Category: Eddie Grove
Tunisia needs more help
On Tuesday, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa hosted a hearing on Tunisia’s Fragile Democratic Transition. Opening statements were given by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman of the subcommittee, Theodore Deutch, Ranking Member of the subcommittee, and Steve Chabot, member of the committee. Testimony was provided by Ambassador Mark Green, President of IRI, Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director at NDI, Aaron Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow, WINEP, and William Sweeney President and CEO, IFES.
Ros-Lehtinen stated that Tunisia is the only country that has made positive gains after the Arab Spring, but these gains are uncertain. Despite its new constitution and elections, Tunisia has been the victim of two recent high-profile terror attacks. The attacks remind us that tourism accounts for 15% of Tunisia’s GDP. Even before the Sousse attack, economic problems in Europe were hurting Tunisia’s tourism.
President Essebsi has claimed that another attack would cause the collapse of Tunisia’s government. The stability of Tunisia and its democratic transition is in the US’s interest. The designation of Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally last week was an important step. But Tunisia is home to the largest contingent of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, and returnees from these conflicts pose a threat. The US needs to help Tunisia strengthen its institutions and invest in its future.
Deutch hailed the peaceful transfer of power after Tunisia’s 2014 parliamentary elections and the ability of its parties to form coalitions. However, Tunisia’s economy has struggled since the revolution. Unemployment is at 15%, and among working-class youth is nearly triple that figure. Tourism has struggled especially after recent attacks. There are home-grown terror cells, external threats from Libya and Algeria, and the threat of returnees from Iraq and Syria. Tunisia’s government must not sacrifice freedom in the name of security. He praised the designation of Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally, as well as the MOU signed in May.
Chabot echoed the statements of Ros-Lehtinen and Deutch concerning Tunisia’s potential to serve as a model and the terror threat. He also expressed concern that Monday’s disappearance of 33 Tunisian citizens on the border with Libya indicates radicalization in that area.
Ambassador Green also affirmed that Tunisia is the brightest hope for democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. The 2014 elections showed that Tunisia’s stakeholders are committed to democracy in a polarized, unstable region. The US administration must train and help reform Tunisia’s security services, which are a holdover from the Ben-Ali regime.
Unemployment weighs most heavily on young Tunisians. Since 2014, IRI has supported decentralization. Tunisia’s bureaucracy stifles entrepreneurship and foreign investment. Tunisia’s government cannot put off economic reform despite pressing security concerns.
Low youth voter participation is another major concern. Civil society groups are necessary to involve youth and connect them to the democratic transition. The US needs to focus more of its aid on supporting democratic governance. Tunisia will likely hold elections in 2016, so the time to foster genuine democratic competition is now.
Campbell several factors that differentiate Tunisia from other Arab countries:
- Tunisia took time to develop its constitution rather than rush to snap elections.
- The military stayed out of politics.
- Civil society was allowed to flourish.
- Tunisia’s political establishment avoided polarizing rhetoric and sought compromise.
Tunisia’s Islamists defied expectations and peacefully transferred power. The situation in Egypt, international pressure, and popular pressure made them respect the democratic process. NDI helped create space for political debate and the parties’ investments in their internal structures have strengthened the democratic process. Campbell cited the balance between freedom and security as a major challenge.
Tunisia does not appear as corrupt as some other countries but there is crony capitalism controlled by privileged families. If you’re not from the right family or region, there is no way to get ahead. It is important to foster a meritocracy. Business leaders want access to capital and want to join international organizations, but there is a sense that crony capitalists are circling the wagons under the current government.
Zelin stated that there have been 11 known attacks by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS since the last election, as well as 10 counter-insurgency operations by the Tunisian military. The US has provided a lot of assistance. Tunisia’s jihadi problem has been present for approximately 20 years, but is coming to the surface now because many exiled radicals returned to Tunisia in 2011.
