Category: Daniel Serwer
The emperor’s new clothes, again
I’ve read and reread the “written commitment” agreed by the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed by the leaders of 14 parliamentary parties and endorsed by the parliament last week. The European Union is treating this as an important step toward the reforms required for eventual membership. It includes a commitment to creating an “efficient and effective” coordination mechanism for the many levels of governance in Bosnia.
Give credit: the statement includes a substantial list of serious economic and social reforms. It says the right, though vague, things about rule of law, corruption, organized crime and terrorism. It doesn’t drop the constitutional reform required to implement the European Court of Human Rights Sejdic-Finci decision, but it postpones it to a later stage. Then there is fairy dust: “measures to accelerate the reconciliation process.”
That’s the giveaway. This is not so much a commitment as it is a wishlist. The wishes are Brussels’, not Bosnia’s. That’s why it took the better part of a month to push it through parliament. What actually happens to implement the commitments will depend on what the European Union presses, not on initiative from the Bosnian side. We can expect the Bosnians to continue to be passive, and sometimes passive aggressive, as Milorad Dodik was during the month it took to get this wishlist approved. Don’t hold your breath for him or other Bosnian leaders to get around to accelerating the reconciliation process.
The coordination mechanism, though it sounds good, is a disturbing idea in practice. Bosnia needs a central government that can negotiate and implement the acquis communitaire. That was the heart of the “April package” constitutional amendments, which died in the Bosnian parliament nine years ago two votes short of the two-thirds majority required. A coordination mechanism is less than half a loaf. It allows the country’s two entities, one district and ten cantons each to veto the necessary reforms. There is no way to make such an object either effective or efficient.
I suppose deft wielding of the EU’s substantial carrots and sticks might make up for these shortcomings. But we rarely see that happen. EU commissioners are far more comfortable bestowing gifts than withholding funds. There are rarely consequences of much import for defying Brussels, and quite often there are substantial rewards. No one suffered consequences for the failure to implement the Sejdic-Finci decision. Once the negotiation had failed, the Commission restored a lot of cash that had been withheld.
The EU is applauding the emperor’s new clothes. But we’ve seen this parade before. It’s not pretty, if you dare to look.
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Boycott Bibi
I more often resist comment on Israel than I give in to it. I am a Jew and only too well aware of the baggage that identity carries, both for me and for others. I cannot be indifferent to the security and welfare of fellow Jews and may be tempted to exaggerate the threats. We have suffered far too much to run the risks of another attempt to obliterate us.
But I cannot keep silent when a Prime Minister of Israel decides to bring his election campaign to the US Congress and tries to narrow the options of the US Administration in its effort to block Iran from getting nuclear weapons. I am also an American, of the second generation born in this country. I see no contradiction at the current juncture between my Jewish and American identities: both want to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.
What Prime Minister Netanyahu wants is different. He wants Iran to give up all its nuclear capability, or at least its enrichment and reprocessing technology. He knows this is impossible. The technology is in the heads and hands of Iranians. There is no way to get rid of their capabilities, even if Tehran were so inclined. But Bibi figures insisting on it will help his re-election bid.
Netanyahu has also made it clear during this election campaign that he opposes giving up the West Bank. He is convinced that doing so will provide a haven for terrorists. This is entirely consistent with his family history, which includes a father who opposed partition of Palestine in 1948 because he believed all the land west of the Jordan River belonged by biblical right to the Jews. Bibi’s father wanted the Palestinians just to evaporate. Bibi wouldn’t mind that, but he more realistically wants them to accept second-class status within an explicitly Jewish state whose eastern border is de facto (if not de jure) the Jordan River.
This combination of unrealistic demands–of Iran and of the Palestinians–is antithetical to American and Israeli interests. It pushes Israel into political isolation with unrealistic goals and leaves Washington with a stark choice: join Israel in defying the rest of the world or abandon the close ties with Israel in favor of settling big issues with the Iranians and Arabs.
Netanyahu’s speech in Congress March 3, if it comes off, will be his opportunity to make his unrealistic demands, cloaking them in claims that Israel is America’s most important ally in the Middle East and the only functioning democracy there. Those claims may be true, but they are also misleading. An Israel that takes Netanyahu’s approach to Iran and the Palestinians will drag the US into an impossible situation. And Israel’s claim to being democratic depends on getting its friends in the US to ignore its treatment of Arabs, both inside and outside the country’s still unsettled borders.
Netanyahu has refused to meet with vigorous Israel-supporting Democrats during his March visit to DC. This makes things easier. For those who disagree with Netanyahu and disapprove of his conniving with John Boehner for an invitation to address the Congress shortly before an election, the right response is to boycott his speech. Let him preach to the converted.
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Authorizing military action against ISIL
Matt Melino, a master’s student in my post-war reconstruction and transition class at SAIS, reports:
The Woodrow Wilson event Monday on authorizing military action against ISIL focused on geography, strategy and unanswered questions.
