Category: Koen van Wijk
Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state, and it’s hard to see it go away
Chatham House’s Lina Khatib recently launched a paper entitled How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state. The paper deals with the past trajectories through which Hezbollah has become the pivotal actor in Lebanese politics. To discuss her findings and their implications for the state of crisis that has gripped Lebanon for over a year, Chatham House convened a panel discussion July 8. The panel agreed that Hezbollah has played its cards well and has become engrained in Lebanon’s corrupt and non-functioning political system. In fact, it has become its most powerful player in many ways. The current crisis has made its transition from a purported ‘defender of the oppressed’ to an established and corrupt part of the political elite all the more clear. Unfortunately, the panel considered the most needed reforms that would actually benefit the Lebanese people unlikely to succeed in the near future.
The speakers were:
Joseph Daher
Visiting Professor,
University of Lausanne
Lina Khatib
Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme,
Chatham House
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Adviser,
U.S. Institute for Peace
Emile Hokayem (moderator)
Senior Fellow for Middle East Security,
IISS
Hezbollah as a unique, but entrenched part of the corrupt system
Lina Khatib summarized the findings of her new paper. She describes what is commonplace for Lebanese: that Hezbollah has become an entrenched part of the Lebanese system. There is no ‘state-within-a-state’: “Hezbollah permeates the state in Lebanon.” It employs many of the practices that have come to define the corrupt political system. There is no transparency on government tenders, and using ministries to provide rents to constituents is the standard.
Joseph Daher maintains that Hezbollah is the primary defender of the Lebanese neoliberal, sectarian political system. It presents itself as a defender of the oppressed (following the Iranian ideology of ‘Khomeinism‘), but this has proved mainly rhetorical. In practice, it oppresses labor unions and favors wealthy industrialists and crime bosses through the ministries it controls. In short, it behaves exactly as the other political entities in Lebanon.
Nonetheless, Khatib explained that Hezbollah is also unique in Lebanon. It has surveillance capacity. Not just within the state, but within its opponents too. This gives it a large advantage over others. Similarly, most parties take advantage of Lebanon’s corrupt political institutions. Hezbollah is different because they have been systematic in using any opportunity – no matter how small – to advance their influence. Hezbollah has political and coercive leverage over both its allies and its opponents, which gives it a great advantage within the Lebanese state. Even opponents of Hezbollah make deals with it behind closed doors – or sometimes even openly. This is what keeps the system in place. As Mona Yacoubian put it, Hezbollah has transformed into the “praetorian guard” of the corrupt Lebanese system.
Toeing the line between state and non-state
Hezbollah’s other major advantage is its status as a hybrid actor. Khatib explains that toeing the line between state and non-state is an ideal situation for Hezbollah. It has influence and legitimacy due to its ties to the state, but is not really a state actor, and is not seen as really in charge of state institutions. There are four main reasons why Hezbollah has no intention of changing this situation:
- The Lebanese state is very weak and not appealing to take over
- There is no Shia majority in Lebanon; outright Hezbollah rule would not be tolerated
- Hezbollah avoids accountability by shirking ownership of the state
- Hezbollah is under sanctions as a terrorist organization in the West, complicating its role as would-be regime.
All of them means all of them
Yacoubian pointed out that Hezbollah’s image has been tarnished, even among its own constituency. The slogan of the Lebanese protest movement ‘all of them means all of them’ refuses to differentiate among the political class. “You see now a political class that is defined purely by self-enrichment and is utterly devoid of any pretense of representing any higher ideal or value.” Yacoubian would go so far as to maintain that there are few real political divisions left among Lebanon’s ruling class.
Hezbollah’s resilience: Iranian support and no alternatives
According to Khatib, Iran’s support to Hezbollah is absolute. Anyone who thinks that Hezbollah can Lebanonize and be removed from Iran’s orbit is dreaming. Steadfast Iranian support makes it stronger than its domestic opponents. With its constituency, it proves resilient because it argues that there is no alternative. Hezbollah’s constituency might not like the party, but they see that there is no realistic alternative to the services it provides. Daher added that Hezbollah’s humanitarian outreach is very large. It claims to have helped some 50.000 families on top of their normal activities in the months of April and May alone. No other actor in Lebanon can match that.
