Category: Eddie Grove
The devil is in the details
My current Middle East Institute interns Maithili Bagaria and Eddie Grove have combed through the many publications asking questions about the impending Iran nuclear deal. Here is their matrix indicating the main issues that need to be resolved:
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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Parameters |
Contentious Points |
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Reducing Breakout Time |
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Natanz will be the only uranium enrichment facility for the next 10 years. Enrichment levels will not exceed 3.67% — insufficient for a bomb, but useful for civilian purposes. The number of centrifuges will be reduced by ⅔ to 5,060, as well as the stockpile of low-enriched uranium from 10,000 to 3,000 kg. |
How exactly will Iran reduce its uranium stockpile? Will it ship it to another country or reduce it through some mechanism domestically? |
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The Arak and Fordow nuclear facilities will be converted into research sites for 10 years. |
What are the restrictions on the scope of research and whether these restrictions will remain after 10 years? |
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Redesigned Arak reactor that will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. |
What will the details of the remodeling be and what will be the level of reduction in plutonium production? |
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Byproducts of fission from the Arak reactor will be shipped out. |
How will this be verified? |
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Iran has committed to not pursue reprocessing indefinitely and to not conduct reprocessing R&D.
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What does indefinitely mean? Does this mean for the duration of the deal? |
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After 10 years, Iran will be bound by a long-term enrichment and R&D for enrichment program shared with the P5+1. |
Most of the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program are lifted after 10-15 years. Iran’s breakout time beyond this point will be contingent on the details of this long-term program, which have not been announced. |
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Eliminating Sneakout Possibility |
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Suspected breaches in the agreement by Iran will lead to sanctions snapback. |
What is the time frame and mechanism for the snapback sanctions? How will the P5+1 members prevent any of the UN Security Council’s permanent members from vetoing a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions? |
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Architecture of US Sanctions will be maintained for much of the duration of the deal to allow for snapback sanctions. |
What does “much of the duration of the deal” mean and why not the entire duration? |
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The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities and the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. |
Given the resistance within the Iranian leadership to international inspection, how will the IAEA and P5+1 enforce regular access? How frequently will “regular access” take place? |
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UN Security Council Resolutions regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program will be voided and replaced with a new Security Council Resolution that will endorse the JCPOA, and keep core provisions from previous Resolutions that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities. |
Given that previous Resolutions called on Iran to cease enrichment entirely and to not build heavy water reactors, what “core provisions” are going to be retained in this new resolution? |
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Rouhani has his chips on a deal
On Thursday, the Wilson Center hosted a panel discussion entitled Rouhani at Two Years: An Assessment on the Cusp of a Nuclear Deal. Panelists included Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar, Suzanne Maloney, Interim Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Associate at the Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Haleh Esfandiari, the outgoing Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson 
Center, moderated. The panelists related how the Iranian people are largely motivated by economic concerns today. President Rouhani has staked his political future on improving the economy. A nuclear deal is the linchpin of his plan.
Wright has visited Iran three times in the past 18 months and has witnessed tremendous change. The political climate has become more stable because people are tired of years of oscillation between reformists and hardliners. Supreme Leader Khamenei has pushed back attempts by hardliners to scuttle a nuclear deal. No one in parliament wants to say that they are against a deal outright. However, the current climate of stability is unlikely to last; political divisions run deep.
Wright said that Rouhani has implemented bold economic reforms, including subsidy reductions that led to a 40% increase in gas prices. He has also fought corruption. His administration has carefully studied the potential aftermath of a nuclear deal and has been in talks with numerous international companies.
Rouhani has not tackled human rights abuses. Public expectations that he would do so have ebbed. Arrests of journalists continue. The judiciary is a hardline check on change. The public is no longer heavily motivated by the causes of the Islamic Revolution and cares more about material concerns like the economy and pollution. There are 14 million Tehranis, but only 100,000 go to Friday prayers and chant “death to America.” The public is looking ahead to the upcoming elections for both parliament and the Assembly of Experts. Ayatollah Khamenei is ailing, so the next Assembly of Experts will likely pick his successor.
