Category: Eddie Grove
Israel hostage to its own right wing
On Wednesday, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia hosted a talk entitled The Threat from Within: Israel’s Extremist Dilemma by Barak Mendelsohn, FPRI senior fellow and associate professor of political science at Haverford College. Mendelsohn is an Israeli expert on radical Islam, who also served in the Israeli Defense Force for five years. Alan Luxenberg moderated. Audio of the conference can be found here.
Mendelsohn explained that most of his work focuses on jihadism, but his research on how actors interpret religion led him to probe similarities between jihadism and Jewish extremism. A few years ago, he was an isolated voice but sadly now finds himself vindicated, with the two recent attacks at the Pride Parade in Jerusalem and at Duma in the West Bank.
Religious Jewish terrorism is not new in Israel. There have been several attacks and attempted attacks since the 1980s. Baruch Goldstein’s massacre of Arabs at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron in 1994 and Rabin’s assassination in 1995 are among them. Jewish terrorism cannot be separated from the settlement project of Israel’s messianic right-wing. It incubates Jewish extremism.
Every monotheistic religion can clash with the state because of the conflict between divine authority and temporal authority. But many religious people have found ways to reconcile God and the state. Religious Zionism saw the emergence of Israel as part of God’s redemptive process. Religious Zionists tolerated state action that conflicted with their preferences because the will of God was represented in the state’s authority.
Many Religious Zionists looked at the victory of 1967 as God’s plan for Israel. They were excited to return to lost Jewish lands, especially Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). The costly 1973 war led to gloom. Religious Jews began to sanctify land over other Jewish values, including the sanctity of life. If the state went against this value, the state was to be opposed.
All Israeli governments since have pandered to Jewish extremists, not just Likud governments. The messianic right built settlements without state authorization. State institutions provided aid to unauthorized settlements. Many were retroactively recognized, even when built on private Palestinian land. The IDF role in the West Bank was was to protect settlers from Palestinians, not protecting Palestinians. When members of the messianic right took illegal actions, few were prosecuted. The courts handed down mild sentences to those who were. Politicians granted amnesty.
In the 1990s, the view that a two-state solution was necessary became dominant among Israel’s political establishment. But the state was unable to act according to its strategic interests and dissociate itself from the messianic right. The state found itself tied to interests that clashed with its own. The messianic movement’s settlements built close to Palestinian cities prevented their expansion and led to increased friction and hostility. This created a self-fulfilling prophecy that made finding a solution to the conflict more difficult.
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The Iran deal’s regional impact
On Monday, an all-MEI panel discussed After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics. Panelists included Robert S. Ford, senior fellow and former US Ambassador to Syria, Thomas W. Lippman, scholar, Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies, and Alex Vatanka, senior fellow. Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research moderated.
Vatanka stated that reformists, moderates, the Iranian public and most of the Iranian media are in favor of the deal. Some hardliners criticize the deal, but they’ve opened a previously taboo debate about the pros and cons of Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei has been vague, but this shouldn’t be taken as opposition; Khamenei rarely unequivocally supports anything. Those close to Khamenei are defending the deal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasn’t come out against it but they and their subsidiaries worry that the deal will hurt them financially. Rouhani needs to reassure them that they won’t lose out as foreign firms enter the market.
The Rouhani Administration is a Western-educated team with cohesive thinking on the country’s direction. Like China, they may try to open up economically and deal with political reform later. Zarif believes that Western companies must invest in Iran to render the deal more stable. Khamenei appears to accept economic reform but has made the resistance economy part of his legacy. It is unclear what he wants from the deal. Is he looking to prevent the possibility of war, eliminate sanctions, or make new friends? If many reformists lose their seats in the next Majlis elections, it means that Khamenei is unwilling to let a reform agenda go farther. If the Majlis accepts the deal and Congress rejects it, Iran can portray themselves as the good guys.
There are contradictions regarding Iran’s regional relations. The deputy foreign minister recently stated that Iran wanted to talk with the Saudis about Yemen and Bahrain, but then an ayatollah at a Friday sermon put Saudi Arabia, Israel and ISIS in the same category. If the reformists reconcile too much with the Saudis, the hardliners will brand them as pro-Saudi agents.
