Category: Daniel Serwer

China and Russia are friends but not equals

Professor Evan Medeiros of Georgetown University analyzed the Xi-Putin declaration this week on NPR:

The Washington Post comes to similar conclusions: there is less to the declaration than some think.

Craig Singleton at Foreign Policy looks also at the readouts and Chinese press coverage. He goes a step further to suggest that President Xi gave President Putin little in order to protect Chinese economic interests, especially in Europe. Those interests he suggests could provide the West with a wedge to separate China from Russia. Economic prosperity trumps authoritarian solidarity.

The good news

The combined military and economic power and geographic extent of a China/Russia alliance would be formidable. It is good news that the Putin’s Olympics jaunt did not solidify into a genuine defense pact. Unless more was agreed than we know, Russia cannot rely on China to help beat Western sanctions. The Chinese may not like NATO enlargement, but it is not a primary concern for Beijing. The flagging Chinese economy is far more important.

The bad news

Moscow and Beijing are both exercised over human rights. Their joint declaration declares their own countries democracies but denounces human rights as a nefarious concern of the West. This may sound illogical to liberal democratic ears, but it is consistent with their distortion of “democracy.” To them, it means any system that somehow expresses the supposed will of the people, even if the people have no rights and have never validated that will in a free and fair election. Xi and Putin, like many other autocrats, think of themselves as the embodiment of the people’s will, evident in their successful assent to power.

China and Russia may be friends but are not equals

For now, Russians and Chinese are putting up with that claim, which in a perverse way demonstrates the power of the democratic example. Chinese and Russians all know the consequences of contesting the power of their leaders. But there is a big difference. Beijing can afford to repress the opposition and buy off the rest. For now, they are doing it in grand style in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as in more retail ways in other parts of the country. Moscow can afford to buy off a few oligarchs but is leaving the majority of the population in straitened circumstances with shortened life expectancies, low incomes, and few free means of expression.

Putin has reasons to invade

It seems likely Putin will go ahead with the invasion of Ukraine. The Russian deployment is not a Potemkin village. It has gotten him little so far that he could not have gotten for more polite asking. The Americans have offered to limit armaments in Europe, provided the agreement is reciprocal. Putin’s moves have also unified NATO in favor of drastic sanctions, including extinction of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, and solidified Ukrainian support for the Alliance, precisely the opposite of what Putin wanted.

None of that however will make Putin hesitate. He wants to prove to the world that Russia is indispensable. “Nothing about Europe without Russia” is his motto. He is trying to reassert Moscow’s claim as a superpower capital, a claim that died with the Soviet Union. For someone for whom power is he be-all and end-all, only the successful use of force can revalidate it.

Beijing stands to lose little

Beijing won’t be happy if Russia invades Ukraine and disrupts the world’s economy, but it will be in his corner when he tries. If he succeeds, the Chinese will enjoy the outcome as a defeat for the Americans, NATO, and human rights. If he fails, the Chinese can walk away unscathed, comforted in the knowledge Putin will need to sell even more natural gas. China and Russia are friends, but not equals.

Tags : , , , , , ,

Stevenson’s army, February 10

– This time, WH has better plans to evacuate a threatened country.

– Africom head sees “hand of Russia” in African coups.

– WSJ reports debate over new Iran nuclear deal.

Thomas Edsall says academic studies link populist support to status anxiety and loss of jobs through trade.

A group of Senators want intelligence sharing with Ukraine. A friend with long experience in intelligence sees problems: But intelligence sharing with Ukraine is not an easy call. Judging from the unclassified literature, it seems likely that Ukrainian intelligence is penetrated by the Russians. So, how do you share, how much, when, and with whom? Here are my guesses: You share only at a very high level, and only with professionals. Probably only with the military. If we and they are lucky, we have already trained them to receive and use what we pass. You leave an air gap between the “western” intelligence and whatever else they have. If we and they are lucky, the “western” equipment is already installed and tested. But you don’t exercise the equipment in Ukraine until the war is real, so as to limit what the Russian penetrations can learn and what advantage the Russian forces can gain as a result. And if you’re really serious, some American “trainers” come with the equipment — and stay there. Not “boots on the ground,” maybe, but “operatives in the ops center.”  And if we and they are lucky, the operatives are neither killed nor captured. So, why the letter? To tell the bureaucrats that we have their back, both parties, if that last bit of luck does not come to pass. 

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

Tags : , , , , ,

Stevenson’s army, February 9

– WSJ touts US information warfare over Ukraine.

– Politico reports some intelligence officials think too much is being released.

– Russians deny promises to Macron.

– At FP, writer sees Xi-Putin statement as no big deal.

– Maybe hypersonic weapons can easily be defeated, but that technology is on the critical list.

– The FY23 budget was due yesterday, but the 2022 budget hasn’t been passed. Expect lengthy delays.

Sanctions against Honduran president revealed.