Moderator
Jim Sciutto: Chief National Security Correspondent, CNN
Panelists
• Lt. General David Barno: Former First Commander for Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and currently Senior Fellow, Center for New American Security
• Jane Harman: Director, President and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center
• Jeffrey H. Smith: Former General Counsel, CIA and currently serves on the Department of Defense Legal Policy Advisory Board
Harman opened the discussion by emphasizing that it is the clear constitutional obligation of members of Congress to declare our wars. But since Vietnam four wars that have gone undeclared. With the president recently submitting a draft authorization for the use of military force (AUMF), Harman offered two pieces of advice for Congress. First, don’t duck – playing the blame game is bad policy and bad politics is hurting the reputation of the US. Congress has to face this issue head on, debate it, and vote on it. Second, avoid groupthink. This point as the major problem with the war in Iraq.
The language of the proposed AUMF includes the phrase “enduring offensive ground operations.” Sciutto noted that the President’s intention behind such a vague phrase is to avoid another Afghanistan or Iraq war, where the US deploys 150,000 troops to a major land war in the Middle East. He also noted there is a lot of leeway, because it is unclear what terms such as “enduring,” or “offensive” mean.
Barno added that the broadness of the phrase is helpful for military commanders who find it useful to have parameters set wide and guidance not too narrow. But Smith believes the phrase is mischievous. The President is clearly trying to capture the sentiment of the US people who do not want another large ground war, but it is unnecessary because the President himself said he would not embark on such an operation. The vague language signals to our adversaries that we do not have a clear plan. Harman agreed that the President is trying to please a large majority of people, but the vagueness of the language displeases people who feel that a clear plan is lacking.
Sciutto asked the panel to comment on the fact that the President did not sunset the 2001 AUMF, which grants him authority to attack al-Qaeda and its associates. Smith thought it curious that the President did not recommend this. The President wants congressional approval on an ISIL authorization but also wants to hold on to the 2001 AUMF as justification for his ongoing actions if the new AUMF is not passed.
Harman wants Congress to come up with an authorization that replaces the 2001 AUMF. Barno argued that the President wants to achieve two aims that are difficult to combine. First is support from Congress and the American people to conduct military action against ISIL. Second is to retain the ability to attack al-Qaeda and its associates in the future. It will be difficult to win the support of Congress if he folds these two into a single AUMF.
Who is the target? Sciutto explained how difficult it is to answer this question because ISIL is spreading and many groups are simply rebranding themselves as ISIL without operational ties. Smith, quoting Senator Tim Kaine, defined ISIL associates as, “individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf or, or alongside ISIL or closely related successors.” The President added the phrase, “in hostilities against the US or coalition partners.” The President is expanding the groups he can go after without naming them.
Smith believes there should be some mechanism to inform Congress of which groups he is going after. When those groups are named, they should be announced publically. This clarity is crucial because other countries will react to what we do, particularly the Russians and the Iranians. Harman added that the US needs to send a signal to the world that this country is united on a single mission and not just a vision described by President Obama.
Can Congress have the necessary debate to come up with a reasonable settlement considering the current political environment? Barno thinks an AUMF focused on ISIL has a reasonable prospect of agreement. Both sides of the aisle believe this is a serious threat that is getting worse. Harman is hopeful. She believes Congress cannot duck this issue because it affects everyone and it involves valuable resources, notably blood and treasure. Smith is cautiously optimistic but concerned about the fallout of failing to come to an agreement. Will the President go on with his current actions? If he does, what does that say about the authority of the President and Congress?
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Dissatisfied
The National Democratic Institute today sent this Kosovo Public Opinion Research from focus groups convened in December. Since I can’t find it on the NDI website, I am posting it here. NDI characterizes the “general direction” this way:
• Public is demanding action
• Progress on infrastructure but not on issues of concern
• Corruption and nepotism contributing to declining economy, education, and health care
• Unemployment leading to desperation
• People seeking change frustrated at the ballot boxRespondents frequently express dissatisfaction with the current circumstances and the way things have progressed– or not progressed – over 15 years. The three ‘top of mind’ issues affecting their mood are high unemployment, corruption and nepotism and similar ‘fair shake’ issues, and what they view as an unsustainable and under-performing economy.
Worth reading the whole thing, for those who take an interest in the world’s second-newest sovereign state.
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Serbia: media and government
I recently asked a knowledgeable friend about media freedom in Serbia. His lengthy reply is below. I’ll of course be prepared to publish other well-reasoned perspectives on this issue.
Here is my theory on the Serbian media scene.
Media freedom activists (MFA) who claim there is censorship imposed directly by the Serbian government or even Prime Minister Vučić himself – and who consist of both journalists and nongovernmental organization representatives – constitute a small fraction of people working in the media sector overall. Most journalists do not complain about censorship and perform their jobs normally.