Wright sees Rouhani as worried about the crumbling Middle East. The Iranian government may approach Syria with increasing realism, and will ultimately walk away from Assad. Rouhani had wanted to reach out to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council but tensions have only increased.
Maloney agreed that economic concerns are central for Rouhani. Government performance, not adherence to revolutionary ideals, is now key to legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Rouhani criticized former President Ahmedinejad or the effect of his policies on the economy. Rouhani believes that Iran’s political system must help the economy and has pushed back against the economic role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Rouhani does not face as much opposition to economic reforms as Khatami and Rafsanjani faced. When Rouhani took office, inflation was at 45%. The technocrats he appointed imposed greater fiscal discipline and cut inflation to 15%. Economic growth has gone from negative to slightly positive. However, the government has fed the people unrealistic expectations for sanctions relief, which is unlikely in 2015.
According to Maloney, a deal is unlikely to transform Iran’s relationship with the West because Khamenei views the deal as transactional, not transformative. Rouhani can improve the economy and get some sanctions relief, but we are unlikely to see a significant change in Iran’s regional posture.
Sajadpour concurred that Rouhani is putting all of his eggs in one basket: achieving a nuclear deal with the West. If improving the lives of Iranians is a priority, then sanctions must be removed. Thus Rouhani has focused on a deal and not improvement of human rights. In 2005, Iran had robust oil exports, as well as a stronger civil society and more press freedom than exist today. Ahmedinejad was responsible for the damage since then, and a nuclear deal would represent Iran digging itself out of this hole.
Rouhani will have difficulty effecting change in other areas, Sajadpour said. He will not be able to fight the IRGC because he needs it to enforce a nuclear deal. Khamenei is crafty and holds the real power. The Supreme Leader has outlasted both his former kingmaker, Rafsanjani, and the reformer Khatami. Khamenei wields power without accountability, with a president who has accountability but lacks power. Saying “death to America” is not helpful for improving the economy for average Iranians, but the smallish minority that chants this holds a monopoly on power and coercion.
Sajadpour stated that Saudis and Israelis have good reason to fear a nuclear deal, since it provide more money to support for Hezbollah. It could also open up an opportunity for US-Iranian cooperation against common enemies, but we have to ask ourselves if enlisting Shi’ite radicals to kills Sunni radicals only creates more Sunni radicals.
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Kidnapped
The Wilson Center Wednesday hosted a conversation entitled Pirates, Islam, and US Hostage Policy with Michael Scott Moore, a freelance journalist for Spiegel Online and a former hostage of Somali pirates. Haleh Esfandiari, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, moderated. Moore related h
is experiences as a hostage of Somali pirates for 2½ years. He also discussed the recent change in US hostage policy.
In 2012, Moore, a dual American and German citizen, was covering a trial of Somali pirates in Hamburg. German public defenders argued that the alleged pirates were merely fishermen made desperate by overfishing from illegal trawling. Moore met Somalis at the trial who arranged for him to travel there to learn more.
Moore flew to Somalia, where he interviewed a pirate boss who framed his actions in terms of a struggle against Europeans. He cited legitimate complaints, like illegal tuna trawling, but his main motivation was greed, not ideology.
A few days later, Moore was ambushed by a truck with a mounted cannon. A dozen gunmen jumped out, pulled him from his vehicle and beat him. The kidnapping was well planned. His kidnappers knew he was American. His captors had been looking at a picture of him on a cellphone before his capture. A fellow captive was taken 50 miles offshore of the Seychelles, 700 miles from Somalia. Both Moore and the Seychellois were originally held on a $20 million ransom demand by pirates pretending to be disgruntled fishermen. But qat addiction, not overfishing, is the main cause of desperation among young Somalis. Qat is an expensive habit and Moore never met a Somali pirate who was not addicted.