From 2003-2011, many individuals falsely accused of being terrorists were imprisoned, only to be radicalized in prison. If Tunisia’s current security bill is passed, we could see a repeat of this. The Ministry of Interior is corrupt and many of the bad practices of the Ben-Ali regime are returning, including possible torture in prisons and arbitrary arrests. These are possible sources of radicalization. The police require retraining and capacity building so they can be seen as protectors, not a group that takes away rights.
The government has had difficulty transparently investigating terrorist attacks and communicating the results to the people. President Essebsi’s comment that the government would collapse following another attack was irresponsible and amateurish.
Tunisia has reinforced its border with Libya and is considering a border fence. However, there are individuals with weapons already inside Tunisia and others who come from Algeria.
Sweeny stated that only 16% of American aid to Tunisia goes toward strengthening democracy. More can be done. Prior to the 2016 elections several things are necessary:
- A standard legal framework for local elections.
- Greater professionalism from the electoral commission and capacity-building in its regional offices.
- Implementation of lessons learned from 2014.
- Focus on unemployed youth, for whom dictatorship and democracy remain much the same.
Sweeny agreed with Campbell’s observations about crony capitalism, and stated that it will hinder foreign investment. Foreign investment will also be constrained by a lack of confidence in Tunisia’s stability.
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Don’t take Jordan’s stability for granted
On Tuesday, the Wilson Center hosted a panel discussion on Jordan and the Challenges of Confronting ISIS Next Door. Panelists included Anja Wehler-Schoeck, Resident Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq and David Schenker, Aufzien Fellow and Director, Program on Arab Politics, WINEP. Henri J. Barkey, the director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, moderated. Both Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker agreed that the primary threat to Jordan’s stability is internal radicalization, not an external ISIS assault.
Wehler-Shoeck stated that there was a slight opening in Jordan at the beginning of the Arab Spring, accompanied by some small-scale protests. The Hirak Movement, while smallish in size, attracted Jordanians of diverse backgrounds. The Jordanian government instituted a few reforms and pursued a strategy of co-optation. The movement has now died down.Both Wehler-Shoeck and Schenker stated that Jordanians are refraining from protesting because they are wary of regional instability.
According to Wehler-Shoeck, a dominant security logic took hold in 2013. Journalists are no longer allowed to publish articles about the Jordanian military or the Iraqi-Swedish national who was recently arrested for plotting bomb attacks on Iran’s behalf. There is also self-censorship among journalists and a strict anti-terror law. Within Jordanian society, conspiracy theories about the formation of ISIS abound. Jordanians continue to the view the US critically, partially as a byproduct of the 2003 Iraq invasion.
Wehler-Shoeck asserted that many Jordanians felt conflicted in September 2014 when Jordan joined the anti-ISIS coalition. Most didn’t like ISIS but don’t support their country’s bombing fellow Sunnis. Many people in Ma’an told her that if they had to choose between a government that was fighting fellow Sunnis and ISIS, they would choose ISIS. Schenker pointed out that the leading hashtag on Twitter during this time was #This_Is_Not_Our_War. Jihadist leaders like Abu Sayyaf claimed that Jordan’s participation in the coalition would be the beginning of the end of the regime. According to a poll by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, a significant percentage of Jordanians did not consider ISIS, the Nusra Front or Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations. Many Jordanians viewed them as effective fighting forces against Assad.
Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker explained that the murder of Muath Al-Kasasbeh changed this dynamic. The government cleverly rode the wave of public outcry against ISIS. Schenker compared this shift to the way that Jordanian public opinion turned against AQI following the 2005 Amman hotel bombings. He speculated about how long this shift in opinion will last.
Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker discussed whether Jordan will remain stable. Schenker noted that Jordan looks great compared to much of the region. The IMF and World Bank forecasts for Jordan’s economy are bullish. Wehler-Schoeck, however, pointed out that the economy has been weakened by trade disruptions. Jordan also suffers from dependence on foreign energy.
Both Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker cited Jordan’s strong allies and increased border security. But Wehler-Schoeck stated that Israel is building a wall on its border with Jordan and is forming a new battalion to protect the border. This is telling. Schenker cited frequent reports of skirmishes on the Jordan-Syria border. Jordan spent $1.3 billion on homeland security measures in 2013. Jordan’s military is cohesive, loyal and well-trained. The US has increased its security aid to Jordan.