Of course, being a minority does not mean being wrong. But in the case of the MFA, the problem is the argumentation they use in their attempts to prove that there is censorship. What they emphasize as their “ultimate proof” is that a vast majority of mainstream media never, or at most rarely, criticize Vučić.
It is true that most media treat Vučić in a positive way, but that does not necessarily have to be due to censorship by him or the government as a whole. The media do not operate in a vacuum; they are an integral part of broader society. As such, they reflect the general mood of the public. If Vučić enjoys huge support from people, it is not surprising that most media might be reluctant to write or speak against him, even if they have grounds. They do not want to risk alienating their readers and followers, both actual and potential.
Even though Vučić is today far more popular than Tadić ever was during his presidency (and certainly holds more power than Tadić did), when you compare the number and percentage of mainstream media that are currently pro-Vučić with the number of those that were pro-Tadić when he was in power, you’ll see that, strangely, more media then favored Tadić than now favor Vučić.
Another two factors that I believe contribute a great deal to sycophantic behavior of some media toward those in power (at any given time, not just at present) are opportunism and cowardice. An example of cowardice is when a journalist refrains from criticizing a politician in power not because someone influential warned them not to, but because of perceived fear of getting into trouble if they did. An example of opportunism is when a journalist (or editor) flatters powerful figures in hopes of earning privileges in return. Albeit different, both can be regarded as cases of self-censorship.
In terms of their attitude toward the ruling elite, Serbian mass media can be roughly classified into three basic categories. Read more
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More Free Syria
My publication Thursday of a post marginally favoring creation of clearly defined liberated and protected areas inside Syria (“Free Syria”) has elicited, in addition to many laurels I would like to become accustomed to, some critical comments and misunderstandings. I thought I might respond and clarify.
First a clarification: I in no way think the UN is doing anything wrong by pursuing “freezes” in Syria. It is doing what it should be doing, given its institutional role and mission: taking advantage of any opportunity whatsoever to improve the lot of Syrian civilians by embarrassing the warring parties into treating them better. It cannot advocate protected areas that infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a member state. It needs to respect Damascus’ authority, while trying to get it to demonstrate some restraint.
But from an American perspective, the freezes are not promising. Experience in the Balkans and elsewhere suggests security for those willing to cease their fire (or freeze the disposition of their forces) is vital to success. Nor are freezes likely to serve Washington’s first priority: weakening, containing and defeating the Islamic State (ISIS). The US should do nothing to detract from the UN effort, but it should also be thinking about its own options.
One highly experienced and knowledgeable diplomat commented to me that protected areas along the Turkish border would arouse strong opposition from the Gulf, whose monarchies don’t want to see Turkish influence expanded in an important Arab country.
I’m sure he is correct that the Arab Gulf will react that way, but I am not so sure they are right to do so.
What harm to Arab Gulf interests has greatly increased Turkish influence in Iraqi Kurdistan done? If Gulf countries are concerned, they should balance any Turkish inroads by supporting the protected areas themselves, with money, arms and if need be ground troops to back up the Free Syrian Army. The Turks would presumably be providing cover only from the air, along with the Americans. Saudi King Salman is showing, friends tell me, less hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood than his predecessor. A modus vivendi with the Brotherhood-led Turks that helps at least some Syrians may not be beyond reach.
The Turks are irrelevant to a protected area near the Jordanian border, where it would presumably get air cover from the Jordanians and the Americans. That is where the US-trained Free Syrian Army troops are being re-inserted. President Obama would be foolish to risk their rout, which would go down in the annals of American failures with the Bay of Pigs. He will have to provide air cover, or convince the Jordanians to provide it. Israel is already providing humanitarian and likely other assistance across its border with Syria, but expanding that to overt military aid seems to me a bridge too far, at least for now.
Iran will have to have a role in any solution in Syria. How would it react to protected areas? The demands of Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and the nuclear talks have already stretched Tehran’s military, financial and diplomatic capacities. Why wouldn’t the Iranians be relieved to see at least a portion of the Syrian opposition walled off in protected areas, which would necessarily be mostly Sunni and Kurdish? That could enable a focus on the fight against ISIS, in parallel with the US-trained Syrian forces, with reduced short-term risks to the Asad regime (though admittedly I wouldn’t have supported the idea if it didn’t increase the longer-term risks to Bashar).
Russia is the big problem. It will see in the proposal for protected areas the kind of slippery slope that allowed a NATO-led military coalition to take down Muammar Qaddafi. But Moscow is tired and broke. It prioritizes Ukraine. Moscow isn’t likely to allow a UN Security Council resolution to create protected areas until it sees a clear US commitment to do it, resolution or not. But it might then figure better to go along, in order to get a resolution that more strictly limits US and allied military action than was the case in Libya.
So yes, there are serious barriers to “Free Syria.” But they are surmountable, with serious US diplomatic and military commitment. That’s what has been lacking.
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