Category: Daniel Serwer
Declining is the right answer
The Middle East is one of the few foreign policy areas other than climate change and trade that will get many electrons during the upcoming election year. Discord will dominate the discourse: President Obama is insufficiently resolute, he needs to stand up more against {you fill in the blank}, we should or should not intervene {here} or {there}. We should support our allies {more} or {less}, we {should} or {should not} condition aid on human rights concerns, and we should {defeat}, {deter} or {contain} one terrorist group or another.
You wouldn’t know that there is wide area of agreement among Americans and their political leaders on what US goals in the Middle East should be. Here they are, more or less in order of their salience to national security:
- Nuclear non-proliferation: no (more) nuclear weapons states in the greater Middle East (which stretches more or less from Mauritania to Pakistan).
- Free flow of energy: oil and gas should flow unimpeded from the Middle East to world markets.
- Counterterrorism: extremist groups in the region should not be able to mount a mass casualty attack against the United States or Europe.
- Support for allies: America’s regional allies should wield the means necessary to confront internal and external adversaries successfully.
- Spreading democratic values: all other things being equal (which they aren’t on most days), Washington prefers to deal with inclusive governments that reflect the will of their people.
If there is agreement on these goals, why so much dissonance on the Middle East?
It comes from two things: different priorities accorded to these generally agreed goals, and differences over the means to achieve them.
Priorities are important. The Obama Administration arguably has prioritized nuclear non-proliferation over support for allies, reaching an agreement with Iran that if implemented fully would prevent it from getting nuclear weapons for a decade or more but giving it relief from sanctions that strengthens Tehran’s position in the region and enables it to confront American allies. Washington would prefer a democratic government in Egypt, but has prioritized support for President Sisi and his fight against what he defines as terrorism. Some argue Washington’s focus on anti-American terrorism is leading us to over-emphasize security cooperation and under-emphasize political reform.
So too are the means to achieve these goals. President Obama has preferred killing terrorists with drones to risking American lives in efforts to build up states in the region capable of confronting the terrorist threat with law enforcement means. He has also followed a long American tradition of keeping oil flowing through Hormuz principally through military means rather than encouraging oil producers to build pipelines to carry oil around the strait. Some still think threatening the use of force is necessary to ensure compliance with the Iran nuclear deal.
So yes, there is discord, but the discord is about priorities and means, not about goals. Basically, all American politicians are singing the same lyrics, even when they strike up different tunes or use an orchestra instead of a rock band.
The bigger question is whether these goals in the Middle East are increasing or declining in importance. Let’s look at the goals one by one.
With the Iran nuclear deal, we have at least postponed the major non-proliferation issue in the Middle East. There are still others: will Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey now be tempted to at least match Iran in nuclear technology? Will Pakistan deploy battlefield nuclear weapons as a deterrent against India? Will Israel’s nuclear weapons generate increasing concern in the region? But on the whole I think we can say the issues are less urgent and less compelling, now that the Iran question is settled for a decade or more.
The US is now far less dependent on Middle East oil than it has been for decades, but energy experts will quickly counter that oil prices are determined in a global market, so a serious supply disruption would be felt economically in the US even if we imported no oil at all. Still, with prices around $50/barrel and Iran soon to regain and eventually expand its export position, there is little to worry about for the moment. The people who should worry most are in China, Japan and elsewhere in Asia, which is increasingly dependent on Middle East oil and gas exports. They should bear the burden of protecting energy flows.
Little can be said about the terrorist threat. An attack can always sneak through. 9/11 was less a probability than a “black swan”–a rare and unpredictable deviation from the norm. Ever since, the number of Americans killed by international terrorists has been less than the number killed by (non-Muslim) domestic ones (even if we don’t always call them terrorists). With Al Qaeda Central much diminished and the Islamic State preoccupied with taking and defending territory in Syria and Iraq, not to mention heightening of counterterrorist defenses worldwide, it is harder to plan and execute a major terrorist plot than it was 15 years ago.
Support for allies is arguably more important in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal, but the means we have chosen to achieve it are such that it involves little in-depth engagement with the Middle East. We ship truly gargantuan quantities of advanced armaments to the Gulf and Israel. We have also supported, despite a lot of doubts, the Saudi war against the Houthis in Yemen. The main purpose of our support for allies is to reduce the need for direct American engagement, not increase it.
Apart from guys like me and my friends in the thinktank community who make a living (or not) thinking and writing about the Middle East, there is little support left in the US for spreading democratic values in the region. The positive results of the Arab uprisings are so paltry–a fragile transition in Tunisia and some reforms in Morocco and Jordan–that most Americans (and certainly the presidential candidates) wouldn’t want to waste much taxpayer money or electoral breath on what they regard as a quixotic pursuit.
So declining is the right answer, even without considering the rising threats to the US from China in the Pacific and from Russia in Europe. Those of us who still worry about the Middle East need to figure out more economical and effective ways to achieve the goals that Americans agree on. More about that in future posts.
