Category: Daniel Serwer
Reconcilation and stability
Dragan Aleksic of Serbia’s Tanjug news service asked some questions. I replied:
Q: We would like to have your comment on Serbian Prime Minister Vucic’s initiative to declare a Remembrance Day for all of the victims in the 1990s war in former Yugoslavia. This initiative has not been well received neither in Kosovo (it was criticized by Prime Minister Thaci) nor in Croatia. The argument is more or less that Serbia is guilty for the war so this initiative is not welcome.What is your view of the initiative to establish a common Day of Remembrance for all of the victims of the 1990s wars in former Yugoslavia?
A: I think it is up to the people of former Yugoslavia, especially the victims, to react to the proposal, not a foreigner like me.
Q: Does the attitude toward Serbia as the culprit justify the rejection of a legitimate initiative aimed at reconciliation?
A: A proposal of this sort works best if it is the result of reconciliation rather than having reconciliation as its objective. Would Serbs have reacted well had the proposal come from Hashim Thaci or Bakir Izetbegovic?
I am reminded of the Recom initiative, which seeks first to establish the facts of what happened in a way that engages everyone concerned. It too has had difficulty being accepted at the governmental level, but it seems to me correct to start with a broad fact-finding strategy, like the one used by the Scholarly Initiative (an effort to get agreement among academics on what happened in the 1990s in the Balkans and why). I recommend all concerned read its Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, which goes a long way toward developing a common narrative.
Q: Does this mean that Serbia does not have the right to launch positive initiatives?
A: Serbia has every right to launch positive initiatives, but other people have the right to react the way they want. It is not only in the Balkans that prior consultation and mutual understanding is important to the success of an initiative.
Q: How do you see the relations in the region, especially when it comes to stability?
A: None of the states in the region have either the desire or the means to create the kind of instability that dominated the 1990s. All but Serbia are either already NATO members or want to become NATO members. The requirement that they first establish democratic institutions is an important barrier to any further conflict among them.
But there are still unresolved issues, especially about the state structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as about mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors between Serbia and Kosovo. My email tells me Serbs think I am crazy to talk about that: they say it will never happen. I say it has to happen before Serbia can enter the European Union. Belgrade has already accepted the constitutional authority of the Pristina government on the whole territory of Kosovo, as well as the idea that Kosovo will qualify for and enter the EU separately, which implies that Kosovo will be a sovereign state. It is not such a big step to UN membership, which makes bilateral recognition almost irrelevant, and even exchange of ambassadors.
Anyone concerned about stability in the Balkans should be thinking hard about undermining radicalization among the region’s Muslims by quickly resolving these issues in Bosnia and Kosovo. They should also want Greece to lift its veto on Macedonia’s NATO membership and EU prospects.
PS: Let me add something I forgot to say to Tanjug. Reconciliation begins with acknowledgement of harm done, by those whose leadership did it. This starts a mutual process. We aren’t quite there in the Balkans, yet.
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Strange values and colossal misjudgment
I have to give credit to New York Senator Schumer for laying out his thinking on the Iran nuclear deal. But it is thinking that betrays strange values and in the end a colossal misjudgment.
Schumer looks at three issues:
- nuclear restrictions on Iran in the first ten years,
- nuclear restrictions on Iran after ten years,
- and non-nuclear components and consequences of a deal.
He asks if the United States is better off with or without the agreement.
On the first issue, he faults both the inspection provisions and the snapback of sanctions. He ignores the unprecedented inspections of nuclear facilities and somehow finds that the US unilateral ability to precipitate re-imposition of sanctions on Iran has little value. But in the end he admits we might be a bit better off in the first ten years than without the agreement.
On nuclear restrictions after ten years, Schumer is concerned because lifting of sanctions will greatly enrich Iran and enable it then to pursue an even more robust nuclear program. He simply ignores the agreement’s provisions for permanent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and the permanent commitment by Iran not to seek nuclear weapons. He says
Iran would have a green light to be as close, if not closer to possessing a nuclear weapon than it is today. And the ability to thwart Iran if it is intent on becoming a nuclear power would have less moral and economic force.
