Category: Daniel Serwer
Sources of fragility in West Africa
Min Kyung Yoo, a master’s student in my post-war stabilization and transition class, writes about a presentation yesterday on drivers of violence in West Africa by Alexandre Marc, Chief Technical Specialist of Fragility, Conflict, and Violence at the World Bank:
West African countries have experienced robust economic growth in the past decade. Since 1990, there has also been improvement in democratic consolidation, which seems to hold better than in other parts of Africa. Most governments in the region are elected and many people resist constitutional changes. In addition, West Africa has one of the most mobile populations in the world, hosting 7.5 million intra-regional migrants, and demonstrates strong regional cooperation through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Despite these positive signs, the Ebola crisis, the Nigerian war with Boko Haram, Mali’s fragility and the Burkina Faso revolt show the region is still fragile. Intra-state civil wars dominate in West Africa, including long-standing ethnic conflicts that disrupt national and regional economies. Politics in West Africa is ethnically oriented and political institutions are very weak. Political and election-related violence is a growing challenge. The nature of violence and conflict has shifted in the past decade, with new threats such as illegal trafficking, religious radicalization, and piracy. Piracy is more rampant along the coast of Guinea than off Somalia.
Marc discussed in depth five drivers of conflict and violence in West Africa:
1. Drug trafficking
Protracted conflicts and political instability, corruption, porous borders, and geographic location all contribute to making West Africa attractive to traffickers. While physical drug trafficking takes place in Guinea and Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Ghana are drawn into the business as they have more reliable and functioning banking system in which drug traffickers perform financial transactions. Drug trafficking has potential to compromise officials and security agents, destabilize governments and weaken states, erode the region’s social fabric and damage economic development.
2. Religious extremism
Religious extremism in West Africa is largely home-grown, and has developed in areas with strong grievances—unemployment, corruption, and perceived marginalization. Increasing traditionalization, intergenerational crisis, disillusionment with the state, as well as external factors such as civil wars in Algeria and Libya, have accelerated radicalization.
3. Challenges of youth inclusion
West Africa hosts a rapidly growing population, but lacks capacity to address the needs of youth. Challenges include poor quality education and few employment opportunities. Unemployment is rarely a main or direct cause of conflict. But youth tend to have high expectations and seek to assert themselves outside both traditional and modern institutions. Meeting the expectations of youth has been a big challenge, leading to frustration and alienation. Gender dimensions and rapidly changing gender roles should not be neglected.
4. Migration
Tensions surrounding migratory flows—including discriminatory notions of citizenship and foreigner, political and social marginalization, competition over land, resources, and employment—have contributed to violence and conflict in West Africa in past decades. Rapid urbanization across the region and the influx of migrants into urban center is another source of instability. Informal settlements populated by unemployed and marginalized youth intensify perceptions of inequality and increase the risk of violent crime and gang activity.
5. Fragility of political and land institutions
Competition for control over political processes that guarantee access to resources has been at the core of much conflict and violence in recent decades. The high incidence of military coups in the region reflects this trend. Almost every conflict in the sub-region features land: ambiguities around legal pluralism (customary and statutory land tenure), ineffective land management, and unequal distribution.
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Give, even at the office
Here is Deah Barakat, a dental student murdered with his wife and sister-in-law last night in Chapel Hill, NC appealing for support to help Syrian refugees in Turkey:
His cause has exceeded its modestly stated goal by a long shot, but I’m sure it can use more: Syrian Dental Relief. I gave, here at the office. It’s quick and easier than writing a check.
PS: Try this too, if that wasn’t enough to convince:
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Hobbits will inherit the earth
Eric Rahman, a master’s student in my Post-war Reconstruction and Transition class this term, writes about Srdja Popovic’s appearance at SAIS yesterday:
Srdja Popovic is a Serbian political activist and executive director of the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS). He was a leader of the student movement Otpor!, which helped topple Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. He has taught at the Harvard Kennedy School, NYU, and the University of Colorado, among others.