Lippman said that despite US declarations of an unshakeable commitment to the Gulf, Gulf Arabs were publicly skeptical until recently. Now the GCC countries publicly (if not privately) believe the US commitment. Beginning at Camp David, they decided that the Iran deal was done and that they weren’t going to do “a full Bibi.” They will work with the US and each other to confront regional problems.
The Saudis won’t race to a bomb; they care about self-preservation, which includes full integration into the world economy. The Saudis can’t afford to become nuclear outlaws.
Tol stated that understanding Turkish fear of the Kurds is key to grasping Turkish politics. It also plays a role in Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis Iran. Turkey shares the West’s objectives regarding Iran’s nuclear program but has promoted engagement rather than isolation, voting against UN sanctions in 2010. Iran is a large market for Turkish goods and the two countries have close energy ties. However, Turkey worries that a nuclear Iran could change the regional balance of power. All political parties in Turkey welcomed the deal and the sanctions relief.
Turkey has three main concerns about Iran:
- Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq and opposes Turkey in Syria.
- Closer ties between Washington and Tehran could come at Turkey’s expense, focusing too much attention on the fight against ISIS and undermining Turkey’s anti-Assad efforts;
- Iran’s support for the PKK and PYD.
Ford asserted that the problems in Iraq and Syria don’t revolve around the US and Iran but around local grievances. The pressures against the Iraqi state are increasing. Low oil prices are contributing to the Kurdish drive for independence. Progress on Sunni-Shia reconciliation is lacking. Iran is partially responsible because of its ties to militias that are considered terrorist organizations by the US. Iran is unlikely to give up these allies, whose political leaders are ruthless and capable. It is unclear if the US and Iran can work together in Iraq. ISIS can recruit as long as the conflict between the Sunnis and the militias continues. If Iran cedes control of the militias to President Abadi, that could help.
Assad is losing and the opposition is advancing on the Alawite homeland. There are diplomatic visits between Syria, Russia, and Iran; Syria’s foreign minister recently visited Tehran and likely
also Oman, which serves as an intermediary with the Saudis. There are also reports that Iran is about to put forward a peace plan with a unity government, constitutional amendments to protect minorities, and future internationally supervised elections. Ford thinks this won’t succeed because the Turks haven’t signed on and their closeness with the armed opposition gives them a veto.
The Russians and Iranians are urging the US to stop pushing against Assad and start working with him, but Assad is about to lose his supply lines. There were recent anti-Assad protests in Alawite-majority Latakia province. Assad doesn’t have the capacity to take on ISIS if it can’t hold the Damascus suburbs. The Iranians have to recognize that Assad is losing but they will almost certainly use at least a small portion of the money from sanctions relief to shore-up Hezbollah and Assad. This will cause a short-term increase in violence.
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Peace picks August 10-14
1. After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics | Monday, August 10th | 12:00 – 1:30 | MEI | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a discussion of expectations across the region following Iran’s agreement with the P5+1 on its nuclear program. The historic deal may end Iran’s status as a pariah state, particularly in capitals outside the region. How have leaders in Tehran indicated they may proceed? How do the Arab states and Turkey view the implications of an Iran empowered by sanctions relief and diplomatic normalization? How might regional states react if Iran steps up its interventions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere? And what actions are America’s allies in the region likely to want of the United States in managing Iran? Discussing these and other questions will be MEI senior fellow Robert S. Ford, MEI scholar Thomas W. Lippman, director of the Center for Turkish Studies Gönül Tol, and senior fellow Alex Vatanka. MEI’s vice president for policy & research Paul Salem will moderate the conversation.
