Category: Daniel Serwer
A bad way to start the new year
2015 was a disastrous year for the Middle East. Uncivil war in Syria raged on, with Russia pitching in on behalf of the Assad regime. Yemen also descended into full-fledged war, with Saudi Arabia pitching in on behalf of President (or former President, depending whose side you are on) Hadi. Libya’s UN-brokered peace agreement seems far from implementation, with two parliaments, two governments and many militias, as well as a growing Islamic State presence. The Islamic State lost territory in Syria (to Kurds) and in Iraq (to Kurds Yezidis, Shia militias and Iraqi government forces), but it would be hard to claim the tide of war has changed direction. Egypt continues to crack down on not only the Muslim Brotherhood and more extremist Islamist threats but also on moderate secularists. Israel and the Palestinians are at an impasse, one in which deadly violence on both sides is escalating.
Can it get worse?
The weekend’s events answer that question: yes. Friday Saudi Arabia, current chair of the UN Human Rights Council, executed 47 people, one of whom was a Shia cleric whose commitment to nonviolence seems uncontested, even if he was no friend of the (Sunni) monarchy. Yesterday Iranians responded by sacking part of the Saudi Embassy, a move that will remind the world of how little the Islamic Republic can be relied upon to protect diplomatic facilities. Today the Saudis claimed that Iran executed hundreds last year with little legal basis. The Iranians are promising that God will punish the Saudi monarchy.
We are clearly in the midst of a downward spiral that could well end in more sectarian bloodletting. Iran can pump more weapons and fighters (both Hizbollah and its own Revolutionary Guards) into Syria. Saudi Arabia can beef up support for insurgents there and escalate its attacks on the Houthis in Yemen. The more regional conflict and chaos, the stronger the Islamic State and Al Qaeda grow in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Afghanistan, even if they are losing territory in Iraq and northern Syria. Instability breeds instability.
President Obama wants to keep the United States out of the fray, except to attack those who directly threaten the homeland. That means the Islamic State as well as Al Qaeda and its affiliates. His astoundingly disciplined refusal to engage otherwise leaves a vacuum that militants expand to fill. Those who think the President indecisive or irresolute have misunderstood. He is determined not to get drawn back in to the Middle East. Watching the Iranians and Saudis go at it should be enough to make many Americans sympathize.
But not doing things is just as much a policy as doing them. It has consequences. The downward spiral is unlikely to stop of its own accord. The Middle East is a high wire act without a net. There is no regional security framework or even a loose association like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help de-escalate. The Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation is far too weak a reed. The Gulf Cooperation Council is an adversary of Iran, not a neutral. Neither Europe nor the U.S. has had much success in getting the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom to temper their conflict.
It is difficult to see how this ends well. It may well be we are heading for a conflagration with much more catastrophic consequences than we have seen so far. Only when the Saudis and Iranians see that happening are they likely to stop. And then it may be too late.
We haven’t seen much yet of 2016. Just enough to know it is a bad way to start a new year.
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Not a good year
Kosova Sot, a Pristina daily, asked for a year-end review, published in Albanian. Here is what I sent :
Today brought me the welcome news that Kosovo has been judged eligible for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a US government agency that focuses on supporting economic policy reform and good governance. That and European Union signature of a Stabilization and Association Agreement that provides substantial benefits to non-EU members are two important milestones for a country that has otherwise had a rough year.
The Kosovo government is under siege in parliament, where its opposition has several times attacked with tear gas, nominally to protest two international agreements: one with Montenegro demarcating the border with Kosovo and one with Serbia on the creation of an Association of Serbian Municipalities. The real motives lie deeper: the current Kosovo government was formed after a ruling party with the largest number of seats broke up a coalition that included its chief rival by surrendering the prime ministry and other key posts. The current rump opposition, which thought it had an unassailable advantage in forming a coalition to govern, found itself left out in the cold.
Still deeper is the existence in Kosovo of anti-constitutional political forces: on the Albanian side of the equation, Vetvendosje (Self-Determination), which insists on the right to a referendum on union with Albania excluded by the constitution; on the Serb side, most politicians, who deny Kosovo is an independent state, even if some are prepared to participate in its governance and acknowledge its laws. It is not easy for a state to accommodate political forces that deny its right to exist or insist on their right to end its existence.
Nor is life easy when your nearest and largest neighbor supports those who deny your right to exist and blocks your access to international organizations that pride themselves on virtually universal membership. Serbia, which has acknowledged in the Brussels talks sponsored by the EU the validity of Kosovo’s constitution and legal system on the entire territory of the country, nevertheless refuses to allow it admittance even into UNESCO. This has had the perverse effects of encouraging more virulent Albanian nationalism and Islamic extremism, both of which represent serious risks to Serbs and Serbian cultural and religious centers in Kosovo. So too does the recent EU decision not permit visa-free travel by Kosovars.
