Category: Daniel Serwer
Beyond ceasefire, what can really happen?
The Gaza ceasefire went into effect today, after a few hours delay. Reports are that humanitarian supplies are entering. Hamas and Israel are arranging or exchange of hostages and prisoners. This phase is to last 6 weeks, after which a more permanent cessation of hostilities is to commence. What are the prospects for a longer agreement?
The next phase
Secretary of State Blinken helpfully outlined the Biden Administration’s plans for phase 2 at the Atlantic Council last week:
We believe that the Palestinian Authority should invite international partners to help establish and run an interim administration with responsibility for key civil sectors in Gaza, like banking, water, energy, health, civil coordination with Israel. The international community would provide funding, technical support, and oversight. The interim administration would include Palestinians from Gaza and representatives from the PA—selected following meaningful consultation with communities in Gaza—and would hand over complete responsibility to a fully reformed PA administration as soon as it’s feasible.
The administrators would operate in close cooperation with a senior UN official, who should oversee the international stabilization and recovery effort.
An interim security mission would be made up of members of partner nation security forces and vetted Palestinian personnel. Its responsibilities would include creating a secure environment for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and ensuring border security, which is crucial to preventing smuggling that could allow Hamas to rebuild its military capacity. We would stand up a new initiative to train, to equip, to vet a PA-led security force for Gaza to focus on law and order and gradually take over for the interim security mission.
These arrangements would be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution.
Some of our partners have already expressed their willingness to contribute troops and police for such a mission—but if, and only if, it is agreed that Gaza and the West Bank are reunified under a reformed PA as part of a pathway to an independent Palestinian state.
This depicts a fairly conventional late 1990s style “integrated” intervention. The UN Security Council authorized interim administrations like this in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), East Timor (1999), and Kosovo (1999). They were not brilliantly successful, but they markedly improved the situation in all three places. Blinken omits one essential ingredient for success: executive authority. The UNSC will need to empower the interim authorities to issue laws, arrest people, and use force to protect civilians.
One new wrinkle here is the Palestinians, who are divided politically and geographically. Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas has already declared its readiness to take on its assigned role. I don’t know anyone who would agree with that proposition, as he has done little to reform it. Besides, it is going to have trouble gaining traction in territory ruled by Hamas for almost two decades. Hamas has said it is prepared to give up its governance role. But at least some of the remaining Hamas militants are going to make sure the PA has a hard time.
Other new wrinkles
I see little prospect that the current Israeli government will accept what Blinken proposes. Netanyahu will not want the ceasefire to last past 6 weeks. That would mark the beginning of the end for him. His right-wing coalition partners had a hard time accepting the ceasefire. They will not accept an international administration whose mandate includes eventual creation of a Palestinian state. In addition, if the war ends or his government collapses, Netanyahu will have to face prosecution and elections. He doesn’t want that.
It will not be possible to start up an international administration without Israeli cooperation. Neighbors are vital factors in determining the success or failure of post-war stabilization and reconstruction. Arab Gulf states won’t agree to contribute troops, police, and money without Israeli approval.
What remains of Hamas will also oppose the next phase, which threatens to end its rule permanently. After 6 weeks of recuperation and attempts to re-arm, extremists in Hamas will try to derail the process. It will only take an attack or two on innocent Israelis to restart the war.
The final new wrinkle
If ever we get to the next phase, it will be in the Trump Administration. In his first term, Trump gave the Israelis 100% support. He abandoned support for the two-state solution and moved the US embassy to Jerusalem. He accepted annexation of the Golan Heights and West Bank settlements as legal. His negotiators put forward a peace plan that paid little attention to the Palestinian goal of statehood.
Trump is reputed to have played a key role in getting the ceasefire. But he did that by threatening Hamas, not the Israelis. Blinken in his remarks at the Atlantic Council suggested that
Israelis must abandon the myth that they can carry out de-facto annexation without cost and consequence to Israel’s democracy, to its standing, to its security.
Trump isn’t going to tell them that. It will happen only if Israelis go to the polls and elect a government committed to Israeli democracy. That is what Netanyahu and his right-wing allies will try to prevent. If they succeed, the war will go on.
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Come for lunch, stay for the talk!
