Category: Daniel Serwer
Stevenson’s army, June 24
What’s happening in Russia? Have to watch and wait. Updates at NYT, also at WaPo, and at this independent Russian site
Meanwhile, quick takes from Anne Applebaum and Tom Nichols.
Lawfare says a new Iran nuclear deal has to stay verbal.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Sit tight, unite, and prepare for opportunity in Russia
I missed the start last night, but Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group rebel forces are still moving toward Moscow from Rostov-on-Don today. They made it half way so far, to somewhere past Voronezh. That itself is amazing. Why hasn’t the Russian air force torn the Wagner column to pieces?
The outcome is uncertain
The outcome is however entirely uncertain. The insurrection could still fizzle. It could suffer catastrophic defeat. Wagner could become mired in a stalemate. Or it could succeed in chasing Putin from the Kremlin. Chechen forces are said to be getting ready to stop their progress toward Moscow. But those forces also have reason to be unhappy with Putin, so will they do the necessary for him?
Nor should we regard Prigozhin’s Wagner forces as heroes. They have fought, tortured, and robbed in Syria and several countries in Africa (Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan). They participated in the Trump-encouraged hacking of the US presidential election in 2016. Prigozhin is no more of a democrat than Putin. Maybe less.
Insurrection could have consequences, even if it fails
But this insurrection, even if ultimately unsuccessful, will have consequences if it lasts more than a day or two. Putin’s hold on power will look tenuous. Russian troops in Ukraine, already demoralized, may hesitate to follow orders from a military command fighting Russians on the outskirts of Moscow. Some might even join the rebellion.
Ukraine’s army will be emboldened and press its counteroffensive harder. Distracted, the Russian army command could make serious mistakes, of either commission or omission. Fighting on two fronts is never easy, but if one is your home front it is likely to get priority.
Belarus could rise against President Lukashenko, who lacks electoral legitimacy. Constituent republics of the Russian Federation might do likewise. Russia might “rupture.” Moscow could find itself fighting not just with Prigozhin but also with half a dozen other rebellious forces.
Sit tight
The West (read the EU, UK, and US) have little direct say in this situation. Brussels, London, and Washington will want to be cautious, lest they give Russians cause to unite. They will also worry that Putin, his back to the wall and his life at risk, could take desperate measures, like use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine or even against his enemies inside Russia. Until now, that has seemed unlikely, but the man is frightened and may have few other cards to play.
China, India, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and other countries that Putin has courted may try to come to his rescue, mainly by providing markets for Russian oil. Except for China, their means are limited. Beijing is more likely to wait until it sees the outcome, which will necessarily be a weakened Russia more dependent on Chinese largesse.
Prepare
A Russia without Putin would be an opportunity for the West. If the rebellion succeeds, a united Western front in dealing with Prigozhin will be vital. He is no more principled than Putin. Steering a post-Putin Russia towards complete withdrawal from Ukraine and encouaging emergence of something resembling democracy there will be a major diplomatic challenge. Now is the time to prepare for it.
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Stevenson’s army, June 23
– Politico reports on HASC NDAA
– Hill sees split between Senate and House GOP over defense
– Carter Malkasian urges Korea armistice model for Ukraine
– Defense News compares German and other national security strategies
– Talented Trump NSC deputy, Nadia Schadlow, has good points on strategy
– History: when US spies searched for Confederate VP
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Back to the future with the past in mind
This post will be “inside baseball,” so those who don’t care about the Balkans or are tired of talking about the region’s problems are hereby forewarned.
In addition to the current brouhaha over where the mayors of four northern Kosovo municipalities should sit, Washington and Brussels are pressing Pristina hard to start negotiation with Belgrade on proposed Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM). The Americans and Europeans point to the 2013 Brussels agreement that introduced this innovation. They insist it is a legal obligation and want Pristina to prioritize it.
No unilateral commitment
Memories are short in the US and EU. They should go back and read the 2013 agreement. It involved a quid pro quo, not a unilateral commitment. It obliges Kosovo to create an ASMM, in exchange for the extension of Kosovo’s constitutional order, in particular its judicial system and police, to northern Kosovo, where three Serb-majority municipalites lie.
