Category: Daniel Serwer
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Russia’s President Putin is combining his military move into Syria with a diplomatic effort to convince America that Russia and Bashar al Assad are indispensable to success in the fight against the Islamic State. Putin wants Washington to understand that Russia is a great power and cannot be ignored, in particular in the Middle East. How should Washington react?
The forward operating base the Russians are deploying near Latakia certainly represents a major escalation of Moscow’s engagement in Syria. At the very least, there is a need to deconflict Russian air operations with Coalition combat missions conducted nearby. No one needs an incident in which Russian and American forces come to blows. But that can be done quietly out of the public eye.
It is not clear yet whether the Russians intend to use their deployment to attack insurgents in Syria. Their base could be a defensive move, one intended to keep western Syria safe for the Russian naval facility at Tartous as well as for the regime’s Alawite supporters, and possibly for Bashar al Assad if he is forced from Damascus. For the moment at least, the housing being built can accommodate something like 1500 troops. That’s a far bigger commitment than the few advisors Russia has maintained in Syria in the past, but it is not a force likely to make much of a difference in the civil war in the ongoing civil war there.
If they do decide to engage against insurgents, the Russians are unlikely to distinguish between what the American-led Coalition thinks of as relative moderates and jihadi extremists associated with the Islamic State or Jabhat al Nusra. Nor are they likely to have a lot more success than the Coalition against the extremists, unless they deploy far more substantial ground forces. From the Coalition perspective, this Russian deployment is still small and aimed at least in part at the wrong targets.
So should we resist the Russian deployment, negotiate with Moscow, or do something else?
It seems to me there is an argument, expressed in the title of this piece, for not doing much to try to foil this Russian move or to accommodate it. There is little risk that 1500 Russians can accomplish much on the military side, beyond protecting western Syria from being overrun and the Alawites slaughtered. Any damage the Russians do to relative moderates won’t be decisive. It is at least as likely that the extremists will do significant damage to the Russians than the other way around.
As for the Russian argument that we should all unite with Bashar al Assad to defeat the terrorists, it really isn’t worthy of much of a response. Bashar and his forces have made it clear for years that their real enemies are the relative moderates the Coalition is supporting. Bashar has no real possibility of reestablishing control over all of Syria. His military tactics of besieging civilian areas and terrorizing their population with barrel bombs have done far more to generate terrorist recruits than to reduce their numbers. Russian forces, who honed their tactics in Chechnya, may kill a lot of people but won’t be any better at counter-insurgency warfare.
If there are to be negotiations, the Coalition would do best to continue to insist that they be based on the June 2012 United Nations communique, which called for a mutually agreeable transitional governing body with full executive authority. There is no reason to abandon that oblique formula, which in practice precludes Bashar al Assad from power even if it does not name him.
So rather than take the bait, Washington would do well to keep its cool and resist the temptation to over-react. The Russian deployment wouldn’t be necessary if Bashar al Assad were strong and getting stronger. Moscow is already overstretched in Ukraine. Letting the Russians double down on a bad bet in Syria is the right approach.
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Mr. Vučić returns to Washington
Serbian Prime Minister Vučić, who visited DC in June and spoke at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, is back for a call on Vice President Biden. That meeting was postponed last time around due to the death of Biden’s son Beau.
I’m a bit surprised this visit is happening so soon. Biden is in the midst of publicly agonizing over whether to run for President next year as he mourns the loss of his son. He has a lot of things to do and might well have put off this visit until later in the year.
That the visit is occurring now is likely a tribute to the importance Washington attaches to Serbia as well as American interest in finishing up the transition of the Balkans from Communist backwater to European showcase. Serbia itself is an important part of the process, and it can also help to resolve issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo, the two main remaining trouble spots in what used to be Yugoslavia. Belgrade has much less to offer in Macedonia, the third weakest link in the chain that links the Balkans to Europe.
