Category: Daniel Serwer
Big surprise is no surprise
The Middle East Institute published my piece this evening:
The Iran nuclear deal has only one big surprise: it is consistent with the April 2 “parameters” that preceded it and contains no surprises. No one caved. Nothing got walked back.
But there are some interesting additions. One is this: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” This is a written confirmation of the Supreme Leader’s controversial “fatwa” against nuclear weapons. It was not so long ago that Iran’s critics in the United States were complaining that the fatwa was only oral and not written. I have not noticed anyone welcoming the written version.
The “reaffirmation” wouldn’t be worth the paper it is printed on except for the detailed limits and intrusive inspections that the agreement provides. No softie on Iran, Dennis Ross confirms that these fulfill previous Iranian commitments to limit centrifuges, enrichment, and enriched uranium; end all plans for separating plutonium; and no longer engage in any research and development related to a nuclear explosive device. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring will be more comprehensive and intrusive than for other countries. While no system is foolproof, nuclear weapons have never been developed within an IAEA safeguarded program.
That leaves the possibility of a clandestine nuclear program outside the purview of the IAEA. There is reason to believe that Tehran had such a program until 2003, when it was allegedly stopped. Iran, which previously stonewalled IAEA inquiries on this subject, has now committed in the nuclear deal to clarifying its past nuclear activities with “possible military dimensions” by October 15, with a final assessment due from the IAEA on December 15. This will be an important early milestone in implementation (or not) of the nuclear deal. It is not the first time the Iranians have promised clarification. Beyond that date, the IAEA can request access to locations of concern. Iranian objections can be overridden by five of eight members of a joint commission overseeing implementation of the agreement. That joint commission includes five Western members (the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and the EU) as well as Russia, China, and Iran.
The agreement provides for sanctions to be lifted once Iran implements its obligations or passes certain time limits in compliance with the agreement. No sanctions get lifted without implementation, and some—like the arms embargo—remain in place for five or eight years (depending on the weapons involved). While most restrictions are lifted within 15 years, some remain in place in perpetuity, including strict IAEA safeguards and the prohibition on nuclear weapons research and development.
The question is what happens if one or another obligation is breached. There is an elaborate, but quick-paced (I count 35 days), dispute resolution mechanism. At that point, UN Security Council sanctions would be reinstated, unless the Council votes within 30 days to continue lifting them. This is a “snapback” mechanism, unprecedented so far as I know in the Security Council. It would give the United States (and other permanent members) a veto over sanctions lifting. Iran has stated that it would treat reinstatement of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments.
So, is this agreement a good thing or a bad thing?
It depends on what you think the alternative might be. At worst, it would be no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program, no IAEA monitoring, and no multilateral sanctions, as the EU and China are champing at the bit to do business with a cash, oil, and gas-rich Iran. At best we might in the absence of an agreement be able to sustain the sanctions for a while but not likely the IAEA monitoring and technological constraints, giving others in the region reason to initiate their own programs to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. War might set back the Iranian nuclear program for a few years, but it would also give them incentive to finish the job and unleash even more chaos than the region is currently enduring.
Relief from sanctions will unquestionably provide the Iranians with resources. Tehran is owed upward of $100 billion that will flow into its coffers, in addition to whatever its renewed exports will bring in today’s bearish oil market, likely to go down further because of Iran’s reentry into it. The Islamic Republic is a profoundly anti-Western regime that even without much available cash has managed to contribute to instability in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Its anti-Americanism may sound hollow after this agreement, which engages Iran in a continuing process involving the United States and three of its allies as well as the European Union, but unless there is a dramatic and unexpected change of heart at the top in Tehran we can anticipate more trouble from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies in the region and even beyond.
America’s friends in the Gulf will therefore be nervous about the implications of this agreement, though the United Arab Emirates was quick to say it welcomed it. Israel denounced it even before the ink was on the page. But soon enough both the Gulf states and Israel will become keen about insisting on fulfilling its every letter, as they have with the interim agreement currently in effect.