It is strange to value a problem that we might (or might not) have 10 years from now as much as you value it today. If nothing else, you’ve had 10 years with a non-nuclear Iran to think and organize what you’ll do next. It is even stranger to suggest that after 10 years of successfully preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon that somehow doing so then would be less compelling rather than more so. If you think war might be necessary to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, you are on a lot firmer ground if Iran violates an agreement than if there are no constraints at all on its nuclear program.
On the non-nuclear issues, Schumer is principally concerned with use of the money Iran will get from sanctions relief for nefarious activities in the region and beyond. I entirely share this concern, which is well-founded in Iran’s need to satisfy its hardliners after what Schumer should admit is a gigantic defeat at the bargaining table.
But then there is the colossal misjudgment: Schumer thinks you have to believe Iran will moderate in the future in order to support the deal. That is wrong. Forget Iran’s political future.
What you have to consider is the reaction of the rest of the world to American rejection of the agreement, which Schumer completely ignores. Instead, he blithely suggests:
Better to keep U.S. sanctions in place, strengthen them, enforce secondary sanctions on other nations, and pursue the hard-trodden path of diplomacy once more, difficult as it may be.
He offers not a word about how America’s European allies, the Russians, the Chinese and the Gulf states would react to this proposition. That is where his arguments go wildly wrong.
First consider what “secondary sanctions” mean. They mean the US will tell other countries’ banks and corporations that they can’t do business with Iran. If they do, they will be excluded from the US market and their assets in the US frozen. There are few things we could do to enrage our closest allies more quickly than that. They would be thrust into the arms of the Russians and Chinese, and together try to work out financing mechanisms that escape US scrutiny and control.
Second, consider whether there would be any diplomacy to pursue. Either the agreement will collapse altogether, in which case you can bet on Iran moving quickly to get nuclear weapons, in order to forestall a US attack. No diplomatic openings there. Or the agreement will remain intact, without US participation. Iran will get sanctions relief from everyone but the US (something it did not expect any time soon anyway). Why would Iran re-engage diplomatically with the US if it can get what it wants from everyone else?
America’s allies would find themselves moving away from their trans-Atlantic connections to much deeper engagement with our adversaries. Support for the US on many issues–especially but not only the Middle East–would wane rapidly. “Secondary sanctions” levied in retaliation against American companies could wreck havoc with the world’s financial and trading systems.
What would the Gulf states do? If the agreement falls apart, they will have no choice but to race for nuclear weapons. If it doesn’t, they still need to consider whether to stick with the isolated and weakening US as a major ally or shift in other directions. I’d bet on a shift in other directions, something that has already started but could accelerate.
The Iran nuclear deal is likely to survive the Congressional challenge next month, as it would require a more than 2/3 majority in both houses to defeat it. But if it fails, we can thank strange values and colossal misjudgment. Senator Schumer is not alone.
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My magic wand
Someone asked for my views on whether Kosovo is equipped to deal with nationalist and Islamist extremism, as well as the best ways to counter violent extremism and the recruitment of foreign fighters. Here is how I replied:
1. The first thing that needs to be said is how different the two topics you’ve given me are.
2. When it comes to Kosovo, nationalism is endemic among both Serbs and Albanians. It was the clash of these two nationalisms that brought us war in the 1990s and prevented consolidation of the peace until recently.
3. The April 2013 Brussels agreement is as close as we’ve gotten to a peace treaty between Serbian and Albanian nationalists. It recognizes the authority of the Pristina-based institutions on the entire territory of Kosovo and implies that Kosovo will enter the European Union as a sovereign entity on its own bottom. In exchange it gives the Serbs of Kosovo a large measure of self-governance, in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan that Belgrade rejected eight years ago.
4. I’m reasonably sure that with international guidance and pressure that peace will hold, though I also believe it will not be consolidated until Belgrade bites the bullet by recognizing Kosovo and exchanging ambassadors with Pristina.
5. I’d like to see that sooner rather than later, though the inclination in Belgrade and the international community, including Washington, is to let it slide for now.
6. Delay encourages nationalist responses in Kosovo, right now in the form of support for Vetvendosje! and its promise of a referendum on union with Albania. It also encourages Kosovo to plan for larger security forces than it would otherwise need and/or burdens NATO more than otherwise would be the case.
7. So much for nationalism. It’s there, and an obstacle when we would like to see a special court created. It is also a law enforcement issue when ethnic nationalists take up weapons and insert themselves into Macedonia. But it is unlikely today to generate the kind of violence that seems to be necessary to get the international community to react.
