Category: Daniel Serwer
Give, even at the office
Here is Deah Barakat, a dental student murdered with his wife and sister-in-law last night in Chapel Hill, NC appealing for support to help Syrian refugees in Turkey:
His cause has exceeded its modestly stated goal by a long shot, but I’m sure it can use more: Syrian Dental Relief. I gave, here at the office. It’s quick and easier than writing a check.
PS: Try this too, if that wasn’t enough to convince:
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Hobbits will inherit the earth
Eric Rahman, a master’s student in my Post-war Reconstruction and Transition class this term, writes about Srdja Popovic’s appearance at SAIS yesterday:
Srdja Popovic is a Serbian political activist and executive director of the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS). He was a leader of the student movement Otpor!, which helped topple Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. He has taught at the Harvard Kennedy School, NYU, and the University of Colorado, among others.
There are few individuals with a history of working in such close proximity to conflict who exhibit quite the optimism and exuberance as Popovic. In an event held at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on the morning of February 10, the author of the recently published Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Nonviolent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World discussed his vision for effective social mobilization to execute non-violent revolution.
He relied on a metaphor drawn from J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings series:
it is the average individual, the person you would least expect, the hobbits, who
can have the greatest impact and transform their societies through non-violent means. Popovic pointed to the electrician Lech Wałęsa and the camera shop owner Harvey Milk to illustrate that it is not institutional elites who bring about change but rather it is hobbits, who rely on their creativity to build a movement and have a lasting impact.
In spite of humorous analogies and moments of levity, Popovic presented a sober
analysis of which conditions and methods are most conducive to fomenting a social movement that can truly effect change in repressive societies. He advocates non-violence even when pitted against a brutally violent adversary. Non-violence is preferable not because violence is morally unacceptable, but because non-violence is the most effective and efficient means to combat a growing menace, as illustrated by the statistics in Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan’s Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.
The threat of ISIS he likened to a swarm of mosquitos. The temptation is
to swat them. But to combat the infestation, one has to turn attention to the source: wet areas or the swamps. There is a confluence of pernicious factors that coalesced to create permissive conditions for ISIS’s rise, but one fundamental issue is the failure of states to deliver services and the resulting vacuum of credibility and legitimacy. This can only be countered by the actual provision of expected basic
services by governments. Service provision will undercut the ISIS narrative and shrink recruitment.
There is an alarming perception among many Iraqi youth that ISIS is ‘cool.’ This perception is destabilizing and arises from lack of alternatives. There is no Iraqi ‘Batman’ or ‘Superman’ young people can look to for moral-cultural education during their formative years, which leaves them susceptible to the sophisticated propaganda machine of an organization such as ISIS.
The Arab spring and the Ukrainian crisis illustrate in Popovic’s view the consequences when a movement lacks long-term vision. In Egypt for example, the
revolution achieved its expressed goal of unseating Hosni Mubarak within the first month of the protests (four years ago today!). But once the moment came to construct a new model of government and service delivery, there was a dearth of strategic planning and the movement began to disintegrate. A similar situation existed in Ukraine following the Orange Revolution in 2003, causing the intra-Ukrainian conflict to simmer and break out again into crisis last year.
Popovic summed up his argument with an apt analogy: “Non-violent struggles are like video games. They have levels and you need a new set of skills for each level.” Despite the challenges faced and the skills required, it is the hobbits who eventually carry the day.
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Bosnia’s muj
I did this interview yesterday for Amil Ducic of the Sarajevo daily Avaz:
1. What is your perception on the indictment of six Bosnians who have been charged with providing money and equipment to foreign fighters joining al Qaeda, Nusra Front and Islamic State in Syria and Iraq? Two persons were even accused of conspiring to kill and maim persons in a foreign country.
A: Innocent until proven guilty is my first reaction. But if proven it should not be such a big surprise. There are a lot of Bosnians in the U.S. Why would we think none of them would be sympathetic with the Islamic State? There are also non-Muslim Americans who support ISIS. Ours is a big country with many different strands of political thought.