So I can’t count 2015 as a good year for Kosovo, despite its achievement of important milestones with Washington and Brussels. I can however hope that both anti-constitutional Serbs and anti-constitutional Albanians will come to their senses and realize that a stable, prosperous and democratic Kosovo is in their interest. That is certainly what concerned Americans wish for in 2016.
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What difference does Ramadi make?
Headlines today suggest that Iraqi security forces have retaken government buildings in the center of Ramadi, which fell to the Islamic State (ISIS) in May. Progress has been slow during the six months of the government offensive, which eschewed the use of Shia militias in a Sunni town 55 miles west of Baghdad that once had a population close to 200,000. The US has provided both tactical air attacks and trainers to support the government effort.
ISIS’s improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have made the liberation particularly treacherous, but ISIS did not make a concerted effort to hold on to Ramadi. Instead they tried to make the government’s advance as costly as possible. It still controls big neighborhoods. I’ve not seen any casualty figures, but they were likely significant, on both sides. The physical destruction is massive.
Now comes the hard part: early recovery and eventual reconstruction. While the past can’t be regarded as necessarily indicating future performance, it is worth a look at what has happened in Tikrit, a town of roughly the same size that was retaken from the Islamic State in April. The UN reported in October that
UNDP supported the efforts of the Government of Iraq to stabilize areas liberated from ISIL, particularly in and around Tikrit, through the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization. Several infrastructure projects identified by local authorities are under way in the sectors of water, electricity, health and education, targeting 85,000 beneficiaries among the 133,000 people who have returned to Tikrit. It is estimated that the previous population of Tikrit was 200,000. On24 August, a cash-for-work project that through a UNDP partnership with local non-governmental organizations employs 200 persons daily for public infrastructure rehabilitation was begun.
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The end is nigh, once again
Two years ago I published a post with this title. Remarkably little has changed since then in many conflicts:
- South Sudan is suffering even more bloodletting.
- The Central African Republic is still imploding.
- North Korea is no longer risking internal strife but continues its belligerence on the international stage.
- China is still challenging its neighbors in the East and South China Seas.
- Syria is even more chaotic, with catastrophic consequences for its population and strains for its neighbors.
- Egypt continues its repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular human rights advocates.
- Israel and Palestine are no closer to agreement on a two-state solution.
- Afghanistan has a new president but the Taliban are stronger in the countryside and the Islamic State is gaining adherents; money and people are still expatriating.
- Al Qaeda is less potent in many places, but that is little comfort since the Islamic State has risen to take the leading role in Salafist jihadism.
- Ukraine has lost control of Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia, and risks losing control of much of the southeastern Donbas region.
The only issue I listed then that is palpably improved is the Iranian nuclear question, which is now the subject of a deal that should postpone Tehran’s access to the nuclear materials required to build a bomb for 10 to 15 years.
Danielle Pletka of AEI topped off the gloom this year with a piece suggesting there are reasons to fear Putin’s recklessness could trigger World War III.
Without going that far, it is easy to add to the doom and gloom list:
- Europe is suffering a bout of right-wing xenophobia (the US has a milder case), triggered by migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.
- Mali and Nigeria are suffering serious extremist challenges.
- The Houthi takeover in Yemen, and intervention there by a Saudi-led coalition, is causing vast suffering in one of the world’s poorest countries and allowing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand its operations.
- Civil war in Libya is far from resolution, despite some signatures on a UN-sponsored agreement to end it.
- Turkey has re-initiated a war against Kurdish forces that had been in abeyance.
- Even Brazil, once a rising power, is suffering scandals that may bring down its president, even as its economy tanks.
I’m still not ready to throw in the towel. Some successes of two years ago continue and others have begun: Colombia‘s civil war is nearing its end, Burma/Myanmar continues its transition in a more open direction (even though it has failed to settle conflicts with several important minorities), Kenya is still improving, ditto Liberia, which along with Sierra Leone and maybe Guinea seems to have beaten the Ebola epidemic, and much of the Balkans, even if Kosovo and Bosnia are going through rough patches.
I still think, as I said two years ago:
If there is a continuous thread running through the challenges we face it is this: getting other people to govern themselves in ways that meet the needs of their own populations (including minorities) and don’t threaten others. That was what we did in Europe with the Marshall Plan. It is also what we contributed to in East Asia, as democracy established itself in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and elsewhere. We have also had considerable success in recent decades in Latin America and Africa, where democracy and economic development have grown roots in Brazil, Argentina, Ghana, South Africa, and other important countries. I may not like the people South Africans have elected, but I find it hard to complain about the way they have organized themselves to do it.
