Category: Daniel Serwer
The SuShi proxy war is likely to continue
This morning’s news that Saudi Arabia is bombing Houthi rebels in Yemen confirms what you already knew: the Middle East is engulfed in a proxy war between Iran–which supports the Houthis in Yemen, Bashar al Asad in Syria, Shiite militias in Iraq, and Lebanon’s Hizbollah–and Sunni states, including in the front lines the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as well as Saudi Arabia. Occasional Sunni-majority contributors include Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. At the same time, Iran and its allies as well as Saudi Arabia and its allies are fighting against Sunni extremists associated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
No wonder it is hard to keep score. This game is played in many dimensions. In the Sunni/Shia dimension, the United States has no dog in the fight, to use Secretary of State Baker’s unforgettable phrase. Our focus is on the fight against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, wherever they rear their brutal methods, because we fear they will inevitably target the “far enemy” (us) in due course. You might think it would be possible for Iran and Saudi Arabia to cooperate in that dimension, but instead they compete. Neither wants a victory over extremism to be credited to the other or to allow the other (or its proxies) to inherit the territory extremists once controlled.
The Sunni/Shia dimension and the anti-extremist dimension are not really orthogonal. Victory in one will affect the outcome in the other. The protagonists know it, which is one reason they are engaging in both. Iran would gain a great deal in the fight against Sunni states if Shia-allied forces win in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, Saudi Arabia would gain a great deal in the fight against Iran if it is able to put a majority Sunni regime in place in Syria and chase the Islamic State from the Sunni provinces of Iraq.
Yemen is a bit of a side show to the main theater of operations in the Levant. But geography makes it important to Saudi Arabia, in whose back yard it lies. If the Iran-allied Houthis are able to take over there, the Kingdom will feel the loss. By the same token, the Kingdom wants to see Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula defeated. Ironically, the Houthis have been at least as willing to engage on that front as the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, but Riyadh won’t see that as a plus. It wants to defeat both the Houthis and Al Qaeda.
Washington is in a difficult spot. It doesn’t want to be a protagonist in the Sunni/Shia war, but is viewed as one with every move it makes. Yesterday’s American air attacks against the remaining Islamic State forces in Tikrit were apparently undertaken only when Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi agreed to limit the role of Shia militias in retaking the capital of Salahuddin province. David Petraeus and others are being quoted as claiming that Iran is a far greater threat to the US than the Islamic State.
Likewise the nuclear negotiations are being seen through the lens of the Sunni/Shia conflict. An agreement that blocks Iran’s paths to nuclear weapons and provides at least a year’s warning of breakout has come to be viewed as strengthening rather than weakening the Islamic Republic. Sunni states apparently prefer military action against Iran’s nuclear program, which would guarantee that the Iranians do their damndest to get the bomb. But their goading of the US to war might be quickly forgotten in the devastating aftermath, as Iran would no doubt target its Gulf neighbors in any response.
This layered set of interrelated issues (Sunni/Shia, Islamic extremists, nuclear capabilities) is a good deal to complex for even very skilled diplomats to imagine easy solutions. The Obama Administration has essentially decided to prioritize two issue: blocking Iran from nuclear weapons and fighting Islamic extremists. We’ll know by Monday, the deadline for some sort of product from the nuclear talks, if the first issue is likely to be resolved. The second is likely to be with us much longer, if only because the Sunni/Shia conflict we don’t want to be involved in will keep feeding the extremists of both varieties with recruits.
The SuShi proxy war (between Sunni and Shia) is likely to continue.
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Justice, justice you shall pursue
Albatrit Matoshi of Pristina daily Zeri asked me some questions Monday. My answers were published today:
Q: Is there a legal basis to establish the United Nations Special Court for crimes in Kosovo if Kosovo institutions fail to do such a thing?
A: I suppose the international community could try to impose a new court, as it did with ICTY. But I doubt that would happen. In principle, I would like to see the Kosovo institutions handle as much of the process of investigating and prosecuting war crimes as possible. But the will and means seem to be lacking.
Q: Do you think it is clear the role of the Special Court and the fact that who will work on it, which will be the role of the current judges of EULEX or even of international judges?
A: Nothing is clear to me about the Special Court yet, as so far as I know many issues have yet to be decided and publicized. Ask the EU, which has taken on this issue.
Q: Do you think that eventually the special court will clean Kosovo’s political scene?
A: I’m not sure what “clean Kosovo’s political scene” means, but the purpose of the court will presumably be justice, not political cleansing.
Q: What is the significance of this Court for Kosovo?
