Category: Daniel Serwer
Early elections in Serbia
Last Friday Belgrade news agency Tanjug asked some questions. My answers were published today:
Q: There is a possibility for the early parliamentary elections to take place in Serbia early in 2016. At the national level, it is said that the reason behind holding the early elections is to once again legitimize the government’s reform policy. Which are, in your opinion, the aspects relating to holding the early elections that would be in line with the policy and interests of the EU and the US in Serbia?
A: Serbia has a constitution. So long as the procedures in that are followed, I don’t think either the EU or the US has a problem with early elections. If they in addition consolidate support for reform, that would be welcome in Brussels and Washington. But of course in a real democracy there is no guarantee that the election outcome will be what foreigners prefer. It is up to the citizens of Serbia to determine the outcome.
Q: Are there tendencies from abroad to reduce the impact of the Russian Federation on the Serbian government taking into consideration the closeness of individual political parties/partners to Russia?
A: Yes. Belgrade both historically and at present is closer to Moscow than Westerners think appropriate for a country that aspires to EU membership. Certainly Brussels and Washington would be happier if Serbia conformed its policies with EU sanctions on Russia. Many European countries have in the past maintained good relations with Russia. But Moscow’s current behavior in Ukraine and Syria makes that far more difficult than in the recent past.
Q: What kind of government Serbia needs in the light of international cooperation and assignments that need to be carried out in the course of the EU integration and addressing the Kosovo issue? Which political ideas in Serbia, aside from the ones that are promoted by the Serbian Progressive Party led by Prime Minister Vucic, are acceptable for the international community?
A: Serbia needs whatever government its leaders negotiate, based on the vote of its citizens. That’s the way parliamentary systems work. Anyone who is truly committed to democracy—including a free press and an independent judiciary—will find a warm welcome in the EU and US. They will also welcome any government committed to continuing with serious normalization of relations with Kosovo.
Q: What is in your opinion the goal of a possible government reshuffle, that is the change of the coalition partners of the Serbian Progressive Party, which according to opinion polls will certainly win a majority vote and thereby the mandate to form the government?
A: I try to stay out of other peoples’ government reshuffles. It is well-known in Serbia which parties and leaders are friendlier with Moscow and which are more aligned with Brussels and Washington. But Brussels and Washington don’t get to vote, only to continue to try to influence Belgrade’s policies in a way that makes European Union membership the outcome.
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Counterproductive
I today attended a meeting with Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Željka Cvijanović, who is in Washington talking about reducing government Bosnia’s bureaucracies and decentralizing the Bosnian state. I can agree with her general stance on those questions. But she neglected to mention in an initial brief presentation at a meeting hosted by Foreign Policy her President’s referendum proposals.
The current issue is a referendum called by the RS assembly on a vaguely worded proposition that challenges the authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s courts and of the High Representative who supervises implementation of the Dayton peace agreements reached almost 20 years ago:
Do you support the unconstitutional and unauthorized imposition of laws by the High Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the imposed laws on the Court and Prosecutor’s Office of BiH and the implementation of their decisions on the territory of Republika Srpska?
The High Representative has discussed the legal issues the referendum raises in a Special Report of the High Representative to the Secretary General of the UN on the Implementation of the GFAP in BiH. The law on the referendum has not yet been published in the Official Gazette. Instead of proceeding as usual with that, the RS President and government are using the threat of the referendum to extract concessions from the European Union, which is engaged with RS in a seemingly interminable dialogue on its justice system.
I will leave the legal issues to the lawyers. What is the diplomatic impact of what RS is doing?
What I told the Prime Minister is this: the referendum proposal is convincing a lot of people in Washington that RS is doing the wrong thing in such an objectionable fashion that it is making the unthinkable thinkable: sanctioning RS officials and even abolishing the entities, which are the heart of the Dayton agreements.
The reaction is less dramatic in the EU, which still hopes to engage the RS and the Bosnians in general in reform processes intended to soften the edges of the country’s entity structure and enable it to make faster progress towards becoming a candidate for EU accession. I wish the Europeans well in that effort, which is backed by the international financial institutions on which both entities and the state government in Bosnia depend. The EU reform plan means the Europeans are less likely to join the US in vigorous action against the referendum proposal.
That is too bad, because only when the RS sees Europe and the US closing ranks and getting ready to do something dramatic will it yield to sweet reason. That is what happened with the Brcko arbitration that reintegrated one of the most contested pieces of real estate in the country and with defense reform that unified the armies in Bosnia ten years ago. Until the Europeans and Americans decide to act together in a concerted way, we’ll see little progress.