Wehler-Schoeck stated that both Jordan and the US have denied that Jordan is planning a buffer zone inside Syria. Jordan does not want to send ground forces to Syria. Schenker asserted that ISIS’s capture of Palmyra and Tadmor changed the debate about whether Jordan needs to be more proactive. A buffer zone would be risky. Jordanian soldiers involved in the creation of a buffer zone would be targeted by ISIS, the Nusra Front, and the Assad regime. Significant casualties could produce a backlash domestically. The Assad regime, which has so far refrained from attacking Jordan, could cause a large movement of IDPs towards the border, through actions such as bombing the power plants in Daraa. It could also sponsor terrorist attacks within Jordan. Jordan’s pro-West orientation makes it a target for both Sunni and Shiite radicals.
Both Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker highlighted the potential for radicalization within Jordan. Wehler-Schoeck cited the significant number of Jordanians who joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2003 and the fact that Al-Zarqawi was Jordanian. The jihadist preachers Al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada are still active in Jordan. There are roughly 2000 Jordanian fighters currently in Iraq and Syria. Within Jordan, there are sleeper cells as well as outright ISIS supporters, but Jordan has a very strong security apparatus. The majority of Jordanians disapprove of ISIS but there are large numbers of unemployed men who are targets for jihadi recruiters. Even better educated Jordanians can be radicalized, as radicalization is also a search for Sunni religious identity. Many young Jordanians who went to Syria and came back frightened and disillusioned were imprisoned. This may be counterproductive, as prisons can serve as centers of radicalization.
Wehler-Schoeck noted that Jordan has tolerated the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the past but has taken stricter steps against it recently, such as the arrest of Zaki Bani Rushaid, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) deputy director. The government’s marginalization of the MB is risky because the MB has served as a platform for more moderate Islamism in the past.
Schenker emphasized that ideology isn’t confined to borders. In Ma’an, there have been several small pro-ISIS demonstrations. Ma’an is 3 hours outside Amman. Authorities are more concerned about radicalism in cities that border Amman, like Zarqa, Rusaifa and Salt. There is a large concern about ISIS sleeper cells among the Syrian refugees. Jordan hosts at least 700,000 Syrian refugees, but the true total may be closer to 1,000,000. Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians contribute about equally to the jihadi-Salafi movement. Two sons of MPs have joined the jihad in Syria. Schenker stated that anecdotally, Jordan appears far more Salafi than it did a couple decades ago. He believes there is a fine line between Salafis and jihadi-Salafis, though Wehler-Schoeck thinks there is a clear difference and that the government must engage with quietist Salafis.
Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker both believe that there is a serious risk of lone-wolf attacks in Jordan. Wehler-Schoeck cited the existence of fatwas calling for such attacks. Schenker warned that traditional targets, such as Western interests, government buildings and tourist attractions could be attacked. The threat from both lone wolves and sleeper cells is very serious. Jordan has excellent security and intelligence services, but they can’t stop all threats.
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House of Kurds
On Wednesday, the Middle East Institute hosted a talk by Hemin Hawrani, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Leadership Council and the head of its foreign relations office, entitled Dynamics in Iraqi Kurdistan. Randa Slim (director of the Track II Dialogues initiative at The Middle East Institute and an adjunct research fellow at the New America Foundation) moderated. Hawrani gave a comprehensive presentation about the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)’s role in the fight against ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan’s prospects for independence, and internal KRG politics.
Hawrani asserted that the war against ISIS will be lengthy because ISIS is the symptom of the problem, not the problem itself. The KRG has a three- phase strategy to counter ISIS:
1. Stop ISIS- this has been accomplished on the ISIS-KRG front.
2. Roll back ISIS- this has been largely accomplished on the ISIS-KRG front, as the Peshmerga have liberated 20,000 km2 from ISIS control.
3. Defeat and destroy ISIS- Still a long way off. Over 1,200 Peshmerga have died in this fight. ISIS continues to gain ground on other fronts. ISIS has managed to almost fully replenish its killed fighters with new recruits.
