Category: Daniel Serwer
Blueprint for revolution
Srdja Popovic, one of the Otpor (Resistance) leaders who were vital to bringing down Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000, will talk at SAIS Tuesday morning 10-11:30 in the Rome building about his new book, for which this is the promotional video:
Please RSVP to itlong@jhu.edu
End of status quo
Vetëvendosje Movement member of parliament Ilir Deda writes from Pristina:
Kosovo has entered a turbulent year. The winter started with the election of a new government composed of former rivals – the PDK of Hashim Thaçi and the LDK of Isa Mustafa. The Western Embassies were satisfied – the status quo seemed ensured. Three out of twenty-one cabinet posts were given to the Serbia-created, -funded and politically -controlled Serbian List, which emerged victorious among Kosovo Serb political parties.
The new American/German brokered government, whose sole purpose is to maintain the status quo, signaled the end of hope for Kosovo’s people, 70 percent of whom voted in the June 2014 elections against the PDK in government. On November 20, 2014 – a day after it was announced that PDK and LDK would govern together, buses of hopeless citizens began leaving Kosovo towards Hungary – through Serbia – and on towards Western Europe. As a direct consequence of the creation of the PDK-LDK government, over fifty-five thousand people have left Kosovo since the end of November.
Amid this despair, the leader of the Serbian List, Aleksandar Jablanovic, led a bus with Serb pilgrims who were trying to come to the western Kosovo town of Gjakova to celebrate Orthodox Christmas. Jablanovic was accompanied by Djokica Stanojevic, the former ethnic Serb mayor of Gjakova during Milosevic’s occupation of Kosovo, who was directly involved in crimes against Albanians in the city and the area.
Gjakova proper and the surrounding area was among the worst hit areas during the Kosovo war in 1998-99, where not only some of the strongest fighting took place, but also thousands of civilians were executed and massacred. Thousands more went missing, and still are unaccounted for. The leading association of missing persons, “The Call of Mothers,” organized a protest to block the visit of the Serb pilgrims. The bus was stoned. Jablanovic called the protesters “savages.”
While over the last 150 years he is not the only Serb politician who called Albanians savages, he is the first Kosovo Serb minister of the government of the Republic of Kosovo to do so. Several days later, Jablanovic questioned the well-documented record of war crimes committed by Serbia’s police and military forces, saying he “didn’t know” whether they had occurred.
A week later, Serbia’s Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, came to Kosovo for a “religious purpose” – to celebrate the Orthodox New Year. When asked whether Serbia would apologize for the state crimes in Kosovo, he added fuel to the fire by responding “everybody can dream.” To the protesting Albanians he said that next time he would bring “books to educate them on politeness.”
Vucic was a minister in the Milosevic’s government in 1998 – 1999, which was responsible for ethnic cleansing, war crimes, execution of civilians, deportation of Albanians and destruction of public and private property in Kosovo. The apology cannot be a “dream” but a firm political position of the Kosovo government as a precondition for normalization of relations with Serbia.
The first two protests were held in Gjakova on January 10 and 17, gathering five and ten thousand protesters respectively, organized by “The Call of Mothers,” Vetëvendosje and few civil society organizations. The same demand was repeated the following week when thousands took to the streets in eight other Kosovo cities.
Amidst these protests, the government sponsored a law to nationalize Trepça – a mine rich in zinc, silver and lead, with deposits worth more than $14 billion – in an attempt to save it from liquidation. Serbia protested and held a joint meeting with the three Serbian List ministers of the Kosovo government. The Kosovo government backtracked on its initial a plan to nationalize Trepça because of Serbia’s opposition. The public was left aghast to see that 15 years after the war and removal of Serbia’s say in Kosovo’s domestic affairs, and almost seven years after the declaration of independence, Serbia still had a say in Kosovo’s affairs. This reversal of history is unacceptable to the people of Kosovo.
On January 23 “The Call of Mothers” and Vetëvendosje, supported by other opposition parties, civil society organizations, unions and independent public figures organized the largest protest held in Kosovo since 1999 in Prishtina, gathering over thirty thousand people. The government was issued a deadline – to dismiss Jablanovic and sponsor the law on nationalization of Trepça in two days, or the protest would continue. At the end of the protest, a small crowd of several dozen people threw rocks at the government building.