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Montenegro will survive the challenge
- It was clear that the protests were violent. I am not sure if this was an attempt to topple the government by force, but I believe that this could not happen in Montenegro.
- To assume power in a democratic system, it is important to obtain more votes, and I am not sure how such violent protests could contribute in gaining more votes, or even uniting opposition. People can love or hate Djukanovic, but the fact of the matter is that he is in power thanks to a democratic system and it will be very difficult to take over the power from him through street demonstrations. In democratic systems this is done through elections.
- Moscow will try to create an impression that there are intensifying efforts against Djukanovic, but in reality it is all about resisting Montenegrin membership in NATO. For Moscow Djukanovic is insignificant, what is important is NATO membership. NATO enlargement, even when it comes to small Montenegro, is a defeat for Putin, and they will try to avoid that kind of defeat.
- As long as the security forces refrain from using excessive force, and as long as it is clear that Montenegro has a considerably stronger group that supports its membership, I believe that NATO will recognize what is behind this. These protests might in fact solidify support for the Montenegrin bid among NATO member states.
*Sinisa tells me I was wrong when I said yesterday Vijesti published the interview. He informs that it was Montenegrin Radio and Television (RTCG).
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Yes, Mr. Obama, there is a Syrian opposition
The Middle East Institute, which graciously calls me one of its scholars, published this piece yesterday:
President Barack Obama has notoriously disparaged the moderate opposition as “farmers or dentists or maybe some radio reporters who didn’t have a lot of experience fighting.” The key question about the Syrian opposition is not whether it can fight — in fact many of its cadres are former Syrian army soldiers — but whether it can govern.
Based on a recent visit to Gaziantep — where the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and many Syrian civil society organizations are headquartered — I believe the Syrian opposition could govern effectively in a part of Syria, if it were adequately protected from ground, artillery and air assault. Syrian opposition fighters would need to provide security on the ground, while the anti-ISIS Coalition would protect any designated area from regime airstrikes and barrel bombs.
There are three possible areas in Syria where a protected and liberated zone might be established: in the south along the Jordanian border and the “green line” that separates the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights from Syria; near Raqqa in eastern Syria; and/or in northern Syria along the Turkish border.
What reasons are there to believe the opposition could govern one or more of these areas?
First, Syrians in many opposition-controlled areas have already established forms of governance, including more than 400 local administrative councils, plus nine at the provincial level. The councils provide forums for dialogue and deliver public services, such as emergency and humanitarian relief, electricity, water and sanitation to millions of people. Some collect taxes and fees. Some have even established police forces and courts. Deraa governorate in the south boasts 76 local councils. Aleppo governorate in the north has some of the most active and well-structured.
What the local councils lack is adequate funding and strong connections to the SIG, which is trying to standardize electoral processes and other procedures. According to its Minister of Local Administration, the SIG needs $42 million to pay their salaries and $300 million to fund their priority efforts per year. Funding the local councils through the SIG would enhance its stature and legitimacy, giving it traction within Syria that it currently lacks.
Second, Western funding over the last four years has generated a wide array of externally-based but Syrian-staffed nongovernmental organizations. Some of these are elite organizations, run by well-educated Syrians who may lack the grassroots support the local administrative councils enjoy. However, others are managing to sponsor intercommunal dialogues, negotiating the release of kidnap victims, organizing women to prevent rape, discovering ways of enhancing livelihoods, providing first responders and ensuring respect for human rights.
Third, the local administrative councils and nongovernmental organizations are receiving significant support from Western donors and meeting tough requirements for accountability and transparency. The Assistance Coordination Unit, a quasi-nongovernmental organization established before the SIG, handled $200 million in Western assistance in 2014 and passed a tough international audit with flying colors. The Coalition-sponsored Syrian Recovery Trust Fund is finding useful ways to spend its $90 million in mostly Western contributions, often through the local councils.
Fourth, the SIG has begun to provide important services. The education ministry has administered high school examinations in opposition-controlled areas of Syria and among refugees for several years. It runs schools staffed by 25,000 volunteer teachers. The SIG health ministry has conducted a successful polio vaccination campaign. In November, the SIG will open a Free Syrian University with a faculty of about 160 professors and upwards of 4,000 students.
No one can prove they can govern effectively until trying to do it. But we have ample indications that the Syrian opposition, despite its many weaknesses, could at least begin to govern inside Syria if liberated areas can be protected from attack.
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Still no end in sight
Syrian President Assad’s surprise visit to Moscow confirms several things:
- The Russians are backing him fully;
- They intend to use the influence they gain to dictate a political outcome;
- That political outcome will be a Potemkin transition with little or no participation by the Syrian opposition the US and its friends are supporting.
Those of us who once hoped Moscow would eventually abandon Assad were wrong. What the Russians clearly intend is to keep Assad in place, as no one else would be able or willing to guarantee their continued naval presence at Tartus and new air and land base at Latakia. President Putin is also sending a clear message to Washington: Russia is back in the Middle East and intends to stay there, no matter what the Syrian people or the Americans think.