Hawrani stated that the KRG is a reliable partner in the fight against ISIS, but they need more assistance because ISIS outguns them. The fighting is different that the Peshmerga has encountered in the past because the majority of casualties are from IEDs and suicide bombers. The Peshmerga need more armored personnel carriers, tanks, and high power rifles. They only have 40 MRAPs but need approximately 400 to deploy their forces. They also need transport aircraft, as well as advisory support to modernize their forces. The KRG needs direct arms shipments to avoid delays in Baghdad as well as more help supporting 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Baghdad, Hawrani said, is doing little to help. Iraq is broken and cannot go back to the pre-2014 situation. The KRG supported Abadi to be Prime Minister for all Iraqis and concluded an agreement with him to receive a portion of Iraq’s budget in exchange for oil from Kirkuk. Baghdad has not kept its side of the agreement, or its promises to Sunni Arabs. Baghdad claims it lacks cash, but it has money for the Shi’ite PMUs. Baghdad must either commit to helping the KRG or not interfere with the KRG.
Hawrani stated that the independence for Iraqi Kurdistan is a process and that it will happen. The KRG plans to hold an independence referendum for all citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurds and others) in the next couple of years. The options posed by the referendum will include:
1. A fully independent Iraqi Kurdistan.
2. An independent Iraqi Kurdistan in a confederation with Iraq.
3. The status quo.
The Kurds will discuss independence with Baghdad before any other capitals because they want to pursue this amicably. The KRG seeks to reassure Ankara and Tehran that their desire for independence is not a threat. The KRG does not have a pan-Kurdish agenda and seeks a peaceful, internal solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey and Iran.
The KRG has done its part to be part of a pluralistic Iraq, but the Iraqi state has failed and Kurds no longer want to be part of an uncertain future. Even a fully independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not fully break with Iraq because there would still be economic and defense ties. There might also be a shared currency and shared oil resources. An independent Iraqi Kurdistan would add to the number of functioning states in the region. A referendum will also be held in Kirkuk and other disputed areas to determine if they want to join Iraqi Kurdistan. Hawrani stated that the capture of Kirkuk and other areas is not territorial expansion because the Iraqi Army abandoned these areas.
With regard to internal KRG politics, Hawrani said that the KDP (his and President Barzani’s party ) is on the same page as its rival, the PUK, with regard to ISIS. The KDP has proposed three solutions to the dispute regarding the duration of Barzani’s presidency:
1. Barzani could serve for four more years and hold an independence referendum during this period.
2. Barzani could serve until the end of the current parliament’s term in 2017, at which point there will be elections for both the presidency and parliament.
3. The government could resign and call for early elections.
Hawrani also spoke about KRG policy vis-a-vis the Syrian Kurds (PYD). The KRG does not wish to interfere in Syrian Kurdish affairs or copy and paste Iraqi Kurdistan’s experience onto Syria. Its main stipulation is that Syria’s Kurds act in a unified fashion. The KRG and PYD had agreed that there would be a unified force of all Syrian Kurds and a unified political administration. The PYD has not abided by these terms.
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Two unexpected wars
On Tuesday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a talk entitled Two Unforeseen Wars: A Military Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine and the Campaign against ISIS with Brigadier Ben Barry, the Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at the IISS.
Barry discussed the conflicts separately but drew some parallels between them on the level of military strategy.
Both the conflict in Ukraine and the war against ISIS came as a shock to the US. The conflict in Ukraine began with a Russian campaign in Crimea led by elite units and complemented by propaganda. The Russians made good use of special forces, electronic warfare and deniability. In Crimea, both sides sought not to use lethal force. The ability of the Russian military to restrain its use of lethal force shows that it is better trained than when it fought in Afghanistan or Chechnya. The Russian military has a cadre of strategic planners and an aptitude for deception.
