of control along the Sea of Azov as far as Ukrainian forces permit. The troops in Belarus to the north and Transnistria in the west would do just enough to prevent Ukraine from redeploying forces to counter the real offensive in the south.
It is also possible Russia will not use overt military force but rely instead, as it did in Donbas in 2014, on proxy forces backed by Russians with no overt insignia. Or Putin could use “private” security forces like the Wagner Group. This would be risky militarily, as Ukrainian forces have improved a good deal. But the domestic political backwash from losses would be lessened. It is also possible NATO member states would turn a blind eye, or at least reduce their reaction, to the use of proxy forces.
Military action is not Russia’s only option. Just keeping enhanced forces on Ukraine’s border will create uncertainty, which discourages investors and raises insurance rates. Disinformation does likewise. Moscow presumably has enough minimally credible intelligence on Ukrainian malfeasance to launch innumerable attacks on its ruling elite. Where the Russians lack information, they are good at inventing it. Moscow can also rent crowds to create disorder and sponsor terrorist attacks mounted to look like attacks on ethnic Russians. Russian hackers have penetrated Ukraine’s cyberspace, raising the likelihood of continuing attacks on critical computer capabilities.
The Western reaction
The White House has been revealing Moscow’s plans in order to preempt them. This has been an effective tactic. The National Security Council has reportedly prepared an extensive playbook on how to react to various scenarios. We should hope this includes non-military ones. Putin is good at using all the elements of national power to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors. The West has to be at least as agile, and punishing, in response. Washington has repeated ad infinitum the mantra “Europe whole and free.” It was an attractive proposition in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse.
But Europe whole and free isn’t going to happen anytime soon. Putin has made his choice: Russia is now an autocracy with imperial aspirations in its neighborhood. He will need to defend those aspirations as well as his own hold on power with whatever means he has available, because many Russians and most Europeans and Americans won’t be interested in helping him. Putin still has lots of dirty tricks up his sleeve.
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Stevenson’s army, February 16
– USTR report says China has failed to live up to trade commitments.
– FP lists new US economic restrictions on China.
– Lawfare analyzes DOD report on China’s Military Power.
– NYT says US intel on Russia has improved, especially regarding military. But CFR sees dilemmas in what to reveal.
– NYT says Russia is courting Latin America
-WaPo says Russian hackers have penetrated deeply in Ukraine.
–Senators can’t agree on Russia sanctions, divided over NordStream2
– GAO notes high level of congressional report requirements on DOD – 1,429 in 2020.
In class I mentioned how presidents can increase their legal authorities by signing statements refusing to enforce laws passed by Congress. Biden did that in approving NDAA.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Convergence is desirable but not magical
My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph argues that recognition of Kosovo by the four NATO member non-recognizers would weaken Serbia’s position and improve the negotiating position of Pristina in its dialogue with Belgrade. He is correct about that. Even one or two additional recognitions would be helpful. All four would open the door of NATO membership to Kosovo.
Wrong about Serbia’s reaction
But he is unfortunately wrong about Serbia’s reaction to such recognitions. They will not happen in a “big bang,” all together. At best they will happen over several years. And NATO membership won’t be feasible until 2027 at the earliest, when Kosovo is scheduled to have a fully qualified army. As recognitions happen, Belgrade will stiffen its resistance, not soften it.
The evidence for this is plain and apparent. As Ed emphasizes, Serbia regards Kosovo as its most important security risk. Each additional recognition will raise the alarm level in Belgrade. Serbia will intensify its opposition to recognition with the remaining non-recognizers. Russia and China will back this resistance. The EU will do nothing to soften it, as there will still be one hardline non-recognizer member state, Cyprus. Nicosia will prevent any consensus within the EU to shift away from its “status-neutral” position on Kosovo, which in any case is essential if the EU is to continue convening the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue.
NATO membership is not more important to Kosovo than UN membership
Ed also states that “A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership.” It is unquestionably easier, since Cyprus is not a member of NATO. But it is just as unquestionably not more meaningful. Remember: NATO-led forces already guarantee Kosovo’s sovereignty and terrritorial integrity, which is what NATO is all about. This seems to be the crux of Ed’s argument:
Without the leverage to sustain its isolation of Kosovo, Belgrade’s strategic calculus will change. The Russian and Chinese vetoes of Kosovo at the United Nations Security Council will be of negligible value on what Belgrade deems its “main political-security challenge.” No longer will the Vucic regime be able to prosecute its aggressive “non-recognition” campaign against Kosovo, or leverage Kosovo to advance ‘Serb World’, or dodge accountability for the regime’s assault on Serbian democracy. With no express demand from the West to recognize Kosovo – and no meaningful backing from Moscow or Beijing on Belgrade’s most important issue – the regime will struggle to exploit convergence domestically, and struggle to explain to citizens how it squandered Serbian leverage.
Even if Serbia were not the home of inat (read “spite, stubborness, persistence”), this would be fantasy. Belgrade’s strategic calculus will not change, at least so long as it is governed by people who claim sovereignty over Kosovo. The Russian and Chinese vetoes will increase in value, as they will be the only insurance against UN membership, which is the universally established symbol of sovereignty in our world. I can’t see any reason why Belgrade would drop its nonrecognition campaign, but even if it did that would make no difference. Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over Kosovo would not be abandoned. NATO troops in Kosovo haven’t changed Belgrade’s attitude, so why would a few more NATO member recognitions or even NATO membership for Kosovo?
Recognitions are desirable but not magical
Let me make clear. I’m all in favor of getting non-recognizers to recognize Kosovo, especially the NATO and EU non-recognizers. Each recognition will improve Kosovo’s position, including in the dialogue with Serbia. But Belgrade will not drop its antirecognition campaign or its opposition to Kosovo membership in the UN. To the contrary, those efforts will be redoubled. What Ed calls “convergence” is desirable, but not magical.
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Stevenson’s army, February 15
– WaPo reports WH bragging about its “Tiger Team” at NSC, which for months has studied scenarios and war-gamed responses to Russian actions in Ukraine. Sounds like a smart move.
– Dan Drezner grades new Indo-Pacific strategy document.
– WH calls for more competition to ensure defense industrial base.
– France is pulling troops from Mali.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 14
– The administration has a formal Indo-Pacific Strategy, just released.
– Dan Drezner doesn’t like the administration’s seizure of Afghan government funds.
-The Hill sees problems if GOP tries to block a new Iran nuclear deal.
– WaPo readers found even more slave owners among members of Congress.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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