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Problems and solutions: perceptions matter

What you do about a problem depends on how you perceive the forces at work creating it and the possibilities for solution. Perceptions often diverge. Here are some issues in the Balkans today where that is the case, including my own views:

Did President Vucic control this month’s Serb rebellion in northern Kosovo?

He claimed not. He told Western diplomats that if they press him too hard about northern Kosovo without offering him something he might lose control there. That would presumably make things worse. Vucic is expert at playing this game. What he wants is the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). That would be an institutional vehicle for maintaining Belgrade’s control over the Serb population in Kosovo permanently.

In my view, it’s nonsense to pretend Vucic doesn’t control what happens among the Serbs in northern Kosovo. It is true Vucic is not liked by many of them, because he has delivered nothing they want. But the barricades erected there in recent weeks came down the day, nay the hour, in which he said so. The Serbian security services and organized crime they control are the main instigators in the north. Anyone who bucks them will be arrested, beaten up, fired, or worse.

Is the problem Kurti?

Many American and European officials dislike Albin Kurti, the prime minister of Kosovo. There are several reasons for this. In opposition, he was a firebrand and his political movement used violence both inside and outside the parliament. He has advocated a referendum on union with Albania, something Washington and Brussels won’t permit. He is often uncompromising, or as he says “principled.” He does not, as his predecessors did, bend easily to American and European preferences.

In my view, Kurti is a sovereigntist. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, but it is still not completely sovereign. A NATO-led force defends its territorial integrity. Foreigners still play roles in its judicial system. Kurti wants to establish Kosovo’s sovereignty, in part by reaching a “final” agreement with Serbia that includes strict reciprocity in all matters and mutual recognition. He doesn’t want to settle for the half measures Washington and Brussels encourage. That frustrates their diplomats.

Can KFOR solve the current crisis?

The NATO-led force in Kosovo, KFOR, now has about 3800 troops from 27 countries. In principle, that force concentrated in the north and properly equipped and trained could have readily taken down the barricades and calmed the situation. Its responsibilities also include Kosovo’s territorial defense. Serbia mobilized its forces along the border/boundary with Kosovo. Were the Serbian Army to enter Kosovo, KFOR (not the still nascent Kosovo Security Force) would be responsible for pushing them back.

In my view, KFOR is lacking what it needs for both its civil and territorial defense roles. Its troops are not all in the north, they are not all trained and equipped for civil unrest, and many of the troop-supplying countries would not want to see their forces in violent conflict. Belgrade understands this and exploits KFOR’s weaknesses. KFOR needs more capacity, not just to push back demonstrators (Albanian or Serb) and the Serbian Army but also to negotiate from a position of strength.

Is the solution two Germanies?

Paris and Berlin have been working for months on a proposal for a half measure that is usually referred to as the “two Germanies” model. The Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic in the early 1970s agreed to live and let live, without mutual recognition. The idea to use this as a model for Kosovo and Serbia has been around for a long time. A version of the French-German proposal leaked in November, but there is said to be a more recent version that includes the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.

In my view, the leaked document isn’t too bad, but it is not two Germanies. Both Germanies became members of the United Nations in 1973. No one thinks Serbia will concede on UN membership for Kosovo. Even if Belgrade were to cave, Moscow won’t without exacting a high price from the West. The model discussed is “two Germanies minus.” It might have some virtues, but the ASM should be included only in a final agreement that provides for mutual recognition. In that context even a sovereigntist like Kurti should be open to considering the proposition.