There are few individuals with a history of working in such close proximity to conflict who exhibit quite the optimism and exuberance as Popovic. In an event held at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on the morning of February 10, the author of the recently published Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Nonviolent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World discussed his vision for effective social mobilization to execute non-violent revolution.
He relied on a metaphor drawn from J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings series:
it is the average individual, the person you would least expect, the hobbits, who
can have the greatest impact and transform their societies through non-violent means. Popovic pointed to the electrician Lech Wałęsa and the camera shop owner Harvey Milk to illustrate that it is not institutional elites who bring about change but rather it is hobbits, who rely on their creativity to build a movement and have a lasting impact.
In spite of humorous analogies and moments of levity, Popovic presented a sober
analysis of which conditions and methods are most conducive to fomenting a social movement that can truly effect change in repressive societies. He advocates non-violence even when pitted against a brutally violent adversary. Non-violence is preferable not because violence is morally unacceptable, but because non-violence is the most effective and efficient means to combat a growing menace, as illustrated by the statistics in Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan’s Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.
The threat of ISIS he likened to a swarm of mosquitos. The temptation is
to swat them. But to combat the infestation, one has to turn attention to the source: wet areas or the swamps. There is a confluence of pernicious factors that coalesced to create permissive conditions for ISIS’s rise, but one fundamental issue is the failure of states to deliver services and the resulting vacuum of credibility and legitimacy. This can only be countered by the actual provision of expected basic
services by governments. Service provision will undercut the ISIS narrative and shrink recruitment.
There is an alarming perception among many Iraqi youth that ISIS is ‘cool.’ This perception is destabilizing and arises from lack of alternatives. There is no Iraqi ‘Batman’ or ‘Superman’ young people can look to for moral-cultural education during their formative years, which leaves them susceptible to the sophisticated propaganda machine of an organization such as ISIS.
The Arab spring and the Ukrainian crisis illustrate in Popovic’s view the consequences when a movement lacks long-term vision. In Egypt for example, the
revolution achieved its expressed goal of unseating Hosni Mubarak within the first month of the protests (four years ago today!). But once the moment came to construct a new model of government and service delivery, there was a dearth of strategic planning and the movement began to disintegrate. A similar situation existed in Ukraine following the Orange Revolution in 2003, causing the intra-Ukrainian conflict to simmer and break out again into crisis last year.
Popovic summed up his argument with an apt analogy: “Non-violent struggles are like video games. They have levels and you need a new set of skills for each level.” Despite the challenges faced and the skills required, it is the hobbits who eventually carry the day.
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Bosnia’s muj
I did this interview yesterday for Amil Ducic of the Sarajevo daily Avaz:
1. What is your perception on the indictment of six Bosnians who have been charged with providing money and equipment to foreign fighters joining al Qaeda, Nusra Front and Islamic State in Syria and Iraq? Two persons were even accused of conspiring to kill and maim persons in a foreign country.
A: Innocent until proven guilty is my first reaction. But if proven it should not be such a big surprise. There are a lot of Bosnians in the U.S. Why would we think none of them would be sympathetic with the Islamic State? There are also non-Muslim Americans who support ISIS. Ours is a big country with many different strands of political thought.
2. Reading the indictment, it’s obvious that the charges are serious. Problem for BiH is that the money is transferred in our country to stimulate the foreign fighters. Your comment?
A: I expect BiH will cooperate as much as it can in trying to block financial transfers to support foreign fighters. That’s something on which all the political leaderships can agree.
3. Again, one of the charged persons Ramiz Hodžić is identified as a person who was radicalized in Bosnia during the war. He was member of the unit “El-Mudjahid”. Do you think this an issue which has to be solved in Bosnia. Radicalization of the Bosnian Army during 1992-1995 is, regarding some opinions, the root of problems…. What is your opinion.
A: I don’t think this is a gigantic problem. At Dayton, a Croat asked that we get rid of the foreign mujahedeen in Bosnia. I asked how many there were. He replied 700, which I took to be a maximum given the source of the information.