The debate in Congress will be vigorous. Most Republicans and a good number of Democrats will oppose the deal on the grounds that it licenses Iran to become a nuclear threshold state, ignoring the Obama administration’s conviction that this would happen faster and with fewer controls in the absence of an agreement. But the opponents are unlikely to muster the two-thirds majority in both houses required to override a presidential veto. The Supreme Leader is thought to have given the green light for this deal, but he has not yet pronounced on it. Assuming he says a dramatically reluctant “yes,” the Iranian Majlis will not block it.
The saga of implementation has not yet begun. It will last 10-15 years. If the agreement holds and prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it will have made an enormous contribution to peace and stability. If it fails, we will have to deal with the ugly consequences: war or a nuclearized Middle East.
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Here’s what I say to Iranians
Here is how I responded to PressTV (Iran’s English service) this morning (I’ll appreciate it if someone lets me know if they publish it in full, or not):
Q: How do you evaluate the deal? Does it cover US or West interests on Iran nuclear activity?
A: I am still reading it, but it appears to me to meet the April 2 parameters and covers the main US interests in preventing Iran from seeking or obtaining nuclear weapons.
Q: [The] Iranian foreign minister calls nuclear deal a ‘win-win solution’ and ‘new chapter of hope.’ Do you agree with this view?
A: It is certainly a win on the US side. He speaks for the Iranian side, so I guess I do agree that it is a win-win.
The question of hope is different. Americans hope for Tehran to end support for terrorism, behave differently in the region and respect the human rights of its own people. I don’t yet see much that gives hope on these issues.
Q: Does this deal lead to more cooperation between Iran and West especially US in regional and international issues?
A: Perhaps, but it doesn’t guarantee it. We’ll have to wait and see. Hostility to the US is one of the pillars of the Iranian regime. I don’t expect that to change, though the hostility may sound hollow in the wake of this agreement. Real cooperation will require an end to that hostility, to jailing of journalists, to support for Bashar al Assad, and to funding of Hizbollah and Hamas. What are the odds of that?
Q: What do you think about US Congress reaction especially Republicans to this deal? [Will] these act [to] help implement nuclear deal or harmful to it?
A: Some people in Congress are opposed to any deal. But I don’t think they have the votes to overcome the President’s veto. It will be a good thing if the deal is thoroughly examined in Congress and in the Majles.
Q: [Will] this deal have any effect on US presidential election or does it help Democrats in upcoming elections?
A: No, I don’t think it helps the Democrats. Implementation is likely to be controversial in the US.
Q: What do you think about Israel’s next approach or activity toward Iran after nuclear deal?
A: Best to ask them, but my guess is that they will protest, seek stronger US security cooperation, and then learn to live with the deal, as they did with the interim arrangement. If Iran violates the deal, they will be the first to protest, even though they say they don’t like it.
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Radio is great
One of my occasional pleasures is doing a first-rate radio program called “Encounter” with Carol Castiel at Voice of America. Here is the latest edition, with Helle Dale of the Heritage Foundation. We talked about Greece’s euro problems and the Iranian nuclear program last Thursday, before either deal was done:
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What I’ll be looking for
I’ve pledged a piece on the Iran nuclear deal to the Middle East Institute, once it is done. I claim some competence in the matter, as I earned a master’s degree in physical chemistry at the University of Chicago (and a doctorate on the history of radiation protection at Princeton) and spent seven years as a science counselor in American embassies working on non-proliferation issues.
Here are some key things I’ll be looking for:
1. Does the deal meet provisions laid out in the April Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program?
The parameters were unprecedented in what they would require a potential bomb-building country to do. The Americans published them, but the Iranians in the end did not formally object to their contents (and the Iranian Foreign Minister implied the document was accurate). Does the new agreement (presumably called a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) faithfully reproduce and implement its provisions?
2. Are the verification mechanisms sufficiently intrusive to ensure that we will know if Tehran cheats?
This is in some respects the most important issue. The parameters promised inspections at uranium-producing facilities for 25 years and surveillance of centrifuges (and their production) 20. How will these provisions be implemented? What provisions have been made to ensure access to suspicious military sites? There is no history of nuclear nonproliferation using facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Can we be reasonably certain of discovering if Iran initiates a clandestine nuclear program outside the purview of the IAEA?
