Category: Daniel Serwer
No easy answers
Lots of people were asking yesterday about President Obama’s decision to send more trainers and equipment to Iraq, mainly for Sunni fighters. Here is more or less what I’ve been saying:
Q. Why is the US sending troops to Iraq at this time?
A. They are sending more troops because the current effort is not succeeding. The Islamic State has lost some territory in the past year, but it has also gained territory and appears no closer to defeat than it was a year ago. Beefing up the training and equipment, in particular for Sunnis, is a move in the right direction, even if it is not likely the last one.
Q. What does this represents in terms of strategy?
A. In terms of strategy, not much. The objective is the same—to defeat ISIS—and this is a marginal addition of resources with which to try to do it. I don’t see any big shift in strategy with this decision.
Q. How is that going to help, if any, the fight against ISIS?
A. The key here is to try to get more Sunni tribal members into the fight. If and when the Sunni population wants to be rid of ISIS in a serious way, it will happen.
But that also depends on what the Sunni population can expect if they join the fight. Will they gain political and economic weight in Baghdad or in their own provinces? Will they be treated properly by the Iraqi authorities and adequate provision made for stabilizing and reconstructing their communities? There are no clear answers to these questions yet. The military dimension is not the only one that counts.
Q. Do you think the US is doing enough to help the Iraqis in their fight? If not, what more should the US does?
A. Most military experts think an important missing link is people on the ground to “spot,” that is target, the air strikes, which have been relatively few due in part to fear of collateral damage. But putting Americans into that role risks their lives and would raise questions about whether the effort is sustainable. Training Iraqis to perform that function risks its use to settle scores.
Like many other issues in the Middle East these days, there are no easy answers.
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Bush, not Obama, decided Iraq withdrawal
As Republican candidates for President continue to raise the question of withdrawal from Iraq, “blaming” the supposed mistake on Barack Obama, I am reprinting from a previous post (published on May 2, 2014) the true story:
The notion that it was President Obama who decided to withdraw troops from Iraq is simply wrong. Here is a first-person account from Bob Loftis, who led the failed negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA):
[The decision to withdraw US troops] happened in mid-2008 [during the Bush Administration]. My team and I were instructed to work on an agreement that would allow a long term US military presence. At no time did the issue of withdrawal arise, even when the term “SOFA” became politically toxic in Baghdad. SOFA talks were suspended in May 2008, with the focus placed on negotiating the Strategic Framework Agreement (which would have some vague references to “pre-existing arrangements” (i.e. certain parts of CPA17). I then heard in September 2008 that…there were new SOFA talks which were about withdrawal. The “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” was signed on 17 November 2008 by Ryan Crocker: Article 24 (1) states “All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”
People will tell you that President Bush thought the agreement would be revised in the succeeding administration to allow the Americans to stay in some limited number. But that doesn’t change the fact that it was Bush, not Obama, who decided on US withdrawal.
Once in office, Obama did try to negotiate permission for the Americans to stay. Prime Minister Maliki didn’t want to give up jurisdiction over crimes committed by US troops. Hard for me to fault the President for not yielding on that point, especially in light of the arbitrary arrests and detentions Maliki has indulged in since. Nor do I think US troops in the mess that is today’s Iraq would be either safe or useful.
Note added in 2015:
The circumstances that today are giving President Obama reason to send more troops back to Iraq are dramatically different from any that could have been anticipated in 2008 or 2009. But at least now they are going back to an Iraq whose government welcomes them. Withdrawal was not a mistake. It was a reaction to the political realities both in Washington and Baghdad. Second guessing is a fool’s game, especially when conducted by Donald Trump and Rudi Giuliani.
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Mr. Vučić comes to Washington
Prime Minister Vučić’s visit to Washington this week, which included a public appearance at Johns Hopkins SAIS, prompted inquiries from the Serbian media. Here are their questions and my answers:
Blic
1. How do you evaluate the results of the visit of prime minister Vučić to SAD?
A: I think Prime Minister Vučić had a very successful visit to the US. He came asking for American political support for Serbia’s European ambitions and he got it.
2. In your opinion, how his lecture look like, what were the reactions?
A: His lecture at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies was great. The reaction was enthusiastic. He left lots of time for questions and was asked some difficult ones. He tried to respond directly to them, which is what Americans like to hear. He clearly wants Serbia to be seen as a reliable international partner, one that does not over-commit to things it cannot deliver.