According to Barry, the insurgency of pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine has exploited grievances against the Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of investment in recent years. They have made little effort to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign against the separatists. Last summer, they had some success in pushing the separatists back, but were stopped by Russian intervention, including professionally applied indirect fire. Both the separatists’ own artillery, as well as the Russian artillery that intervened, are skilled. The Ukrainian Air Force has been stymied by the separatists’ air defenses. The separatists have also made effective use of SIGINT and drone intelligence to call in strikes. Russia has improved its military readiness, as the conflict in Ukraine attests.
With regard to the fight against ISIS, according to Barry, Maliki’s 2010 election victory was followed by his attempt to consolidate power by marginalizing Sunni and Kurdish politicians. Meanwhile, the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq fought Assad in Syria and renamed themselves ISIS. They rebuilt their networks in Iraq among discontented Sunni tribes and used sophisticated propaganda to gain volunteers and donations. They then launched their assault on Fallujah, followed by their capture of Mosul. In Mosul, the majority of 3 or 4 Iraqi divisions disintegrated in the face of ISIS’s onslaught. The Iraqi army had suffered from Maliki’s attempt to assert direct control over it and replace capable commanders with politically loyal ones.
ISIS has used both insurgency tactics and conventional forces. The high water mark of ISIS offensives in Iraq came in the fall of 2014. After this point, ISIS still counterattacked at vulnerable spots and conducted offensives in Syria simultaneously. ISIS is now on the strategic defensive in Iraq, but this has been an active defense. To take Ramadi, ISIS used diversionary attacks to distract the Iraqi forces. They may have also conducted the attack under the cover of a sandstorm to stymie coalition airstrikes.
Barry described the sequence of an ISIS attack:
1. Indirect fire.
2. En masse suicide bombings.
3. Captured armored bulldozers are used to breach Iraqi army berms.
4. Close assault including cameramen to document the carnage and subsequent executions.
The fall of Ramadi played into ISIS’s narrative of defending the borders of the Caliphate and mounting counterattacks. These facts on the ground inspire recruits and cause other groups to declare allegiance to ISIS.
According to Barry, ISIS has two main vulnerabilities:
1. In a successful, sustained offensive against it, ISIS would have to move a large numbers of fighters, unmasking them and rendering them vulnerable to attack.
ISIS could, however, move large numbers of civilians at the same time to complicate an attack.
2. If the Sunni tribes in Iraq turn on ISIS, this would be a significant blow.
At first glance, these two conflicts have little in common but Barry drew a few parallels between them:
1. Both conflicts show the importance today of winning the information war. Military operations will increasingly be used for their propaganda effects.
2. The Russian separatists and ISIS leverage superior military leadership against the Ukrainian government and the Iraqi military, respectively.
3. Without airpower, the anti-ISIS coalition would be far worse-off than it is. In Ukraine, we can see how the Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of airpower.
4. Artillery is key in both conflicts. Indirect fire is normally the cause of the majority of casualties in war, and this is likely true in both Iraq and Ukraine. Western militaries have reduced their use of indirect fire, but Russia and China still have extensive indirect fire capabilities.
5. Both conflicts demonstrate the need for the US and NATO to assess which of their allies are vulnerable to hybrid warfare.
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Peace picks July 6-10
1. A Conversation with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian| Monday, July 6th | 4:00 | German Marshall Fund | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) invites you to a conversation with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian. The focus of the discussion will center on France’s defense priorities, as well as the future of U.S.-French cooperation in meeting the spectrum of challenges currently facing Europe and the United States. Jean-Yves Le Drian is the French minister of defense. He was appointed in 2012, serving in this position through two governments. Le Drian has overseen French intervention in Mali in
2013, France’s Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, a counter terrorism mission conducted in partnership with Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger, and operation Chammal in support of the Iraqi forces again Daesh. As minister of defense, Le Drian also directed the publication of the French White Book on Defense and National Security in 2-13. Prior to this, Le Drian was the president of the Brittany Regional Council from 2004 to 2012. Until 2007, Le Drian was deputy of Morbihan to the National Assembly, having first been elected in 1978. In this position, he sat on the National Defense Committee. Previously, Le Drian held the position of mayor of Lorient from 1981-1998, during which time he also served as France’s secretary of state of the sea.