Some will wonder why I even attended a meeting at which I was bound to hear propositions that I object to.
My general approach to life as a private citizen and professor is that I am willing to listen to any foreigner the USG allows into the country (and quite a few it won’t allow in). My willingness to listen is in no way an indication of agreement or even softness. I was absolutely clear that Dodik’s toying with the referendum and using it to extract concessions from the EU is damaging not only his reputation but the viability of the RS. Catastrophic was the term I used to describe the likely outcome.
I am saying so publicly as well so there is no doubt about my views. It is arguable that we needed to allow the RS to continue to exist at the end of the Bosnian war in order to make peace. The peace has lasted, and for that we should all be grateful. But institutions are not necessarily forever. If the RS continues on its counterprodutive path, Americans and Europeans should reach the logical conclusion.
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Governing Syria 2
Last week, I suggested the Syrian opposition is in a better position to govern, at least in a part of Syria, than President Obama believes. But I also promised more on the local administrative councils, Syrian nongovernmental organizations, the assistance coordination unit and the nascent Free Syria University, all civilian activities that represent the best the Syrian opposition has to offer. Today I’ll try to fulfill that promise.
Local councils
Local councils are not unique in Syria. The Libyan revolution also spontaneously generated ad hoc municipal governing councils in 2011 and 2012. But the phenomenon seems to be unusually pervasive in Syria, with the count now about 425 according to the Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA). Most function at the local level, but some function at the city or provincial level. MOLA is trying to raise the number of provincial-level councils from 7-8 at present to 9-10 (out of 14 provinces) by the end of the year.
What do they do? The most recent and most comprehensive report is from last spring, by the Local Administrative Councils Unit (LACU), a creature of the Syrian opposition but not part of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG). A second survey by a Syrian NGO on their legitimacy is in progress. The LACU report suggests that, in addition to emergency response, the most common projects are in the areas of water, power, education, health, and hygiene (I suppose that includes waste management). But most projects are stalled, often because of lack of funding, especially for salaries. A few councils have set up a local police force. Some have set up courts. Many more local ones record marriages and property transactions, though they don’t always have access to regime records.
Where do they operate? Half of the local councils operate in liberated areas subject to bombardment. A handful operate in regime-controlled areas. About one-third operate in stable liberated areas.
How are the local councils formed? One-third were elected, sometimes in indirect elections (that is, a larger electoral assembly chooses them). Half are formed “by consensus.” They are overwhelmingly male–I was told fewer than 2% of the members are women. In rural areas the local councils may have less authority than armed groups, but in cities they hold more sway. Stories of local councils facing down armed groups there are common. The armed groups need the local councils to take care of civilian needs.
How are they funded? The international donors are dealing a great deal with the local councils, most often without coordination or reference to the Syrian Interim Government, which has no funds to provide to the local councils for projects. A few manage to collect some fees or taxes, but most rely on volunteer labor and international donor support. The local councils depend heavily for legitimacy on their ability to deliver services, and secondarily on accountability and transparency. They are a genuinely bottom-up phenomenon.
Fully funding the local councils would require about $3.5 million per month for the salaries of about 10,000 workers. Supporting them fully to provide services and build projects would cost about $300 million per year, I was told.
Nongovernmental organizations
Syrian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) tend to be elite organizations run by well-educated people with good connections to international donors (that, anyway, is what I was told by an NGOer). The NGOs emphasize the right things: service delivery, accountability and transparency. But they also sometimes compete for service delivery with the local administrative councils, which often can’t meet donor requirements for documentation, monitoring and evaluation.
NGO activities inside Syria are however vital and impressive. They negotiate ceasefires and prisoner releases, deal with kidnappers, mobilize first responders, help open schools, promote intergroup dialogue, provide medical aid in besieged areas and counter violence against women. They are trying to organize an effort to allow NGOs to participate in UN peace talks. If the idea of a northern protected zone goes ahead, NGOs will have prepared Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds to return and decide on priorities for their future.
Education
Syrians have a particular concern with education. The SIG has managed to administer high school exams in liberated areas and in the neighboring countries (among refugees) for several years. One million students attend “field” schools in liberated areas and refugee camps, taught inside Syria by 25,000 volunteer teachers in apartments and basements (most school buildings in liberated areas have been bombed). There is a computer school for disabled students in Aleppo.
But many Syrian children are not in school. High school courses are on online, but the literacy rate is down to 50-60% among young people. More educated Syrians are leaving and going to Europe. In an effort to keep more young people in Syria, the SIG is planning to open in November a “Free Syria University” in liberated areas for 4-5000 students. Ten faculties will operate with 160 professors.