Prospects for reform
So how to move forward? Khatib made it clear that the solution is not to extract Hezbollah from Lebanon, as this would be impossible. A solution would be to reform the Lebanese political system. This needs to be Lebanese-led, but it will require foreign aid. Yacoubian agreed. She proposed a number of concrete reforms that foreign actors can contribute to:
- Support the Lebanese Armed Forces, the only state institution standing between where we are today and total chaos. This is one of the few policies that is continuing today, primarily by the US.
- Cabinet formation and the ability to move forward with reforms are essential. The US, Gulf, and EU can do more to pressure the political elite to form a technocratic government. Steps towards this could be sanctions against the most corrupt political leaders who are obstructing government formation. This is currently happening haphazardly, but it could be done more concertedly.
- The international community can and should do more in the way of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable Lebanese. Bypassing the government is vital to avoid corruption. Perhaps a special UN agency could be tasked with this.
Khatib warned that economic pressure and sanctions alone are unlikely to change Hezbollah’s behavior on its own. As with the IRGC, a weakened currency only benefits Hizbollah, as they make their money abroad, in US dollars. The same is true for Assad in Syria. Sanctions are important, but they aren’t a primary tool. They need to be part of a comprehensive approach.
The panel was pessimistic about the prospects of efficient foreign support for reform. Khatib warned that Hezbollah benefits from the common attitude that sees Lebanon as a lost cause. If the international community gives up and maintains the status quo, Hezbollah benefits. Therefore, bottom-up reform is key. But Daher believes that the Lebanese protest movement has failed to create a unified answer to the corrupt system. He sees the international response as lacking originality. They are now attempting to get Saudi Arabia back to the table and to resume cabinet formation. These efforts will sustain the sectarian parties and system in the paradigm that has been employed for the last several decades.
Khatib emphasized that incremental change must be possible. The gradual approach by which Hezbollah grew its influence can be reversed in small steps. Nonetheless, Hokayem summarized Daher’s pessimistic view. Reform won’t come from the top down in Lebanon, it isn’t emerging in an organized form from the bottom up, and meaningful change is unlikely to come from the outside.
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Hamas’ position improved, but Palestinians need unity
Violence once again erupted between Israel and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in May. A tenuous ceasefire emerged after 11 days of fighting that left hundreds of Palestinians, as well as dozens of Israelis, dead and many more injured. The Palestinian Authority has become increasingly unpopular, and Palestinians have come out in protest against the PA and its leader Mahmoud Abbas since the conflict. Meanwhile, Hamas’ legitimacy has only increased with its handling of the recent crisis. Negotiations to unite the PA’s Fatah and Hamas and to organize new elections in all Palestinian territories ended when Abbas refused to go forward over Israel denied permission for elections in East Jerusalem.
The Middle East Institute organized a panel to take account of Hamas and Gaza’s current situation. How should we see the most recent war? What are perspectives for future peace and stabilization in Gaza and Israel-Palestine in general? How, if at all, can the West, the PA, and Israel engage Hamas in a more constructive way? The panel agreed that a new impetus is needed for the Palestinian national movement to move forward again.
The speakers were:
Aaron David Miller
Senior fellow
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mouin Rabbani
Co-editor
Jadaliyya
Celine Touboul
Co-executive director
Economic Cooperation Foundation
Khaled Elgindy (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs
MEI
Taking stock of the most recent conflict
Rabbani summarized the events of May. He thinks this conflict was significantly different from previous bouts. Palestinians had become increasingly divided territorially and especially politically, with different factions concerned with their own local interests. This time Palestinians from different groups came together for issues that weren’t necessarily local. The initial outbreak started because of Israeli Palestinians protesting expropriations in Sheikh Jarrah. Islamic Jihad and Hamas were the first to engage Israel, but not over issues related to Gaza, for the first time since 2006. Then, in response to the Gaza violence, a mass mobilization emerged in the West Bank focused on a national agenda. That has not happened for a long time.
Miller, disagreed. Without downplaying the suffering in the most recent conflict, he remarked that it was remarkably similar to the three previous rounds of fighting. Nor does he believe that it will transform the Palestinian-Israeli conflict going forward, despite the largest incidence of racial violence in Israel since its inception.
External powers
As for the role of the US, Miller indicated that the Biden administration has one priority: domestic economic and political recovery. Biden’s efforts in Israel-Palestine are minimal. During the conflict he took three steps:
- avoided placing the US in the center of the conflict;
- supported Israel, at least initially;
- then applied limited pressure for a ceasefire.