2. Reading the indictment, it’s obvious that the charges are serious. Problem for BiH is that the money is transferred in our country to stimulate the foreign fighters. Your comment?
A: I expect BiH will cooperate as much as it can in trying to block financial transfers to support foreign fighters. That’s something on which all the political leaderships can agree.
3. Again, one of the charged persons Ramiz Hodžić is identified as a person who was radicalized in Bosnia during the war. He was member of the unit “El-Mudjahid”. Do you think this an issue which has to be solved in Bosnia. Radicalization of the Bosnian Army during 1992-1995 is, regarding some opinions, the root of problems…. What is your opinion.
A: I don’t think this is a gigantic problem. At Dayton, a Croat asked that we get rid of the foreign mujahedeen in Bosnia. I asked how many there were. He replied 700, which I took to be a maximum given the source of the information.
At least half of those were forced out after the war, in part due to American pressure. Many of the remainder are living peacefully with their Bosnian families. It is twenty years since the war ended. Some will be well above fighting age (and condition) now.
So yes, Bosnia should do what it can to block them from helping or volunteering for the Islamic State. But let’s not exaggerate the scale of the problem.
4. What about the Bosnian community in USA. Is there is a danger of being labeled?
A: What I’ve seen of the Bosnian community reaction in the US is universal condemnation of any support to the Islamic State or other extremists. There will no doubt be bigots who “label” all Muslims as terrorists. But most Americans know and appreciate that Muslims in the U.S. overwhelmingly oppose extremism.
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The courteous banality of evil
I won’t have much time to write today, due to meetings and my class this evening. But here for your edification is the full BBC interview with Bashar al Asad:
Listen and weep. Note not only the content, but the reasonable and courteous tone combined with incredible lies. The courteous banality of evil.
PS: The Syrian government is proud of this interview and published the text. I assume it is an accurate rendition, but I have checked.
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Negotiations fail, force prevails
The United States is closing its embassy in Sanaa in the aftermath of the takeover (that’s a coup by another name) by Houthi insurgents, who Friday issued a constitutional declaration. It provides for dissolution of the existing parliament, formation of a “more representative” 551-member National Transitional Council that will elect a five-member presidency council, and a two-year transition period. The goals are laudable:
- achieve a dignified life for the popular masses,
- end corruption through an effective national strategy, reform public service,
- eliminate flaws in community justice,
- relieve oppression,
- reform the security and military institutions on national bases as well as
- restore trust and respect for these institutions,
- improve the livelihood of their members,
- achieve security in society,
- face down criminal takfiri forces and their allies and supporters,
- build a strong, cohesive Yemeni society that does not exclude any person or party, and
- end conflicts, divisions and ruptures.
What could go wrong?
As Nadwa Aldawsari pointed out at the Carnegie Endowment this afternoon, the Houthi victory marks the death knell of the Gulf Cooperation Council transition plan that UN envoy Jamal Benomar has tried assiduously to implement. It failed, she thought, because it provided immunity to former President Saleh and kept in place much of his regime, while excluding the Houthis. Despite having previously fought against them, Saleh took advantage of his situation to make common cause with the Houthis, an armed group that is dominated by an early Shia sect known as Zaidis.
While Nasser Arrabeyee, speaking by Skype from Sana’a, would prefer that the Houthis leave parliament as is and occupy instead places in the Shura Council, there is no sign they are prepared to do that. The Houthis seem intent on governing through the transition period. The risks that entails are all too obvious: Nadwa pointed to the large ungoverned spaces in Yemen, where Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)–the Sunni takfiris mentioned above–have more or less safe haven, despite the American drone war. It is unclear to me whether that will continue without the embassy open. In any event, it has not been successful at stemming recruitment to AQAP, which appears to be stronger in manpower and weapons today than several years ago.