The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU)
One of the big issues for international donors in dealing with Syria is whether they can rely on the money to get where it is supposed to go and have the impact it is expected to have. The ACU was set up as a quasi nongovernmental organization (quango) to meet these requirements. It gets money from international donors and invests it in projects, mainly for health, food, nutrition, housing and services.
Established in December 2012, ACU grew from $53 million in 2013 to close to $200 million in 2014. Meeting international auditing standards, it is paying teachers, civil defense workers, street cleaners. It is also buying wheat and vaccinating children. The goal is to help Syrians where they are, so that they won’t move elsewhere, which should ring a bell with Europeans.
My conclusions
I don’t want to paint too rosy a picture. It is easy to find criticism of the local councils, NGOs and quangos. None of these organizations is a sturdy and reliable pillar on which to lean. But I don’t want President Obama to continue painting too bleak an outlook either.
Syria has good people trying to meet colossal challenges with limited means. Yes, I would spend $500 million per year on these civilian activities aimed at making life more livable and the future more productive for a country that right now is costing us far more just to provide humanitarian relief. Certainly that amount would be far less wastefully spent than the Pentagon performance in trying to “equip and train” Syrians to fight ISIS. Syria’s local administrative councils, nongovernmental organizations and quangos merit not just funding but our confidence and commitment.
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Obama’s Syria options
Russia has in the last ten days deployed a forward operating base and ground troops in Syria, bombarded opposition forces the US supports, intentionally attacked hospitals, repeatedly violated a NATO ally’s (Turkey’s) air space and has launched long-range cruise missile attacks from the Caspian Sea. Russia is at war in Syria and signaling determination to win at any cost.
How should the US react?
Let’s assume direct military action (destroying the Russian base near Latakia, for example) is out. The United States does not want to go to war with Russia over Syria. Great power wars have a way of spinning out of control, with unintended consequences not likely to be worth our while. What else can Barack Obama do?
- Nothing. Or more precisely he can continue to denounce the Russian behavior as self-defeating and counter-productive, as well as likely to put Moscow into a quagmire from which it will find it difficult to emerge without costly consequences. The main difficult with continuing this policy is that it risks projecting an image of weakness and inviting more Russian aggression. It isn’t likely to do much for Barack Obama’s legacy either.
- Push the Syrian opposition into a negotiated solution that leaves Assad in place. This is what some close to the current administration have argued for. It is the most likely result of current UN mediation efforts. It would amount to surrendering Syria back to Bashar al Assad and solidifying Moscow’s and Tehran’s hold on the country. The problem with this idea is that it is unlikely to end the war, because a large part of the opposition will continue fighting, led by its most extreme elements. The Sunni world would regard this outcome as confirming America’s bad faith, dramatically reducing Washington’s influence in the Middle East.
- Mirror Russian behavior in Ukraine. Moscow has installed a forward operating base in a third country and is acting against forces we support at the request of a friendly government in Damascus. The US could install a forward operating base in Ukraine and even act against the rebel forces Russia supports, at the request of the friendly government in Kiev. This would risk a direct clash with Russian forces, but it is noteworthy that Moscow calmed the war in Ukraine before striking in Syria, suggesting that it doubts its own capability to act in both places at the same time. The US military should not have the same problem.
- Mirror Russian behavior in Syria. Like Moscow, Washington could strike against people it considers terrorists inside Syria: Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are both designated by Washington as terrorist organizations and both operate inside Syria. There is no logical reason to limit US action to Sunni extremists. The Shia variety is no more appetizing. Moscow’s action will make it an enemy in the Sunni world. The US is already an enemy in Iran and has little to lose there. Some Iranians would be happy to see the more extreme parts of their Islamic Republic forced to withdraw from Syria.
- Ratchet up sanctions. Putin is upping the ante in the hope of proving himself indispensable to a solution in Syria and using a political solution there to wriggle out of sanctions. We don’t need to allow him to do that, but could instead work with European allies, whose interests in stemming the flow of refugees will be hurt by the Russian military action, to “see” him and double down. Moscow is feeling the pinch of both sanctions and lower oil prices. If the Europeans and Americans can stick together, either Putin will break or the Russians will break him. Popularity doesn’t last forever even in an autocracy if the autocrat can’t deliver.
- Prevent Syrian helicopters from flying. The Syrian Air Force drops its “barrel bombs” on civilian areas from a relatively few remaining helicopters. Such attacks violate international humanitarian law. The UN Security Council has asked that they stop. Making clear that if they fly they will be destroyed, either in the air or on the ground, would be a relatively easy move and would signal a willingness to rebalance the military equation in the opposition’s direction.