Among the Arab states, Egypt remains the main interlocutor. The Abraham Accords might seem significant, but Egypt’s geographical proximity continues to place it front and center. The primary Gulf state involved is Qatar, because of its extensive financial support for Hamas.
Both Miller and Rabbani emphasized that third parties tend to engage with Israel and/or Palestine mainly because of US incentives. Egyptian President Sisi hopes to prove his importance as a US partner as he has come under increasing criticism from the Biden administration for domestic repression. The normalization treaties between Israel and several Arab states were primarily deals with the US, with Israeli normalization as one of the bargaining chips.
Miller lamented that there is no international ownership of Gaza right now. No one is currently willing to take ownership of this issue and coordinate its solution. As long as this remains so, he is skeptical of the chances for progress.
Perspectives for lasting peace?
Moderator Elgindy remarked that none of the underlying issues have been resolved, making the current ceasefire highly unstable, as witnessed by recent renewed attacks between Gaza and Israel. Rabbani hesitated to make a definite statement. “Last time, in 2014, nothing changed and we were warned that a new confrontation would erupt quickly, but the ceasefire held for seven years.” It’s possible that Hamas’ role will now change and it will become a leader of the Palestinian cause, because of Mahmoud Abbas’ unpopularity. Alternatively, the current actors could muddle through indefinitely. Or the conflict could erupt again next week. It’s very hard to predict.
Touboul remarked that the new Israeli government could provide an opportunity for further peace talks. The former government focused on the separation of Gaza and the West Bank. It had a schizophrenic policy towards Hamas, on the on hand not acknowledging it and aiming to weaken it military, but on the other fearful that weakening it too much would lead to a power vacuum and end Hamas’ ability to continue the ceasefire. Israel essentially vetoed the reunification of Fatah and Hamas by blocking elections in East Jerusalem. New Israeli policy could make a unified Palestinian government possible. For this to happen, she believes the Israeli government should be challenged to formulate a transparent and coherent policy towards Gaza, rather than leaning on the ‘zero risk-tolerance’ policy previous governments have employed.
Rabbani warned that “initiatives that try to achieve something while remaining under occupation are futile”. The same is true for reconstruction in Gaza while the blockade continues. “You’re basically talking about humanitarian band-aids being put on a very serious hemorrhage.”
Engaging Hamas and bringing the PA into Gaza
Meanwhile, the issue of Palestinian political unification remains fraught. Touboul outlined three key characteristics that any effort should have:
- The PA cannot accept steps that will only benefit Gaza without benefiting the situation in West Bank and Jerusalem.
- It needs to be gradual and supported by a broad coalition, including the US and Israel.
- Hamas as well as Fatah need to see benefits in cooperating with the other. Their cooperation cannot focus on deterrence alone. Key to this will be the gradual transformation of Hamas into an unarmed political entity in the long term.
However, Miller clarified that US engagement with Hamas through official channels remains entirely impossible legally and politically. As long as Hamas has a terrorist wing, it will have to engage through back doors. Israel does engage with Hamas in its own way (prisoner swaps, ceasefires), as Netanyahu needed Hamas to continue the de-facto ‘three-state solution‘.
A future for the Palestinian national movement?
Miller ended by emphasizing the need for unification of the Palestinian national movement, without which it will be impossible for the Palestinians to argue their case. Rabbani concurred. He believes it is time for a revival. The core requirement for this is that Palestinians need to start setting aims that further Palestinian interests, rather than appeal to outside parties, who have shown they do not have Palestine’s best interests at heart.
Rabbani doesn’t believe that strengthening the PA is necessary. Perhaps the PA should be weakened further after its failures and unpopularity. Strengthening the PA in favor of Hamas or others is in the US and EU’s interest, but not that of the Palestinians. Thirty years afer Oslo, Palestinians should start putting their own interests and rights first. If the Palestinians establish a unity government that includes Fatah and Hamas, Rabbani believes that the world would quickly adapt to the only game in town.
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Ghani looks for partners and opportunities in the future
The withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan is soon to be a reality. The last troops will leave before September 11. There is still no political resolution of the country’s decades-old civil war. Fighting is escalting as foreign support declines. Experts have speculated that the Kabul regime led by president Ashraf Ghani may fall to the Taliban as soon as six months after the withdrawal is complete. In this context, the Arab Center Washington DC organized a conference on Looking towards Peace in Afghanistan after the US-NATO Withdrawal. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani gave a keynote speech June 22, before meeting with President Biden on three days later on the new context Afghanistan finds itself in and the opportunities that it affords.