Moore’s guards were unaware that the US does not pay ransom. If the pirate bosses knew of the policy, they cynically believed they would receive money anyway. The kidnappers were opportunistic and asked for money from all sources: the US and German governments as well as Der Spiegel. They updated him on supposed negotiations with the US. It took them a year and a half to realize that they would not get money from that source. Moore thinks that President Obama’s clarification that families will not be prosecuted for paying ransoms is positive. The past practice of telling families they could be prosecuted caused confusion and limited their efforts to help their loved ones.
Deterrence could reduce hostage taking, Moore suggested. A consistent rescue policy would be one way to accomplish this. A few days after his capture, a Navy Seal team rescued two other American hostages and shot their captors dead. If this happened consistently, pirates might think twice about taking hostages. However, the wishes of families must be honored, since hostages sometimes die in rescue attempts. Policymakers must allow families to choose whether they would like the US to attempt a rescue. Consistent punishment, such as the death penalty, could also be an effective deterrent. The pirates tried in Hamburg in 2012 were jailed for several years, which is not enough.
Moore had previously assumed that pirates could not be devout Muslims because theft is forbidden in Islam. However, his guards prayed five times per day. Moore asked whether they saw a contradiction. At first, they explained that they were just guards and their bosses were un-Islamic thieves. However, pirate bosses do not hire guards who are not fully on board with the work. The guards also claimed that they were protecting Moore from the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab, but received a salary from the pirate bosses.
The guards later claimed that piracy and hostage taking are not haram (forbidden), provided that the victims are infidels. The guards would point out wild pigs and ask Moore if he wanted ham. Moore believes the bosses used a dehumanizing narrative of captives as pig-eaters to convince the guards that what they were doing was all right. Like ISIS, whose leaders are often former Ba’athists, Islam is not the motive for the leaders of pirate gangs. They spread ideas in Islamic terms to motivate their foot soldiers.
Ultimately released for $1.5 million, Moore views the outcome as a miracle. Straying from the political into the deeply personal, he related how his belief that his death was imminent made him reflect on how he had lived his life. He felt that he had fallen short in caring for others. He urged the audience to think each day about how they can do better for their loved ones.
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Afghanistan: from bad to worse
Tuesday the United States Institute of Peace hosted a panel entitled Can Afghanistan Stabilize as US Forces Plan their Exit? Panelists included 
William Byrd (USIP Senior Expert in Residence), Ali Jalali (Former Minister of the Interior of Afghanistan and USIP Senior Expert in Residence), Scott Smith (Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, USIP), Moeed Yusuf (Director, South Asia Programs, USIP). The panel was moderated by Andrew Wilder (Vice President, USIP Center for South and Central Asia). A link to a full video of the conference can be found here.
Overview
Wilder presented an overview of the situation in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have had more casualties this year alone than the US military has had over the entire course of the conflict in Afghanistan. There is pessimism in Kabul over the political deadlock, there is very little economic activity (ironically in part because some investors are scared away by President Ghani’s anti-corruption agenda), and President Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan has been unpopular domestically.
Security
Jalali discussed Afghanistan’s poor security environment. The end of the Coalition combat mission meant an end to international air and intelligence support in this typical fighting season. The Taliban may be willing to negotiate, but want to improve their bargaining power through gains on the ground.
The ANSF struggle with a low force to space ratio in its attempt to defend vast territories. The troops are spread thinly to maintain a presence in all parts of the country occupying small, remote, vulnerable outposts. The Taliban attack these outposts, causing heavy casualties, and then disperse. Suicide attacks in cities have also increased, demonstrating to citizens that the government is incapable of providing security.
The ANSF lack intelligence capacity. In the past, they were able to foil 70% of planned attacks, but now they foil a mere 30%. Instead of manning remote, strategically insignificant posts, the ANSF should focus on intelligence-gathering to take the fight to the Taliban through ambushes.