This is what we have failed to do in the Middle East: American military support for autocracies there has stunted democratic evolution, even as our emphasis on economic reform has encouraged crony capitalism that generates resentment and support for Islamist alternatives. Mubarak, Asad, Saleh, Qaddafi, and Ben Ali were not the most oppressive dictators the world has ever known, even though they murdered and imprisoned thousands, then raised those numbers by an order of magnitude as they tried to meet the challenge of revolution with brute force. But their departures have left the countries they led with little means of governing themselves. The states they claim to have built have proven a mirage in the desert.
If there is reason for doom and gloom, it is our failure to meet this governance challenge cleverly and effectively. We continue to favor our military instruments, even though they are inappropriate to dealing with most of the problems we face (the important exceptions being Iran and China). We have allowed our civilian instruments of foreign policy to atrophy, even as we ask them to meet enormous challenges. What I wish for the new year is recognition–in the Congress, in the Administration and in the country–that we need still to help enable others to govern themselves. Investment in the capacity to do it will return dividends for many decades into the future.
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The UN leans forward
The UN last week leaned forward on two important conflicts. The Secretariat went ahead with a Libyan peace deal, despite the refusal of the chairs of the country’s two competing parliaments and some armed groups to sign. A couple of days later, the UN Security Council passed a Syria resolution endorsing the so-called Vienna 2 road map for a ceasefire, negotiations, a new constitution, transition and elections. Neither move ends either war. Optimists hope they are first steps in the right direction.
The roads ahead will be difficult. In Libya, many armed groups seem unready to end their struggle, which is more about control of oil, the country’s substantial sovereign wealth funds and patronage than it is about religion or identity. But that is little comfort. It is not clear whether the Tobruk-based parliament, recognized under the agreement as a powerful lower house, will be able to move to Tripoli. Nor is it clear that the Tripoli-based parliament, which is to become a kind of advisory upper house, accepts its reduced role. Without a substantial deployment of peacekeepers, there is little the international community can do beyond the threat of sanctions against individuals to change their minds. In the meanwhile, the Islamic State is expanding its presence and aiming to control Libya’s vital oil facilities. Maybe that will get the attention of the warring factions.
Syria is no less difficult. The United States and Russia may nominally agree that it should remain united and become a state in which its citizens decide how it is governed, but they differ on whether and when Bashar al Assad should go, who is a terrorist and what should be done to fight the Islamic State. Washington thinks Assad has to leave in order to enable a serious fight against terrorists. Russia thinks he is fighting terrorists but might eventually leave, if and when the Syrian people decide. Russia is mostly bombing people the Americans thinks are moderates vital to Syria’s future, not the Islamic State. Washington is beefing up moderate forces, but refuses to give them the means to end barrel bombing and Russian strikes. Even a ceasefire in Syria will be difficult. The Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra (an Al Qaeda affiliate) won’t participate. Who will monitor the ceasefire, reporting on violations and who commits them?
None of this means the UN is wrong to try. What it means is that our expectations should be tempered.
A serious ceasefire in all of Syria isn’t likely. Some parts of the country may calm, but the international community will need to settle for “fight and talk,” a time-honored tradition. Agreement on transition isn’t likely either. The day Bashar al Assad agrees that at some future date he will be leaving power will be the day he leaves power. The notion that he will preside over a credible democratic transition is bozotic. He intends to remain in power and will likely be able to do so as long as the Russians and Iranians back him.
In Libya, it is unlikely that the UN-sponsored accord will be implemented without some sort of international peacekeeping presence, to secure at least Tripoli so that the united government the agreement foresees can safely meet and deliberate. That may be neccessary, but not sufficient, since the Islamic State threat is not in Tripoli (yet), but rather in Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, and civilians in Benghazi need protection even more than those in Tripoli. Washington isn’t going to bother with Libya, except when it targets an Islamic State militant or two (or two dozen). If Libya is to be stabilized, the Europeans will need to step up to the task, or convince Arab countries to do it. Italy is attached by umbilical pipelines to Libyan gas production. France also enjoys Libyan oil and gas. Europeans with interests need to stop talking and start acting if they want their investments and energy supplies saved.
The UN is also leaning forward in Yemen, where the more or less Shia Houthis allied with forces loyal to former President Saleh are fighting the Saudi- and Emirati-backed effort to restore President Hadi to power in Sanaa. The effort to get a ceasefire and political settlement there is just beginning, without much initial success. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is expanding and enjoying relative immunity in Yemen’s vast hinterlands. The Islamic State can’t be far behind.
