Category: Daniel Serwer
No viable alternative
The furor over the Republican letter to the Iranians and the debate over the President’s authority to reach an agreement with Iran is obscuring a vital issue: is there a viable alternative? Let’s consider the options:
1. A better agreement. That’s what Netanyahu told the Congress he wanted. He wants one in which Iran gives up its substantial (he called it vast) nuclear infrastructure. This is presumably a reference to its 20,000 or so centrifuges. Since we don’t know precisely what the agreement will provide in this area, it is difficult to comment on this option. But the fact is that no nuclear power has ever used nuclear facilities safeguarded by the Intenrational Atomic Energy Agency to produce the materials needed for a nuclear weapon. It doesn’t really matter how many centrifuges they’ve got. Diversion of this sort is readily detected. It would be the least of my worries. Intrusive IAEA inspections are a necessary part of any agreement.
2. Maintenance of sanctions. The other members of the P5+1 (UK, France, Germany, Russia and China) are unlikely to cooperate if the US walks away from what they regard as an acceptable agreement. If they eliminate sanctions, Iran would feel little pressure on the nuclear question. The US could of course maintain its own sanctions, as it likely even if there is an agreement because some of them were imposed because of human rights abuses and Iranian support for terrorism. But it is important to remember what 50 years of unilateral embargo got us from Cuba, a much more vulnerable economy: zero.
3. War. The US could presumably destroy a good portion of Iran’s nuclear program. It would require a massive attack in many parts of the country, including destruction of Iran’s air defense system. We are not talking a one-night stand here, but rather a campaign over weeks if not months. The outcome would be uncertain, but few think it would set back the Iranians from nuclear weapons more than two or three years. So we would have to repeat the effort several years down the pike. In the meanwhile, the Iranians would wreck vengeance on US troops in Iraq as well as on US allies in the Gulf. As a consequence, oil prices would jump, helping the Iranians with reconstruction and the Russians with their aggression in Ukraine.
4. Regime change. Oops. I forgot to bring my magic wand, so that may not be possible today. The Bush Administration tried hard and failed, not to mention his predecessors. President Obama has forsworn it, not because he doesn’t want it but because it is impossible to negotiate with people if you are trying to unseat them. There is no telling when the Iranian people will throw off the yoke of the Islamic Republic, much as I might wish for it. Hope is not a policy.
A nuclear agreement–with or without Congressional approval–starts to look a lot better when you take a clear-eyed look at the alternatives. Congress could of course undermine an agreement or even make it impossible to implement. But so too could the Supreme Leader or the Iranian Majles. American won’t renege if the agreement provides for a year of warning time before Tehran can make a nuclear weapon and demonstrably improves the visibility of what Iran is up through IAEA inspections. The Iranians won’t undermine an agreement that removes enough sanctions to allow some measure of economic recovery.
When you’ve got no viable alternative, compromise starts looking good.
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True, but irrelevant
Republican senators have written an open letter to Iran’s leaders warning them that any agreement with the United States on its nuclear program not approved in Congress can be revoked “with the stroke of a pen” by the next President. That’s true, but irrelevant.
For several reasons:
1. The Iranians already know it. Does anyone in Congress imagine that no one in Tehran knows the difference between a “mere executive agreement” made by the President on his own and a treaty ratified by the Senate? The Iranians are difficult, but not dumb.
2. If a deal is struck, it will have to be one that demonstrably restrains Iran from getting nuclear weapons and gives the world advance warning if it moves in that direction. The Administration is aiming for a one-year breakout time. Does anyone think the next president will jettison an agreement of that sort without any substitute?
3. A move to junk an agreement would not find support even from the United Kingdom and France, much less Germany, Russia and China. Without the support of these other P5+1 countries, the US would be unable to reimpose multilateral sanctions on Iran and would be reduced to the kind of unilateral effort that has proven so fruitless for more than 50 years against Cuba.
I imagine someone in the Iranian Majles is arguing for a reply to the Senators that might read, if it were honest, along the following lines:
If our two current presidents reach an agreement and a future American president reneges on it, our Supreme Leader will ditch Iran’s obligations and do as he wishes. This could include pursuit and deployment of nuclear weapons, though you won’t know because the extra monitoring of our nuclear program provided for in the agreement will no longer apply.
The Iranians of course are far too sophisticated to reply along those lines, but the Senatorial letter will certainly bring joy to the hearts of those hardliners who would like to do so.
The letter is clearly intended to make the negotiations more difficult. Some might even say it is an effort to interfere in them, making the letter a potential violation in spirit of the (never enforced) Logan Act, which prohibits private correspondence with foreign governments “in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States.” That is presumably one of the reasons it is an “open” letter.
The Senators’ letter is of course not really about Iran but about American politics, in particular Republican relations with President Obama. The Republicans are trying to restrain him from what they regard as his unjustified and allegedly illegal efforts to shape policy, in particular on immigration, health care and global warming but also more generally on anything they think a Republican president would do differently.