The government and its controlled media began the expected propaganda, accusing Vetëvendosje of being behind the violence. The international sponsors of the government followed the same line. Meanwhile, all the security institutions in Kosovo had credible information that Vetëvendosje was not behind the violence, but did not come forth publicly with this information. Instead, the government said that Jablanovic would not be dismissed.
January 27 saw twenty thousand people gathering in Prishtina. Since early morning the police, under orders from the government, showed hostility and brutality – it did not allow the organizers to set the stage in the center of the city, confiscated protest materials, and prevented citizens from other cities from joining the protest in Prishtina. The police started throwing tear gas at the crowd while the speeches of the opposition figures were ongoing. One hundred seventy people were injured, as the police used tear gas, water cannons, and UN-banned rubber bullets on the protesters, while the protesters threw rocks at the police. The clashes lasted over six hours. Almost two hundred protesters – mostly young – were arrested. Such police brutality has not been seen in Kosovo in the last fifteen years. Nor was such anger of young protesters, who blame the government for the lack of hope.
The government accused the opposition of wanting to “violently overthrow” the government. Prime Minister Mustafa went further – he accused the media of aiding the opposition in the “destabilization of the state,” because media were broadcasting live scenes and reporting from the protest. In the US, it is quite normal for CNN and other media to broadcast from such events. In Kosovo, the PDK-LDK government began using rhetoric similar to the worst totalitarian regimes.
On February 3, the prime minister informed the public that Jablanovic would not be part of the Government any more, while the opposition halted the protests to await the response of the government on Trepça. If the law on transforming Trepça into a public company is not proposed soon, the protests will continue.
The protests brought the return of hope among the citizens, who see that an arrogant government can be forced to be accountable to its people, and not only to Western Embassies. The protests were not against the Kosovo Serbs, as alleged continuously over the last month. The anger of Kosovo’s people 15 years after the war with the overall state of affairs – no economic development, high unemployment, high corruption, Serbia’s destabilizing role, and alarming poverty of half of the population – has reached extreme heights. There is no more space for unconvincing justifications of incompetent politicians. This is the beginning of the end of the fifteen years status quo in Kosovo. The majority of people who are determined to stay in Kosovo are resolute to see the state succeed. They are determined to have a dignified life in the Republic of Kosovo.
Drums don’t win wars
A president who was trying to extract America from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is now preparing to escalate the war in Ukraine and the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Yesterday, his nominee for Defense Secretary made it clear he supports sending lethal armaments to the Ukrainian government to fight off Russian aggression, a position also advocated by former officials. The White House is also preparing to send Congress a request for an authorization to use military force (AUMF in Washington parlance) against ISIS, something the administration is already doing.
Both these moves fall in the inevitable category. We’ve pretty much run out of alternatives.
ISIS is universally regarded as not only a threat to vital interests but also one with which it is impossible to negotiate. They seem intent on proving that with the immolation a month ago of a Jordanian pilot whom they then feigned being prepared to exchange for an Al Qaeda terrorist. If we are going to fight ISIS whenever and wherever, it is certainly proper that there be a Congressional authorization. Hawks will want it broad. Doves will want it narrow. But both will want it, even though it will make little difference to what the US actually is doing.
In Ukraine, the government is losing control of the southeastern Donbas region and could lose control of even more of its territory to insurgents fully backed by Russia’s substantial military might. I’ll leave to military experts assessment of whether American assistance with lethal but defensive weapons will have a serious impact at this point. It could take a year or more before any significant materiel and training is deployed on the battlefield. In the meanwhile, Moscow will use any American decision to arm the Ukrainians as an excuse to redouble its own efforts.
So neither of these noisy headline issues is likely to have any quick impact. Drums don’t win wars. And these two wars are not only conventional force-on-force clashes between organized military forces, even if they involve some battles of that sort. Both involve counter insurgency, the kind of war (known in the Pentagon as COIN) the US loves to forget.
I’ll leave to the COINistas the analysis and policy prescriptions on the military side. The important point for me is that COIN necessarily involves an important civilian component. You win the war against insurgency by protecting the civilian population. You have to win the peace over a decade or more by ensuring a continued safe and secure environment, establishing the rule of law, ensuring stable governance, growing the economy and meeting social needs. If you fail to do those things in the aftermath of war, you end up with Libya: a weak state that has collapsed now into civil war, leaving breeding grounds for extremists.