2. Naval Aviation | Wednesday, August 12th | 9:00-10:00 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join CSIS and the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) for a discussion with Lieutenant General Jon Davis, Deputy Commandant for Aviation and Vice Admiral Mike Shoemaker, Commander, Naval Air Forces moderated by Admiral Joseph Pureher, USN, Ret. Vice Admiral Peter H. Daly, USN, Ret., CEO, USNI will provide an introduction. The Maritime Security Dialogue brings together CSIS and USNI, two of the nation’s most respected non-partisan institutions. The series is intended to highlight the particular challenges facing the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, from national level maritime policy to naval concept development and program design. Given budgetary challenges, technological opportunities, and ongoing strategic adjustments, the nature and employment of U.S. maritime forces are likely to undergo significant change over the next ten to fifteen years. The Maritime Security Dialogue provides an unmatched forum for discussion of these issues with the nation’s maritime leaders.
3. Thailand and the Changing Geopolitical Dynamics of Southeast Asia | Wednesday, August 12th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the Asia-Pacific, economic development and interconnectivity is growing alongside increasing tensions between neighbor states. This is no clearer than in the fight for building Thailand’s infrastructure. Nobuhiro Aizawa will discuss how Thailand’s 2014 coup and competing infrastructure bids are altering the geopolitics and international relations of Southeast Asia. Abigail Friedman will offer comment, and Carnegie’s James L. Schoff will moderate. Speakers include: Nobuhiro Aizawa, associate professor, Kyushu University, Abigail Friedman, founder and CEO, The Wisteria Group. Moderator: James L. Schoff, senior associate, Asia Program,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
4. The Threat from Within: Israel’s Extremist Dilemma | Wednesday, August 12th | 11:30 | FPRI (n.b. this event is in Philadephia but FPRI posts video and/or audio of its events) | REGISTER TO ATTEND | “We have been lax in tackling Jewish terrorism,” said Israeli President Reuven Rivlin this week in response to the attacks at the gay pride parade and then the firebombing of a home in the West Bank, resulting in the burning to death of an 18-month-old child. These are not isolated incidents, however, and pose a threat to the Israeli government’s authority, Israeli democracy, and add yet another impediment to peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. We have asked Barak Mendelsohn to explore the rise of Jewish extremism in Israel, the dilemmas it poses for Israel, and what might be done to alleviate it. Barak Mendelsohn is a senior fellow at FPRI and associate professor of political science at Haverford College. This past academic year, he served as a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Security at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He has already written extensively on the Messianic movement inside Israel, in addition to his work on radical Islam and jihadism. He served in the IDF for 5 years and received his Ph.D. in government from Cornell University. His books include Combating Jihadism (University of Chicago Press, 2009) and The Al Qaeda Franchise (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015).
5. From Coalition to Conservative Majority: What’s Next for UK Foreign Policy? |Wednesday, August 12th | 6:30 | British Embassy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This past May, the United Kingdom took to the voting booths and surprised many pollsters by handing a slim majority to Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservative Party, thereby electing the UK’s first Conservative majority government in over a decade. Meanwhile, former Tory coalition partners the Liberal Democrats, led by outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, managed to hold only about 15% of their previous seats, the Labour Party lost seats and the Scottish National Party became the third largest party in the Commons. Since the election, the UK has continued to play a major role in the international foreign policy scene, from announcing its commitment to maintaining NATO’s defense spending target of 2% of GDP to playing a leading role in negotiations on the Iran Nuclear Deal. Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and the British Embassy invite you to join us for a post-election discussion moderated by Deputy Head of Mission to the United States, Patrick Davies. Mr. Davies, joined by a panel of experts from the Embassy, will discuss the new UK government, as the UK and its allies grapple with foreign policy issues such as combating ISIL, nuclear negotiations with Iran and EU reform.
6. Assessing the Iran Nuclear Agreement: Placing Sanctions in Context | Thursday, August 13th | 10:00-11:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Sanctions are what convinced Iran to begin negotiations with the United States. However, the mechanics behind lifting sanctions and the differences among international, U.S. and European Union sanctions are complicated. All beg the question of how effective the Iran deal really is. This program will explore the role of sanctions in the Iran Deal. Our panelists will examine the structure of the sanctions regime, debate its various implications, and explore what we can do about it. Among the questions to be addressed are: What sanctions are currently in place on Iran? What is the difference between multi-lateral oil sanctions and unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran? Is it really possible for the sanctions to be “snapped back” if Iran violates the agreement? Would the sanctions regime really disband if there was no agreement? Join us as our panel discusses Iran’s new sanctions regime and what it means for the future. Panelists include: Ilan Berman, Vice President, American Foreign Policy Council, Emanuele Ottolenghi, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation. Hosted by: James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, Heritage Foundation.
