My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
– Several insider stories about the tanks for Ukraine deal reveal bureaucratic politics at work. DOD did not want to send M1s for many reasons. Biden overruled the Pentagon to meet German demands. But DOD will contract to build the tanks, not send them from current stocks. Politico has the diplomatic angle. Fred Kaplan explains DOD. NYT has the Biden perspective, and NYT also details the broader Ukraine arms issue.
Ross Douthat has a powerful insight, that Washington and Moscow are both escalating to reach a peace settlement that is likely just to ensure stalemate.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
– Budget hawk think tank CRFB, whose online game we use in class to help you understand what’s in the US budget, has a new report on balancing the budget. NYT’s Paul Krugman says we don’t have to worry so much about the debt.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Here is the latest version I’ve seen of the German-French plan for normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. It is a step in the right direction, if fully implemented, but with some dubious additions and important missing elements.
What’s new
This latest text has a bit more detail on arrangements for the Serbian community in Kosovo than I have seen previously, especially in Article 7 (the glitch [sic] is in the original):
Both sides advocate for the achievement of concrete arrangements, in accordance with the relevant instruments of the Council of Europe and using existing European experiences, in order to ensure an appropriate level of self-government for the Serbian community in Kosovo and the possibility of providing services in Kosovo. Kosovo.[sic] some specific areas, including the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia and direct channels of communication between the Serbian community and the Government of Kosovo.
The parties will formalize the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and ensure a high level of protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage, in accordance with existing European models.
The first of these paragraphs isn’t great. It fails to make reference to the Kosovo constitution as the basis for these “concrete arrangements.” It also fails to require reciprocity inside Serbia for the Albanian community there. What conditions would govern “the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia”? Nor is it clear what “direct channels of communication” with the Kosovo government means. There is already a Council of Communities that provides such communication with the Kosovo President, as well as Serb and other community representation in parliament and in the government ministries.
As for the Church, the text lacks reference to the longstanding issue of the Decan/i monastery’s property. It should reference implementation of the relevant Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
What’s missing
Most important is what is missing. There is no apparent reference to recognition of Kosovo by the five EU members that do not recognize it.
The failure to get recognition by the five nonrecognizers is a deal breaker. It might not have to be in this text, but it would have to happen in order for Kosovo to be convinced that normalization was real. Even with those five recognitions, this agreement would not come close to the German/German Basic Treaty it is supposedly modeled after. That entailed the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic both becoming members of the United Nations. There is no such possibility here, as Russia would require an unacceptable price.
EU negotiator Lajcak is said to have met with the five nonrecognizers this week in Brussels. That’s good, but more is going to be needed. Each one will have to be convinced that the time has come to drop their opposition to Kosovo’s European prospects. Washington and EU capitals, not just Lajcak, will need to engage.
The rest of the iceberg
They will also need to engage on pressuring both Belgrade and Pristina to make the necessary compromises. Pressure on Kosovo has long been apparent. It is relatively easy to pressure a country that has no other option than bandwagoning with NATO and the EU. Pressure on Serbia is far less so. President Vucic has played a successful hedging game, balancing Russia and China against the EU and US.
That game may now be up. The Europeans have delivered a tough ultimatum to Serbia, one whose specific content is uncertain but easy to imagine. Branko Milanovic does:
threats must range from the suspension of EU negotiations, elimination of EU support funds (that Serbia gets as a candidate member), reintroduction of visas, discouragement of EU investors, to possibly additional financial sanctions (say, no access to short-term commercial loans), ban on long-term lending by the European banks, EBRD and possibly the World Bank and the IMF, and for the very end elements of a true embargo and perhaps seizure of assets.
@Demush Shasha thinks this has caused a notable change in President Vucic’s tone:
Have been following many of these conferences. This was the most realistic by far. Vucic spoke about need for Serbia to stop “lying to itself” and “open its eyes” and understand the consequences of rejecting French-German proposal.
He noted that Serbia can not stop Kosovo membership into NATO, CoE, etc. He underlined that if Serbia rejects French-Gerrman proposal: (1) EU accession process will be stoped, incl visa ban, (2) withdrawal of EU investments, (3) overall economic sanctions.
I think what we saw tonight is a first clear step in prepping the the ground for agreement with Kosovo.
Let me echo Demush. Something is beginning to move. Branko, a keen observer of the Balkans even if he mostly focuses on inequity worldwide, is opting for taking the agreement rather than suffering the consequences. It is not however yet clear whether the push will be sufficient. We’ll have to wait and see whether hopes are realized or dashed.