Politics
Smith discussed Afghanistan’s political impasse. The government is in a state of institutionalized crisis, as disagreements continue between the supporters of President Ghani and Chief Executive (CEO) Abdullah. The agreement between the two parties gives both sides an equitable share of power, but does not contain mechanisms for dispute resolution if one side oversteps its authority. The result is disputes about how to resolve disputes.
Those who try to serve as mediators between the parties become distrusted by both sides. Ghani has tried to build a competent government but has not appointed anyone with previous ministerial experience. Abdullah is losing some supporters because he cannot provide patronage appointments to all his benefactors.
Meanwhile, an opposition is forming that includes former president Karzai and is hoping this government will collapse so that it can step into its shoes. The risk is that the Taliban will step in instead.
Economics
Byrd discussed Afghanistan’s economic woes. Afghanistan’s economy has traditionally been based on subsistence agriculture and herding. The Coalition’s military campaign brought investment, but this is drying up in the wake of the withdrawal, causing a decline in growth. Growth is not yet negative only because recent harvests have been good.
There is little business investment, capital flight, and high unemployment. Human capital indicators, such as literacy, are poor. There is a dire fiscal crisis, though revenue has improved somewhat in the first four months of this year. The Afghan private sector needs more confidence. Byrd argued that high tariffs on imports of cash crops like apples and almonds, combined with innovative export subsidies, could be beneficial.
Foreign policy and negotiations
Yousef spoke about Ghani’s attempt to reconcile with Pakistan. Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan made sense because he has no other options. The state has gotten weaker and the Taliban stronger. Pakistan has been reluctant to go after the Taliban’s safe havens militarily and has been concerned about Afghan-Indian ties. Ghani has been less warm towards India, hoping that Pakistan can bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.
So far, this has not happened. If negotiations do occur, they should focus on what is needed to achieve a ceasefire. Yousef argued they should not become mired in human rights issues, which can be addressed later.
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Peace for sale
Monday the Wilson Center hosted Calculating the Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, which was a presentation of a RAND Corporation study. Here is a link to the study. Ambassador Charles Ries (Vice President, International, RAND Corporation) and C. Ross Anthony (Senior Economist, RAND Corporation and Director, RAND Israeli-Palestinian Initiative) explained the methodology and key findings of the study. Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen (Director, Arab-Israeli Programs U.S. Institute of Peace) and Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives, the Wilson Center) provided their assessments of the significance and potential impact of the study.
The study examined the economic impact of five different trajectories for the conflict over a ten-year period:
- A two-state solution based on the Clinton parameters.
- A unilateral Israeli withdrawal from much of the West Bank coordinated with the Palestinians and the international community.
- An uncoordinated unilateral Israeli withdrawal from part of the West Bank.
- Nonviolent Palestinian resistance, through the internationalization of the conflict and nonviolent demonstrations.
- A violent Palestinian uprising.
The study compared each of these trajectories to the status quo, in which current trends continue for the next 10 years, and considered the impact of each scenario on direct costs to both parties, as well as on missed economic opportunities because of the perpetuation of the conflict. The study did not model a one-state solution because of the uncertainty regarding the character of such a state.
A two-state solution would provide the greatest economic benefit to both sides. Conversely, a violent Palestinian uprising would be most harmful to both sides. Neither unilateral withdrawal scenario would have a significant economic impact on either side. Nonviolent Palestinian resistance would harm both sides economically, though not as much as a violent uprising.
A two-state solution would provide a greater benefit to Israel in absolute terms, but a greater proportional benefit to the Palestinians. Israel’s GDP would be $23 billion larger in 10 years over what it would have been if present trends continued. The GDP of the West Bank and Gaza would be $9.7 billion larger in 10 years over what it would have been if present trends continued. This translates to a 5% increase in Israel’s GDP but a nearly 50% increase in the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza. The study assumed that Israel’s security costs would not change in a two state solution, but that a decrease in uncertainty, an increase in trade with the Arab world and the Palestinians, an influx of Palestinian labor into Israel, and increased tourism would boost the economy. On the Palestinian side, increased tourism, freedom of movement, Palestinian labor in Israel, and trade are among the factors that would boost the economy.
