Category: Daniel Serwer
You decide
Shpend Limoni of Pristina daily Gazeta Express asked some questions today. I answered:
Q: The political stalemate in Kosovo is continuing for months. The opposition parties and the government are still in the opposing positions regarding the demarcation process with Montenegro and Brussels Agreement on the Association of Serb Municipalities. Do you think that early general elections are a solution for this crisis?
A: Whether to hold early elections is a choice Kosovars need to make, not foreigners. That is what parliament is for.
On the merits of the two issues, I’m surprised either one has aroused so much passion and have my doubts that early elections will lead to their easy resolution.
Q: Mr. Thaçi is insisting on becoming President of Kosovo as a fulfilment of the governing coalition agreement. Yesterday he met with State Secretary John Kerry which is seen as a decisive moment for his candidacy. Do you think that Thaçi has US support in his intentions to become next President of Kosovo?
A: You will have to ask US government officials about official US government support. Generally Washington tries to stay out of choices of this sort in countries with democratic systems. We really do believe in government of the people, by the people and for the people. I realize that in Kosovo that principle may have been violated in the past, but I don’t really see any good reasons for violating it now.
Q: Considering the large international support for Mrs. Jahjaga do you think that she has a chance for a second mandate as President of Kosovo?
A: I think President Jahjaga has done a great job of representing Kosovo both to the international community and in her domestic capacity. But to get a second mandate she needs to find the support required in parliament.
Q: Do you believe that the Special Court somehow could affect the election of the President and the overall situation that is Kosovo is facing right now?
A: I imagine that the cases the Special Court might consider will be a factor in the minds of at least some of the parliamentarians who elect the President and who need to find a way out of the current situation. But it is impossible to predict now precisely who will be indicted and for what. That will attenuate somewhat the impact of what the court might do.
My main point throughout this interview, and in many others, is that people in the Balkans need to start taking responsibility for their own decisions. The unipolar, imperial moment is over. Washington has a lot of other things to worry about. Friends and allies who want to make a serious contribution will be taking care of their own business, not leaning on Washington to make decisions for them.
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Diminished West revisited
Hisham Melhem published a bold and compelling piece over the weekend about Western interactions with Iran that has garnered a great deal of praise from people I respect. Hisham lambasts the Italians for covering up nude statues during the visit of President Rouhani, mocks Rouhani for asking the Pope to pray for him, praises the French for insisting that any meal they serve has to include wine, excoriates the Supreme Leader for Holocaust denial, and decries the Iranian humiliation of American sailors. He appears to have convinced most that these recent incidents with Iran have diminished the West, perhaps irreversibly.
I think he is wrong on the merits, most notably the notion that anything that happened last week suggests diminished the West. If I have to live in a civilization in decline, let it be this one.
But let me respond to his points one-by-one.
On the statues and the wine: we all bend a bit to the preferences of our guests. I am a pork eater, but I wouldn’t serve it during a meal with Kosher or Muslim guests. I don’t know anyone who would. The French are entitled to their view that wine is essential to a meal, but I find that attitude rather intolerant and inhospitable. I bet their businessmen aren’t insisting on wine served at meals if their Iranian Airbus customers object. As for the statues, what the Italians did is at least as laughable as what John Ashcroft did in covering statues at the Justice Department, but that didn’t convince me America is in decline. Italian spinelessness shouldn’t convince anyone that the West is diminished.
As for the Pope, I bet Francis wishes he had a dollar for all the visitors who ask him to pray for them. What else does one ask of the Pope?
The parts of Melhem’s lamentation that have some merit are the complaint about showing photographs of the US sailors, who so far as I can tell really did violate Iran’s territorial integrity, as well as the complaint about Khamenei’s Holocaust denial.
My understanding is that display of prisoners is a violation of 1949 Geneva convention. The Americans should have objected, vigorously. I take it they did not because they were relieved to get them back quickly after they entered Iranian territory and did not want to undermine those who had made the arrangements for their return. That is screwy, as we need the Iranians reminded that the nuclear deal, and more generally Tehran’s return to the international community, entails responsibilities as well as privileges.
On the Holocaust, I thought Khamenei’s video seemed less committed to denial than previous utterances. He says “it is not clear whether the core of this matter is reality or not… Even if it is a reality, it is not clear how it happened.” That’s far from a resounding denial and might even be interpreted as an implicit retreat from it. I won’t be satisfied until Iran accepts not only the reality of the Holocaust but also one of the consequences: creation of the state of Israel. But listening to your enemies is at least as important as denouncing them. I’ll leave to Iran experts whether I have misheard.
I realize of course that Hisham’s tirade is in defense of the West and its liberal values. But I don’t think on close examination that it works. Insisting that others accept your standards and beliefs is not a liberal value. Listening to them and talking with them about why we believe what we do is. But that won’t attract anywhere near the same notice as a broadside.