I really don’t know what the next president will do with any nuclear deal the current one comes up with by the end of the month. If the Administration were to ask for Congressional approval, the agreement would be far more binding and harder for the president to undo. It might be preferable if it were an executive agreement and therefore readily abrogated if the need arises. That is something the Republicans should reflect on.
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Another March madness
I was reminded this week of the CNAS report If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran, by Colin Kahl, Jacob Stokes and Raj Pattani in 2013 when Colin was out of government. It makes particularly interesting reading in the run-up to a possible nuclear deal with Iran. March is the make or break month for at least a framework agreement.
The report is a reminder of what we are going to need to do if there is no agreement and Iran manages (whether or not there is a military strike on its nuclear facilities) to get nuclear weapons. Our objectives would then number 11:
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Prevent direct Iranian use of nuclear weapons;
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Prevent Iranian transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists;
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Limit and mitigate the consequences of Iranian sponsorship of conventional terrorism, support groups and conventional aggression;
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Discourage Iranian use of nuclear threats to coerce other states or provoke crises;
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Dissuade Iranian escalation during crises;
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Discourage Iran from adopting a destabilizing nuclear posture that emphasizes early use of nuclear weapons or pre-delegates launch authority;
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Persuade Israel to eschew a destabilizing nuclear posture that emphasizes early use of nuclear weapons or hair-trigger launch procedures;
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Convince other regional states not to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities;
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Limit damage to the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nonproliferation leadership;
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Prevent Iran from becoming a supplier of sensitive nuclear materials; and
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Ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf.
While some of these objectives are already operable (especially the last), it is eminently clear that Iranian nuclear weapons would be a major challenge. According to Kahl, Stokes and Pattani, the responses would have to include:
Deterrence to prevent Iranian nuclear use and aggression through credible threats of retaliation by:
- Strengthening U.S. declaratory policy to explicitly threaten nuclear retaliation in response to Iranian nuclear use and strengthening commitments to defend U.S. allies and partners;
- Engaging in high-level dialogue with regional partners to extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella in exchange for commitments not to pursue independent nuclear capabilities;
- Evaluating options for the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear forces;
- Providing Israel with a U.S. nuclear guarantee and engaging Israeli leaders on steps to enhance the credibility of their nuclear deterrent; and
- Improving nuclear forensics and attribution capabilities to deter nuclear terrorism.
Defense to deny Iran the ability to benefit from its nuclear weapons and to protect U.S. partners and allies from aggression by:
- Bolstering U.S. national missile defense capabilities;
- Improving the ability to detect and neutralize nuclear weapons that might be delivered by terrorists;
- Improving network resilience to reduce the threat posed by Iranian cyber attacks;
- Maintaining a robust U.S. conventional presence in the Persian Gulf and considering additional missile defense and naval deployments;
- Increasing security cooperation and operational integration activities with Gulf countries, especially in the areas of shared early warning, air and missile defense, maritime security and critical infrastructure protection; and
- Increasing security cooperation with Israel, especially assistance and collaboration to improve Israel’s rocket and missile defenses.
Disruption to shape a regional environment resistant to Iranian influence and to thwart and diminish Iran’s destabilizing activities by:
- Building Egyptian and Iraqi counterweights to Iranian influence through strategic ties with Cairo and Baghdad, leveraging assistance to consolidate democratic institutions and encourage related reform;
- Promoting evolutionary political reform in the Gulf;
- Increasing assistance to non-jihadist elements of the Syrian opposition and aiding future political transition efforts;
- Shaping Iran’s nuclear posture through a U.S. “no-first-use” pledge;
- Persuading Israel to eschew a preemptive nuclear doctrine and other destabilizing nuclear postures;
- Establishing crisis communication mechanisms with Iran and exploring confidence-building measures;
- Limiting U.S. military objectives in crises and conflicts with Iran to signal that regime change is not the goal of U.S. actions; and
- Providing the Iranian regime with “face-saving” exit ramps during crisis situations.
Denuclearization to constrain Iran’s nuclear weapons program and limit broader damage to the nonproliferation regime by:
- Maintaining and tightening sanctions against Iran; and
- Strengthening interdiction efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, to limit Iran’s access to nuclear and missile technology and stop Iran from horizontally proliferating sensitive technologies to other states and non-state actors.
I suppose there is some universe in which the United States can do all these things successfully and at the same time shift its strategic attention out of the Middle East towards countering an aggressive Russia and a rising China, but it is not the real universe in which you and I live.