The civilian efforts required are in the first instance the responsibility of the governments involved. But their capabilities are at best limited and at worst nonexistent. In Ukraine, even a government victory would likely require peacekeepers to ensure stability in Donbas and avoid reignition of conflict. In Iraq, it is hard to picture the Baghdad government’s security forces welcomed in Anbar and Ninewa provinces. Some kind of local governance with its own security forces (the proposed National Guard?) will be needed. In Syria, Bashar al Asad has shown no sign of willingness to govern fairly or effectively in areas the government retakes. There too some kind of local governance will be needed.
The international capacity to contribute to these efforts is also limited. The State Department has shrunk its civilian conflict and stability operations capability, which was never substantial. The European Union has grown weary and leery of deploying its much more substantial capacity. The UN is stretched thin. OSCE is doing a yeoman job of observing the much-violated ceasefire in Ukraine, but it is a giant step from that to peacekeepers and monitoring implementation of a peace agreement.
We are embarking on another long period of war. We should be strengthening not only our military capacities, but also our civilian ones.
Why pay attention to Kosovo?
If you stick around international affairs long enough, some of the people you met in the earlier years are likely to turn up in high places later on. I first met the still youthful Hashim Thaci, a two-term prime minister who is now foreign minister, in 1999, when the US Institute of Peace hosted a post-war meeting of Kosovo Albanians at Lansdowne in Virginia.
The issue at the time was not so much conflict between Serbs and Albanians. With notable exceptions, NATO brought large scale interethnic violence to a fairly quick end after the war, until rioting in 2004 unsettled things again. At Lansdowne we were concerned with Albanian on Albanian violence, as different factions vied for post-war dominance. The dialogue and the Lansdowne Declaration they agreed on that occasion are often credited with ending an incipient civil war and turning both the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its more peaceful rivals in the direction of political rather than military competition.
Hashim Thaci was a key figure at Lansdowne, representing an important faction of the KLA that had fought the Serbs from the mid 1990s until the war ended in June 1999. His role was mainly a political one. He had also been a key figure at the failed Rambouillet negotiations that preceded the war and played a role in the UN administration of Kosovo, though he remained out of power until he was elected prime minister in 2007. He presided over independence in 2008 and governed until this year, when his party won a plurality in parliament but failed to be able to put together a majority without giving up the prime ministry.
His talk here today focused on Kosovo’s post-war transition, its increasing role in the region, Russian efforts to influence the Balkans, Kosovo’s efforts to counter violent extremism, and the importance of keeping the country on its democratic and European trajectory. He is looking for American help to keep the doors to NATO and the EU open, as well as private sector American investment.
I asked the foreign minister about the firing yesterday of a Serb minister from the government. He underlined that the minister was fired for inappropriate remarks he had made, not because he is a Serb. That’s the right thing to say, even if it is a bit of distinction without a difference in this circumstance. No Albanian would have made the same comments. I also asked about the special tribunal Kosovo is supposed to create to prosecute in The Hague crimes committed during and after the NATO/Yugoslavia war. He said he thought there was no need for it to convene in The Hague, but the legislation will pass and the court will be created, enabling EULEX to proceed with indictments.
Thaci pledges cooperation in countering the flow of extremists to Iraq and Syria and the influence of Russia, both of which are inimical to Kosovo as well as the US. Moscow is now more active than in many years in Serbia, Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Macedonia and even Montenegro, which has rejected the Russian overtures. The number of Kosovar “foreign fighters” is not huge–hundreds rather than thousands–but it represents an important qualitative shift in a country that has generally not taken religion too seriously. The government is now cracking down and has arrested more than 130 returnees.
Washington has a hard time even remembering that it once saved Kosovo from a Serbian onslaught that made half the Albanian population refugees. With threats throughout the Middle East and in Ukraine, few care much about Kosovo. But it behooves us to remember that a bit of diplomatic dynamism to help Kosovo to get into the EU’s visa waiver program and to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement as well as enter NATO’s Partnership for Peace could go a long way to preventing further radicalization and ensuring that Kosovo becomes the consolidated European democracy it aspires to be.
Couphobia
Fear of coups (couphobia?) has broken out in all too many places. Turkey’s President Erdogan is cracking down on the Gulen movement members for fear they are plotting against him. Russia’s President Putin has done the same with foreign funding of nongovernmental organizations. Egypt’s President Sisi fears the Muslim Brotherhood will do to him what he has done to their (former) President Morsi, who languishes in prison.
Even in Macedonia, an EU candidate country, the Prime Minister says the opposition was plotting to oust him. Then again, the United States is said to be orchestrating an anti-Victor Orbán coup d’état in EU member Hungary.