7. The Iran Deal: Key Issues and Controversies | Thursday, August 13th | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a discussion with Dr. Colin Kahl and other members of the administration on key elements of the Iran nuclear deal and its specific implications for the international community. Speakers include: Dr. Colin Kahl,
Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Adviser to the Vice President, Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Director for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, National Security Council, Chris Backemeyer, Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, U.S. Department of State. Moderator: Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS.
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Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria
On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?. Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated. The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.
Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition. Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings. The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue. The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon. The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked. YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy. This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.
After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad. This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey. There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint. The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions. The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.
Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria. Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria. The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy. Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question. Necessity has limited Turkish actions. Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.
Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition. Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested. Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD? The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory. The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls. If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.
Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives. The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term. The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation. The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:
- How deep into Syria will it go?
- Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
- Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?
Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.
Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:
- We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
- Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
- There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.
We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win. This is a tough line to walk with Turkey. The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence. Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force. The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad. The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex. We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program. Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra. Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point. However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain. Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program. Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899. The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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Shore-up Jordan before it’s too late…
Ambassador Oded Eran (Senior Research Fellow, INSS, former Israeli ambassador to Jordan, the EU and NATO, and former head of the Israeli negotiating team with the Palestinians) and Eddie Grove (Research Assistant Intern, MEI and former Research Assistant Intern, INSS) co-authored an article entitled Threats to Stability in Jordan in the July 2015 issue of INSS Strategic Assessment. The article describes the challenges that Jordan must overcome in both the short-term and the long-term to remain stable.
Despite persistent predictions of the imminent demise of the Hashemite regime, Jordan has remained stable, buoyed by international aid from the US and the GCC. Jordan faces a growing jihadi threat, fueled largely by a poor economy and high youth unemployment. In the short-term, Jordan’s stability will be aided by low oil prices and a temporary rise in patriotism after pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh’s murder by ISIS. In the long-term, Jordan needs to address water and energy scarcity issues to remain stable and serve the needs of a growing population, including its many refugees.
Jordan has high unemployment, including a youth unemployment rate of ~30%. A few key reasons for this include:
- Jordan’s education system doesn’t provide students with necessary skills for the workforce.
- Jordanian students often choose fields of study that aren’t in high demand in the workforce.
- Syrian refugees compete for informal sector jobs.
Youth unemployment, often long in duration, leads to frustration. This frustration is compounded by a lack of avenues for political expression among Jordanian youth. Little real reform occurred during Jordan’s relatively small-scale Arab Spring protests.
Some discontented youth see jihadism as attractive. Experts estimate that there are 5,000-10,000 jihadis in Jordan, and that this number may have doubled since the Arab Spring. Jordan’s jihadis were traditionally mainly Palestinian, but growing numbers of ethnic Jordanians (East Bankers) have been joining the movement. East Bankers have traditionally been regime loyalists and comprise the majority of the military and security services. Cracks in their loyalty pose a serious threat to the regime.
The government closely watches jihadis; it arrests those who post jihadi content online and preachers who deliver extremist sermons. According to one expert, the vast majority of Jordan’s jihadis now sympathize with ISIS. ISIS has grassroots support, if not an organized presence. YouTube videos have shown pro-ISIS rallies in Ma’an and Zarqa and there is also evidence of ISIS sympathizers in Irbid. As of fall 2014, there were 1000-1500 Jordanian fighters in Syria, and 8% of Jordan’s population sympathized with ISIS. Ten percent didn’t consider ISIS a terrorist organization, and opposition to Jordan’s participation in coalition airstrikes was widespread: #ThisIsNotOurWar was a trending Twitter hashtag.