2. EnCourage Pt. II: Voices From the Middle East| Tuesday, July 7th | 9:00 | Johns Hopkins SAIS – Nitze Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After a successful EnCourage conference in Jerusalem this year, New Story Leadership (NSL) returns to Washington with our 2015 Team of five Israeli and five Palestinian students aged 20 – 32 to host EnCourage Pt. II: Voices from the Middle East in partnership with the Johns Hopkins University Conflict Management Program. This second EnCourage conference comes at time when the conversation about Israel and Palestine has been
dominated by hopelessness. In the face of stalemate, NSL has reached out to young activists in Israel and Palestine to tell stories of courage and hope for the Middle East. The conference will include keynote speeches by four NSL Team members, a panel discussion, and a question-and-answer session between the Team, academic panel, and the audience. Keynote speakers include: Abeer Shehadeh, University of Haifa, Israel, Shay Ater, Tel Aviv University, Israel, Mohammad Al-Hroub, Al Quds University, Palestine, and Yaara Elazari, Integrated Program for the Hebrew University and the Jerusalem Academy for Music and Dance, Israel. Panelists include: Professor Marc Gopin, James H. Laue Professor of Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, and the Director of the Center on Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, George Mason University, Professor Stef Woods, American Studies Program, American University, Dr. Manana Gnolidze-Swanson, George Mason University, and Dr. Boaz Atzili, Director of the SIS Doctoral Program, American University. Additional panelists TBA!
3. The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security| Tuesday, July 7th | 12:00-1:30 | Atlantic Council| REGISTER TO ATTEND | Securing the Middle East after an Iran nuclear deal is the region and the world’s next big challenge. The United States and its allies have engaged in tireless diplomacy with Iran over the past few years to produce an agreement that would limit Tehran’s nuclear program for the next decade and a half. But the hard work does not stop here, and in fact, it may have just begun. To protect the deal and take full advantage of its potential benefits – which include the drastic reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons proliferating in the region – the United States needs a comprehensive strategy for regional security in the Middle East. After all, the ultimate prize and broader objective is and has always been to secure and stabilize the region, and a nuclear deal with Iran – as strategically significant as it is – is only one piece of the Middle East security puzzle. Please join the Atlantic Council for a launch of a report by Brent Scowcroft Center Senior Fellow for Middle East Security Bilal Saab entitled The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security and a debate on the future role of the United States in the Middle East following a nuclear deal with Iran. Additional speakers include: Barry Posen, Director, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Richard Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations. Moderated by: Barbara Starr, Pentagon Correspondent CNN
4. Two Unforeseen Wars: A Military Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine and the Campaign against ISIS | Tuesday, July 7th | 2:00-3:00 | International Institute for Strategic Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The unexpected Russian occupation of Crimea, the subsequent insurgency in eastern Ukraine and the rapid conquest of much of northern and western Iraq by ISIS were all strategic shocks. But there is now enough reporting on the conflicts to allow a preliminary analysis of their military contours, including the similarities and differences between the two wars. Brigadier Ben Barry will present the military dynamics of both the Ukrainian conflict and the ISIS insurgency, while examining the emerging military lessons of the conflicts and the military challenges that the pose for the US, NATO and their allies. Speakers include: Ben Barry, Senior Fellow for Land Warfare, IISS and Samuel Charap, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, IISS.
5. The Iran Negotiations: Is this Really the End Game? |Wednesday, July 8th | 11:00-12:15 | Wilson Center |REGISTER TO ATTEND | Despite the uncertainties, the United States and Iran seem to be in the final stages of what promises to be a comprehensive accord on the nuclear issue. Join us as analysts and observers of Iran, Middle Eastern politics, and U.S. foreign policy assess the state of the current negotiations, the implications of an accord and the consequences for the region without one. Speakers include: Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic Relations and Director, International Security Studies, Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar; Historian, analyst, negotiator, and former advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 1978-2003, Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center, Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Danielle Pletka, Senior Vice President for Foreign Policy Studies, AEI and former Senate Committee on Foreign Relations senior professional staff member, Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar; Journalist and Author/Editor of eight books, most recently editor of “The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are.”