The speakers were:
H.E. Dr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani (keynote)
President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Sultan Barakat (introduction)
Founding director,
Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, Doha institute for Graduate Studies
A withdrawal foretold
The President focused first on the reality of the current situation. The US withdrawal is a game changer. “By ending the guessing game” surrounding the presence of US forces,” Biden forced all stakeholders to reassess their assumptions in the new context. This decision was no surprise to the Afghan government: “this is a transition for which, mentally, we have been ready.” President Ghani respects Biden’s decision and thanked the troops that helped Afghanistan so generously. Now, Afghanistan needs to be ready to establish new relations with the US and NATO. Far from abandoning Afghanistan, these allies will now become partners in assuring the prosperity and development of the country.
Focusing on opportunities, not risks
Ghani cited Nobel-prize winner Daniel Kahneman, who demonstrated that when strategic situations change people tend to focus on threats, rather than opportunities. For now, however, it is important to focus on opportunities. Afghans have been living with uncertainty for 43 years. They have grown accustomed to see potential despite this. The president explicitly reminded the academics present at the conference that they are speaking of a nation of 30 million. “The specter of Najibullah’s fall haunts us,” he admitted. The more people compare the current situation to that, as well as to the fall of Vietnam, the more they add to the anxiety and fears of the Afghan people. President Ghani does not believe that either of those situations is a good comparison.
“We do not ask the world for a sense of indebtedness, because that is not the reality. But we ask for understanding and we ask for partnership in a meaningful way.” There are two key processes to successfully shape the opportunities now presented:
- All stakeholders must acknowledge the strategic shift. All must frame and reframe their partnerships and resist the urge to pretend that the context hasn’t changed. The Kabul government immediately accepted and acknowledged that the withdrawal changes everything. Ghani called on foreign nations to stop hedging and waiting for events to unfold. Avoid atavistic behavior. Accept the changing context and look towards the new future of Afghanistan without applying historical ideas. “Join us to create a peaceful Afghanistan based on the noble quest for peace, cooperation, and prosperity.”
- Afghanistan needs to focus on new and changing partnerships. Ghani is pleased that, together with all of its core interlocutors (US, NATO) his government has immediately been able to change focus to the new chapter, which will bring peace, prosperity, and connectivity to Afghanistan. The region is crucial in this regard.
To secure the peace of Afghanistan by avoiding foreign competition over influence, “we are seriously considering the permanent neutrality of Afghanistan” so that all can be sure that Afghanistan will not be the theater of competition. “We are not looking for patrons, we are looking for partners.”
Challenging the Taliban to govern
The President turned last to the Taliban and the future of Afghan governance. “My colleagues and I have been very clear we are not interested in power, we are interested in principle and commitment. We are willing to bring elections forward to ensure orderly succession.” The Taliban movement is making a strategic mistake by continuing violence when political pathways are on the table in Doha. Why continue with violence when the context has changed and none of the assumptions of the past continue to be relevant? “A tragedy is in the making. This tragedy is a long and distractive civil war. The Taliban and the Taliban alone will be responsible for the scope of this tragedy.”
Ghani put two core questions to the Taliban:
- Will the Taliban acknowledge the centrality of an Afghan nation of common interest, or will they put their relations with their network and sponsors first, as they did in 2001? They must choose where their loyalties truly lie, and make this clear to the people of Afghanistan.
- What is the Taliban’s practical vision for Afghanistan? They can’t avoid explaining their proposed solutions for governance issues such as COVID, the return of refugees, women’s rights, education, water management, etcetera.
By focusing on governance and development despite continuous fighting, “we have changed the discourse in the world and the region to stop looking at us as just poor Afghanistan, but rather as potentially rich Afghanistan and a partner.”
Ghani concluded by emphasizing his personal commitment to Afghanistan’s prosperity: “Never will I leave this country, never will I abandon my people, and never will I stop urging peace and prosperity for all of us.” “If war is imposed on us, we will surprise the world as has been our habit and our destiny in the past.”
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Radicalization thrives as French Muslims lack a coherent identity
The position of French Muslims has become increasingly controversial. The experience of several terrorist attacks and the proliferation of Salafism met a government response. A new “Islamist separatism” bill, which would further expand separation of church and state, is currently being passed through the French parliament. It would prohibit any civil servant or contractor for the public sector from wearing religious symbols. Although the bill does not explicitly mention Islam as such, many fear that it could unfairly target and further alienate Muslims in France.