3. How are sanctions to be lifted?
Does lifting of sanctions follow verified implementation? Which sanctions are to be lifted and how? Will the architecture of sanctions remain in place, as pledged in the parameters?
4. What provisions have been made for “snap-back” of sanctions in the event of violations?
Who decides when there is a violation? How is it decided that sanctions will be reimposed? What is the promised “dispute resolution mechanism”?
5. Will the arms embargo on Iran be lifted?
The parameters promised lifting of all UN Security Council resolutions “on the nuclear issue.” Does this mean the arms embargo, which among other things has blocked Russian sales of advanced air defenses to Tehran, will be lifted and if so how and when?
Other issues
US representation in Tehran: This deal is so far-reaching and complex, it is difficult to see how it can be implemented effectively without an official US presence in Iran. Are provisions being made for return of US diplomats and technical experts? Does this mean re-opening of a US office (if not an embassy), or will the Americans work out of the embassy of Switzerland, which has represented the US there since we broke diplomatic relations in 1980?
Iran’s behavior in the region, support for terrorism and human rights record at home. Both Democrats and Republicans will raise these issues during the 60-day Congressional review period. The Obama Administration has been reluctant to press those concerns as hard as it might while the nuclear negotiations were ongoing. Will that policy now change? Will the US be more prepared to push back against Iran’s forces or their proxies in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Lebanon? Will Iran use the funds it gains from sanctions relief to make even more trouble, and how will the Administration react to that.
Regional security: Wars are currently raging in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Iran and the US are both directly or indirectly implicated in all of them. Can the nuclear deal somehow lead to a regional accord that includes Saudi Arabia and Turkey and enables a more effective effort against ISIS as well as restoration of state integrity and effective governance?
I look forward to getting some answers, maybe tomorrow.
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The risks of victimhood
Today stones were thrown at Serbian Prime Minister Vucic, who was departing the 20th anniversary commemoration of the Srebrenica massacre in eastern Bosnia. He had previously made statements on the occasion:
As the prime minister of the Serbian government I’m ready to bow and pay respect to innocent victims of Srebrenica.
He is also reported to have said Belgrade “despised” those responsible for the massacre, which he described as “a terrible and terrifying crime.” This is a far cry from what he said in 1995, right after Srebrenica:
one hundred Muslims would be killed for every dead Serb
When people move in the right direction, my inclination is to welcome them, not throw stones at them.
But Serbia has refused to characterize the event as “genocide,” despite decisions by both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice. At Belgrade’s behest, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution this week, apparently because it included the g-word.
Some have said the stone throwing incident was “attempted murder” or a “lynching.” It was neither. But it was ugly, dangerous and unworthy. Gerard Toal reminds us courageously:
we need to examine with extreme sensitivity how the production of victimhood through the memorialization of genocide can sometimes produce acts of genocide.
I would add that it can also cause less deadly harm. Florence Hartmann and Ed Vulliamy blame Britain and the United States for abandoning Srebrenica to its fate. While they are two people who merit a great deal of credit for their advocacy on the Bosnian war, their allegation is based on misinterpretation of what happened in 1995.
They treat as news the idea that Britain and the US knew what might happen at Srebrenica. That’s not news. They themselves quote a Security Council report from 1993 warning of 25,000 casualties if the Serbs were to enter Srebrenica. Of course we (I was in the State Department) knew that the Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia might be overrun. They were militarily indefensible. It is not clear that even air attacks could have stopped what happened.
Washington was trying to convince Bosnian President Izetbegovic to give up on maintaining the enclave at Srebrenica and move its population to Federation territory. That was not in any sense abandoning Srebrenica to its fate, though it would have amounted to helping the Serbs cleanse eastern Bosnia of Muslims. It also would have saved, as it happens, more than 8000 lives. I don’t think we were wrong to lean in that direction. Saving lives was more important than holding on to indefensible territory.