Vučić will face some unfinished business in Washington. The Prime Minister has made promises about bringing to justice those responsible for murdering two Albanian Americans, the Bytyqi brothers, in July 1999. Those promises have not yet been fulfilled. Biden I trust will raise that with him, as others did during the June visit. The Vice President may also urge restraint in responding to the formation of a Association of Albanian Municipalities in southern Serbia, the mirror image of the Association of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo. What’s good for the goose, he may suggest, is good for the gander, provided the laws of the respective countries are observed.
Apart from the flow of Middle Eastern refugees through the Balkans, the issues haven’t changed much in the last three months: Vučić be seeking American support for Serbia’s EU ambitions, which he’ll get along with a dose of suggestions from Washington as to how to accelerate and improve Serbia’s prospects: reform of the judicial system, buying natural gas from Azerbaijan rather than Russia, aligning Serbia with EU Ukraine-related sanctions against Moscow, implementing the “normalization” agreements between Belgrade and Pristina.
The Prime Minister will also be appearing at the American Chamber of Commerce, where he will presumably pitch American investment in Serbia as well as Serbian exports. Commercial issues of this sort are decided in the U.S. by the private sector, not the government, which can’t do much more than jawbone American companies and try to facilitate their contacts with the Serbian government and private sector. An appearance at the Chamber helps grease the skids.
Vučić will also give a talk at Brookings, where I imagine Serbia’s relationship with Moscow will be a focus of attention, not least because his host is Russia expert Fiona Hill. While the Prime Minister often emphasizes that Serbia has made a definitive choice for the West and EU membership, Serbian President Nikolić and others associated with the government seem less convinced. The Prime Minister is likely to emphasize the importance of Balkan road, rail, aviation and energy infrastructure in ensuring the region is linked strongly to Europe and the West.
So this visit will be in part a reprise and in part an extension of the Prime Minister’s previous encounters in DC, which left a good impression. It’s a sign of how much has changed that the good news these days comes from the Balkans, and even from Serbia.
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Libya needs all the help it can get
I had an opportunity today to talk with Hill people about Libya. Here is more or less what I said:
1. It’s a pleasure to be here to talk about Libya, which is today a country in big trouble but with some hope of finding its way out.
2. I confess to a lot of sympathy with the revolution that started in February 2011. I visited Benghazi and Tripoli that September and again in July 2012, to observe Libya’s first national elections in almost 50 years.
3. I found Libya the friendliest Arab country I have ever visited. Libyans knew who saved Benghazi and appreciated it. They ran good elections in 2012 and were looking forward to a free and democratic future.
4. But the revolution began crashing in the fall of 2012. Three years later, Benghazi is chaotic, tribal tensions are causing sporadic violence in the south and only recently has the west begun to stabilize, due to exhaustion of the Misratan and Zintani militias.
5. The country has two parliaments and two governments. The internationally recognized one is based in Tobruk and Bayda, with support from militias gathered together in a coalition called Dignity. The other is based in Tripoli, with support from militias in the Dawn coalition.
6. The big change since I wrote “Libya’s Escalating Civil War” in May is the heightened prospect of a UN-brokered political agreement, hopefully to be signed before the end of this month.
7. The agreement would create a Government of National Accord (GNA) with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) elected in June 2014 as its legislature and an advisory State Council drawn mainly from Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC).
8. This would be a power-sharing arrangement that attempts to merge Libya’s two governments into one. That is a classic way for diplomats to try to resolve civil wars.
9. But it is not entirely symmetrical. The Tripoli-based GNC would become advisory.
10. That’s the main sticking point. The proposed GNC amendments to the draft agreement would make it a second house of a bicameral parliament, with virtually equal powers to the HoR.
11. That may be a deal breaker, but there is another way out of the current impasse. The GNC may be able to make up some of what it loses institutionally in the now ongoing bargaining over deciding who sits where: the positions of prime minister, deputy prime ministers and the two ministers who will be part of the Presidency Council are particularly important.
12. That the bargaining has gotten to this stage—the musical chairs phase of ending a war (who will get a good seat and who will be left standing)—is a good sign, though no guarantee of success.