Updated version of WaPo report on Afghan evacuation gives more evidence supporting my view that a key factor was the organizational culture clash between a State Dept that always resists closing an embassy and was sympathetic to the destabilizing effects on the host nation government and a military that makes detailed, rigid plans without regard to diplomatic and psychological consequences — coupled with a White House that prefers hedging to binary choices.

CORRECTION: The stopgap spending bill runs to March 11, not April as I wrongly said yesterday.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

Tags : , , , , , , , , , , ,

Stevenson’s army, February 8

– French officials say Putin promised no new military initiatives for now.

– WaPo has Army report on Afghan withdrawal.

– Vox says Biden learned from Crimea handling under Obama.

– Yesterday I sent Ezra Klein’s report that social trust was key factor in pandemic coping. Kevin Drum argues that loss of social trust correlates with rise of Fox News. [FWIW, I think social media’s stimulation of anger and outrage also mattered.]

– FP says hypersonic missiles are easy to counter.

– RollCall says Continuing Resolutions hurt defense. [Latest plan is to kick the can to April]

-SAIS prof Paula Thornhill comments on new civ-mil research. And she links to great issue of Air University’s SSQ.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

Tags : , , , , ,

Stevenson’s army, February 7

– WSJ says administration will soon release its Indo_-Pacific economic strategy.

– NYT says redistricting has left only 40 competitive House seats, the lowest in decades. But court challenges loom in many states.

– Ezra Klein reports studies showing best predictors of national success in pandemic are trust in government and trust in fellow citizens.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

Tags : , ,

Europe neither whole nor free won’t last forever

For three decades, Washington has sought a Europe “whole and free.” Once the Iron Curtain came down and the Soviet Union broke up, it seemed possible that liberal democracy would spread eastward and southward, into former Soviet Republics and Warsaw Pact states as well as the Balkans.

The enterprise went well for a decade or two. The Baltic republics and most of what was then termed Eastern Europe joined NATO and the EU, as did some of the Balkan countries. Russian objections were minimal. But the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s and state collapse in Albania delayed the process for some. Russian intervention in the 2000s delayed others.

Resurgent Russia has Chinese backing

Russia is now resurgent militarily and financially. It is flexing its muscles on the borders of Ukraine. Moscow aims to block further progress in making Europe whole and free. It also hopes to roll it back where it can. China, in many ways the greater power, is backing Russian pretensions, not least because the Russian challenge reduces the capacity to enhance American military presence in Asia. China and Russia also want to demonstrate the resilience of autocracy even as democracies are struggling to cope with COVID and populist, often ethnic, nationalism.

The threat is real

The Russian threat to Ukraine is real. Over 100,000 troops, including frontline combat units, are poised to enter Ukraine from Russia to the east, Belarus to the north, and Crimea to the south. The UK and US have unveiled Russian plots to stage provocations intended to justify intervention. No one knows whether President Putin will pull the trigger, but the gun is loaded and pointed at Ukraine.

The Americans have what they can

President Biden is trying to focus on the more reasonable of Putin’s demands. These include a discussion of force deployments in Europe, especially intermediate range missiles. Biden has also sent a lot of training and equipment to the Ukrainian army and threatened dramatic economic sanctions. Those moves are intended as deterrence. The United States will not defend Ukraine as it would a NATO ally, because Ukraine isn’t one. But it will also not rule out forever Ukrainian membership in the Alliance, which is one of Putin’s unreasonable demands.

Europe whole and free is already a dead letter

If Russia invades, Europe whole and free will obviously be a dead letter. But in many ways it already is. Russian troublemaking in the Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and elsewhere has become endemic. Russian assassination attempts, rented violent crowds, extremist gangs, cyberattacks, disinformation, and threats to cut off natural gas supplies have become daily events. These are key tools of the “hybrid warfare” Russia finds useful and convenient, as they are relatively cheap and unlikely to provoke much reaction the Kremlin can’t parry.

With Xi in his corner, Putin will return to Moscow from the Beijing Olympics with an army poised to invade Ukraine, the ground frozen to suit his tanks, and a big decision to make. He lacks only the (optional) Ukrainian provocation. If he wants one, his secret services will no doubt provide.

An invasion will embarrass the Americans

A Russian invasion of Ukraine will put Biden in an awkward position. He has deployed a few thousand Americans to eastern NATO allies, and NATO is ready to deploy more. But they have a more political than military purpose. They reassure Poland and Romania and act as a tripwire for broader US involvement. Biden does not want to be snookered into defending Ukraine or going to war with Russia. If a Russian invasion is successful, it will be a short-term embarrassment for the Americans and give Biden’s opponents a talking point, even if the Republicans share the desire to avoid war.

But it won’t be a long-term triumph for Moscow

A successful Russian invasion will however not be a long-term triumph for Moscow. It will solidify NATO and turn most of the Ukrainian population into sworn enemies. Putin will face a post-war reconstruction challenge many times the size of the one he has failed to meet in the parts of Donbas Russian proxies already occupy. The United States did not fight the Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), but both were prelude to revolutions decades later that laid the basis for the end of the Soviet Union. Europe neither whole nor free won’t last forever.

Tweet