By contrast, a violent uprising would pose heavy costs on Israel through an increase in instability, increased security costs as well as decreased trade, Palestinian labor in Israel, and tourism. Palestinians would suffer from decreased Palestinian labor in Israel, destruction of property, greater restrictions on movement, more prisoners in Israel, more barriers to trade and the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Israel’s GDP would be reduced by 10% relative to the baseline scenario and the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza would be reduced by approximately 45% relative to the baseline scenario.
The study’s authors did not recommend a path forward for Israelis and Palestinians and noted that the various intangible factors (conflicting national narratives, lack of leadership, lack of urgency, etc.) that have led to the current impasse in the conflict fall outside the purview of this study.
Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen noted that this study presents the conflict as opportunity-based rather than rights-based, and allows groups advocating for a solution to the conflict to use data to support their case. Nonetheless, the impasse in the peace process is likely to persist because of mutual distrust. The recent election of a right wing, nationalist government in Israeli reinforces the Palestinian perception that the Israelis have not been negotiating in good faith. Operation Protective Edge reinforced the Israeli view that no Palestinian leader can guarantee an end to Palestinian land claims inside pre-1967 Israel.
Aaron David Miller noted that if it were possible to buy a solution to the conflict through economic inducements, this would have happened already. The issues of security, competing narratives, broken trust, and psychological trauma must be addressed before the two parties can look rationally at the opportunity costs. In addition, the leadership, urgency, and effective third-party mediator required to solve the conflict are missing. The good news is that the study got a lot of publicity and interest. The bad news is that nobody knows what to do about it.
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Yemen: bleak outlook
Last Thursday, the Wilson Center hosted Youth and Civil Society: The Missing Powers in Yemen with Mohammad Al-Shami, a Yemeni youth activist and advocacy trainer. Haleh Esfandiari, the director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, gave opening remarks and moderated a question and answer session.
Al-Shami presented a bleak picture of Yemen’s predicament. For years prior to the current conflict, Yemen suffered from poverty, water shortages, youth unemployment, inadequate healthcare, divisions along many lines, repeated conflict, and the absence of rule of law. The government was highly centralized, weak and corrupt. Citizens needed to come to Sana’a for basic administrative needs and officials there often required bribes.
The military was seen as only representative of a portion of Northern Yemen. The National Dialogue process that occurred prior to the most recent conflict called for restructuring the military. Soldiers from the North were angered that they could lose their jobs to Southerners as a result.
The current conflict reflects the complex divisions of Yemeni society. The rebels are comprised of disparate elements, some of which are not allied with each other. Al Qaeda has filled the power vacuum in some areas, including the major city of Al Mukalla. Al Qaeda is able to provide stability and services, making those who do not necessarily agree with jihadi ideology turn to them for safety. When the war ends, reconstruction will be long and complicated. The underlying factors that led to the conflict will still be present.
According to Al-Shami, civil society in Yemen is plagued by a lack of expertise and cooperation. International donors provided some training to Yemeni civil society organizations but not crucial capacity building. Civil society organizations did not collaborate on initiatives, and multiple organizations were often inefficiently working on similar projects simultaneously.
These organizations are nevertheless the primary providers of life-saving assistance on the ground. The conflict has forced them to focus on humanitarian rather than development work. They lack supplies and largely depend on Yemen’s weak private sector for materials. Despite these challenges, Yemeni civil society organizations are distributing food and water, finding people shelter, and setting up clinics. They are able to access villages controlled by different forces and serve as the best source of information regarding events on the ground.
In Al-Shami’s view, GCC airstrikes were not the only available solution to the upheaval in Yemen. The GCC does not value civil society and has neglected civil society in its initiatives. The National Dialogue provided an opportunity for a political solution and civil society could have played a role in a peaceful settlement. As the violence drags on, it makes reaching a solution increasingly complicated. The peace talks in Geneva will be more complicated than finding a political solution from the outset would have been.
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