A: The important thing for Kosovo’s citizens to appreciate is that there are rules that apply in any armed conflict. Even in an entirely justified war, war crimes may occur. In the first instance, every country is responsible for the behavior of its own fighters. There is nothing unusual about the international community expectation that Kosovo fighters be held responsible. I wouldn’t want my liberation war stained with war crimes.
Q: How do you think this process will last and how many people will be involved?
A: How would I know? The process usually lasts much longer than anyone expects.
Q: Was there any possibility to avoid the creation of this Court if the Kosovo judiciary will have done its job better or has been inevitable process?
A: Yes. Had the Kosovo judiciary pursued war crimes cases more aggressively and effectively, there would be little need for this Special Court.
But there are also limitations. I’m not sure the Kosovo courts can be expected to pursue crimes that may have occurred in a neighboring country.
Q: Do you think the Kosovo political scene will be affected more by the creation of this Court?
A: There are obviously political differences over the creation of the Special Court. Those need to be resolved within Kosovo’s political institutions. That is what they are for.
Q: Can establishment of this court have negative effects on the situation in Kosovo and how?
A: I know creation of the court is hard. But it is important for Kosovo to demonstrate its willingness to see war crimes allegations investigated and prosecuted in a fair and objective way.
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The Levant will never be the same
I spoke Thursday morning at the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome on “The Fight Against ISIS and US Middle East Policy.” The powerpoint I used is attached.
Questions focused on Iran and whether it might play a positive or negative regional role if a nuclear deal is reached. My guess is that it may continue to play a negative role, because the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will lose something in a nuclear deal and may require compensation. That could come in the form of a free hand to pursue aggressive Iranian objectives in the region, including not only Syria and Iraq but also in Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain.
There is, however, one important constraint on Iran: partition of Iraq or Syria would be against its interests, as it would likely lead to problems in the Iranian province of Eastern Kurdistan. Iran will not want its strong support for Shia militias in Iraq or for the regime in Syria to precipitate partition of either of those countries. The question is whether they will recognize the danger before it becomes irreversible. In my view, it is important to have Iran inside any future multilateral talks on Syria, precisely to expose them to the risks of going too far.
A couple of people raised the question of how the ISIS is financed. I know of no one with a really good answer to this question. I certainly don’t have one. It is clear enough that they used to get lots of money from trading in oil and oil products, but the anti-ISIS coalition has destroyed a good deal of their capacity to refine (and the drop in oil prices hits them too). They gained a good deal of hard cash from banks in Mosul, but that is a non-renewable resource. My impression is that Gulf funding has largely dried up, though it may still continue from private sources.
One person asked about the mutual silence of ISIS and Israel. They seem to be leaving each other alone. I think that is a temporary bit of restraint. Both recognize the danger and enmity of the other but are not willing yet to engage. That condition won’t last forever. Israel wants to be sure ISIS does not gain control of its border with Syria. ISIS will go after Jerusalem when it feels strong enough to do so.
A good deal of the discussion, including Riccardo Alcaro’s enlightening introduction, revolved around the question of how stability might be brought to areas liberated from ISIS as well as the necessity of doing so. General Allen has only just begun the process of talking with the Iraqis about stabilization. There are no easy answers, but security, governance and essential services will need to be provided. We are a long way not only from defeating ISIS but also from ensuring that the war does not create vacua that even more radical groups might seek to fill.
If you think of the war against Islamic extremism as having begun with the US attack on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, it is clear we have been more successful in fragmenting and spreading the enemy than in containing him, much less defeating him. That’s due in large part to stabilization failures, not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere. It would be better not to repeat that experience, though I have little confidence we have either the means or will required.
The war has displaced and impoverished many millions. Minorities are on the run. Relative majorities are frightened and distrustful. States are failing. Borders are evaporating. Extremism is reaping rewards. Moderation is fading. The Levant will never be the same.
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Netanyahu’s win has consequences
The Netanyahu who won yesterday’s Israeli election is a Netanyahu with two big international policy objectives that put him at odds with the current American administration: he wants to block both a nuclear deal with Iran and creation of a Palestinian state. He will try to form a rightist coalition that supports him on both these key points. He and his rival Isaac Herzog have already rejected President Rivlin’s proposal for a national solidarity government that includes them both.
The relative success of the united Arab coalition in this election is likely to have little impact on Netanyahu’s fourth term in office, beyond spooking Israel’s rightwing into even more virulent anti-Arab rhetoric. It will be difficult for the Arab members of the Knesset to deliver much if Netanyahu is successful in forming his preferred coalition.
Americans need to take stock of this election result and consider their options.