- Increase support for the Syrian Interim Government. The war in Syria is unlikely to be won or lost on the battlefield. Who governs best will win in the end, both at the negotiating table and in the hearts and minds of the Syrians. Our allies in the Syrian opposition need a much more concerted effort to help win the civilian contest. Their capabilities have improved. But support arrives fragmented and irregularly. It should be constant and unified. The amounts may sound big–I would guess they need hundreds of million per year to make a real impact–but that is a lot cheaper than war.
Note the absence from my list of increasing humanitarian aid. We are already spending billions on it. The time has come to expect Russia, which is now causing humanitarian problems in Syria, to step up. Washington should tell Moscow that a contribution of $1 billion per year to UN relief in Syria is the minimum expected.
The trouble with writing an “options” post like this one is that someone will inevitably claim that I supported one or the other of these ideas. So I need to be explicit: I am inclined toward 5, 6 and 7, though I confess to thinking 4 is also appealing.
We should be thinking about all of them and not crossing them off the list too soon. If Putin keeps pushing, sooner or later we’ll need to push back. Force may need to be a last resort, but it should not come too late to make a difference.
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Governing Syria
I am writing from Gaziantep in southern Turkey, where I’ve enjoyed a week’s worth of meetings over the last three days. I came to have an upclose look at the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and some of the rest of the Syrian exile presence in this bustling city of 1.5 million located 60 kilometers or so north of the border, including both nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and a couple of quangos (quasi-nongovernmental organizations). That is what I would call the Local Administration Council Unit (LACU) and the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), which are creations of the Syrian Opposition Council that predate the SIG.
Sorry for the acronyms. War generates them. It’s not only the Pentagon.
It is easy enough sitting in Washington to hear the worst about the SIG, SOC, LACU and ACU. President Obama himself has several times stated baldly that the Syrian opposition is incapable of taking over the country. The Syrian NGOs and quangos also come in for a great deal of disdain, as they are heavily dependent on US and European funding.
I can’t say the skeptics are entirely wrong. But they are definitely focusing on the empty part of the glass. What I’ve happily found here are serious people doing serious things with minimal resources and a great deal of commitment and optimism, despite the vagaries of international support.
Let me start with the SIG. It was created by the Syrian Opposition Coalition, a quasi-legislative body recognized by the US and other governments as the political (as distinct from the legal) representative of the Syrian people. The SIG looks like a government in exile: it has a prime minister, a deputy prime minister and ten ministries.
Some of these ministries have impact on the ground inside Syria. The education ministry approves curriculum and administers school examinations in “liberated” areas. The health ministry is said to have mobilized thousands of volunteers inside Syria. If you are an ordinary Syrian unable or unwilling to leave, it is no small thing that your kids are still going to school (even if not likely in a school building, as the regime has bombed most of those). And getting them vaccinated against polio is a big deal since the outbreak in eastern Syria a couple of years ago.
But the SIG has little traction with the armed groups fighting both the Assad regime and extremist groups like Jabhat al Nusra (an Al Qaeda affiliate) and the Islamic State. No one I met pretends that the Defense Ministry plays much of a role in the ongoing warfare. Located outside Syria without a defined and stable relationship with the fighting groups, the SIG looks to some like a Potemkin government sketched on flimsy paper with little governing authority.
I found at the top of the SIG a strong desire–even commitment–to move inside Syria, an ambition that has existed however for years without being realized. I was told an order to relocate the Education Ministry into an opposition-controlled area of northern Syria is already in effect. The best prospect for moving the rest of the SIG into Syria–until the Russians entered the war in recent days–was an area Turkey calls “the rectangle,” a 98-kilometer stretch of its border about 60-70 kilometers deep into Syria that the SIG was expecting to see cleared of its current IS rulers and protected from air and ground bombardment by the regime.
Civilians in Gaziantep, both Syrians and internationals, have been actively planning to move quickly into this area, once IS is cleared from it, with the essentials of post-war reconstruction: security, rule of law, governance, economic activities and humanitarian relief. Local councils for the main population centers already operate outside the “rectangle” but inside Syria. Plans for local police forces and border control are being drawn up. The SIG is surveying public facilities and potential economic activities in the area as well as planning to build accommodations for returning refugees on state-owned land. The Americans have hosted a “table top” simulation for civilian agencies to identify needs and capabilities, Syrian and international. Europeans are hoping that liberating the “rectangle” will help to stem the flow of Syrians out of Turkey into the Union.
No one yet knows whether the Russian air attacks will cancel these plans, but at the very least they are complicating the situation. How can the “rectangle” be protected from Russian attacks, which have focussed not on IS but on the Free Syrian Army? The Russian bombardment is driving younger Syrian fighters towards the Islamic State rather than away from it.