6. Hearing: Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran | Thursday, July 9th | 10:00-1:00 | Rayburn House Office Building | Chairman Royce on the hearing: “As we anticipate a congressional review of the Administration’s possible nuclear agreement with Iran, we’ll be looking to see how the Administration has done on Congress’ red lines. Did we get anywhere, anytime inspections? Full Iranian transparency regarding its past nuclear activities? No large-scale, immediate sanctions relief; but guaranteed, workable sanctions snap-backs? Meaningful restraints on Iran’s nuclear program that last decades? This hearing will be the first in a series the Committee will hold should the Administration strike what might be one of the most significant agreements in decades. As I have said, no deal is far better than a bad deal.” Witnesses include: The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, Foreign Policy Project Advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center, (Former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control & Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State), Michael Doran, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Michael Makovsky, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer, JINSA Germunder Center Iran Task Force.
7. Middle East Energy: Beyond an Iran Nuclear Deal |Thursday, July 9th | 10:30-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Iran hopes that the pending nuclear framework agreement will lead to much needed foreign investment in its oil and gas sector. Insofar as eased sanctions permit, billions of dollars will be needed to reverse production declines and re-establish production growth. How realistic are Iran’s aspirations to attract such investment, and what increased production and exports can be reasonably expected over the near to medium term? In turn, what will be the impact
of increased Iranian exports on its neighbors, notably Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and their desire to secure a larger share of the global market? How will the Saudis and other Gulf monarchies react to Iranian moves? What are the implications of changes in Saudi national and energy leadership and of Kurdish moves to produce and export separately from Baghdad? What is the effect of these regional changes on the global energy balance? Energy experts will explore these issues in this eighth event in the Wilson Center’s Regional and Global Energy Series. Speakers include: David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies LLC, David Gordon, Senior Advisor, Eurasia Group, Julia Nanay, Principal, Energy Ventures LLC, Jean-Francois Seznec, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council. Moderator: Jan H. Kalicki, Wilson Center Public Policy Fellow and Energy Lead.
8. The Iran Deal and its Consequences | Thursday, July 9th | 2:00-3:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) are expected to reach a ground-breaking comprehensive nuclear agreement by the end of June or shortly thereafter. The panelists will analyze the agreement in terms of its impact on nonproliferation, regional dynamics, US-Iran relations, and trade and investment in Iran. They will also discuss the potential obstacles to implementation both in Iran and in the United States. Panelists include: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, Kenneth Katzman, Middle East Specialist, Congressional Research Service, Clifford Kupchan, Chairman, Eurasia Group, John Limbert, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, US Naval Academy. Moderated by: Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
9. Washington D.C. Launch: Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance | Thursday, July 9th | 2:00-3:30 | Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the face of growing mass violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber attacks, the world needs a new kind of leadership, combined with new tools, networks, and institutions. The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, in collaboration with the One Earth Future Foundation and UN Foundation, invite you to the Washington, D.C. launch of Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance, the new report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance. The report offers a vision for just security, to ensure that neither justice nor security imperatives are neglected by critical international policy debates in 2015 and beyond. It further presents a bold, yet practical action plan for innovating global governance, and ways to mobilize diverse actors to advance reform to better respond to 21st century threats, challenges, and opportunities. Co-chair of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance Madeleine K. Albright and Commissioner Jane Holl Lute will discuss the report.
10. A View from the Frontlines of Islamist Insurgency: Perspectives on Terrorism in the Middle East and South Asia | Friday, July 10th | 12:00-1:30 | Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | What do ISIS’s rise in Iraq and Syria and Iran’s new-found power and growing sphere of influence in the region portend for the broader Middle East? What is being done to counter Islamist
extremist forces in the region and what is the current state of play? How do the current regional dynamics impact the threat from al-Qaeda, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Join us at The Heritage Foundation as a panel of experts discuss the evolving regional dynamics and trends pertaining to the threat of Islamist extremism and share with us various perspectives on the struggle against the threat. Speakers include: Sara Carter, Senior Reporter, American Media Institute, Sebastian Gorka, Ph.D., Major General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Chair of Military Theory, Marine Corps University, and Katherine Zimmerman, Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute.