Charlie has been back a few days, but I’ve been down for the count, so here is a massive catchup edition:
January 23:
The ever-valuable D Brief has this: Norway’s military chief said around 180,000 Russian troops have been killed or injured in Ukraine so far. “Russian losses are beginning to approach around 180,000 dead or wounded soldiers,” and “Ukrainian losses are probably over 100,000 dead or wounded,” Defense Minister Eirik Kristoffersen told TV2 on Sunday. He also said an estimated 30,000 civilians have been killed in the war so far, though he didn’t elaborate on how he arrived at any of his numbers.
[This is interesting because the two subjects NOT covered by the western media are Ukrainian casualties and operational restrictions imposed by NATO couontries.]
– We talked in class about George Santos. New York magazine claims to list all of his lies.
– The pending appointment of Jeff Zients to be WH chief of staff resurrected this story about how he failed to create a Department of Trade. As we’ll discuss in class, congressional committees weren’t happy with either the plan or the reorganization power Zients proposed because it weakened their jurisdiction.
-The Economist often has clever headlines. Politico wins the prize this week for: Who Shot the Serif?
January 22:
Happy Year of the Rabbit!
As I read the accumulated papers, I see these items of special interest:
– Paul Kane laments the retirement of Senate “work horses” and includes data on diminished voting on amendments [because of the filled “amendment tree”]
I see that a lot has been happening during my travels. The big news on Ukraine is the dispute between US & Germany over tanks. A good catch-up piece is today’s D Brief, a newsletter worth reading regularly.
Good news for Congress: NYT says lawmakers changed the rules that in effect give them a $34,000 pay boost which they never would have voted for directly.
More good news at State: Sec. Blinken has ordered a shift from Times New Roman fonts for official documents to Calibri. When I worked on the Policy Planning Staff I failed to persuade Under Secretary Pickering to take advantage of the retiring of the Wang Computers and allow overseas cables to be written with upper and lower case letters instead of the required [by the former technology] ALL CAPS ALL THE TIME.
Also January 20:
Many of you know that I favor a return to Regular Order in Congress, the way the armed services committees do the NDAA, with vigorous oversight, a bill open to many amendments, and a compromise process that allows the ill to be signed into law — for 62 years now. But both Democratic and Republican leaders have opposed those open rules. Speaker McCarthy now wants to bring them back. Here’s what happened last time.
Fletcher’s Dan Drezner puts his economic statecraft syllabus in his Substack column. I like his work and will review this for things I should be assigning.
The Partnership for Public Service has a guidebook for new officials that has a lot of good ideas on how to be an effective bureaucrat. I probably should make it required reading.
On Politico a sometime historian compares FDR’s help to Britain before Pearl Harbor to the West’s help to Ukraine today. Good background, but I’d note that FDR was constrained by US public and congressional opinion, not by a fear of provoking war with Hitler. Biden is limited by concerns about Russia reactions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Derek Chollet, Counselor at the State Department, is the highest-ranking US government official dealing with the Balkans these days. He was in Pristina and Belgrade last week. What should we understand from his tweets about the trip?
The caveats
First: the caveats. We don’t know whether Chollet tweets for himself or has staffers do it. He surely supervises the tweeting, but that might be after the fact, not necessarily before. Nor should we expect tweets to reveal anything the US government regards as confidential. But tweets have become a main vehicle for getting into the public domain a diplomat’s narrative about trips and meetings. So it is worth some time and mental energy to interpret them.
Pristina
Derek began his trip on January 11 with this meeting and tweet:
Had a wide-ranging conversation with Kosovan journalists today. Once again commended for immediate and strong solidarity with Ukraine & discussed our perspective on ASM and next steps for the EU-facilitated, US-supported Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.
That “Kosovan” may signal that there was at least one Serb journalist in the group. Albanians in Kosovo refer to themselves as Kosovars; Kosovan is accepted way of referring to “citizens of Kosovo,” regardless of ethnicity. I can’t imagine why he would commend journalists for solidarity with Ukraine. More pertinent was his mention of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM), which the Americans are pressing hard. So no real surprises here, but a pretty clear indication of priorities: Ukraine, dialogue, ASM.
Next up was a meeting with Prime Minister Kurti:
Important conversation with @albinkurti on Dialogue. Appreciate engaging constructively and flexibly. Looking forward to continued partnership on advancing ongoing efforts towards normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
This is pretty friendly to Kurti, who has aggravated the Americans a great deal in the past. It appears not only to acknowledge some flexibility and constructiveness on his part, but also states that the objective of the dialogue is normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. That falls short of mutual recognition, which is what Kurti wants. But it corresponds to EU objectives and goes much further than Serbia has been willing to go so far. An “important” conversation in diplomatese means one that pointed in the right direction.