Moderate opposition Syrians are dismayed. In their eyes, what Putin has done merits a strong reaction. He is attacking the people America has said it supports. While they nod knowingly at President Obama’s assertion that Syria will be a quagmire for the Russians, Syrians think American failure to respond looks weak and vacillating. It will lengthen the war. I find it hard to disagree.
The Syrians I spoke with are also concerned about UN envoy De Mistura’s effort to set up four working groups to discuss issues that would have to be resolved in any peace settlement. They question the composition of the working groups and view the effort as a step backwards from the UN’s own Geneva 1 communique, which called for a mutually agreeable transitional governing body with full executive authority.
Few in the opposition would agree to any transition in which Bashar al Assad is not deprived of presidential powers early in the game. Most believe opposition fighters, especially but not only the more extremist ones, will continue the war if Bashar remains in place. The SOC is considering withdrawing from the UN effort, though it will come under a lot of international community pressure to participate. Many Syrians here want a negotiated solution, but not one that perpetuates the dictatorship and denies the country’s citizens the right to govern themselves.
Next up: the local administrative councils, the assistance coordination unit and the nascent Free Syria University, which represent perhaps the best the Syrian opposition has to offer.
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More Russia in Syria
Hamid Bayati a few days ago asked some questions about Syria for publication by the Iranian Mehr News Agency in Farsi and in the Tehran Times in English. This was before the Russian strikes. I answered:
Q: According to recent developments it seems new era begins in Syria to bring peace to this country and Iran and Russia leading the efforts to kick out terrorist groups from Syria, how do you evaluate this issue?
A: From my perspective, the problem is more complicated than kicking terrorist groups out of Syria. The key question is what comes next. Most analysts here think Bashar al Assad will not be able to reestablish his authority over areas that have been in rebellion. If this is correct, political transition and countering terrorism have to proceed at the same time. President Rouhani’s notion that the terrorists can be defeated and only then will it be possible to talk about political reform is unrealistic.
Q: Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that any attempts to overthrow the government in Syria could lead to a failed state like Iraq or Libya, what is your idea about this view?
A: It could, but it needn’t. A negotiated political transition could provide the legitimate authority required to avoid a failed state. If a political solution does not happen, Syria will continue fragmenting into a patchwork of areas of control, with Kurds along much of the northern border with Turkey, relatively moderate insurgents in the south, extremists in the center and east, and the regime in Damascus and the west.
Q: In recent weeks we saw different news about Russia and China military activity in Syria, how do you evaluate this issue?
A: Chinese deployment is still a matter of speculation. Russia has already deployed
I doubt a couple of thousand Russians will be more effective than a similar number of Americans or Europeans. Russian air attack capabilities are significantly less accurate and effective than those of NATO countries. Collateral damage and the political backlash are likely to be greater.
The Russians can also expect to be targeted by suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices and other terrorist weapons. My guess is that Moscow has put itself on a slippery slope to much greater involvement in Syria, which cash-strapped President Putin can ill afford.
Q: Some experts say US agrees with Russia’s new approach in Syria? Is it true? If true what reasons led to West agree with Russia on Syria?
A: Washington unquestionably agrees that the Islamic State must be defeated, but the Americans are unlikely to align themselves openly with Russia in Syria, if only to avoid alienating the majority Sunni population there. US forces are not attacking Bashar al Assad’s forces, but Washington sees no solution in Syria without a commitment that he leave power. Moscow and Washington do however have to deconflict their military operations, to avoid any unintentional clash.
Q: What do you think about Iran, Russia, Iraq and Syria agreement on cooperation against Islamic State?
A: I think Iraq should get help from wherever useful help can be gotten. I doubt they will get much from Moscow, but that is for Baghdad to decide.
Russia will have to be cautious about appearing to align itself with Shia forces against Sunnis. President Putin is quite rightly concerned about Chechnyan and other Russian extremists. He should be expecting them to strike back not only in Latakia but also inside Russia. The notion that he can kill them all abroad and thereby prevent attacks at home echoes a line used by George W. Bush when the US invaded Iraq. It wasn’t true then and it is not true now.
In general, I don’t think enhanced Russian involvement in Syria and Iraq will make much difference to the course of the war there. Moscow deployed its troops because the Assad regime had weakened to the point that extremists were threatening western Syria, which is the heartland of the Alawite community and also hosts the Russian naval base at Tartous. The relatively modest deployment may block the insurgent advances, but it is unlikely to change the military balance much beyond that.
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