Prime Minister Netanyahu argued that an agreement would pave Iran’s way to a bomb. But that was a rhetorical flourish, not serious analysis. The worst that can be said of an Iran/P5+1 agreement is that it is irrelevant: Iran is more likely to sneak out through a clandestine program than break out by diverting nuclear material from its civilian nuclear program. I can see no way an agreement that expands IAEA inspections can make it easier for Tehran to divert nuclear material to a bomb-building effort. And the military strike option–which would certainly cause Iran to try to accelerate bomb-making efforts–would remain open if there are violations of an agreement.
Containment requires far more of Washington than it can reasonably be expected to deliver. That is a good reason for preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And an agreement is the best bet for that. Anything else would be March madness.
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The Gulf beyond oil
Elizabeth Kiefer, a master’s student at SAIS, reports on the Carnegie Endowment discussion this week of the Chatham House report Future Trends in the Gulf.
Panelists:
Jamil De Dominicis, Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Program, Chatham House
Kristen Smith Diwan, Visiting Scholar, Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University and lecturer at American University’s School of International Service
Jane Kinninmont, Deputy Head and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Program, Chatham House
Matar Ebrahim Matar, Former Member of Parliament, Kingdom of Bahrain
Moderator:
Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Jane Kinninmont provided a brief summary of the new Chatham House report. While the Gulf States are often seen as a bastion of stability, a number of factors that have generated tensions between civil society and Gulf governments such as high population growth, increased internal migration, lavish economic spending, government nepotism, the public’s dissatisfaction with current land ownership policies, lack of employment opportunities for women, and the uneven distribution of wealth. The proliferation of information via Twitter and satellite television has created the expectation among Gulf citizens of greater government transparency and generated calls that citizens be included in international and domestic policy debates.
While the Gulf States were originally receptive to change in the wake of the Arab Spring, these regimes are now less likely to accommodate local demands for openness as a result of the turmoil that has accompanied transitioning states. Governments are now repressing civil dissent and resisting calls for political transformation. Some of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have increased social spending in an effort to buy off local dissent, but this strategy is not sustainable in the long-term due to declining oil revenues and poor economic policies.
Kinninmont argued that these regimes must pursue economic policies that move beyond oil to create knowledge-based economies. Such a shift must be accompanied with parallel public discussion about what a “new deal” with a state that provides fewer subsidies and expects greater inputs from its citizens entails.
Western countries are sending mixed messages to Gulf states. Continued military and security assistance, without pushes for democratic reforms or increased social spending, have reinforced negative Gulf behaviors.
Jamil De Dominicis noted the space for constructive political dialogue in the Gulf States has decreased since 2011. He is particularly alarmed about the practice that many states are pursuing of revoking the citizenship of political dissidents. Dominicis advocates that Gulf states take a long-term approach towards transition that redefines the relationship between the state and citizen beyond the accumulation of wealth.
Kristen Smith Diwan noted that the West needs to view its strategy with Gulf states beyond the lens of oil and gas. The new security environment in the Middle East will make Western political concerns in the Gulf more difficult to address. Many Gulf states are using new legal frameworks and media laws, enacted under the guise of anti-terrorism efforts, to crack down on peaceful opposition. She highlighted the use of such tactics in Kuwait and Bahrain, where several moderate clerics who spoke out against government policies were sentenced to prison. The parliaments in many Gulf States are now less representative of the region’s political landscape due to free speech restrictions.
Diwan echoed Dominicis‘ concerns about taking away citizenship, noting that revoking citizenship is a highly effective and symbolic tactic to repress dissent. Policies that drive peaceful political dissent underground risk creating violent extremist groups in the coming years.
Matar Ebrahim said Gulf youth are increasingly following economic, human rights, and democracy issues on Twitter. Their governments are increasingly committing human rights abuses and even torture against those who protest. The current political environment is not sustainable and is driving foreign companies out of the region due to security concerns.
Ebrahim said that there were three scenarios that could play out in the region. The first is continuation of the status quo, which he believes is not sustainable and would ultimately precipitate inevitable but difficult political transitions in Gulf states. The second scenario involves a political “opening up” in Saudi Arabia, which would have ripple effects in the region. The third and most likely scenario is a political transition in a small country such as Bahrain, which could serve as a model for others. Ebrahim noted that the time for change was now, as the economic outlook for Bahrain is particularly bleak.
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Bluster with consequences
Prime Minister Netanyahu was better today in Congress than yesterday at the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee. But still blustering.
He argued that the nuclear deal with Iran currently under consideration is bad because
- it leaves a lot of nuclear infrastructure in place (enabling what he regards as a minimal one-year breakout time);
- Iran could evade the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections or evict the inspectors, as North Korea did;
- It would leave Iran unconstrained in a decade.
Netanyahu wants a better agreement that continues sanctions and restrictions on the nuclear program until Iran stops its aggression and support for terror in other countries (he mentioned Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon in this connection) and ends its threat to annihilate Israel. Failing this, Netanyahu wants no deal.