13. But even success will be no more than what the State Department people are referring to as a “70% solution.”
14. Khalifa Haftar, who commands what he calls the Libyan National Army on behalf of the “Dignity” coalition, is not likely to sign on. Nor will some hardliners associated with the “Dawn” coalition.
15. A 70% solution without international peacekeepers is a dicey proposition. Thirty per cent is a lot of potential spoilers.
16. The key issue for success will be security arrangements, especially in Tripoli. Those arrangements have not yet been made, though I understand some of the militias have begun talking informally about them.
17. Even in the best of all possible worlds, that will take time, as building the confidence of HoR members required to get them to move to Tripoli will not be easy.
18. What about international peacekeepers, at least to secure Tripoli? The Italians have indicated a willingness to lead such an effort, but it will be vital that the initiative come from a legitimate Libyan government only after Tripoli is stabilized and the HoR has moved there.
19. Arab participation, which won’t be easy or quick to arrange, is vital.
20. That will leave a perilous transition period. The Islamic State affiliate in Libya is second only to the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in posing a threat to U.S. interests.
21. Though chased recently from Derna by other extremists, ISIS has established itself in centrally located Sirte, Qaddafi’s hometown. A rebellion there last month failed.
22. ISIS despises both Dawn and Dignity. It will try to destabilize a Government of National Accord.
23. So whatever forces back the GNA will need to be prepared to fight ISIS, in addition to other spoilers who refuse to acknowledge its authority.
24. What will the U.S. role be if the 70% solution goes forward?
25. First Washington has to be prepared to press the parties in Libya to adhere to the UN-brokered agreement. This will likely include sanctioning recalcitrants. It also needs to include support for those who are prepared to support the peace process, whether nationally or locally. It would be particularly important if the Misratan and Zintani militias can be convinced to come to a truce.
26. Second, Washington needs to help ensure Libya’s neighbors back the 70% solution to the hilt. The Tunisians and Moroccans, who have hosted some of the negotiating sessions, are on board.
27. The big question mark is Cairo, which under President Sisi has in the past backed Dignity and in particular Haftar. I am told the Egyptians are ready to abandon that support.
28. Third, Washington should support any international peacekeeping mission with air and sea logistics, intelligence and air strikes.
29. Fourth, Washington will need to train Libyan forces, especially for counter-terrorism.
30. This is more controversial than it sounds, because a previous U.S.-supported effort to train a General Purpose Force (GPF) came a cropper several years ago due to misbehavior of the Libyans involved. Some refused to return to Libya. Others did worse.
31. CT training and assistance will have to occur in Libya. It will be expensive and dangerous. Congressional support for the effort will be vital. I suggest we prepare to spend as much as the $600 million we planned for the GPF, over three to five years. That will be a hard sell.
32. But we have to decide whether we are serious about defeating the Islamic State or not. A failed UN political agreement in Libya could open the door to ISIS, which is still relatively weak there.
33. We know however how quickly and suddenly ISIS can expand and take over territory.
34. Libya is an enormous country with a small population–only 6.4 million when everyone is at home, likely no more than 5 million or so today. Its hinterland would be ideal as an ISIS safe haven, giving it strategic depth as it loses territory in Iraq and Syria.
35. The Libyans deserve better, in particular if they sign on to the UN-brokered agreement. I hope we’ll be prepared to support their efforts.
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Gulf jitters
Kuwait University Professor Abdullah al Shayji published Sunday his latest Gulf News commentary criticizing the Iran nuclear deal. I’ve written him this note in response:
I certainly understand your concern about Iranian subversion and terrorism in Bahrain and Kuwait. Your police and prosecution have done well to identify perpetrators of the latest incident and bring them to court quickly for what I trust will be a fair trial.
But I find your position on the nuclear deal ill-founded. Let me innumerate the reasons why, in response to points you make in this piece:
1. You can hardly say it was done behind your backs. We’ve all known about these negotiations for more than two years, and the basic parameters of the deal were made public in April. I don’t know what diplomatic exchanges there were prior to that, but I’d be willing to bet they happened.