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The good news from Tikrit
I have been curious about the situation in Tikrit, liberated from the Islamic State nine months ago. This morning’s NPR report is the best I’ve seen/heard on the subject. Sounds like a solid B grade to me, which under the circumstances is pretty good. And the first year isn’t over yet. Whatever grievances persist, returns and startup of construction are excellent signs. It is post-liberation conditions that will decide the eventual outcome of the fight against the Islamic State, not merely military prowess.
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The confessional/ethnic temptation
Henri Barkey writes in The American Interest:
The U.S. government [should commit] itself to the creation of a confederal democratic Syria that is divided along confessional and ethnic lines. In its most elementary form, the new Syria would be divided along three main areas, Alawi/Christian, Sunni, and Kurdish, with Damascus remaining as the capital although temporarily run by a UN administration.
How simple! How neat! How symmetrical!
How homicidal.
I’d be the first to admit that something like this confessional/ethnic cantonalization is emerging from the chaos of Syria’s civil war. The Kurds have established several cantons of what they are calling “Rojava” along the Turkish border. Alawites, Shiites and Christians are retreating from central Syria to the west. The Islamic State dominates a good part of the east, though there is no single “Sunni” area but rather a patchwork of them. Ultimately some sort of equilibrium may emerge organically that resembles what us conflict management nerds call a mutually hurting stalemate, one of the key conditions for a negotiated outcome.
But that is a different proposition from US advocacy of confessional and ethnic cantonalization, which implies someone in Washington or New York drawing lines. That would lead quickly to ethnic cleansing, because each group would seek to establish unquestioned dominance over its own territory. There is no single concentration of Sunnis. Creating one can be done, but only by force. What will happen to Alawites and Christians who have managed to survive in Sunni areas through the war, but now find themselves on the wrong side of some line drawn in Washington? What will happen to the Sunnis who inhabit western areas of Syria, none of whose provinces were majority Alawite before the war? Those who don’t “belong” will be chased out, forced across the lines into what someone in Washington or New York has designated as their homeland.
If you don’t like Sykes-Picot, you are sure not to like Henri’s proposition.
The only group in Syria that would jump at it is the Islamic State. It would get recognition of its dominance in parts of eastern Syria. That alone should give any American pause. It should also have made the editors of a publication called The American Interest hesitate.
Worst off would be Damascus, where Henri proposes the UN govern, temporarily. But Damascus is as mixed as all of Syria, with significant populations of Sunnis, Shia, Alawites, Kurds and Christians. Ethnic cleansing there would take particularly brutal and unforgiving forms as each of those groups tries to protect itself from others and dominate the capital. Where would UN capability to prevent that from happening come from? Who is going to deploy peacekeeping forces quickly and effectively to back up a UN administration?
Consider also the regional impact. The Kurdish PKK would get official recognition of its safe haven in Syria, from which it could continue to attack Turkey. Ankara won’t go along with that. Islamic State ambitions to control Anbar and Ninewa provinces in Iraq would get a big boost. Baghdad wouldn’t accept that. Some in Beirut would be tempted to think about a “greater” Lebanon, incorporating turf from Syria. The Jordanian border, on both sides of which there are the same tribes, would be at risk.
The United States already has a perfectly good vision for the future of Syria: an inclusive, pluralistic polity that settles its issues peacefully within well-established institutions. That’s not what is lacking. It is the political will and resources to make it happen that are missing.
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Coexistence on the border of war
My colleagues at the International Repubican Institutehad me do a facilitation training workshop in December with some of their staff and collaborators, focused on growing frictions between Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts. This brief description of the workshop on “Promoting Coexistence Between Syrian Refugees and Jordanians” was published originally on the IRI website.
With more than 630,000 registered Syrian refugees out of a population of 6.5 million, Jordan faces inevitable tensions between its own citizens and the people it has sheltered from the civil war tearing apart its northern neighbor.
Most of the Syrian refugees live in cities near the border, not in camps. Populations of Jordanian towns have doubled and even tripled. Syrians and Jordanians compete for housing, jobs, water, electricity, waste disposal, health and education in a country whose economic performance has been middling at best. Local governments and the services they provide are overwhelmed. For the Syrians, a seemingly temporary emergency is turning into a long-term nightmare.
Jordanians and IRI staff concerned about this situation and its longer term risks met recently in Amman to consider possible solutions. Their energetic brainstorming session identified six goals that, if realized, would significantly reduce the risks involved and promote coexistence between Syrian refugees and Jordanians:
- Improve community-level conflict management
- Build local governance capacity
- Increase awareness of legal rights and responsibilities
- Promote social and economic integration
- Expand economic opportunity
- Enlarge donor assistance and make it more effective
Little is being done along these lines yet. Few Jordanians and Syrians are prepared to manage local conflicts. Local governments have limited resources and little interest in meeting the needs of Syrians, who Jordanians sometimes view as privileged by international donors. Rights are ignored and responsibilities neglected. The Syrian and Jordanian communities are largely segregated from each other and enjoy little communication or mutual exchange. Economic opportunities are limited for both communities in a country that has a high fixed exchange rate with the dollar and little appetite for economic reform. Donors are neither transparent nor accountable from the local community perspective.
