Category: Daniel Serwer
Stevenson’s army, May 18 and 19
This is from yesterday: We’re back from travel and I’ve only begun to look at the accumulated papers. More to come. Meanwhile, these worthwhile pieces:
– Steve Walt has good advice on how people with master’s degrees can have good foreign policy careers.
– WOTR warns of the seduction of buzzwords.
-Substack columnist Noah Smith has interview with China specialist who has the best analysis I’ve seen of China’s tech policies.
– Media critic Dan Froomkin hits WaPo for not curating its classified leaks. I agree.
– I also agree with this call for beefing up CRS.
– NYT had fine profile of CIA director Burns.
In more recent news: US & allies disagree on F16s to Ukraine.
-Taiwan’s opposition has an interesting candidate.
– CFIUS may be used for Forbes acquisition.
– NYT questions Pentagon rules for special forces.
– FT says South Africa may face severe US sanctions
– Teixeira’s supervisors warned him about classified procedures but didn’t stop him.
Charlie posted this today:
– State has released a new foreign military sales policy, WSJ explains
– Pentagon acknowledges $3 billion accounting error, freeing more money for Ukraine.
– Assad is back in the good graces of the Arab League.
– Politico explain the legislative complexity of passing a debt ceiling bill.
– Glenn Kessler uses the example of “VA cuts” to explain how Ds & Rs argue over the GOP bill. [The point is that discretionary spending cuts are required but not identified.]
Good think pieces: By SAIS Prof Frank Gavin
– On Marine Corps reform
– On future Eurasian security
– And if you’re a subscriber, Economist has a new “defence” news site.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What the State Department forgot to say
This morning’s Chollet and Escobar pas de deux at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee demonstrated that the Senators who attended really know something about the Balkans. The questioning was pertinent and at times incisive. The responses were less so.
Of course the State Department Counselor and the Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for the Balkans know what to say. They are for EU membership, democracy, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They are against Russian malfeasance, Chinese financing, corruption, and ethnonationalism.
It’s what they don’t say
It’s what they don’t say that really counts, starting from the premise: “Europe whole and free.” This 90s US foreign policy slogan is inapplicable today and for the forseeable future. Europe is not going to be whole and free any time soon. We’ll have to accept a line somewhere. That’s what the war in Ukraine is about: will Kyiv be on the Western side of the line, or will all or part of Ukraine be forced into a subserviant relationship with Russia?
While the Americans are trying to attract it with all the carrots they can think of, Belgrade has chosen definitively in recent years to move towards Moscow and Beijing. There is no sign of anything but rhetorical interest in EU membership. Progress in the EU accession process has ground to a halt. The political system in Serbia has veered towards autocracy. President Vucic and his minions, who include virtually the entire media landscape in Serbia, mouth ambitions to retake Kosovo (or part of it) and use the worst ethnic slurs available against Albanians. There really is nothing comparable happening in Kosovo.
As for the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue, Escobar claimed the February and March agreements on normalization are legally binding and being implemented, but when confronted with examples of President Vucic’s refusal to implement specific provisions he and Chollet retreated to bothsiderism. That was also their response on corruption in Belgrade as well. “We find it everywhere in the Balkans.” In recent memory, I can’t name a US official who has referred explicitly to the many and gross manifestations of organized crime and corruption in Serbia.
Chollet and Escobar were enthusiastic about the proposed Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASMM), claiming it would enable Serbs to integrate more into Kosovo and would have to be consistent with the Kosovo constitution. They ignored the Serb proposal for the ASMM, which is unequivocally intended to create an autonomous Serb entity, like Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, inside Kosovo, complete with executive powers. They were also enthusiastic for Serbia’s Open Balkans initiative, provided that it treats all the countries participating equally. They forgot to mention that Kosovo has not even been invited to Open Balkans because Belgrade doesn’t want to address it properly in the invitation.