The Wilson Center June 16 held a seminar on the position of French Muslims in the French state. The panel agreed that the current bill is an attempt by President Macron to appeal to right-wing voters. He faces reelection in 2022. Extreme right-wing candidate Marine Le Pen is polling well. France’s “Muslim Question” emerged from the political tradition of laïcité, which enforces strict separation of church and state, and decades of marginalization and exclusion of French Muslims. If French society doesn’t find better ways to engage this community, radicalization will continue. Nonetheless, the panel conceded that internal discussions in the Muslim community to find alternative Islamic narratives are also needed.
The speakers were:
Amel Boubekeur
Sociologist
EHESS (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales)
Steven Philip Kramer
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Professor of National Security Studies
Eisenhower School, National Defense University
Hakim El Karoui
Senior Fellow
Institut Montaigne
Senior Partner & Paris Office Head
Brunswick
William Drozdiak (moderator)
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Author of “The Last President of Europe: Emmanuel Macron’s Race to Revive France and Save the World”
A history of laïcité
Drozdiak introduced the tradition of ‘laïcité’ (secularism) in French politics. He mentioned that it is central to French political life, as it is enshrined in the first article of the constitution since 1905. It is more far-reaching than the separation of church and state in most democracies, and essentially relegates religious affiliation to the private sphere. Today it is a controversial topic. To some it is the glue that allows the French to live together despite their religious differences, but to others it has become an anti-religious tool used to discriminate against Muslims in France. El Karoui further nuanced this controversy. To him there are three visions of laïcité:
- Laïcité as an essentially legal term: the separation of church and state, a core democratic right.
- Laïcité as a historical battle between the Catholic church and the state that some think is being waged today between Islam and the state.
- Laïcité as a tenet of the Enlightenment. Here the discussion is cast in terms of reason as opposed to religion. The protection of the rational political process requires the exclusion of religious considerations.
Failed integration of Muslims in France
Muslims today often feel disconnected from the French state and society. Kramer outlined five historical reasons for this based on his forthcoming book:
- The shadow of colonialism and harsh decolonization processes scarred and uprooted huge populations of Muslims in the 20th century. Around a million Muslims left for France from Algeria alone. The atrocities of colonialism left deep impressions on these migrants.
- The historical timing of Muslim migration to France also affected their integration. The major wave of immigration came during the industrializing boom after World War II. Muslim men migrated to France to work and eventually brought their families. After this initial boom, however, the economy slowed down and began to deindustrialize, leaving many Muslims unemployed and marginalized.
- French urban policy also pushed Muslims to the fringes. During the boom period, massive social housing projects were set-up on the peripheries of cities. Many French natives left these areas when mortgages became more easily attainable in the 1970s, leaving behind Muslim ghettos in the ‘banlieues’.
- Kramer sees laïcité as part of the issue as well. He believes that opposition to public religiosity has turned anti-religious ideas against Muslims in particular. This is worsened by the Rassemblement National party, which was founded by returning white settlers from North Africa and has always held anti-Islamic sentiments.
- Most recently, the impact of Islamic terrorism on the Western world and in France has led to a mutual cycle of distrust and alienation between French society and its Muslim members. This has also pushed politicians such as Macron into security-based thinking surrounding Islam to counter the political rise of his main rival, Marine Le Pen.
The position of Muslims today and the new law
Boubekeur and El Karoui then spoke on the current issues the Muslim community in France faces. Boubekeur believes that the way the French state engages with Muslim communities has been entirely unsuccessful. It focuses on using appointed representatives of the Muslim community to speak for Muslims. However, this treats French Muslims as believers, rather than citizens. Furthermore, these representatives (often foreign Imams) lack local legitimacy. Their inability to address Islamophobia in France has left young Muslims disillusioned with their leadership.
Further adding to Muslims’ alienation is the fact that the state’s relationship to them has always been led by political agenda:
- In the 1970s, this meant Islam was seen as an immigration issue (not French, but migrants);
- In the 1980s and 90s it was seen as a banlieue issue;
- In the 2000s it has become securitized and linked to threats of radicalization and terrorism.
El Karoui identified three main issues among the current Islamic community in France:
- There is now a real Muslim middle class (10% hold a Master’s degree or higher, 1/3 a Bachelor’s) but there remains an undereducation problem among Muslims.