When Muath Al-Kasasbeh was murdered, it prompted an anti-ISIS backlash and a surge in patriotism. A February 2015 poll showed overwhelming support for Jordan’s participation in coalition airstrikes, and that 95% of the population now considered ISIS a terrorist organization. Confidence in PM Ensour’s government also increased. King Abdullah urged Jordanians to “hold their heads high.” This became a trending hashtag on Twitter. The surge in patriotism was not universal, however, as a Jordanian MP and a high-ranking Jordanian diplomat publicly derided this new slogan. In addition, an ISIS cell was arrested in Mafraq in March 2015, a poor city with many Syrian refugees.
The wave of patriotism will fade and energy costs will increase, so Jordan needs to address its water
and energy scarcity issues. Water scarcity may have been a contributory cause of Syria’s civil war, and Jordan is one of the world’s most water-scarce countries. Additionally, ~40% of the inputs into Jordan’s water networks become Non-revenue Water (NRW). NRW is essentially water that is not accounted for when customers are billed, due to leakage, illegal use, faulty meters, incompetent meter-readers, and poor accounting. Israel provides Jordan with water from Lake Kinneret, and this quantity may increase in the future. Jordan also plans to desalinate water at Aqaba. However, solving Jordan’s water crisis requires progress on multiple fronts, including NRW reduction (with the help of the international community). Climate change could worsen Jordan’s water woes, and comparisons between Jordan and Syria are ominous. Water scarcity drove internal migration in Syria, which combined with other factors like corruption, unemployment and inequality to ignite the crisis. Jordan displays similar risk factors.
Jordan must also address its energy scarcity issues. Jordan used to import natural gas from Egypt, but repeated terror attacks on the pipeline through the Sinai halted the imports and damaged Jordan economically, forcing it to import costlier petroleum products. Low oil prices provide a temporary respite. Fortunately, Jordan has plans to diversify its energy sources by 2020, with the following breakdown:
- 10% from wind and solar.
- 14% oil shale.
- 6% nuclear.
- 29% natural gas.
- 1% imported electricity.
- 40% petroleum products.
Unfortunately, this won’t happen, at least not by 2020. Israel may import gas from Israel, but this is politically challenging and Israel’s gas companies are embroiled in an anti-trust dispute with the Israeli government. Gas from Gaza is more politically palatable for Jordan, but is unlikely to come online soon for political reasons. Jordan imports LNG from Qatar, but this is costlier than gas via pipeline. Little progress has been made on the wind and solar projects, and Jordan’s nuclear ambitions may never come to fruition because of high costs and international opposition. Oil shale (not to be confused with shale oil) has never before been extracted on a commercial scale and may not be viable at oil prices below $75/barrel.
Costly energy imports damage Jordan’s economy (and therefore its stability) as follows:
- High energy prices increase the cost of living for struggling Jordanians.
- Jordan’s remaining energy subsidies are a burden on the government’s budget and divert funds from key areas.
- Energy subsidies crowd-out private sector investment.
Energy diversification (with the help of the international community) would alleviate these issues, and help counteract the poor economic conditions that contribute to the rise in jihadism.
Israel has a strong interest in preserving Jordan’s stability, as Jordan is a buffer state. Jordan used to
export goods through Syria, but Israel has allowed Jordan to use Haifa’s port for exports, and is improving the facilities there. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is always a complicating factor in Israeli-Jordanian relations; the majority of Jordan’s population is Palestinian, causing a political climate in which Jordan requires at least a semblance of progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to ensure quiet domestically. Jordan’s 2014-2015 UN Security Council membership further complicates this balancing act.
To shore-up Jordan’s stability, Israel can:
- Increase bilateral cooperation (this has likely already happened).
- Expedite water and gas transfers.
- Allow for greater access of Jordanian products to Israel, but more importantly, the Palestinian market.
- Increase its use of Jordan’s port of Aqaba, which could produce mutual benefits.
In addition, the US and GCC must keep up financial assistance to Jordan, but ensure that this assistance addresses long-term issues. The immediate risk posed by ISIS is likely not a frontal attack. ISIS rather seeks to exploit pockets of poverty and unemployment within Jordan, including among East Bankers. Financial resources are needed to prevent this.
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