Poor Bosnia
Bosnia suffered the worst from State Department amnesia. Yes, the officials said, the Bosnia constitution would need changes, in accordance with decisions by the EU and the Venice Commission. They forgot to mention that one of those decisions, by the European Court of Human Rights, was taken 14 years ago. The US gave up long ago on pressing for its implementation.
They liked the decisions of the HiRep that enabled formation of the government in the Bosnian Federation, but forgot to mention that one of them changed the way votes were counted after they were cast. The other was taken to iron out problems the first had created. The net result was to ensure that two ethnonationalist parties could rule in the Federation. Only one ethnonationalist party was dissastified with these decisions, Escobar claimed. He forgot to mention that that party and other dissenters just might represent more than a majority of the voters. Never mind the disgraceful act of changing the way votes are counted after they are cast.
The rest
I trust Macedonians won’t be too pleased to hear from Escobar that in order to join the EU they will have to change their constitution to mention their Bulgarian minority, which he failed to say numbers a few thousand (certainly less than 1% of the population). Nor will the Albanians in Serbia be pleased to hear that their numbers–almost certainly equal to or greater than the number of Serbs in northern Kosovo (and far more than the Bulgarians in Macedonia)–don’t merit mention of an Association of Albanian Majority Municipalities inside Serbia. Never mind Albanian seats in the Serbian parliament, to match the guaranteed Serb seats in the Kosovo parliament.
Escobar will be winging off to Podgorica for the Montenegrin presidential inauguration Saturday. No one bothered to mention that we owe the oderly and so far nonviolent change of power there to its current President, Milo Djukanovic, whom American and European diplomats have spent years deploring for alleged (but still unproven) corruption. The new President, Jakov Milatović, avows a pro-European stance but has more than warm relations with President Vucic in Belgrade. A lot will depend on June 11 parliamentary elections. I hope they are conducted as freely and fairly as those under Djukanovic.
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The Senate takes a bite at the Balkans
Here are the notes I took during today’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Balkans. I’ll have more to say later today on what I think of what I heard:
Senator Menendez (D-NJ) knows what is going on. He said in his introduction to today’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing that a two-faced Belgrade is too close to Moscow. He added that the US is bringing too much pressure to bear on friends in Pristina and not enough on Belgrade. Senator Risch (R-ID) was not far behind, focusing (among other things) on regional energy and cybersecurity issues.
Europe whole and free
State Department Counselor Chollet treated the Balkans as a missing piece of the “Europe whole and free” puzzle the Administration seeks to solve. The February and March normalization “agreements” between Belgrade and Pristina he treated as a breakthrough. He acknowledged Kosovo as a good friend and Serbia as a problematic. He sought to reinforce support for Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Montenegro’s progress on rule of law, and Macedonia and Albania’s movement towards EU membership.
State Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabriel Escobar claimed the recent normalization agreements are being implemented. He pledged to deter Milorad Dodik’s movement toward secession. He pushed on EU accession for Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia, including a constitutional change in Skopje recognizing the Bulgarian minority.
Ethnonationalism
Questioned about corruption in Serbia, Chollet claimed the US is dealing with it. Pressed on Vucic’s refusal to sign the normalization agreement or to implement it, he retreated to bothsidism. Escobar claimed the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities would have to be consistent with the Kosovo constitution and would provide advantages to Kosovo in its relations with its Serb population.
Menendez urged that the US engage with the EU nonrecognizers, eliciting suggestions from Chollet and Escobar that progress on normalization would help. On minority rights in Serbia, Escobar made the usual noises about being concerned for all but made no commitment to seek conditions for them equivalent to what the Serbs are seeking in Kosovo.
Risch asked about US relations with the different ethnic groups in Bosnia. Chollet underlined US support for Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and expessed dismay at talk about secession. He promised to impose consequences on those who are corrupt or undermine the Dayton accords. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) asked about the HiRep’s imposition of changed rules after the election. Escobar claimed those changes had allowed formation of the Federation government with objections from “one ethnonationalist” party.