3. What are the key messages from that lecture and how do you interpret that message?
A: The Prime Minister made it clear that Serbia has made a strategic choice for Europe, that it is not trying to balance between Europe and Russia, but that NATO membership and Serbia’s ultimate relationship with Kosovo are still open questions.
He was modest about what Serbia can deliver in its OSCE chairmanship on Ukraine. He explained Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions against Russia as due to lack of EU compensation for Serbian producers who would suffer the consequences.
The Prime Minister was clear about his personal commitment to media freedom, a more efficient and independent judiciary, and resolution in the courts of responsibility for the murder of the Bytyqi brothers. Those of us interested in the Balkans will be interested to see how and when these commitments fulfilled, but the overall impression was very positive: he is thoughtful, clear and committed.
He made it clear he wants Serbia to be a factor of stability in the region, which is suffering a rise in nationalist sentiment that could lead to more problems. He is also committed to Serbia’s internal stability, which is challenged by difficult social and economic circumstances.
Tanjug
1. In short, what is your analysis of the results of the visit?
A: The Prime Minister came looking for American political support for Serbia’s European Union prospects. He got that so far as I know. He also wanted to make a good impression as someone who considers his commitments carefully and fulfills them. He succeeded at that as well. And he wanted to portray Serbia as a factor for stability in the region, which is something Americans welcome.
2. In your opinion, what was the most important issue for the US side and what for the Serbian prime minister?
A: For the US, I think the most important point was this last one: Serbia is central to the region. Its commitment to stability and peaceful conflict resolution makes a big difference in Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro. I imagine officials discussed this in some detail with respect to each of these countries.
For the Prime Minister, the main thing seems to have been gaining US political support for Serbia’s EU candidacy. I think he got that commitment in general terms. But of course Serbia has to deliver on the EU requirements, especially with respect to an independent judiciary and media freedom.
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The Perils of Macedonia
With the European Union mediating, Macedonia’s four major political parties have agreed to some sort of transition arrangement to allow voter rolls to be cleaned up and the electoral mechanism lubricated, followed by elections next April, three years earlier than necessary. This presumably offes a way out of the crisis brought on by opposition publication of wiretaps demonstrating high level government malfeasance.
It’s a win-win-win-win, as one of my correspondent’s declared. Opposition leader Zoran Zaev, who lost a parliamentary election 14 months ago, gets another opportunity. Prime Minister Gruevski so far at least is avoiding calls for his resignation. He came out just one vote short of an absolute majority in parliament last time around and may well be able to beat his rival again in 10 months. The governing coalition’s Albanian leader Ali Ahmeti is relieved of pressure to bring the government down and can still hope to do well next year. The Albanian opposition gets another bite at the apple.
But it still has a big hole in it: that transition arrangement. The opposition will want a technocratic government. Gruevski will want to hold on to at least nominal control. It is not clear how they are going to square that circle.
But once again, Macedonia has taken at least half a step away from the brink of disaster. It has done that repeatedly since handily managing to escape Yugoslavia in 1991 without the secession wars that marked independence for Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. It managed a massive influx of Albanians during the NATO/Yugoslavia war of 1999 without the often predicted dire consequences. It negotiated an end to a burgeoning inter-ethnic civil war in 2001 before things got out of hand. Macedonia is the Balkan Pauline: always in dire danger, but escaping somehow at the last moment.
Credit for this latest escape goes in part to the EU, whose Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn did the honors. He reiterated the EU’s commitment to Macedonia’s European perspective, which I suppose involves some sort of assistance promise. He also made it clear the EU wants the government to stop mucking about with the media and the judiciary.
That has become the standard European and American refrain, as Gruevski–originally elected and successful as an economic reformer–has demonstrated an increasing tendency to follow Vladimir Putin’s lead on governance (not to mention Ukraine sanctions and natural gas supplies).
The villain of this episode is Greece, which has blocked Macedonia’s progress towards EU membership for years because it claims the exclusive right to use the name “Macedonia.” That means there is little gain, and much pain, in Macedonia’s politicians doing what is needed to adopt the acquis communitaire as well as align the country’s foreign and security policies with Brussels. Macedonia has already qualified for NATO membership and its soldiers have fought integrated with Americans in Afghanistan. But Greece has blocked that road to international respectability as well, despite a clear, unequivocal and binding decision of the International Court of Justice that in doing so Athens violated a 1995 commitment.
