Category: Daniel Serwer
Stevenson’s Army, May 1
-WaPo says “U.S. officials” have new North Korea policy. Looks like a trial balloon. And WSJ even got Jen Psaki on the record.
– WSJ also explains Biden’s careful media strategy.
And WSJ says Biden foreign policy takes backseat to domestic issues.
AP reports secret US deal with Taliban.
WaPo says Taliban has imposed checkpoints to control traffic over much of Afghanistan.
Really tough call: WaPo details administration divisions over vaccines: intellectual property rights vs public health; future biotech leadership vs current manufacturing; trade vs protection. Lots of second and third order issues and consequences.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, April 30
– In class, we talked about originalism as a school of judicial interpretation. The Yale law prof who has used history for more liberal conclusions is Akhil Reed Amar. And Slate has a new piece arguing that a pending gun laws case poses a dilemma for originalists who oppose restrictions.
– I recently saw a stunning new documentary, The Hunt for Bin Laden. Politico has an article drawing on the oral histories used in that documentary.
– FP argues that US withdrawal from Afghanistan will be very expensive.
– DNI warns about China’s reaction to change in US Taiwan policy.
– CFR report says there’s still hope for arms control.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The one-sided war of dreadful non-papers continues, mine next!
Koha Ditore has published a non-paper on the EU-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The origins of the paper have not been verified, though it is widely referred to as French and German. They deny it originates with official Paris and Berlin.
I’m not worried about the origins of the paper. It clearly reflects ideas discussed within the EU. I comment below on its dreadful contents.
While asserting the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of both Kosovo and Serbia, in practice this proposal requires that Pristina surrender practical application of sovereignty over economic development, health, urban and rural planning in Serbian communities both north and south of the Ibar River as well as sovereignty over dozens of Serbian Orthodox Church sites and institutions, whose protective zones would be extended in some undefined fashion. In the north, this proposal includes an “autonomous” district that would in addition acquire legislative authority over finance, property, infrastructure, culture, social welfare, the judiciary and police, housing, and European cooperation, with only a vague wave of the hand in the direction of Kosovo’s constitution.
In return, Pristina gets practically nothing: no bilateral recognition by Serbia and no UN membership, only vague promises of treatment as a sovereign state, including exchange of ill-defined permanent diplomatic missions. President Vucic was right when he said this offers more than the Ahtisaari Plan. It offers a great deal more to Serbia and requires much less of Belgrade. It would even roll back specific provisions of the 2013 Brussels Agreement that extended Pristina’s judicial and police authority to northern Kosovo.
All you need to do to understand the profound unfairness of this proposal is to ask whether Belgrade would be prepared to make it reciprocal, empowering the Albanian-majority communities of southern Serbia in the way proposed here for the Serb-majority municipalities of Kosovo. “No” is the answer. Nor would Serbia be prepared to offer an undefined extension of protected areas around mosques inside Serbia. Reciprocity is one of the basic rules of sovereign states. This proposal would leave the Kosovo state significantly less sovereign than it is today while asking Belgrade to do little more than continue to maintain a representative in Pristina.
The non-paper war is not doing the cause of peace and stability in the Western Balkans much good. The two salvos so far have come from one side, the first in favor of moving borders to accommodate ethnic differences and the second in favor of keeping borders where they are but not respecting the Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. So I think I’ll prepare my own non-paper. It won’t move borders and will be consistent with official US policy of respect for the sovereignty and terrritorial integrity of all the states of the Balkans, but it will add some practical means of achieving what most in Europe, the US, and the Western Balkans says they want: prosperous and democratic states worthy of EU membership. Look for it in the next few days on peacefare.net!
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Stevenson’s army, April 28
– Congress may increase staff budgets
– Congress may cut aid to Afghanistan.
– These people may be nominated ambassadors.
– Taliban may be responsible.
– Afghan army may collapse.
– Kahl confirmed.
Painful reminder: New Yorker tells of the Chinese exclusion act.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, April 27
Census numbers show gains for GOP-controlled states. Republicans will be in charge of drawing new maps in 187 congressional districts this year, compared with 75 for Democrats, down from the GOP’s 219-44 advantage a decade ago, according to the Cook Political Report. The other seats are in states where power is split, a commission is in charge of the maps, or the states have only a single House seat.
Here’sthe full Cook Political report analysis.
– Combatant commanders want more information declassified.
-WSJ says troop phones put operations at risk.
– Kerry denies Zarif claim about Israeli attacks.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What if World War I had ended without US intervention?
SAIS Professor Charlie Stevenson writes:
Philip Zelikow, academic, diplomat, and executive director of the 9/11 commission, has written an excellent book with a deeply tragic story. The Road Less Traveled [Public Affairs, 2021] analyzes Woodrow Wilson’s failed effort to launch peace talks that could have ended the bloody conflict in Europe and kept the United States out of the war.
Zelikow knows how government works from the inside. He also co-authored the second edition of Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision, the landmark work on bureaucratic politics analysis. He uses that background to explain the many ways in which good intentions for peace were scuttled by zealots for war.
Among his assessments:
- Woodrow Wilson wanted to shepherd a peace conference but didn’t understand how to craft the diplomacy. He was more angry with Britain than Germany as late as January 31, 1917.
- Wilson was undermined by his close adviser, Edward House, who miscommunicated many of Wilson’s views to European diplomats and personally wanted to join the war in support of Britain.
- Wilson was also undermined by his senior State Department officials, who also favored joining the war with the Allies and who failed to turn Wilson’s goals into a plan.
- Germany’s civilian government desperately wanted peace and offered substantial concessions, but they were ultimately overruled by the military high command, who promised the kaiser a quick victory through submarine warfare.
- The British government was ready to accept peace talks in the fall of 1916, only to be out-maneuvered and then replaced by David Lloyd George, who privately believed the war couldn’t be won yet publicly vowed a fight to the finish. [His plan for victory envisioned battles in the Balkans and Turkey.]
- The French and Russian governments faced growing public opposition to continuing the war and would likely have agreed to a status quo ante bellum peace.
If only experienced career diplomats had developed a plan for launching peace talks…
If only Wilson had pushed ahead and forced his subordinates to act on that plan…
If only the British had recognized their desperate financial situation and acted while Asquith was still prime minister…
If only the German Chancellor had persuaded the kaiser to delay the return to unrestricted submarine warfare…
The United States would not have entered the war. [Wilson had already cut off British access to US loans.]
Russia might not have had its revolutions and ultimately a communist takeover.
Postwar Europe would not have been so disrupted by political unrest and military conflict.
I’ve spent a lot of time over the years studying the outbreak of war in 1914. Since historians usually only write about things that have happened, it’s rare to have such a solid work about something that almost happened. Zelikow has profound lessons for practitioners on how ideas get turned into policies and policies processed into accomplishments.
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