- A portion of young Muslims are looking for an identity. They don’t feel fully French, but also don’t feel Algerian, Tunisian, etc. They have increasingly started to identify primarily as Muslims, and some have made a very conservative interpretation of Islam their identity.
- Other Muslims feel that there are no adequate representatives for them in society. They are not tied to foreign states, nor do they identify as Muslims (i.e. they don’t want the Islamic community leaders to represent them). If this group cannot be represented and engaged, Islamism will continue to be an issue and the far right will continue to abuse it.
New ways to engage Muslims and new narratives to counter radicalization
The panel offered some solutions. Boubekeur focused on the ways in which the French state interacts with Muslims. El Karoui emphasized the need for new, authentic, Islamic counternarratives.
Boubekeur said the state has two options:
- Let Muslims engage in discussions with the French state as citizens (whomight have certain special needs, e.g. their desire to wear the veil in public spaces) or;
- Stick to a neutral, secular state, and let French Muslims express themselves without the weight of being associated with terrorists. Also allow them to organize themselves better, which is now frustrated in the name of countering Islamist networks.
According to El Karoui, the current proliferation of Salafist and Islamist ideologies can only be solved if Muslims find their own solutions in the struggle between Salafism, Islamism, and faith. The solution is in their hands. Muslims need to create symbols against Salafism and alternative narratives of Islam that appeal to young people.
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Peace Picks | June 21-25, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- World refugee day: Stories of resilient women | June 21, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The Atlantic Council hosts a powerful conversation with refugee – and former refugee – women from around the globe as they share their stories of hope and triumph after surviving unforgettable hardship. These are stories of true resilience.
Speakers:
Adrienne Arsht (opening remarks)
Executive Vice Chair, Atlantic Council; Founder, Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center and Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Reena Ninan (moderator)
Journalist and International Correspondent
Suzana Vuk
Account Executive, Zoom Video Communications
Priyali Sur
Founder & Managing Director, The Azadi Project
José Felix Rodriguez
Regional Coordinator of Migration, Social Inclusion and Non-Violence (Americas Region), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Lilia
Interviewed by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Sedighe
Interviewed by the Azadi Project
Masouma
Interviewed by the Azadi Project
Rebecca Scheurer (closing remarks)
Director, Humanitarian Initiatives, Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, Atlantic Council
2. What Iran’s election results portend | June 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Following the June 18 presidential elections in Iran, a panel of experts discuss the political landscape and the ballot’s regional and international implications. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion of the implications of the election results for US-Iran relations, the 2015 nuclear deal, and Iran’s regional and domestic politics, including the succession to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Speakers:
Borzou Daragahi
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Fatemeh Haghighatjoo
Director, Nonviolent Initiative for Democracy
Azadeh Zamirirad
Iran Researcher and Deputy Head of the Africa and Middle East Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Sadegh Zibakalam
Author and Professor, University of Tehran
Barbara Slavin (moderator)
Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
3. Prioritizing clean energy investments in emerging and developing economies | June 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Around the world, developing markets are facing a daunting challenge: how to strengthen their economies to improve the lives and livelihoods of citizens while not relying on high-carbon avenues for growth which have been deployed for generations. In many ways, the future of climate action relies on the decisions made in these emerging markets, and additional fiscal pressure brought about by the pandemic has made investing in necessary energy transformations to create sustainable, long-term growth even more difficult. A new report from the International Energy Agency (IEA), in collaboration with the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, outlines a plan for mobilizing and prioritizing clean energy investments in these economies.
The Brookings Initiative on Climate Research and Action will convene an event to discuss the new IEA report, “Financing clean energy transitions in emerging and developing economies” and the obstacles to mobilizing and deploying finance for clean energy transitions.
Speakers:
David G. Victor (introduction)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
Fatih Birol (keynote)
Executive Director, International Energy Agency
Michael Waldron (paper presentation)
Head of the Energy Investment Unit, International Energy Agency
David Dollar
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution
Samantha Gross
Director, Energy Security and Climate Initiative; Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
Rachel Kyte
Dean, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Steven M. Rothstein
Managing Director, Ceres Accelerator for Sustainable Capital Market
4. Terrorist Attacks, Cultural Incidents And The Vote For Radical Parties: Analyzing Text From Twitter | June 22, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | Hoover Institution, Stanford University | Register Here
The Hoover Institution announces a new seminar series on Using Text as Data in Policy Analysis. These seminars will feature applications of natural language processing, structured human readings, and machine learning methods to text as data to examine policy issues in economics, history, national security, political science, and other fields. This third session features a conversation with Francesco Giavazzi speaking on Terrorist Attacks, Cultural Incidents and the Vote for Radical Parties: Analyzing Text from Twitter.