China and Russia
Senator Ricketts (R-NE) asked about growing Chinese influence, especially in Serbia. Escobar bemoaned the easy availability of Chinese financing. He suggested the Committee and its members might be helpful by visiting and talking with people in the Balkans. He also asked about Montenegro and got a strong endorsement of newly elected President Milatovic, whose inauguration Escobar will attend.
Senator Shaheen (D-NH) asked about the EUFOR mandate for peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chollet averred that the UN Security Council will act to renew it without too much difficulty. Escobar and Chollet pledged vigorous use of sanctions against corrupt individuals. They also thought repeating to Vucic and Kurti that they need to move forward will help.
Narcotrafficking and back to ASMM
Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) asked about Albanian narcotrafficking. Escobar said it is a difficult challenge. He agreed that Open Balkans has potential to help and said the US supports initiatives that are open to all of the Balkan states on an equal basis. Chollet referred to the problem of trucks spending “80% of their time” at borders.
Senator Chris Murphy (D-VA) shared Menendez’s worries about Serbia not fulfilling commitments but added that Kosovo has not been much better. The ASMM he thought is not entirely new. It could help Kosovo integrate its Serb population and be less reliant on Belgrade. Chollet said the US will not support anything like a Republika Srpska. Murphy noted we are asking North Macedonia to change its constitution but not Kosovo.
Ethnonationalism redux
Senator Van Hollen (D-MD) asked about Bosnia’s constitution. Escobar thinks the EU is pushing for a more civic Bosnia and some constitutional change will be needed. He thought the formation of the Federation and state governments would lead in that direction but the path would be a rocky one.
Menendez worried about reinforcement of ethnonationalism in Bosnia by the HiRep’s decisions. Escobar suggested that Venice Commission and EU recommendations are up for discussion. But he also thought corruption was part of the problem.
Back to Russia, China, and Open Balkans
Menendez also worried about Serbia’s lack of interest in the EU and what the US can do to stop its drift towards Russia and China. Chollet claimed that is what the US has been doing, but energy, Kosovo, and corruption present obstacles. Serbia has not aligned on sanctions but has been helpful on humanitarian and other issues, including UN resolutions.
Menendez finally worried about Open Balkans and sanctions evasion in Serbia. Escobar claimed sanctions evasion is not a problem in the region and that Open Balkans is complementary to other pro-Europe initiatives. It must be open to all as full members or the US won’t support it.
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Tunisia merits pressure
Distinguished colleagues have addressed a letter to President Biden about Tunisia:
Dear Mr. President:
We write to you with growing alarm over Tunisia’s dramatic turn towards repression and authoritarian rule. During the recent Summit for Democracy, you eloquently spoke about the urgency of our current moment: “We’re at an inflection point in history, where the decisions we make today are going to affect the course of our world for the next several decades.”
Tunisia is part of this global story and struggle. At the start of your term, Tunisia was the last remaining democratic success story of the Arab uprisings. Today, its democracy is dying. What happens in Tunisia in the next critical weeks will reverberate in the region, signaling to competitors like China and Russia that the future of the Middle East aligns ever more closely with their own authoritarian vision.
The situation is dire. Since his coup in July 2021, President Kais Saied has dismantled every democratic institution in the country, pushing through a hyper-presidential system with no checks on his power. He has intensified his crackdown against dissidents, casually labeling them “cancers” and “traitors” and hauling them before military courts. He has jailed his opponents from across the political spectrum, including Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi, Democratic Current leader Ghazi Chaouachi, and National Salvation Front leaders Chaima Issa and Jawher ben Mbarek, among others. And he has incited violence against migrants and Black Tunisians, embracing racist conspiracies. We urge you to take practical steps to reverse these dangerous trends.
The United States should not reward such behavior with aid, loans, praise, and photo-ops. Lending our taxpayer dollars and legitimacy to Saied will only encourage other populist leaders to believe that they too can get away with dismantling democratic institutions. If the U.S. is truly serious about shoring up democracies worldwide, it must send a signal that there are real costs to democratic backsliding.