Netanyahu is not a party to the Iran nuclear negotiations, but his efforts to encourage US Congressional opposition have born fruit not only in his address to Congress but also in the form of a Republican “open letter” to Iranian leaders that was intended to undermine the Administration’s negotiating stance and wreck prospects for a deal. We should expect more of this kind of subversion in the future. Netanyahu and his allies in Congress want war with Iran and will stop at nothing to get it.
It has long been clear that Netanyahu’s conditions for creation of a Palestinian state preclude the creation of one worthy of that name. He has wanted continued Israeli military control over both Gaza’s entry and exit points and large portions of the West Bank, while insisting on Palestinian demilitarization. But during the election campaign he went further, declaring no Palestinian state would be created while he is prime minister. Washington needs to recognize that there is no point in continuing the Middle East peace process in any form now that Israel’s prime minister has ruled out a two-state solution, which has been the declared US objective.
What do you do when your putative ally departs from your goals on priority issues?
You re-examine the alliance. That is difficult in this instance, because Israel has strong backing across party lines in the Washington. Any effort to restrain settlement-building in the West Bank or other moves to enable realization of a Palestinian state will be met in Congress with vigorous, and likely veto-proof, opposition. Even American votes or abstentions in the UN Security Council in favor of Palestine could engender dramatic political responses in Congress. The Obama Administration may thus be reduced on Palestine issues to immobility.
But that should not happen on Iran, where Netanyahu has a less direct role. The Administration needs to bring home next week a truly good agreement on Iran’s nuclear program that will give the international community a year’s warning of any Iranian effort to “break out” and the intrusive monitoring necessary to make a “sneak out” impractical and detectable. Netanyahu can fulminate against such a deal, but he is unlikely to be able to stop it or to take unilateral (and likely ineffectual) military action against Iran.
For those who once hoped for Israelis to reject Netanyahu, the election result is an enormous disappointment, even if his additional seats come mostly from rightwing rivals. The impact on the Middle East peace process will be dramatic. But the impact on nuclear negotiations with Iran need not be.
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Kerry’s hint
Secretary Kerry’s few words Sunday about negotiating with Bashar al Assad have roused the commentariat to hyperbole: Aaron David Miller says
…if…the U.S. comes to terms with Mr. Assad, then Washington will have achieved a horrible trifecta: legitimizing a mass murderer, feeding ISIS propaganda, and alienating its own Sunni allies.
That is eminently quotable. But the sentence that precedes it is more to the point:
If Russia and Iran would support a transition in Syria that forces Mr. Assad, his family, and the regime’s mafia from power; that includes Alawites, Sunnis, Christians, and Kurds in the new Syria; and that doesn’t open the door to further ISIS gains, the outcome could be fine.
The simple fact is that Washington has long been prepared to negotiate with Assad or his regime. It did so at the Geneva 2 talks in early 2014. I imagine it would do so again if it can move Assad aside or out. Kerry clearly intended this when he said yesterday:
To get the Assad regime to negotiate, we’re going to have to make it clear to him that there is a determination by everybody to seek that political outcome and change his calculation about negotiating.
This reminds me of Kerry’s apparently offhanded remark about Syria’s chemical weapons, which led to a diplomatic rather than a military initiative to remove them. That effort was not 100% successful, but it was easily over 75% successful. Kerry also went on to say:
That’s under way right now. And I am convinced that, with the efforts of our allies and others, there will be increased pressure on Assad.
This could be wishful thinking. But if he is hinting that Tehran and Moscow (those are presumably the “others”) are prepared to increase pressure on Bashar, we might well be within range of a 75% breakthrough along the lines of the one Miller described as acceptable.
What might that look like? It would have to involve the central premise of the 2012 Geneva communique: a transitional governing body with full executive powers. It is difficult for me to picture Assad staying in the country while that happens. His life would be in danger. He might remain nominally as president, but take a long vacation in Moscow or Tehran, with his family. Or perhaps in Latakia. Someone else would need to be put in charge, either as acting president or prime minister.
Who might that be? The current vice presidents of Syria are Farouk al Sharaa (despite frequent rumors of his defection) and Najah al Attar. Both are Sunni Muslims and loyalists to Assad, who appointed them after long service in the Ba’ath party and his government. Neither would be much welcomed among the externally based Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), but a constitutional succession (like the one in Yemen) would presumably preserve more of the Syrian state and its capabilities to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) than a violent overthrow of the regime.