2. Your concern about Iran being only 6 to 12 months from a nuclear weapon 15 years from now ignores the fact that Iran was closer than that (3 months according to the Americans) before the April interim agreement. It makes no sense to be more concerned about something that might happen 15 years from now rather than something that had already happened, and is now being reversed.
3. I would join you in hoping the Administration will calm Gulf jitters, but I would also suggest that the Gulf states need to cooperate more in order to counter Iran militarily in the region and through vigorous law enforcement at home. The failure of the GCC to get serious about integrating its capabilities and collaborating seriously, especially in Syria, is a source of considerable disappointment in Washington.
4. You suggest that Gulf jitters could lead to a nuclear arms race. Rapid Iranian progress on nuclear technology over the last decade and more did not, so it is hard to understand how a roll-back of their program and a 15-year freeze on many of its efforts should. Iran was severely punished with sanctions for its nuclear ambitions. I doubt any Gulf state would want to run a comparable risk, especially now that Iran is losing much of what it had gained.
5. The lifting of sanctions is a necessary part of the agreement, but I agree with you that it will provide Tehran with ample resources to make more trouble in the region. That was going to happen anyway, as the multilateral sanctions were slowly decaying and would likely have evaporated if an agreement had not been reached.
President Obama has made it clear he is not relying on moderation of Iranian behavior on non-nuclear issues and is prepared to counter them when and where he can. Those in the Gulf concerned about Iranian behavior might worry more about how to do that more effectively and less about their past disappointments. Some specific proposals are in order.
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The Russians are coming
Of course they’ve already been present in Syria for decades and throughout the current civil wars. They have been holding on tight to their naval facilities at Tartus, supplying Bashar al Assad’s forces with weapons, training Syrian forces, and protecting Syrian diplomatic interests, in particular at the United Nations. But now Moscow seems to be constructing a base for a thousand or so troops at on air field outside Latakia, 50 miles to the north of Tartus. What are they up to? What does this move signify?
Building a base of these dimensions is a serious deepening of Russian commitment to the Syrian regime. Secretary Kerry called it escalation. But it betrays the weakness of the regime more than its strength. Latakia is the heartland of Alawite support for Bashar al Assad. If it requires Russian troops for its defense, the regime is either in deeper trouble along the coast than many had imagine, or perhaps preparing to relocate Assad from Damascus. Either way, it wouldn’t be necessary if things were going well for Bashar. Those who had hoped (I once counted myself among them), that Moscow would realize the folly of its support for him are going to be disappointed.
The Russians have reason to be concerned. Syrian government forces have palpably weakened over the last two years. Regime-organized militias (National Defense Forces) and Lebanese Hizbollah, sometimes under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps command, are now doing much of the fighting, as the regular army is disintegrating. The opposition has taken Idlib, 80 miles or so from Latakia, and much of the surrounding countryside.
They are within striking distance of Latakia, though the topography and demography will make getting there difficult. Alawite militias as well as Syrian regular forces, Hizbollah and now the Russians will defend Latakia and its approaches with vigor.
Moscow will portray whatever it is doing as support to a legitimate government fighting off a terrorist assault. The Russians I’ve talked with about Syria are fully committed to killing as many Sunni extremists as they can abroad, before they get to Mother Russia. The Islamic State has significant Chechen support. Moscow figures it is better to kill them in Syria than to risk their coming home to roost. The parallel with Bush Administration rhetoric should be noted.
Neither the regime nor Moscow will, however, make much distinction between the Islamic State and other more moderate forces that have taken up arms against Bashar al Assad. Their efforts on behalf of the regime are likely to radicalize the majority Sunni population of Syria further and help the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra recruit cadres. Russian escalation will also sink American diplomatic efforts to bring about a political solution in Syria. Neither the regime nor Moscow has ever shown interest in a solution that displaces Bashar, which Washington regards as a sine qua non, in order to convince at least some of the rebels to stop fighting.