A far more intense focus on these issues is required. Training in conflict management of key people in both communities, perhaps to work in tandem, would provide a quick response capability as well as a longer-term capacity to reduce tensions. Overwhelmed local governments need help, including from local civil society organizations, in analyzing and responding to needs. More integration in win/win economic enterprises and social services would reduce tensions. Donor transparency and accountability would give both Jordanians and Syrians confidence that they are being treated fairly.
This dialogue among Jordanians was just the start of a much broader process of consultation. Syrian refugees should meet to brainstorm their own goals, which are likely to be different from those the Jordanians outlined. Then they will together need to look for ways in which both groups can cooperate to turn their difficult challenges into opportunities. Syrians may be in Jordan for a long time, like the Palestinians and Iraqis who preceded them. Both countries can ultimately gain from the talents and enterprise Syrians have to offer.
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Hangups: why and who
The Syria peace talks did not begin as projected in Geneva today, though they are likely to convene before the end of this week. Secretary of State Kerry is doing his damndest to make it happen. What are the hang ups? Is he wise to press so hard?
There are two big hangups: why talk and with whom. Or in diplomatese: the agenda and the shape of the table.
Why is the bigger issue. The Syrian opposition, backed by Washington, wants to talk about transition of power away from Bashar al Asad to a “governing body with full executive powers.” That 2012 formula has been repeated ad infinitum since, either explicitly or implicitly (by reference to the June 2012 United Nations communique in which it first appeared). The regime has made it clear it will not negotiate about transition in Geneva. Nor did it last time the UN tried for a political solution, two years ago. Bashar al Asad’s delegation will stick with an anti-terrorist pitch, backed by the Russians and Iranians. The military gains the regime has made against its opponents since Russia’s intervention in the fall mean it is feeling little pressure to yield.
While the Russians never tire of saying that they are not wedded to Bashar al Assad, everything they do suggests the opposite. There is good reason for this. Moscow has no hope of a welcome in Syria by a serious successor to the regime, so the Russians are sticking with what they’ve got.
Iran even more so. Tehran has risked Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias it supports and Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria, certainly losing thousands. Though Syrians in my experience are little inclined to sectarianism, the approximately three-quarters of the population that is at least nominally Sunni is not going to easily forget what Iran and its proxies have done to prop up a dictator. Nor will the Alawites and Shia who have backed the regime want to find out what the majority population is inclined to do in retaliation. So having Iran at the table, entirely justified by its role in the conflict, is no easy formula for a solution.
In addition, there are other “who” problems. The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, often cited as a serious obstacle, is not such a big problem this time around. With Saudi sponsorship, the main opposition forces other than al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State have chosen a High Negotiation Commission (HNC), headed by former regime Prime Minister Hijab, and a negotiating team. The main body of the opposition is, in fact, remarkably unified this time around, at least for the moment.
The problem is that there are forces claiming to be opposition that lie outside the HNC, which does not recognize them as such. They come in two flavors: Kurdish and so-called “internal” opposition, both heavily favored by Moscow.
The Kurds who count are affiliated with the Kurdish PYD militia who are fighting in northern Syria against the Islamic State with US support. Washington doesn’t want them excluded from the talks, even if they are affiliated with the Kurdish militia waging a rebellion inside Turkey. Moscow agrees, not least to give Turkey grief.
Moscow also backs elements of the “internal” opposition who aren’t regarded by the opposition forces represented in the HNC as real opposition. Russia is trying to force internal opposition figures into the HNC delegation, likely in exchange for allowing some of what Moscow regards as extremist groups also to join. From Moscow’s point of view, the more unmanageable and fractious the HNC presence in Geneva, the better. The last thing Moscow wants is for the Syrians to choose their own delegation, which would be heavily anti-Russian.
The HNC seems determined to reject Kurdish participation in its delegation, not least because the Kurds often clash with opposition brigades represented there and collaborate with the regime in territories the Kurds largely control. But of course that may mean separate Kurdish representation, which in some ways is precisely what the mostly Arab HNC should not want to see. Separate Kurdish representation in the talks could well favor Kurdish ambitions for a separate federal unit within Syria, like the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. The Syrian Kurds are calling theirs “Rojava.”
With all these complications, is Secretary Kerry wise to insist?
Richard Gowan argues that there are reasons to proceed, despite the odds: possible progress on humanitarian issues, keeping a peace process alive because it may eventually lead somewhere, and most of all the need Washington and Moscow are feeling to limit their recent competition and try for some cooperation in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal. Even a failure, in this view, has the virtue of trying.
My own inclination is towards skepticism, not least because failure at this point will likely mean another tw0-year hiatus. Secretary Kerry is a far greater risk-taker than most of his predecessors. He tried with Israel and Palestine far beyond the point at which others would have given up. The result is an impasse that may last a long time. He pressed forward with Iran on nuclear issues to good effect. Will his Syria effort look more like the former or the latter? More likely the former, with catastrophic consequences for millions of Syrians.
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