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Is there still independent media in Russia?
On Wednesday, the Carnegie Endowment for international peace hosted A Conversation with Alexei Venediktov, the editor-in-chief of Echo of Moscow, often described as Russia’s last independent journalism outlet.
Venediktov began by describing the state of US-Russia relations. There is still no direct conflict between the citizens of Russia and the citizens of the US, but approximately 78% of Russians now view the US as an enemy, compared with 50% only a few years ago. Any sanctions against Russia and negative statements by American journalists about Russia are viewed as a challenge.
In 2000, Venediktov and Putin talked for a couple of hours after a press conference about the future of media in Russia. Putin described two adversaries:
- enemies, who you fight with, make truces with, and then fight with again and
- traitors, who you think are on your side and then backstab you.
Putin asserted that he has no mercy for traitors, but Venediktov is just an enemy, and not a traitor.
Venediktov believes that the confrontation between the US and Russia was inevitable under Putin, who spent his younger years as a KGB officer, where there were clear-cut friends and enemies. Perestroika unsettled him because it blurred these lines. Now he is back to the days of his youth again. The enemies and the battle lines are clear. This is his comfort zone.
Putin has aptly converted foreign policy into domestic policy. The main claim against him is that he opposes competition in all aspects of life. He is against political, economic, social, and moral competition. Russia is becoming a nation incapable of competing and will therefore lag behind again.
The two main groups in Russia today are nationalists, who believe in the superiority of Russian ethnicity, and post-imperialists, who believe in restoring what they view as the greatness of the Soviet Union. The post-imperialists encompass not only ethnic Russians, but also Tatars, Chechens and Ukrainians. This is a pro-Putin movement. He appeals to young people who want Russia to be rich, powerful, respected and feared once again.
Venediktov discussed the murder of Boris Nemtsov, stating that the investigators proved through technical means that those whom they arrested were the perpetrators. He does not believe that someone ordered the crime at a high level. Venediktov believes that the perpetrators felt that by killing an enemy of Putin that they would be treated with leniency. However, Putin knew Nemtsov personally and had a lenient approach to him. When Nemtsov was killed, Putin was outraged.
Venediktov speculated that it may ultimately be shown that the CIA or the Ukrainian intelligence services ordered the murder to shake Putin’s grip on power, but there is currently no evidence to suggest this. Venediktov has bodyguards because he has been declared an enemy of Islam and of Chechnya.
Venediktov believes that the conflict in Ukraine will not end in the next ten years. It will become like the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There will be daily casualties. Venediktov believes that separatists shot down MH17 by accident but that we will never know for sure. He noted that before MH17 was shot down, Western rhetoric against Russia was not militant but that it became militant afterward.
Venediktov stated that of the hundreds of POWs captured by the Ukrainian Army, only two have been Russian personnel, and they were intelligence officers, not soldiers. He believes we need to be cautious in assessing the extent of Russian military involvement in Ukraine. Venediktov also believes that relations with Georgia will continue to deteriorate because Russia will annex South Ossetia. This will lead to a rise in anti-Russian discourse in Georgia.
Asserting that ISIS is considered to be the top security threat by the Russian government, Venediktov said a high-level dialogue between US and Russian officials regarding ISIS is ongoing. Putin recently held a press conference in which he devoted 3/4 of the time to discussing ISIS. Ukraine is more about public relations.
An audience member if Venediktov is truly an enemy of Putin, or more of a Putin apologist, given some of his positions. Venediktov replied that he is just a journalist, not a politician. He opposes Putin’s policies and he is the only journalist that Putin publicly criticizes. He joked that it would be easier to present Putin with horns and a tail to this audience, but all journalists have horns and a tail so that would just make Putin one of them. Venediktov stated that Echo of Moscow is an open forum for diverse opinions. As such, it attracts criticism from much of the political spectrum.
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