Izetbegovic would have none of it. He favored keeping the enclaves in order to attract international attention and hoped-for military intervention. The former was eventually ample, but the latter was not until later in the summer of 1995, when NATO unleashed a disproportionate air attack on the Serbs in retaliation for a mortar that landed in Sarajevo. Srebrenica may or may not have informed later decisions, but those of us who lived through the events will always regret that we didn’t do more to stop what happened in July 1995.
That does not mean we were to blame. Nor was Izetbegovic, even if his decisions left the Muslims of Srebrenica exposed to their fate. Let’s get this straight: Ratko Mladic, Radovan Karadzic and Slobodan Milosevic were to blame. Blaming the US, Britain or Izetbegovic, or even Aleksandar Vucic, makes no sense and risks creating a sense of victimhood that could take disastrous directions. What happened, as Ed Joseph points out, was the Serb war aim, not a perversion of it. It is important to keep the focus where it belongs, lest victimhood get out of hand.
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Srebrenica and its implications
I participated in a panel Wednesday at Voice of America on Bosnia: Twenty Years After Srebrenica with Ambassadors Stephen Rapp and Kurt Volker as well as Tanya Domi. The video of the event is on the VoA website (it is too big to upload to peacefare.net).
The unwelcome news of Russia’s veto of a UN Security Council resolution marking the anniversary arrived just before we started. Angela Merkel at the time was in Belgrade, so Tanjug had some questions about her visit there and the blocked UNSC resolution:
Q: In short, what is your analysis of the results of the visit, and in your opinion, what was the most important message?
A: The visit went well. Merkel’s explicit message was praise for Serbia’s fiscal restraint. I imagine that has more to do with the Greek crisis than with anything else. I don’t imagine Merkel was pleased with the Russian veto of the Srbrenica resolution, but I don’t know what she said to Nikolic and Vucic about that.
Q: Also, how do you comment the fact that UNSC didn’t adopt British resolution on Srebenica because of Russian veto, as a consequence of disagreement on the text of resolution?
A: The disagreement appears to have been focused on use of the word “genocide,” which is a characterization both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice have both used with regard to Srbrenica. The view from Washington is that that word characterizes a well-established fact. Russian and Serbian denial of that fact makes Prime Minister Vucic’s attendance at the Srebrenica commemoration less important than it otherwise might have been.
Q: What is your opinion on prime minister Vucic`s visit to Potocari? What will that step mean for the region?
A: As indicated above, I don’t think it will be seen as significant in the region, because of the Security Council veto. Only if he were to say something explicit condemning the genocide will there be much impact. That isn’t likely, but it would certainly be welcome here and in Brussels.
Srebrenica of course has broad implications far beyond the Balkans for international community and American policy, as Derek Chollet points out. But I disagree with Derek on a number of issues, as I pointed out to a correspondent this morning:
1. On Iraq, I think Derk’s argument is specious: the only viable justification for intervention in 2003 was weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Saddam was not doing much more harm to his population then than he had been doing for a long time (or that many other dictators have done since). Without WMD, the intervention was just a monumental mistake.
2. In Libya, Derek fails to mention that the Libyans did not want our help after Qaddafi was gone, because they thought (with some good reason) that they could handle it themselves. They did pretty well until late 2012 but then ran off the rails.
3. In Syria, lots of people saw the need for early diplomatic efforts to remove Assad, which among other things might have prevented the transformation of a peaceful rebellion into a violent one. Derek and Phil Gordon should be ashamed of their failure to get the President to act on his conviction that Assad had to go.
4. Rwanda and Srebrenica do inform such decisions, but I doubt there was much we could have done militarily in either case to prevent what happened. In Srebrenica, we tried to convince Izetbegovic to move the Muslims out of the enclave, which was obviously vulnerable. That is now being criticized as a proposal to assist ethnic cleansing. But military intervention on the scale required was out of the question at the time. In Rwanda, military intervention against whom? Individual machete wielding Hutus?
Bottom line: Our military strength has made our diplomatic capabilities atrophy. We should get back to using military strength to frame issues, which it seems to me the Administration has been pretty good about with Iran (the military option being so unattractive they hardly had a choice). But the solutions are often diplomatic rather than military.
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