I’ll be speaking at Georgetown 12 noon-2 pm on my latest book: Strengthening International Regimes: the Case of Radiation Protection. I’ll be talking not only about radiation but also other technologies that offer benefits but also post risks. All are welcome (see poster below and video to the right for more details):
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An opportunity that may be missed
The Middle East is in a rare period of rapid change. The Assad regime in Syria is gone. Its successor is still undefined and uncertain. Israel has crippled Iran’s Hamas and Hizbollah allies. It is trying to do likewise to the Houthis in Yemen. Egypt is on the sidelines, preoccupied with civil wars in Libya and Sudan. A weakened Iran is contemplating whether nuclear weapons would help to restore its regional influence.
The global powers that be are not anxious to get too involved. Russia, stretched thin, let Syria go. The United States is inaugurating a president known to favor withdrawal from Syria. He will support almost anything Israel wants to do. China is doing its best to guarantee access to Middle East oil but wants to avoid political involvement. The European Union has a similar attitude.
So what will be the main factors in determining the future of the Middle East? Who has power and influence in the region and outside it?
Turkiye
The Turks are so far the big winners in Syria. They are getting an opportunity to send back Syrian refugees and will try to decimate their Syrian Kurdish enemies. They have influence over the ruling Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leadership in Damascus, whom they supplied and unleashed.
When it comes to reconstruction in Syria, Turkish companies are experienced and nearby. Turkish pockets aren’t as deep as American or Chinese pockets. But they are deep enough to get things started fast, especially if World Bank money is put on the table.
The Turks will try to convince the Americans to leave. They’ll argue that they can and will suppress Islamic State and other terrorists. They may even promise to allow the Kurds to continue their local governance structures. But they would want the Syrian Kurds to cut their ties to Kurdish terrorists inside Turkey.
The Turks will want a not-too-Islamist government in Damascus, something akin to their own. Syria has an enormously diverse population. HTS governance in Idlib was autocratic. But that was during the civil war. It will be much harder to impose that on Damascus after liberation from Assad. Syrians want their freedom. Turkiye has an interest in their getting it. Only inclusive governance will permit the return of refugees.
The Gulf
Some of the big money for reconstruction in Syria will come from the Gulf. The Saudis may be willing, if they gain some political influence in the bargain. How they use that influence will be important. In the Balkans 30 years ago they sponsored Wahabist clerics and mosques. Mohammed bin Salman has marginalized those within Saudi Arabia. We can hope he will not export them now. But he will, like the Turks, want a strong executive in Damascus.
What Syria needs from the Gulf is support for inclusive, democratic governance. The UAE will weigh in heavily against Islamism, but the Emirates are far from democratic or inclusive. Qatar, more tolerant of Islamism, will prefer inclusion, if only because the Americans will pressure them to do so.
Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu has not achieved elimination of Hamas in Gaza. But he has weakened it. The Israelis have been far more successful in Lebanon, where they have dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah. They are also destroying many Syrian military capabilities. And they have seized UN-patrolled Syrian territory in the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon.
Israel had already neutralized Egypt and Jordan via peace agreements. Ditto the UAE and Bahrain via the Abrahamic accords, though they were never protagonists in war against Israel. It would like similar normalization with Saudi Arabia. Now Israel controls border areas inside Lebanon and Syria. Repression on the West Bank and attacks on the Houthis in Yemen are proceeding apace.
Netanyahu is resisting the end of the Gaza war to save his own skin from the Israeli courts and electorate. Whether he succeeds at that or not, his legacy will be an “Israeli World.” That is a militarily strong Israel surrounded by buffer zones. But he has done serious damage to Israeli democracy and society.
Iran
Iran is weakened. That will encourage it to quicken the pace of its nuclear program. It won’t go all the way to deploying nuclear weapons. That would risk giving the Israelis an excuse for a massive attack, or even a nuclear strike. Nor can Ankara adopt the Israeli policy of opaqueness, as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That requires openness to inspections. So transparency about its nuclear threshold status is the likely policy.
Bottom line
Turkiye, Israel, and the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia) are the big winners from the current Middle East wars. They would be even stronger if they were to cooperate. All have an interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, in stabilizing Syria, and in preventing terrorist resurgence. So does the US. There is an opportunity, but one that may be missed.
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Democracy doesn’t favor a serious peace
The headlines today say Hamas and Israel have reached a Gaza ceasefire deal that will
- allow exchange of hostages/prisoners,
- get Israeli troops to withdraw, and
- infuse humanitarian assistance.
All that is good.