8. Violent extremism—if by that you mean non-nationalist extremism of the Islamist variety—has in the past been rare in Kosovo. Takfiris do not grow naturally there. I have rarely met a less religious people than Kosovo Albanians, whose dominant faith during most of the last two decades has been Albanianism, not conservative Islam.
9. That is changing. The reasons are many:
• Frustration with slow economic progress,
• The languid pace of international acceptance and recognition,
• Ill-educated, unemployed, often criminal and disappointed youth,
• Takfiri propaganda stemming mainly from Saudi Arabia,
• A limited number of militant mosque leaders,
• Recruitment of fighters for Syria and Iraq.
These have combined to spawn and grow a small but notable Muslim extremist coterie.
10. It would be a mistake to exaggerate Islamist extremism in Kosovo, which is ideologically inconsistent with the kind of national liberation struggle the Kosovars conducted in the 1990s.
11. That’s what the government did when it arrested dozens and released more than half because of lack of evidence.
12. But it would also be a mistake to ignore it.
13. The good news is that the current government and more generally the ruling elite in Kosovo dislikes religious extremism and regards it as a threat to them, not just to us.
14. They sincerely would like to rid themselves of that threat and have passed legislation aimed at doing just that.
15. But legislation and law enforcement will not be sufficient in Kosovo any more than they would be sufficient elsewhere on their own.
16. In my view, the most important antidote to recruitment is the one that has worked elsewhere: community efforts, based on former extremists and their families.
17. But that will not suffice. At the risk of stating the blazingly obvious, what Kosovo needs to prevent radicalization is what any of us would wish for it even if radicalization were not an issue: more rapid progress towards the EU, formation of its army and entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, effective implementation of the Brussels agreement, more capable and less corrupt institutions, better education, more jobs and security services both alert and cautious to avoid making matters worse.
18. Now, where did I leave that magic wand….
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Magic numbers
The magic numbers are 44 House Democrats and 13 Senate Democrats. Those are the thresholds opponents of the Iran nuclear deal need to reach to achieve veto-proof majorities in both houses of Congress, assuming all Republicans vote against.
Rob Satloff says defeat of the deal would be no big deal. John Bolton says it would be a good thing. Suzanne Nossel says it would be a disaster. Who is right?
Nossel in a word. But let’s go through the drill.
Satloff argues that defeat in the Congress might either push President Obama to
- reopen the negotiations, seeking a “better deal,”or
- seek to implement the agreement without Congressional approval.
For Case 1, Rob offers no explanation of why the Iranians would agree to renegotiate. For Case 2, he suggests the Iranians would abide by the terms of the agreement, despite not getting the sanctions relief that was the primary purpose of their engagement in the negotiations. This runs contrary to both what the Iranians have said–that they will proceed apace if there is no deal–and what they have done in the past. The Iranian nuclear program mushroomed (to use an unfortunate metaphor) after the Bush administration ignored Tehran’s feelers about reaching an accommodation and refused to talk about anything but dismantling its nuclear program.
In both cases, Rob fails to consider the reaction of the Chinese, Russians, Europeans and Gulf States.
This is fatal to his argument. With rejection of the agreement in the US Congress, the united front against Iran getting nuclear weapons would quickly evaporate. The Chinese and Europeans, who have been salivating at the prospects for increased trade with Iran, would have no reason to go along with reopening the negotiations. If the Iranians do appear to be implementing the agreement, multilateral sanctions would rapidly disappear, leaving the US isolated and unable to get the European support required if the “snapback” provision is to be used.
Bolton argues that the snapback provision is not only useless but harmful to American interests, because it sets a precedent for getting around the UN Security Council veto. He cites as a negative example a Cold War era effort by Dean Acheson to do an end-run around the UNSC through the General Assembly. That effort caused no harm Bolton admits, but he is unfazed. He is sure snapback is bad, even if the experience he cites was not. It’s hard to imagine why the New York Times published that argument.
Let’s get real. Rejection of the deal in Congress would most likely lead to three “no”s:
- No International Atomic Energy Agency inspections;
- No multilateral sanctions;
- No constraints on the Iranian nuclear program.