President Vjosa Osmani is less directly engaged in the dialogue but has played an important role in staking out the Kosovo state’s posture on many issues:
Good to meet with VjosaOsmaniPRKS. Our partnership is steadfast. We commend Kosovo for solidarity with Ukraine in enacting sanctions, supporting refugees and journalists, and condemning Putin’s war. Grateful for Kosovo’s generosity in hosting Afghan evacuees & refugees.
That acknowledges Kosovo’s solidarity with the West on two key issues. It’s a good look for Pristina.
From here things get a bit harder to interpret. Chollet met next with the Kosovan Serb political party sponsored by Belgrade whose members have withdrawn from Kosovo’s state institutions:
Informative meeting with Srpska List members. Valuable to hear the concerns of all communities in Kosovo. Need Kosovan Serbs in Kosovan institutions. We continue to emphasize the importance of an ASM consistent with Kosovo’s Constitution.
This underlines the importance of the Serbs’ return to their official jobs and offers an ASM consistent with the Kosovo constitution as incentive. That last point on the constitution has not always been clear in US statements, but of course it reduces the incentive, as Srpska Lista has no interest in an ASM that isn’t controlled by Belgrade.
Chollet went on to meet with political opposition and civil society leaders:
Appreciate hearing from Kosovo’s opposition leaders. Constructive dissent is essential to a strong democracy. Grateful for the opportunity to engage and hear their views.
Really enjoyed the discussion with representatives of Kosovan civil society. Appreciate the important role you play in advocating for all citizens & holding institutions accountable. Your efforts advance the EU-led Dialogue & support inclusion of all communities in Kosovo.
These are pretty pro forma statements. It is good, standard practice for US diplomats to meet with opposition and civil society leaders. It tells you something mainly when it doesn’t happen, as we’ll see in Belgrade.
Belgrade
There Chollet stuck with protocol order, which means President Vucic first:
We seek a strong relationship with Serbia based on respect and a shared commitment to democratic principles. Thanks to @predsednikrs Vucic for good conversation on US-Serbia partnership.
This is not enthusiastic. He states the American objective without any hint that it was shared by Vucic and he refers to a “good” conversation, which in diplomatese connotes disagreement.
No one should agree to be photographed with Vucic standing up:
The contrast is immediately apparent in Chollet’s meeting with Foreign Minister Dacic:
Great conversation with FM Dacic. We value Serbia’s commitment to peace and stability, and we are committed to helping Serbia realize its European future.
This is odd though, as Dacic is a prime Russophile who may have been smart enough to quot the State Department statement on Chollet’s trip, which cited peace and stability. But his political commitments are far closer to Moscow than Brussels.
Things get worse at the next meeting:
Pleased to meet PM @AnaBrnabic and DPM/Minister of Defense @VucevicM to talk key issues from energy security to economic integration, to U.S.-Serbia defense relations and ensuring peace and stability.
Brnabic was particularly antagonistic toward Europe and the US during last month’s Belgrade-instigated blockade of northern Kosovo while Vucevic mobilized Serbian forces on the boundary/border. I suppose that soft reference to ensuring peace and stability betrays a bit harder line in private, but these two are prime movers behind Belgrade’s opposition to sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and many other anti-Western Serbian government positions. Why no hint of that?
Chollet met with the press in Serbia and tweeted this:
Free and independent press is key to a flourishing democracy. Happy to spend time tonight talking with #Serbia’s dynamic press corps about where we can take relations in 2023 and beyond.
Serbia’s press is far from free and independent. It’s “dynamism” is manifest in finding ways every day to pump up fake fear of Kosovo Albanians and do the bidding of the government in myriad other ways.
Civil society in Serbia is in far better shape, in part because it lacks political weight. Chollet tweeted this:
Civil society is crucial to ensuring the rights of all citizens in every democracy. Enjoyed hearing from a diverse group about their important work here in Serbia.
But there was no photograph. Maybe someone wasn’t comfortable with being seen at that meeting.
One big difference between Belgrade and Pristina: no meeting with the political opposition in Belgrade. It is weak, but exists. It includes some ultra-nationalists as well as more liberal democratic folks. But not meeting with opposition is a notable departure from normal US diplomatic practice. Why not?
It might of course have happened in private. But even that tells us what we need to know. Unlike Kosovo, Serbia is no longer a democracy but is well on the way to autocracy. That should inform American policy. It doesn’t yet.
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