At least half of those were forced out after the war, in part due to American pressure. Many of the remainder are living peacefully with their Bosnian families. It is twenty years since the war ended. Some will be well above fighting age (and condition) now.
So yes, Bosnia should do what it can to block them from helping or volunteering for the Islamic State. But let’s not exaggerate the scale of the problem.
4. What about the Bosnian community in USA. Is there is a danger of being labeled?
A: What I’ve seen of the Bosnian community reaction in the US is universal condemnation of any support to the Islamic State or other extremists. There will no doubt be bigots who “label” all Muslims as terrorists. But most Americans know and appreciate that Muslims in the U.S. overwhelmingly oppose extremism.
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The courteous banality of evil
I won’t have much time to write today, due to meetings and my class this evening. But here for your edification is the full BBC interview with Bashar al Asad:
Audio PlayerListen and weep. Note not only the content, but the reasonable and courteous tone combined with incredible lies. The courteous banality of evil.
PS: The Syrian government is proud of this interview and published the text. I assume it is an accurate rendition, but I have checked.
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Negotiations fail, force prevails
The United States is closing its embassy in Sanaa in the aftermath of the takeover (that’s a coup by another name) by Houthi insurgents, who Friday issued a constitutional declaration. It provides for dissolution of the existing parliament, formation of a “more representative” 551-member National Transitional Council that will elect a five-member presidency council, and a two-year transition period. The goals are laudable:
- achieve a dignified life for the popular masses,
- end corruption through an effective national strategy, reform public service,
- eliminate flaws in community justice,
- relieve oppression,
- reform the security and military institutions on national bases as well as
- restore trust and respect for these institutions,
- improve the livelihood of their members,
- achieve security in society,
- face down criminal takfiri forces and their allies and supporters,
- build a strong, cohesive Yemeni society that does not exclude any person or party, and
- end conflicts, divisions and ruptures.
What could go wrong?
As Nadwa Aldawsari pointed out at the Carnegie Endowment this afternoon, the Houthi victory marks the death knell of the Gulf Cooperation Council transition plan that UN envoy Jamal Benomar has tried assiduously to implement. It failed, she thought, because it provided immunity to former President Saleh and kept in place much of his regime, while excluding the Houthis. Despite having previously fought against them, Saleh took advantage of his situation to make common cause with the Houthis, an armed group that is dominated by an early Shia sect known as Zaidis.
While Nasser Arrabeyee, speaking by Skype from Sana’a, would prefer that the Houthis leave parliament as is and occupy instead places in the Shura Council, there is no sign they are prepared to do that. The Houthis seem intent on governing through the transition period. The risks that entails are all too obvious: Nadwa pointed to the large ungoverned spaces in Yemen, where Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)–the Sunni takfiris mentioned above–have more or less safe haven, despite the American drone war. It is unclear to me whether that will continue without the embassy open. In any event, it has not been successful at stemming recruitment to AQAP, which appears to be stronger in manpower and weapons today than several years ago.
The situation in Yemen may also evolve into a proxy war between Iran, which has supported the Houthis with money, arms and ideology, and Yemen’s weightiest neighbor, Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have cut off aid to Yemen, which is an astoundingly poor country. Key Yemeni tribal leaders are thought to be in the Kingdom now. They are no doubt looking for support to do combat with the Houthis.
Yemen’s south, once independent, is once again moving in that direction, hindered only by the disunity of its secessionist advocates. According to Laura Kasinof, the state has evaporated there, with little impact as its presence was already so attenuated. Tribal rather than formal justice is preferred in much of the area.
Nasser underlined that the Houthis are for the moment very much in charge. The powersharing arrangement President Hadi had been using is gone. Former President Saleh is no longer “dancing on the heads of snakes” to govern, but he is still orchestrating the dance and trying to ensure that his son Ahmed eventually takes power.
Negotiations have failed. Force has prevailed. Not clear what is next, but it isn’t likely to be good.
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