So Pauline lives to provide even more excitement in the next episode, which I imagine isn’t far off. Will Gruevski resign? Will the election be transparently free and fair? Will the judiciary and media act independently and not face repercussions? Will Albanian insurgents try to kidnap the process? Tune in next month for another exciting episode of the Perils of Macedonia.
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A snapshot of Sisi’s Egypt
I’ve spent the last few days in Cairo, where little has visibly changed since my visits in September 2011 (something like a revolution was still in progress then) and January 2014, when I observed the referendum that approved the current constitution (over 98% of those 39% who voted were in favor). The city still bussles day and night, the Nile flows gently, the traffic is only marginally better behaved then in 2011, the air is hot, dusty and polluted, the contrasts of rich and poor are still dramatic.
I haven’t spent any quality time talking to ordinary Egyptians. Mostly I’ve been hearing from the educated and sometimes wealthy elite that supports President Sisi’s efforts to restore order and improve the economy, without (at least for now) expanding civil liberties.
The predominant sentiment towards the US among those I talked with is resentment. Egypt, they think, deserves better and more than it is getting from the US, which was slow to recognize that former President Morsi had lost legitimacy and quick to suspend aid. Washington follows a “double standard.” It provides too much support to Israel and too little to the Arabs, especially the Palestine and Egypt.
The Americans are also failing to counter Iranian troublemaking in the region, failing to stop financing for the Islamic State, failing to bring down Bashar al Assad or support the intervention against the Houthi (sic), and failing to recognize the peril of the Muslim Brotherhood. The US government, some think, may even be playing a role in supporting one or more of these malign factors in the region.
Lack of confidence in official America is coupled with an all too apparent affection for American society and hunger for American culture, education, technology, trade and investment. Sisi’s Egypt is hoping to upgrade Egypt’s technical and educational levels and improve its economy, in part through cooperation with the US, while continuing its crackdown on nongovernmental organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood, street demonstrations and media.
The model is a technocratic one: use expertise and money effectively while blocking political challenges.
Some Egyptians characterize the Middle East today as “a Fascist moment.” They argue there can be no compromise with the Islamic State, or those in the Muslim Brotherhood or elsewhere who take up arms against state structures, anywhere in the region. The Arabs need to reassert themselves, resist the American intention of empowering Iran, and join together to counter foreign hegemony, including by forming the united Arab army Egypt has proposed.
The Egyptians I heard from welcome the upcoming bilateral “strategic dialogue” with the US, which is supposed to meet in July. They hope this will be an opportunity to reframe the relationship in a way that will be more satisfactory to Egypt and less dominated by the US. Cairo will try to convince the Americans that the Muslim Brotherhood is in fact a terrorist organization and that a broad crackdown is therefore justified. Some might be ready to give a little on NGOs and street demonstrations, though resentment of American “interference” in these internal matters is strong. Building an effective regional counterweight to Iran will be an important part of the conversation, as will be moving the relationship more definitively in the direction of trade and investment (a free trade agreement is one possibility).
While privatization and other structural economic reforms seem still far off, the Egyptians are reasonably pleased with what President Sisi has achieved so far, including reduction of subsidies and his flagship project to expand the capacity of the Suez Canal. They hope a more stable and prosperous Egypt will mean return to a leading regional role in the future, even without more political opening.
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Vučić at SAIS
The Conflict Management Program and Center for Transatlantic Relations
at The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
cordially invite you to
Remarks on Serbia’s Strategic Choices
with
Prime Minister of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić
Thursday, June 4
10 AM to 11 AM
Is it possible to smooth and accelerate Serbia’s movement towards Europe, while balancing its relations with Brussels, Washington, Moscow and NATO? Prime Minister Vučić will discuss Serbia’s strategic options and dilemmas.
Please RSVP at: https://serbia-sais.eventbrite.com
Please note:
Guests must be registered in order to attend the event and must provide a government-issued photo ID at the check-in table (no exceptions).
Check-in opens at 9:30 a.m. and closes promptly at 10:00 a.m.
Location:
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Kenney Herter Auditorium
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
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