Speakers:
Francesco Giavazzi
Professor of Economics, Bocconi University; Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research; Research Associate, NBER
5. Views From the Ground: Perceptions of Domestic Conditions in MENA | June 22, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) holds the third event in a four-part series in cooperation with Arab Barometer, on the occasion of the publication of Arab Barometer’s findings from the sixth wave of its surveys. The third panel will bring together experts from the US and Middle East alongside Abdul-Wahab Kayyali, senior research specialist with the Arab Barometer, to discuss the findings relevant to domestic conditions in the region. What have been the views of governments throughout the pandemic and ongoing crises? How are the economic conditions, and in what ways has the change of global work conditions impacted regional populations? What are the perceptions of civil liberty and freedoms?
Speakers:
Abdul-Wahab Kayyali
Senior Research Specialist, Arab Barometer
Sahar Khamis
Non-Resident Scholar, MEI
Saloua Zerhouni
President, Rabat Institute for Social Science
Ibrahim al-Assil (moderator)
Senior Fellow, MEI
6. Iran’s Pivotal Presidential Election | June 22, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | Wilson Center and United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
The election on June 18 could mark the most important political transition in Iran for more than 30 years since the new president is likely to be in power when the next supreme leader is selected. Most Iranians—and now the majority of voters—were born after the 1979 revolution. One of the looming questions is how many will vote—and what will turnout say about public support for the regime.
The election intersects with critical negotiations between Iran and the world’s six major powers over the future of the JCPOA nuclear deal. Iran’s next president will set policy for years to come on foreign relations, including talks with the outside world on its nuclear and missile programs as well as on domestic affairs and the economy, which have been stifled by economic sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic.
This expert panel will discuss the election results and the implications for Iran, the Middle East, and the United States. How will the new president fare with the Biden administration?
Speakers:
Robin Wright
Distinguished Fellow, USIP-Wilson Center; Author and Columnist, The New York Times
Suzanne Maloney
Interim Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution; Senior Fellow, Brookings Center for Middle East Policy
Ali Vaez
Iran Project Director, International Crisis Group
James F. Jeffrey (moderator)
Chair of the Middle East Program, Wilson Center; Former Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, US State Department
7. Re-Seeding Culture: Syrian Artists in Berlin | June 23, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute’s Arts and Culture Center in collaboration with the Goethe-Institut Washington host a conversation about the development and influence of a thriving Syrian creative community in Berlin over the past decade with a panel of members of this community.
How did Berlin emerge as a new hub of Syrian arts and culture in diaspora? What challenges did Syrian artists face? How did they adapt and engage with this new artistic landscape? And what sort of influence has this exchange of cultures had on Berlin’s artistic community and cultural institutions?
Speakers:
Khaled Barakeh
Contemporary Artist
Kinan Hmeidan
Actor
Diana El-Jeiroudi
Filmmaker & Producer
Malu Halasa (moderator)
Writer
8. Advancing the role of women in Sudan’s transition | May 23, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Chatham House | Register Here
The contribution of women to Sudan’s transition is crucial to ensuring long-term peace, stability and development. In March 2020, the transitional government adopted its National Action Plan on women, peace and security, in line with UN Resolution 1325 which reaffirms the important role of women in peace and security efforts. Earlier this year, the cabinet also announced its priority to empower women in public affairs yet implementation of these commitments remains slow
At this event, panellists reflect on the role of women in the implementation of peace in Sudan and discuss how to increase the participation of women in political roles and other fields. They also examine outstanding priorities for legal reform, the impact of gender-based discrimination and the need for action to secure the rights and safety of women in the country.
Speakers:
Samia El Hashmi
Co-Founder and Chairwomen, Mutawinat Benevolent Company
Samia Nihar
Head, Gender Unit, Development Studies and Research Center, University of Khartoum
Manara Asad Begira Arbab
International Cooperation and Public Relations Officer, Sudan Youth Organization for Climate Change
Yousra Elbagir (moderator)
Freelance Journalist and Writer
9. A Conversation with Iraq’s Planning and Migration Ministers | June 23, 2021 | 10:30 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Join USIP for a discussion with Iraq’s Minister of Planning Khalid Najim and Minister of Migration and Displacement Evan Jabro on the current situation and challenges to stabilization, reconstruction and reform efforts in Iraq. The discussion will also shed light on the status of Iraq’s displaced communities and recent returnees — including ethnic and religious minorities and those at al-Hol camp — as well as the Iraqi government’s plans for the future.