Netanyahu failed to explain how the US would be able to get the kind of deal he is talking about. The Europeans, Russia and China are unlikely to continue sanctions if the current deal is not concluded. Without multilateral sanctions, Iran would still be feeling some pressure from the oil price collapse and unilateral US sanctions, but it is hard to picture Tehran signing on to something more restrictive with a disunited international community than with a united one.
Netanyahu also said explicitly that he prefers no deal to the current deal, which he described as paving the way for an Iranian nuclear weapon. That’s loony. Without some sort of deal–at least extension of the interim Plan of Action–Iran would be free to race for a nuclear weapon without constraints other than the existing IAEA inspections. If Netanyahu thinks they are inadequate in the deal being negotiated, which beefs them up significantly, why would they be any better without a deal?
Looking beyond the bluster, there were a few interesting commissions and omissions in the speech. Netanyahu dropped the explicit threat of war. He did say Israel can defend itself and will stand alone if necessary, but he neither demanded that the US go to war against Iran nor stated clearly what Israel would do. He presumably has come to understand that the military option is a bad one: it won’t succeed in destroying everything, it would accelerate Iran’s nuclear efforts and it would have to be repeated in a few years time. Iran’s nuclear program involves many installations, some of which are buried deep underground. Even the US would have trouble damaging it beyond repair.
I share Netanyahu’s concern with Iranian behavior throughout the Middle East (and occasionally beyond, witness the terrorism it sponsored in Argentina). I’m not sure he is correct that Iran is as radical as ever, but let’s concede that premise. He imagines maintaining sanctions will be useful in moderating Iranian behavior or bringing about regime change. There are two problems with this hypothesis. There is no reason to believe it true–countries isolated by sanctions often become more radical, not less–and there is no way to maintain the sanctions.
So what we got this morning was more classic Netanyahu: bluster without any serious effort to explain how his newly discovered alternative, a better deal, could be achieved. I trust the speech will help him in his electoral campaign in Israel, if only because it shifts the debate there away from his vulnerabilities (economic and social policy) and towards security, which favors the Israeli right wing (though not necessarily Netanyahu himself). Here in the US, it will make life harder for the Obama Administration, as it implicitly roused the Congress to oppose any deal Secretary Kerry brings home.
I suppose Speaker Boehner, who invited Netanyahu to address Congress without informing the White House, is satisfied and hopes this show will help him face down a brewing revolt against his leadership among House Republicans. Netanyahu hopes Israelis won’t notice that he has put the country’s relationship with the United States at risk. I hope both lose those bets.
PS: Some Israelis seem to agree with me:
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Chutzpahdik
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s warm-up pep talk today at AIPAC (the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee) was a classic chutzpahdik performance: he claimed respect for President Obama and his office, appreciation for unprecedented US assistance, and insistence on the importance of bipartisan support in the US for the close relationship with Israel. He even lauded his wife, who has been a serious source of embarrassment.
Netanyahu cited agreement between the US and Israel that Iran should not have nuclear weapons but disagreement on the methods to achieve that goal. Israel, he said, has to worry about its survival, whereas the US worries about its security. Netanyahu claimed Israel can and will defend itself, citing the attack on the Osiraq reactor, the invasion of Lebanon and other instances where the US and Israel disagreed. Israel weathered these disagreements and will weather the current one because of common values and (metaphorical as well as real) family relationships.
The alliance, Netanyahu said, is strong and get stronger.
This is fantasy. Netanyahu has done serious harm to relations with the United States by disrespecting its president, accepting a one-party invitation to address the Congress, bringing his re-election campaign to Washington, and opposing an agreement with Iran without proposing an alternative that would make Israel more secure. He has split the American Jewish community, most of which is far more interested in an agreement not only with Iran but also with the Palestinians than Netanyahu is. Israel is losing ground steadily and irreversibly among young American Jews.
We’ll have to wait for tomorrow’s speech in Congress to hear Netanyahu’s substantive arguments against a nuclear agreement with Iran that lengthens the time it would need to make a nuclear weapon to a year and imposes strict monitoring requirements.
It is hard to picture how Israel would end up better off without such an agreement. Iran would then be free to pursue nuclear weapons at whatever pace it decides. Israel lacks the military punch required to take out dozens of often underground nuclear facilities farther from its territory than the single Syrian and Iraqi reactors it destroyed in the past. Even if it could damage vital nuclear facilities, the Iranians would reconstitute their program and forge ahead, making it necessary to attack the nuclear facilities again within a few years. The sanctions regime that has slowed the Iranian nuclear program and brought Tehran to the negotiating table will fall apart if there is no agreement.
I can agree with Netanyahu’s concerns about Iran’s support for terrorism. Not just its nuclear program but also its support for extremists in many parts of the world are deplorable. But unless he has an alternative worth considering, tomorrow’s speech on the nuclear issue will be nothing but more bluster.
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