What it is
But it is still only a ceasefire, not even a formal end to hostilities never mind a peace settlement. The ceasefire is to last seven weeks, during which negotiations on future arrangements for Gaza are to continue. As Tony Blinken put it yesterday:
The ceasefire deal itself requires the Israeli forces to pull back and then, assuming you get to a permanent ceasefire, to pull out entirely. But that’s what’s so critical about this post-conflict plan, the need to come to an agreement on its arrangements, because there has to be something in place that gives Israelis the confidence that they can pull out permanently and not have a repeat of the last, really, decade.
That is a good reminder. A ceasefire won’t last if there is no mutually enticing way out of the conflict. What might that be?
The rub
Therein lies the rub. The obvious way out would be a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. It could be run by a successor to the hapless Palestinian Authority. The current Israeli government is dead set against that. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu could accept it, which is doubtful, his coalition partners would not. A new Israeli government will be needed for any post-war settlement that appeals to most Palestinians.
But this government has been successful in doing what Israelis wanted in Gaza and Lebanon. It has diminished Hamas and all but disemboweled Hizbollah. It has also weakened Iran. Netanyahu would likely win a new election, but have no clear path to a parliamentary majority. Nor would anyone else. The pattern of indecisive Israeli elections would continue. There is no sign of a majority that favors a Palestinian state. Democracy does not favor a serious peace settlement.
Trump’s challenge
This is a big problem for the newly elected Trump Administration. It has assembled a mostly pro-Israel diplomatic team. It is difficult to picture Ambassador Huckabee bludgeoning the Israelis into accepting a Palestinian state. Trump’s threat that “all hell will break lose” absent an agreement was intended to threaten Hamas, not Israel.
Trump could turn the table and speak out for a Palestinian state. He did it at least once in his first term. But then he deferred to the Israelis:
If the Israelis and the Palestinians want one state, that’s OK with me. If they want two-state, that’s OK with me. I’m happy if they’re happy.
That is not resounding support for a Palestinian state.
The Saudi factor
It will be up to Riyadh to make it happen. Saudi Arabia wants normalization with Israel as well as a defense and nuclear agreements with the United States. It would be willing to help finance Gaza reconstruction. But it has to get a “concrete, irrevocable steps in a three to five year time horizon” to a Palestinian state in the bargain.
Israel wants normalization with the Saudis as well. Can fragmented Israeli democracy, American pro-Israel diplomats, and a Saudi autocrat combine to produce a Palestinian state? Anything is possible.
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Things in the Balkans can get worse
My post yesterday on Biden’s less than sterling foreign policy legacy disappointed my Balkan fans. They thought his weak performance in their region merited attention. So here is a moment of attention. Let’s start with Trump’s first term, 2017-21.
Trump disappointed
In 2020, then President Trump signed with Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President Vucic separate agreements on “economic normalization.” The US Administration advertised these agreements as great achievements. They provided for highway and rail connections, financing for small and medium enterprises, entry of Kosovo into what was then labeled a “mini-Schengen” zone that included Serbia, Albania and Macedonia, mutual recognition of diplomas, prohibition of “untrusted” (read: Chinese) 5G vendors, as well as a number of other provisions that have little or nothing to do with economic normalization between Belgrade and Pristina. The other economic provisions were even more minimal, except for a promise to Belgrade of more US investment.
These agreements mostly went unimplemented. Israel recognized Kosovo and Pristina located its new embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Serbia got lots of new US investment. The most important provision, Serbia’s suspension of its anti-recognition campaign, never happened so far as I can tell.
Everyone had high expectations for Biden
People in the region, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo, had high expectations for the Biden Administration in 2020. Senator Biden had been a vigorous advocate of US interventions in the Balkans. Secretary of State Blinken knew the region well. Ambassador in Belgrade Chris Hill had been deeply involved at Dayton and thereafter at Rambouillet and as ambassador in Macedonia. Derek Chollet, Counselor at State, was likewise knowledgeable.
To my surprise, they decided to turn American policy in a decidedly pro-Belgrade direction. They also decided to back Albanian Prime Minister Rama to the hilt. I knew that Biden had favored Belgrade getting candidacy for the European Union, without having met the requirements. I had opposed him on this issue while testifying in the 2000s. But I did not understand this reflected a generalized lean towards Serbia. For much of the Biden Administration, Gab Escobar, former DCM in Belgrade, led on the Balkans at State. He made creation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities his exclusive priority. That meant giving Belgrade what it wanted most while giving Pristina nothing. That was never going to work, and it didn’t.