Iran would be free, if it wants, to move ahead towards nuclear weapons, not in 10 or 15 years, but right now. If President Obama or his successor were to decide on attacking the Iranian nuclear program, he would be on his own without allies and without the grounds Iranian violation of the agreement would provide.
That is not the worst of it though. American clout with all concerned would decline markedly. With Iran presumed to be racing for a nuclear weapon, the Saudis, Egyptians and Turks would need to keep pace. The Europeans think they led what they call the EU3+3 (P5+1) in the negotiations. Rejection in Congress would pull the rug out from under our closest allies. Russia and China would deem the US unreliable, even as they respectively pursue arms and energy deals with Tehran.
Rejection in short would be a milestone comparable to the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations not much more than 100 years ago. It would break the faith with Europe, reduce US clout with less friendly world powers, initiate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and limit America’s ability to lead on many non-nuclear issues.
President Obama will speak about all this today at American University. I trust he’ll have those magic numbers in mind.
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That’s not easy
The Kosovo parliament yesterday mounted the two-thirds margin needed to approve constitutional amendments required to allow creation of an internationally-staffed Special Court that will meet outside the small country to consider cases that date from after the end of the Kosovo war and may include some in which the crimes actually occurred in Albania. It will likely be years before the court reaches any verdicts.
It took courage for Hashim Thaci, who is rumored to be the subject of at least some of the cases in question, to dragoon his political party into providing the votes necessary to reach the two-thirds threshold. The constitutional amendments had failed just a few weeks ago, due to defections by Kosovo Liberation Army enthusiasts. They regard the creation of the Special Court as an attack on the legitimacy of their liberation struggle and the sovereignty of the state it created.
The international community saw things differently. Kosovo’s friends in Washington and Brussels might have preferred the country’s own courts to take up the cases in question. But Kosovo is too small and too interconnected for its still nascent court system to be able and willing to try such cases, which require foolproof witness protection. In any event, it would not have been possible for the Kosovo courts to deal with those involving crimes that allegedly occurred in Albania, including murder and organ trafficking.
It is unfortunately not clear that the internationals can manage the feat either. The European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has been bumbling at best, incompetent and even corrupt at worst. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which lacks jurisdiction in the cases the Special Court will hear, hasn’t been a lot better. Its trials have dragged on for years, with inconsistent and difficult to account for outcomes. Its main virtue was that it removed notorious alleged war criminals from circulation in their own countries and thereby muted their political currency and relevance.
It was supposed to do better than that. International justice was intended to hold individuals accountable, remove the presumption of guilt from ethnic groups, and provide a just foundation on which to build real reconciliation and a warm peace. Judged by those expectations, the alphabet soup of international efforts to make law the rule rather than the exception has to be judged a miserable failure. While the military potential to wreck havoc in the Balkans is today greatly reduced, ethnic tensions still prevail over moderation, mutual disdain over common interests and hatred over good sense.
My one fear about this new court, whose creation has to be counted as a big step forward, is that it may fail like other international justice efforts to hold perpetrators accountable. Bringing people to trial for crimes allegedly committed 15 or 16 year ago is challenging. Evidence goes missing or is destroyed, witnesses become unavailable or unwilling, memories fade. The organ-trafficking allegations will be particularly difficult to prove. Perhaps the single biggest challenge in Kosovo is intimidation: I wouldn’t want to live in a country of less than 2 million people where most of the population would consider me a traitor. Testifying means a lifetime in exile in some other country’s witness protection program.
So I do hope the internationals understand the big responsibilities they have taken on with the creation of this Special Court: assembling airtight cases from aging evidence and testimony, conducting trials expeditiously and transparently, convincing not only the accused but two whole countries that the process is fair and unbiased, avoiding the besmirching of reputations without ample proof, assigning responsibility in a way that avoids harming innocent people.
That’s not easy.
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The Turkey/Syria conundrum
This discussion of Turkey and Syria on CCTV America yesterday went well. Mike Walter moderated with the following guests:
- Cale Salih, from Oxford, is a visiting fellow to the European Council on Foreign Relations focusing on the Kurdish people.
- Daniel Serwer is a professor in conflict management at Johns Hopkins University.
- Tulin Daloglu from Ankara is a Turkish journalist and opinion writer.
- Joshua Walker is a transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, a non-partisan U.S. think tank.
And part 2:
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