More likely perhaps would be a military takeover, something that has happened frequently in Syria’s past. This would have to exclude Bashar’s younger brother Maher, who was a major protagonist of the crackdown on peaceful protesters and the subsequent civil war. He and the rest of the Assad family would have to join the President in exile, or decide to fight. That would make the current civil war in Syria deteriorate further, as the regular army (or a large part of it) supports the military takeover while the Alawite militias try to protect both the remaining Assad family members and the Alawite population, which is split between western Syria and Damascus.
That will not be the only complication. There will be nothing easy about a political settlement of the Syrian conflicts if Kerry is correct and one is in the offing. ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra and perhaps also some Kurdish forces will continue to fight whatever transition arrangement is made. Iran and Russia will continue to try to preserve their assets in Syria.
Tehran will be particularly keen on its Revolutionary Guard forces playing a major role, in order to guarantee continuation of Syria’s role as a bridge to Hizbollah, whose forces are also engaged there. Moscow will want its port access and strong military supply relationship with Syria preserved, but its main preoccupation will be to portray whatever settlement is reached as a triumph for Russian diplomacy and a defeat for the US, which it managed reasonably well in the case of chemical weapons.
Secretary Kerry may be hinting at something better than preservation of Assad in power, but implementation won’t be easy.
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The road forward is civilian as well as military
I spoke this afternoon at on a “political analysts” panel at The Road Forward conference on planning the future of the Syrian American Community. Here are my speaking notes:
1. Let me start by saying the obvious. This comes from someone who would have preferred that you stick with nonviolent rebellion. But four years have passed and that is history.
2. Now you’ve got to do better on the military front. There is no substitute for that.
3. The regime’s relative success on the battlefield, with ample Iranian and Russian support, has made a political solution less feasible than in June 2012, when the Geneva communiqué was adopted.
4. If you want to get back to its provision for a transitional governing body with full executive powers, you are going to need somehow to threaten Bashar al Assad’s hold on power, making him feel that failure to agree puts him more at risk than agreeing. That is vital for a negotiated solution.
5. But it is only a necessary condition. It is not a sufficient one.
6. Today’s Syria is the scene of a devastating regional proxy war pitting Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran against each other, with the US and Russia only slightly more removed.
7. Syrians need to re-establish control over their own destiny.
8. The civilian dimension is as important as the military one.
9. One vital civilian dimension is diplomacy. The Syrian opposition did well at the Geneva 2 conference. But it failed to follow up on that triumph by uniting its factions.
10. That is still vital. Broad unity under a single umbrella would make the opposition a more serious negotiating partner not only for the regime but also for the Americans, Russians and Iranians.
11. A second important civilian dimension is governance. You cannot hope to be taken seriously unless you are serious about plans to govern effectively inside Syria. The “Back to Syria” idea was a good one, but it was never implemented.
12. It never even got out of the planning stage, so far as I know.
13. Even that would have an impact: a serious plan to govern protected areas in the north and south would give people sympathetic to your pleas for American help, like me, what they need to argue in your favor.
14. It is now ancient history, but in both Kosovo and Bosnia civilian governance during the wars weighted heavily with the international community. In Kosovo, the Albanians created institutions that provided health and education, in addition to a parliament and a presidency. In Bosnia, the collaboration of Croats and Muslims in the Bosnian Federation was vital to success at the Dayton peace talks.
15. The time is ripe in Syria. One way or another, Syrians trained in US-sponsored programs will begin to be inserted back into the country over the next year or so.
16. Failure to protect them from bombardment could lead to a Bay of Pigs fiasco.
17. No-fly zones, even with anti-aircraft weapons, are insufficient. The regime and extremists could well attack with artillery. What Syrians need are protected areas along the Turkish border and in the south, where American, opposition, Jordanian and Israeli interests converge.
18. These would not be “safe” areas. They would be target-rich environments in the view of both extremists and the regime.
19. On the ground, they will have to protect themselves. But air cover should come from Coalition countries, including Turkey and Jordan.
20. Military protection will not however make protected areas a success. Only if governance succeeds will they represent a serious step forward.
21. Success in governance will depend on planning and unity.
22. The national plans for The Day After and the Syrian Transition Roadmap have been overtaken by events. Nor is it sufficient for disparate administrative local councils to accomplish heroics here and there.
23. What you need is a plan for governance and enough performance to convince the powers that be that the opposition is a viable governing entity and a bulwark against extremism.
24. I have to admit that I voted twice for Barack Obama, who has made big mistakes in Syria. If you want him to correct those mistakes, you need to do better not only on the battlefield but also in diplomacy and governance.
25. This is a dark moment for the Syrian opposition, but also an opportunity: to write a serious plan for governing liberated areas of Syria.
26. I hope you’ll move in that direction. I pledge my personal support for such an effort.
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