The seemingly shy and hesitant Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is proving to be a bold risktaker. The UN is doing the right things. If it didn’t exist, we would have to invent it. American politicians should be more appreciative.
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Glad to be left out of a dubious category
I’m in Amman, talking to people about southern Syria. This is a counterpart to my visit to Gaziantep, near the Turkish border with Syria, in October to talk with people about the north, which is now suffering serious turmoil.
There are essentially three geographic components to southern Syria at the moment. Daraa and Quneitra governorates, Suweida to the east and Rif Damascus to the north. Daraa and Quneitra are largely under opposition control, though the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra sometimes fight with each other and with Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades in Quneitra. Suweida, which is mostly Druze, is under regime control but tries to remain out of the fray. Important parts of Rif Damascus to the south and east of Damacus are opposition controlled but under siege by pro-regime forces, including Iranians and Hazara Afghan immigrants to Iran.
Daraa, in contrast to the north, is enjoying a period of relative stability. Sixty-five per cent is said to be under control of units (originally 56 of them!) that claim FSA association under the rubric of the Southern Front, which claims 35,000 fighters. “Control” is a relative term. The chief justice of the opposition-affiliated Deraa court was assassinated Tuesday. It wasn’t the first assassination in Daraa. There is some presence of regime forces in the center of Daraa and along the main north/south road. There is lots of bang bang, but they are not pressing hard to gain territory. Russian air attacks, though greatly feared, are relatively few. The population mostly belongs to the Hoorani tribe, making infiltration harder than in less homogeneous and more urbanized areas. Free Syrian Army supporters in Amman are holding back on any offensives, in particular against the regime stronghold in the center of Daraa town. Some think this is in exchange for a limit on Russian air strikes, which the Jordanians in particular want to avoid because they would chase more refugees across the border. The Coalition Military Operations Center in Amman holds a good deal of sway over the Southern Front, as it provides money and vital supplies.
The big problem for the Syrian opposition in the south continues to be barrel bombs, which still rain down on civilians despite Russian and Syrian denials. No ceasefire in the south can take hold as long as the FSA sees this happening.
Governance in Daraa is a hit and miss affair. The opposition provincial council recently redrew districts to include areas under regime control, but only one of six districts has managed to hold an election. The other members are chosen in indirect elections by more local councils, if I understood correctly. Civil defense is sometimes well-organized and schools are open in many areas, despite sometimes being targetted. Water and electricity are scarce. Police are virtually non-existent. The local councils are however important in delivery of humanitarian supplies, which flow amply across the border from Jordan. Some local people are returning from Jordan to Daraa, but that may be more a signal of the economic difficulties they face in Jordan rather than improved conditions in Syria.
The Israeli and Jordanian borders in the south are tightly monitored. The Jordanians have closed the more accessible border crossing points to refugees, though they remain open to FSA fighters. Twelve thousand refugees have accumulated in a no man’s land at a less accessible border crossing point. The Israelis are said to provide medical treatment to all comers at their border, regardless of affiliation. Some think this a successful “soft power” ploy; others think it is an intelligence gathering operation. It could be both. The procedures for delivering patients, sometimes with notes from Syrian doctors pinned to their clothes to indicate what treatments have already been attempted, are tight and conducted under sniper supervision only at night.
Farther north in Rif Damascus, the situation in East Ghouta remains miserable. Jaish al Islam is dominant among the opposition forces there, though Jabhat al Nusra is also present. Both are fighting the Islamic State. Local councils are present in more peaceful areas but fighters dominate closer to the front lines. Courts apply Sharia, as does the court in Deraa, but the worst “hudud” physical punishments are not utilized.
Jaish al Islam was represented at last week’s Riyadh meeting of the Syrian opposition, along with Ahrar al Sham and other Islamist groups. There is a palpable shift in sentiment in the opposition, including the Islamist groups, towards negotiation with the regime, even if they all continue to insist that Bashar al Assad must go. None think the fighting will stop if he doesn’t. Ahrar al Sham, loathed by some because it includes Jabhat al Nusra (Al Qaeda) participation, is seen by others as turning in a more civilized and perhaps even democratic direction. Some say it does not to commit massacres, unlike the Islamic State.
The Syrian army has been decimated by more than four years of war. It is said to be down to 100,000 from a troop strength of 320,000, though some believe its morale has risen significantly with the Russian air strikes. Hizbollah is now leading the fight against the opposition in many areas. Iran, the opposition believes, gives the orders. Bashar al Assad has been reduced to talking about regime control of “useful Syria,” by which he means Damascus, north to Homs and Hama, and west to Latakia and Tartus, more or less. The south is glad to be left out of that dubious category.
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