The Biden administration should immediately suspend all U.S. assistance to the Tunisian government, as it is legally bound to do after both military coups or civilian coups in which the military plays a decisive role. This has happened in Tunisia when the army shuttered the democratically-elected parliament. The U.S. should impose Magnitsky sanctions on Saied and his enablers, including the ministers of interior, defense, and justice, and not provide any funds, training, or equipment to these ministries while they persecute journalists, activists, and dissidents. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was correct to halt work on Tunisia’s $500 million Compact agreement, but formal suspension of the partnership by MCC’s board—chaired by Secretary of State Antony Blinken—would send an even stronger signal.
The pending $1.9 billion IMF loan—which would provide an economic lifeline to Saied’s regime—also represents an important lever. The United States should ask the IMF Executive Board to refuse a final agreement until Tunisia meets specific political conditions, including releasing political prisoners and establishing a genuinely inclusive national dialogue and political roadmap. After all, Saied’s government will be hard-pressed to follow through on its proposed economic reforms without the support of the major political parties, labor unions, and civil society organizations.
We believe such sustained pressure represents the best possible way to halt Tunisia’s authoritarian turn. The swift and universal condemnation of Saied’s racist rhetoric against migrants in February did lead his government to take some measures for their protection. Even if Saied is too dogmatic to change course, however, increased international pressure might lead those around him to stop facilitating his crackdown, limiting the damage he can do to the system. It can also signal to the opposition—as well as everyday Tunisians who are too afraid to speak out—that the U.S. is watching, and not bankrolling their repression.
Our goal should be to incentivize Tunisians across the political spectrum and across state institutions to reconsider the dangers of dictatorship, which, once entrenched, will be difficult to undo. To be sure, if Tunisia ended up defaulting on its debts, ordinary Tunisians would undoubtedly be affected. But they are already suffering under a seemingly never-ending economic crisis, which has only worsened since Saied’s presidential coup in July 2021. An economic strategy that is personalized and subject to the whims of an unpredictable leader is a recipe for continued chaos.
Some fear undue pressure from Washington could drive Tunisia into the arms of China. Such concerns are misplaced, given Beijing’s own constraints at present as well as the historic alignment of Tunisian state institutions with the West. Moreover, even with support from China, Tunisia will still need an IMF loan and U.S. assistance for its economy to recover and attract private investment. Washington must also recognize that the way we compete with China is not just to try and outspend them. Our approach must be to distinguish ourselves from China by bringing our values to the table.
The current crisis in Tunisia is emblematic of a broader trend the U.S. is likely to face going forward: new forms and manifestations of autocracy—often supported by our strategic rivals—challenging democratic values. Your administration has admirably and clearly declared which side it stands on in this debate. Today in Tunisia it has an opportunity to act on those convictions.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Amb. Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Russia
Amb. Jeffrey Feltman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Amb. Jake Walles, former U.S. ambassador to Tunisia
Amb. Robert Ford, former U.S. ambassador to Syria, Algeria
Amb. Cynthia P. Schneider, former U.S. ambassador to The Netherlands
Elliot Abrams, former U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor
Stephanie T. Williams, former UN Senior Advisor on Libya and former US diplomat
Michele Dunne, former Director for North Africa, National Security Council (NSC)
David J. Kramer, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor
Tom Malinowski, former U.S. representative (D-NJ)
Kenneth Wollack, Chairman, National Endowment for Democracy
Matt Duss, former senior advisor to Sen. Bernie Sanders
Francis Fukuyuma, Stanford University
Larry Diamond, Stanford University
Sarah Leah Whitson, Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN)
Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Sarah Yerkes, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Shibley Telhami, University of Maryland
Courtney Freer, Emory University
Shadi Hamid, Brookings Institution
Sharan Grewal, College of William & Mary
Note: Organizational affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.