The fourth and most substantial one, Mitrovica, is Serb-majority now, but only because the Serbs have prevented Albanians and others from returning to their homes north of the Ibar River since 1999. Any serious extension of the Kosovo constitutional order to the north would allow all the displaced people to return to their homes.
The Kosovo parliament approved the 2013 agreement and Serbia’s did not. That undermines the argument that it is morally binding on Pristina. I’m no lawyer, so let’s assume it is legally, even if not morally, binding. Where do we stand on extension of the Kosovo constitutional order to the north?
The quid pro quo isn’t working
Nowhere is the right answer. Serbia has maintained its control of the four northern municipalities. It uses a combination of clandestine security forces and cooperating criminal organizations. It refused to accept Kosovo’s decision to insist on Kosovo license plates in the north. That was after the expiration of an agreement that temporarily allowed Serbian license plates. Belgrade instructed the Serb police and judges to leave Kosovo’s institutions.
The Serbs of the north boycotted the recent municipal elections on orders from President Vucic, which his minions enforced with intimidation. The few citizens who turned out elected the non-Serb mayors. Rent-a-mob rioters have prevented three of them from entering the offices Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti insists they should occupy.
This reminds me of Kosovo during the period of Serbian rule in the 1990s. Then Albanians boycotted elections, but they also accepted the consequences, which were severe. Serbia appointed Serb mayors for Albanian-majority communities and ejected Albanians from their jobs in the supposedly autonomous province. The Albanians ran their own unofficial school and health systems for almost 10 years.
The chicken and egg
There is as usual a chicken and egg problem. You can ask who started the downward spiral, but you’ll never get an agreed answer. All that really counts is that things are bad and getting worse.
Serbia mobilized its army and deployed it closer to the boundary/border, a military threat that violates the February agreement on normalization of relations.
Serbian police have detained three Kosovo policemen, claiming they were on Serbian territory but providing no evidence. Belgrade has refused thus far to release them, despite a KFOR request. Even if they did wander into Serbia, which is possible but unlikely, why would Belgrade not repatriate them as speedily as possible? Or were they snatched from Kosovo territory, like the American Albanian Bytyqi brothers Serbian police murdered after the 1999 war?
One sided diplomacy won’t work
The EU and US are making things worse. The American ambassador in Belgrade declared Kurti not a partner, while praising President Vucic just a few days after his agents had attacked NATO troops in the north. Even the State Department thought this strange. Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabe Escobar corrected the bizarre statement. NATO maintained its commitment to a military exercise with Serbia while canceling one with Kosovo.
The Europeans are fond of citing the 16 member states that have arrangements like the ASMM for numerical minorities. But in each and every one of those cases the neighboring country recognizes the hosting state. If Serbia were to recognize Kosovo, the ASMM would surely be less threatening to Pristina.
The EU has been sending detailed unilateral demands telling Prime Minister Kurti he has to withdraw his police from a territory they are entitled to be present in. Even if you think he made a mistake to try to install the mayors in the municipal buildings, you might want to show some understanding for his view that the Kosovo state has an obligation to enforce the rule of law as provided for in the 2013 agreement you are citing, or appreciation for his willingness to hold new elections in the north provided the Serbs will participate.
Back to the future
The 2013 Pristina/Belgrade agreement has real virtues in 2023. But they are not limited to the ASMM. The US and EU need to remember all its provisions, not just the ones that suit Belgrade.
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Stevenson’s army, June 22
– In FP, Gen. McChrystal says we have to change how we make foreign policy because of AI
– Jonathan Guyer of Vox assesses how close China and Russia are
– CFR has good background on industrial policy
– Dan Drezner criticizes a big but stupid article in NYT
– TNSR has big article on escalation management in Ukraine
– Lawfare tells how to sanction-proof a government
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 21
-D Brief explains Somali requests for US military help
– EU considers a “Marshall Plan” for Ukraine
– Congress may not save the A10s
– Democrats criticize GOP cuts in international spending
-Modi discusses relations with US
– WSJ reports Chinese tech workers in Cuba
– WaPo has its story on US-Iranian talks
– NYT hits Senate for nomination delays
-Axios notes loww congressional productivity because of messaging bills
– Media hit for paying more attention to Titanic tourists than dying migrants.
– Noah Smith raises doubts about Chinese economic strength.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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