I can’t be sure all these claims are as baseless as that last one. Washington just doesn’t care enough about Hungary to engineer a coup there. My guess is that Sisi has plenty to worry about, as he has vastly overdone the repression, creating a growing reservoir of resentment that might fuel an effort to oust him one day, though Egyptians are so tired of disorder (and the army so satiated) that it is unlikely a coup there would be popular. Erdogan and Putin are likewise doing their best to fulfill their own prophecies by making life hard for their legitimate opponents, whose natural reaction will be to think about their options. A coup might be one of them.
Then there are the guys–and they are guys–who really should fear a coup. Syria’s President Asad has destroyed his country in order to prevent anyone else from challenging his hold on power. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un presumably thinks he protected himself, but who knows which uncle or cousin still alive might make the attempt?
Yemen’s President Hadi is facing a coup in everything but name. The Houthi rebels who have him trapped don’t want to displace him, partly for fear that would end military assistance against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from the Americans the Houthis love to hate. Libya can’t have a coup because it is unclear who has power. It is having a civil war instead.
All the couphobiacs should remember Nouri al Maliki. He was so afraid of a coup that he appointed cronies to command his army and grabbed as much direct control over the other institutions of the state as he could. The result was collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces when faced with the Islamic State and his removal from power because even the Iranians and his own Dawa party turned against him. It doesn’t always work that way, but the example should serve to illustrate the perils of concentrating power too much.
The couphobiacs are unlikely to be chastened however. Once they start down the road of repression, it is hard to turn around or back out. They fear removal from power means they lose their lives as well. What Erdogan, Putin and Sisi need more than anything else is assurance that they can retire gracefully and live out their natural lives. Not everyone can afford to keep autocrats in power well into senility, as the Saudis do. But countries that want their autocrats to retire need to follow the Vatican’s lead and provide funding and protection (before they start committing war crimes and crimes against humanity). Come to think of it, that’s America’s solution too.
The war may be over, crime persists
Sergio Guzmán Escobar, a SAIS master’s student, reports from Friday’s conversation with Juan Carlos Pinzón, Colombia’s Minister of Defense, at the Inter-American dialogue. Video of the event is available here.
With the Colombian peace talks between the Government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaras de Colombia (FARC) – the world’s longest lasting Marxist-Leninist insurgency – reaching what analysts call a “point of no return” the Colombian Minister of Defense, Juan Carlos Pinzón, discussed the country’s security outlook. The minister arrived from Davos, Switzerland where he reassured international investors about the continuity of Colombia’s security policies in a post-agreement scenario.
Moreover, he reviewed the country’s current security threats and outlined them as:
1. Armed Insurgent Groups – Communist insurgencies groups like the FARC and the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN), who engage in terrorist activities, drug trafficking, extortion, child recruitment and illegal mining.
2. Organized Crime – Remnants of the former right-wing paramilitary organization Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and groups of organized gangs that engage in drug-related violence in both urban and rural contexts.
3. Citizen Security – street crime and urban gangs who are responsible for the palpable insecurity in the cities, including muggings and house burglary.
The fact that the negotiations come to a successful end will not necessarily mean that the country’s security outlook will improve overnight. The nature of the threats will change and the armed forces and the police will have to respond accordingly. The minister noted that Colombia has already undergone four different Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) processes and will be able to see the process through in collaboration with multiple government agencies that have experience in this field, especially the National Agency for Reintegration.
As a result of the negotiations, rumors have emerged about the future of the Colombian military possibly downsizing as part of the agreements with the FARC. The minister was emphatic that the armed forces are not going to be downsized regardless of budgetary pressures. The size of the armed forces in the next 5-10 years will remain constant. But there will be a greater mix of military police activities (the Colombian police is a under the Ministry of Defense and is a separate branch of the Armed Forces), to enable the armed forces to engage threats resulting from the peace process. “An agreement will not banish crime.”
Responding to allegations that a new rural police force would include demobilized members of the FARC, the minster remarked “No.”
A pending issue the minister failed to signal in his remarks arises from Venezuela. As the peace agreements are close to being finalized, Colombia is no longer dependent on Venezuela’s “good offices” to keep the FARC at the negotiating table. If oil prices remain low, Caracas’s economic situation will be dire. Scarcity of basic goods will cause President Maduro’s political support among the population to wane. Turbulence in Colombia’s neighbor may represent a real security threat.