Moscow will enjoy acting to fight ISIS in defiance of the Americans, whose anti-ISIS Coalition has had only a modicum of success. The situation in Syria is the mirror image of the situation in Ukraine, where the Russians are supporting insurgents and the Americans are supporting a legitimate government. Great powers, Putin feels, can do as they like, not least because that is how he thinks the Americans behave. The many differences between the trumped-up rebellion in eastern Ukraine and the all too genuine (and initially peaceful) uprising in Syria are of little interest to Putin.
So rather than just an escalation, it is better to see the Russian base-building as a further deterioration of the Syrian situation. It means heightened fighting, more displaced people and refugees, and less hope for a political solution. Europe had better brace itself for a much greater flow of what it prefers to call migrants, especially in anticipation of winter. The Russians are coming is not good news.
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Refugees are not the problem
The flow of refugees into Europe from the Middle East and North Africa is now attracting widespread attention. The 71 Syrians who suffocated last week in a truck in Austria, and the three-year-old who drowned in the Mediterranean, have done what close to 250,000 dying in Syria over the past 3.5 years (that’s an average of about 200 per day) could not: they have mobilized public opinion. Germany and Sweden are rightly praised for opening their doors. Hungary is trying to seal itself off. The Americans may take more than the trickle of refugees they have accepted so far, but still an insignificant number. The UN is appealing for funds, which have been sorely lacking. More than $8.4 billion is needed.
But refugees are not the root of the problem. Nor are the ones who arrive in Europe and the US the Syrians most in need or most at risk. They are the symptom–a relatively small and distant one–of a much larger and more challenging problem: the multi-sided conflict in Syria, to which we’ve become unfortunately inured. Four million people have managed to escape Syria, mostly fleeing to neighboring countries. They are the relatively fortunate ones, when not jammed into a truck in Austria or drowning in the Med. Seven million have been displaced inside Syria, where relief is much harder to find.
Of course problems are much more visible when up close and personal. But we need to keep the focus on the disease, not only the spreading ripple of symptoms.
The disease has its origins in the Syrian dictatorship’s response to peaceful pro-democracy protests. Determined to stay in power, it cracked down violently, concentrating its efforts against relative moderates and the majority Sunni community, both of which were a real threat to Bashar al Assad’s hold on power. The natural result was the growth of Sunni extremism, which has helped Bashar demonstrate that the only alternative to his rule is Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. To this day, his forces continue to focus disproportionately not on jihadi terrorism but rather on those who say they want a secular, democratic state.
There is no way to run this history backwards. The extremists will not disappear if Assad falls. It is highly unlikely that relative moderates would replace him. The best we can hope for now is to create some relatively safe places inside Syria where moderates can govern, providing protection for civilians and beginning to service their needs so that they don’t flee.
The northern area that the Americans and Turks are contemplating for this purpose is hardly ideal. Large parts of it are barren rural areas over which control will be hard to establish. Turkomans populate much of the border area with Turkey, along with Kurds against whom the Turks have been fighting. The Kurds already control much of the rest of the border, where the key to making things safer for civilians will be cooperation between them and the Arabs who live both among them and farther south.
The area along the Jordanian/Syrian border in the south is another possible protected zone, one dominated by relatively moderate Sunni insurgents, including some with US training, and the non-Muslim, Arab Druze. The Druze have tried to hold their fire and avoid close alignment with either the regime or the insurgents. Self-preservation is their priority. Bringing them into closer alignment with the insurgents would require giving them the confidence that they will be protected from the vindictive reaction of the regime.
Protected areas north and south would not solve Syria’s problems, but with Coalition (read US plus at least some European and Gulf) support, they might begin to stem the tide. If nothing is done to enable Syrians to remain in their country, it is a virtual certainty that next year’s outflow will be much greater than this year’s, with economic and political consequences for both the neighboring countries and Europe that will dwarf what we are seeing today. But the refugees will still not be the root of the problem.
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