The situation in Yemen may also evolve into a proxy war between Iran, which has supported the Houthis with money, arms and ideology, and Yemen’s weightiest neighbor, Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have cut off aid to Yemen, which is an astoundingly poor country. Key Yemeni tribal leaders are thought to be in the Kingdom now. They are no doubt looking for support to do combat with the Houthis.
Yemen’s south, once independent, is once again moving in that direction, hindered only by the disunity of its secessionist advocates. According to Laura Kasinof, the state has evaporated there, with little impact as its presence was already so attenuated. Tribal rather than formal justice is preferred in much of the area.
Nasser underlined that the Houthis are for the moment very much in charge. The powersharing arrangement President Hadi had been using is gone. Former President Saleh is no longer “dancing on the heads of snakes” to govern, but he is still orchestrating the dance and trying to ensure that his son Ahmed eventually takes power.
Negotiations have failed. Force has prevailed. Not clear what is next, but it isn’t likely to be good.
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It’s not just about today’s Ukraine
Washington is now in a full-fledged debate on whether to send lethal (but “defensive”) arms to Ukraine. The President has said it is one of the options on the table.
The advocates argue that arming Ukraine would raise the costs of Russia’s aggression and, along with Western sanctions, improve the odds for a negotiated solution. A successful effort would also bolster confidence in American policy, both within the NATO Alliance and more broadly, redounding to Washington’s benefit in countering Putin’s moves not only in Ukraine but also elsewhere in the world.
The opponents say Russia will escalate further, even before any additional weapons can be deployed in the hands of people who know what to do with them, intensifying the conflict to Ukraine’s disadvantage, allowing Moscow to impose a unilateral solution and undermining confidence in the US. Opponents also fear an Alliance-rending split with the Europeans (especially Germany) and a proxy war with Russia, with negative implications for cooperation with Moscow on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and other important issues.
Who is right?
I’m afraid both are, which complicates the decision-making. I doubt a decision to provide defensive arms now will do anything militarily significant in the near term other than accelerate the Russian offensive. Moscow will win the the battle for Mariupol if it really wants to. But failing to supply arms will allow Moscow to impose its will not only now but also in the future, undermining the credibility of American commitments elsewhere even more.
It is still possible to hope that the discussion of arming Ukraine in Washington will weigh heavily enough to cause Moscow to take seriously the proposal that German Chancellor Merkel and French President Hollande carried to Russian President Putin. But if that proposal–whose contents are unknown–essentially allows the insurgents to establish their own autonomous states only nominally linked to Kiev, it will lay the basis for the next war and encourage further Russian adventures in neighboring territories where Russian speakers happen to live.
There is lots of advice out there on how to manage the relationship with Putin’s aggressive Russia, which seems intent on challenging the West in what amounts not so much to a new Cold War as a pale imitation of the 20th century version. Ukraine is not the first Russian attempt to extend its influence to ethnic Russian or otherwise Russo-philic territories. Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Republika Srpska have all presented opportunities for Russian defiance. Moscow is even mucking about in Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia, three countries strongly committed to European Union membership (and the first two also to NATO membership).
Not getting too excited about these challenges is part of the solution. Russia is biting off more than it can chew in Ukraine. The situation in already annexed Crimea does little credit to Russia, which is hard-pressed to finance needs there due to dramatically lower oil prices and demands elsewhere in the parts of Ukraine Russia now controls. Putin is said to be insistent that he not be responsible for reconstruction in Donbas, where the damage is extensive.
But making life harder for Putin should also be part of the strategy. The Ukrainian army needs to vastly improve its training, equipment and performance if it is to mount anytime in the future a serious threat to take back the parts of Ukraine already under Russian dominance. If the German/French proposal fails, that would be the moment to up the ante by providing serious military assistance to Ukraine. It won’t help much in this decade. But it might be vital in the next.
Putin is playing a long game, one that encompasses not only Ukraine but also other neighbors in what the Russians used to like to call their “near abroad.” The West also needs to play a long game that encompasses not only military assistance to Ukraine today but also much closer economic and political relations with Russia’s now terrified southern neighbors, including NATO membership for those that want it.
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