But Biden’s people kept on leaning towards Belgrade. When Serbia kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, they said nothing meaningful. When Vucic sent rioters to Kosovo to attack NATO peacekeepers, Washington said little. When Serbia organized and equipped a terrorist attack in Kosovo, they did nothing. In Bosnia, the Biden people prioritized getting rid of a Bosniak nationalist politician. They left the much-sanctioned Serb and the equally odious Croat for another time.
What to expect now
I don’t expect better of the second Trump Administration. Jared Kushner, Trump’s Saudi-funded son-in-law, has been prospecting for investment projects in both Serbia and Albania. So far as I am aware, he hasn’t even visited Bosnia or Kosovo. You can expect Trump to do nothing that will endanger Kushner’s projects or his Saudi money. That means a continued tilt towards Belgrade and away from Pristina, though not away from Tirana. Albania and Serbia agree on many things, including the need for their presidents to stay in power without serious opposition. The Americans have been supportive under Biden. That will continue under Trump.
People in the Balkans will be watching Marco Rubio’s confirmation hearing today for any questions involving the Balkans. That could be a hint of where things are going. But I wouldn’t bet on any Balkan issues getting raised, unless someone prompts one of the Senators to do it.
Mico Vlahovic quotes outgoing Assistant Secretary James O’Brien as saying:
We do not want to it to seem that one [US political] party or the other is taking responsibility, because in America both parties believe that a strong relationship is important – both for our country and for Serbia.
That implies continuity in the appeasement of Belgrade.
It could be worse than that, if Washington returns to wanting to partition Kosovo on ethnic lines. But neither appeasement nor partition will bring peace and stability. The route to that is strengthened sovereignty for all the region’s countries. In these waning days, the Biden Administration is pushing “strategic dialogues” with both Belgrade and Pristina. That’s not the worst idea I’ve heard, but it all depends on the agendas.
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A stronger American still fumbles
President Biden made a farewell appearance at the State Department yesterday. As a former Foreign Service officer, I’m of course delighted that he did this. It is especially important and timely because the Department now faces Donald Trump’s threat of loyalty tests and mass firings.
Biden’s understandably directed his remarks at justifying what his Administration has done on foreign policy. So how did he really do?
The bar was low
Certainly Biden can justifiably claim to have strengthened America’s alliances. The bar was low. Both in Europe and Asia the first Trump Administration had raised doubts. Allies could not depend on Washington’s commitment to fulfill its mutual defense obligations. Biden’s claim that compared to four years ago America is stronger because of renewed and expanded alliances is true. He is also correct in claiming he has not gone to war to make it happen.
The extraordinary strength of the American economy is an important dimension of this strength. Voters decided the election in part on the issue of inflation. But the Fed has largely tamed that and growth has been strong throughout. Manufacturing is booming, including vital semi-conductor production. Investment in non-carbon energy sources has soared. The defense industrial based is expanding.
Biden is also correct in asserting that America’s antagonists are worse off. Russia has failed to take Ukraine because of the US effort to gather support for Kyiv. Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria are weaker. Only the Houthis in Yemen are arguably stronger than four years ago.
China is facing serious domestic economic and demographic challenges. But I don’t know why Biden claims it will never surpass the US. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, it already has, though obviously per capita GDP in China remains much lower.
Some claims gloss over big problems
Biden is rightly proud that there is no longer war in Afghanistan, but he glosses over the chaotic withdrawal. He also doesn’t mention the failure of the Taliban to keep its commitments.
He vaunts progress on climate change, but without acknowledging that the goal of keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees centigrade will not be met.
Biden talks about infrastructure in Africa. But not about its turn away from democracy, civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and the unresolved conflict in Libya.
He urges that Iran never be allowed to “fire” a nuclear weapon. That is a significant retreat from the position that Iran should never be allowed to have one.
Biden mentions the impending Hamas/Israel ceasefire. But he says nothing about Israel’s criminal conduct of the war in Gaza. Nor does he blame Israel’s right-wing government for the long delay in reaching a deal.
Biden’s legacy
At the end, Biden seeks to bequeath three priorities to Trump: artificial intelligence, climate change, and democracy. He no doubt knows that Trump isn’t going to take the advice on climate or democracy. He might on artificial intelligence, as his Silicon Valley tycoons will want him to.
Sad to say, Biden’s legacy will lie in other areas. Fearful of nuclear conflict with Russia, he failed to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defeat Russia. He was reluctant to rein in Israel for more than a year of the Gaza war. He failed to stop or reverse the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. America is stronger than it was four years ago, but it has not always used that strength to good advantage.
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