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Syria is in good company in the Arab League
The Arab League decided yesterday in Cairo to readmit Syria. The League had suspended Syria’s membership in response to its violent crackdown on demonstrators in March 2011. President Assad will presumably attend the May 19 Summit in Riyadh. This comes on top of several bilateral normalization moves, including by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Conditions aren’t likely to be fulfilled
The readmission is supposedly conditional. Though I’ve been unable to find the official statement, press reports suggest the conditions include allowing humanitarian assistance and return of refugees, clamping down on Syria’s burgeoning Captagon drug exports, and the beginnings of a political process called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254.
I’ll be surprised if much of that comes to pass. Assad could and should have done all those things long ago. Preventing humanitarian assistance, blocking return of refugees, financing his regime with drug smuggling, and blocking any transition are all part of his strategy. Readmission to the Arab League is unlikely to change his behavior, which aims at restoration of his personal authority on the entire territory of Syria.
Fighting abates but conflict continues
That is still far off. The mostly Islamist remains of Syria’s opposition control parts of northwestern Syria while Turkish troops control several border areas, where they have pushed hostile Kurdish forces farther east and south. Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces control a large part of the east, with support from the U.S. Damascus requires Iranian and Russian support to maintain sometimes minimal control over the west and south. Israel continues to bomb Syria pretty much at will, to move Iranians and their proxies away from its border and to block military supplies to Hizbollah in Lebanon.
None of these conflicts is settled, but fighting has abated from his heights. None of the forces involved has the will and the wherewithal to change the current situation. Assad no doubt hopes that normalization with the Arab world will solve his economic problems and enable him to mount the effort required to regain more territory. He may negotiate to regain territory from Turkey in exchange for promises to clamp down on the Kurds. He’ll wait out the Americans, who aren’t likely to want to remain in Syria much longer.
Autocracy restored
If Assad is successful in restoring his autocracy, he won’t be alone in the Middle East. It is a long time since the Arab Spring of 2011. Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is gone, as is Egypt’s. Bahrain’s democratic movement was snuffed out early. Yemen’s and Libya’s “springs” degenerated into civil war. Sudan is headed in the same direction. Iraq has suffered repeated upheavals, though its American-imposed anocracy has also shown some resilience. Saudi Arabia has undertaken economic and social reforms, but driven entirely by its autocratic Crown Prince. The UAE remains an absolute monarchy.
Only in Morocco and Qatar have a few modest reforms survived in more or less stable and relatively open political environments. They are both monarchies with a modicum of political participation. Though Qatar allows nothing that resembles political parties, there is limited room for freedom of expression. Morocco is a livelier political scene, but the monarchy remains dominant whenever it counts.
America has already adjusted
The Biden Administration has already adjusted. It is treating democratic values as tertiary issues with any Middle Eastern country with a claim to good relations with the US. There is no more talk of Saudi Arabia as a rogue state. Washington is silent on the restorations of autocracy in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The Americans want to see negotiated solutions in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Those are more likely to restore autocracy, or something like Iraq’s power-sharing anocracy, than any sort of recognizable democratic rule.
The Americans are not joining the Syria normalization parade. They are not blocking it either. Washington no doubt figures the conditions are better than nothing. We’ll have to wait and see if that is true.
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Stevenson’s army, May 6
FYI, I’ll be away for a while. But I’ll get to the saved papers when I return.
-In class, we read about the planning for the Iraq war and noted the inadequate planning for Phase IV. Author Garrett Graff has stunning revelations about the decisions on de-Baathification and disbanding the army that led to the insurgency.
– More on the Wagner fights with the Kremlin: WaPo found evidence in Discord leaks, now reports Prigozhin’s latest outburst.
-Politico sees challenges for CJCS successor Brown in some of his earlier statements.
– It’s a podcast, where Trump PDB briefer describes her work.
– Lawfare looks at the congressional debate over the debt language in the 14th amendment.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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