Some see President Obama as “hesitant” in response. I don’t. He decided a long time ago that Syria was not worth a candle. If he thought US interests were directly threatened there, he would have done more long ago, as he did in Yemen (with drones and special forces), Iraq (with air attacks) and now most recently in Afghanistan, where he intends to keep thousands of American troops. The American air attacks are strictly focused on the Islamic State; extreme care is being taken to avoid “collateral damage.” This president is extremely disciplined. What others see as indecision is in fact a determination not to get involved on the ground in a country that does not directly threaten US national security.
I think he has made a big mistake, because it has been clear from the first that continuation of the war in Syria would lead to sectarian polarization and easy recruitment for extremists, even if no one predicted the emergence of the Islamic State. Assad is its godfather. His brutal repression of a peaceful civilian rebellion has caused dissatisfaction to flow towards the jihadis, not away from them.
The Russians will suffer the same backlash. The Islamic State has already threatened to take the fight inside Russia, where Putin’s repression of Chechnya and mistreatment of Crimean Tatars and other Russian Muslims will not doubt provide the jihadi cause with ample recruits. Russia has poked the hornets’ nest in Syria. Now the Sunni hornets will attack their antagonist. No doubt Putin will respond with repression that will help jihadi recruitment.
Obama has kept his distance from the Russian intervention. The Pentagon has negotiated an agreement intended to deconflict US and Russian air operations. That is necessary, even if it implies to some US acceptance of the Russian intervention. Any further moves to validate what the Russians are doing would embroil the US in a way guaranteed to offend America’s Gulf and other Sunni friends, especially Turkey (whose airspace Russia has repeatedly violated). Russia has made itself the spearhead of Shia influence in the Middle East. Washington will want to try to stay above the sectarian divide. It has no dog in the fight between Sunni and Shia extremists like the Islamic State and Hizbollah, which are both America’s enemies.
Intervention comes with obligations. Russia should now be expected to ante up for a substantial share of the international humanitarian assistance Syria requires. I think $1 billion per year would be appropriate. It should also be expected to pay for the lion’s share of the post-war reconstruction, as the US did in Iraq and Afghanistan. If you want to be treated as a major power, those are burdens that cannot be shirked.
The US is amping up its military supplies to the Syrian opposition forces, whose performance on the battlefield will now determine the outcome of this war. Both Moscow and Washington say there is no military solution in Syria, but both know that a political solution will be dramatically different if the regime can retake Aleppo and Idlib, which seem to be the main objectives of the current Russian-backed offensive by the Syrian army, its paramilitary partners, Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The proxy war between the US and this alternate coalition has begun.
Poor Syria. Its people wanted freedom and got war. The Russian intervention is unlikely to end the fighting, because the Potemkin transition it intends won’t entice many to lay down their arms. There is still no end in sight.
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Kurdistan is simmering too
Last Wednesday I had the pleasure of discussing developments in Iraqi Kurdistan with Mustafa Gurbuz of George Mason University and the Rethink Institute and Namo Abdulla of Rudaw. Here is how it came out:
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The Balkans are simmering
Slow progress towards the EU and NATO is causing unrest in the Balkans. That means I get interview requests. Here are two and the promise of a third.
Pristina daily Gazeta Express today published a brief interview I did for Shpend Limoni yesterday. Here it is in English:
Q: Kosovo is passing through an unprecedented situation where opposition parties (VV-AAK-NISMA) are disrupting parliamentary sessions expressing their anger over EU brokered agreements with Serbia and demarcation of border with Montenegro. Opposition parties also threw tear gas canisters in Parliament Chamber a step which was condemned by EU and US diplomats. Is there any recipe how to resolve this deadlock?
A: I don’t have any recipes for how others govern their own countries, but I do hope that law and order will prevail and violence will lose the day. The Kosovo opposition needs to make its points peacefully, or risk both a crackdown by the state and a loss of support at the polls.
The opposition needs to win an election and form a government in order to decide what Kosovo should do. When they do, I doubt they will want to spoil the Brussels agreements, because Kosovo has a real stake in good relations with the EU, the US and Belgrade.
Q: Do you think that Kosovo institutions are able to find a solution or do we still need international involvement?
A: I tend to favor solutions arrived at by the Kosovo institutions, supported when needed by the international community. I find it hard to understand why people are excited about demarcation of the border with Montenegro, which is a vital step in establishing Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. I understand unhappiness with the most recent Brussels agreements, but the problems with them come mainly from the Ahtisaari Plan. There is no alternative to implementing that.
If I may quote Giulio Andreotti: il potere logora qui non c’e l’ha. Power wears out whoever hasn’t got it. I might hope the opposition parties in Kosovo would focus on how it intends to attract votes and govern more effectively than their competitors, rather than behavior that many citizens will find unappealing.
I did an interview Friday with Esmir Milavic of Sarajevo’s Face TV. I can’t vouch for the Bosnian voice over, but here it is:
And I talked yesterday with Voice of America about the demonstrations in Montenegro and Russian efforts to prevent its accession to NATO. I’ll post that too if and when I get a link or an embed code.
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