Speakers:
Michael Yaffe (opening remarks)
Vice President, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Minister Khalid Batal Najm
Minister of Planning, Republic of Iraq
Minister Evan Faeq Jabro
Minister of Migration and Displacement, Republic of Iraq
Sarhang Hamasaeed (moderator)
Director, Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace
10. Book Discussion | Transforming Our World: President George H.W. Bush and American Foreign Policy | June 24, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
From the fall of the Soviet Union to the Gulf War, the presidency of George H. W. Bush dealt with foreign policy challenges that would cement the post-Cold War order for a generation. Transforming Our World: President George H.W. Bush and American Foreign Policy offers readers a unique perspective on international events in the Bush administration — in the words of distinguished U.S. foreign policy insiders who helped shape them. They shed new light on and analyze President Bush’s role in world events during this historic period, his style of diplomacy, the organization and functioning of his foreign policy team, the consequences of his decisions, and his leadership skills.
Speakers:
Andrew H. Card Jr.
Author, Transforming Our World; Former White House Chief of Staff; Former Chair, National Endowment for Democracy
Andrew S. Natsios
Author, Transforming Our World; Director, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University
Ambassador Mark Green (moderator)
President, Director, & CEO, Wilson Center
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The pandemic weakened the weakest governments and social groups
The Middle East Institute June 15 hosted a seminar discussing the impact of COVID-19 on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This was in collaboration with the recently released 6th wave of the Arab Barometer, an expansive regional survey. Using the results from this survey and analysis from the Brookings Doha Center, the panel assessed the pandemic’s effects on the region and the perceived efficiency of government responses. As the survey was held in three rounds throughout 2020-2021, the Arab Barometer could also register changes over time. Bottom line: the pandemic exacerbated the region’s existing problems and the hardest hit were the most vulnerable communities (refugees, the poor, and women).
The speakers were:
Yasmina Abuzzuhour
Visiting fellow
Brookings-Doha Center
Salma Al-Shami
Senior research specialist
Arab Barometer
Shala Al-Kli
Non-resident scholar
MEI
Deputy regional director
Mercy Corps
Karen Young (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Economics and Energy
MEI
Exacerbating existing problems
Shahla Kli COVID has worsened existing issues, particularly for IDPs and refugees. She highlighted two of these structural weaknesses in particular:
- Lack of institutionalization: This is manifested in weak healthcare systems and social welfare programs. COVIC pushed these to their limits. Furthermore, some countries (such as Syria or Lebanon) lack well-structured recovery and vaccination plans, exacerbating and lengthening the crisis.
- Unemployment/the ‘youth bulge’: Problems in the labor market abound in the MENA region. Many of its youthful populations work in informal, day-to-day jobs. This is particularly true for migrants and refugees. Often these jobs disappeared during lockdowns. Conversely, many poor citizens and migrants had no choice but to continue working despite the pandemic, potentially falling ill themselves.
Public opinion
Salma al-Shami outlined the relevant results of the Arab Barometer on this topic. The Barometer gathered data on seven countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) due to financial and access constraints. She summarized the findings in five main points:
- Concern for COVID is still high in these countries, but it is significantly higher among women than among men.
- The loss of education for children and increased cost of living were the the number one and two concerns. In Jordan some 140 days of education were lost according to UNESCO, and even more in Iraq.
- Public opinion on government response to COVID varies with the assessment of the healthcare system and inflation control. If these are positively rated, the government’s response also tends to be. This is the case in Morocco and Tunisia for example, while Lebanon and Iraq lack such public confidence. Morocco was also the only country where significant relief packages were deployed. Some 49% of respondents in that country indicated they received some form of aid, where that number didn’t top 20% in any of the other countries.
- Concerning vaccines, there is still some hesitancy. Where trust in government is high, so is the willingness to take a vaccine, as in Morocco which has already seen an exemplary vaccine rollout compared to its neighbors. However, in Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia, only 35-42% indicate they are willing to take a vaccine. Abouzzouhour added that in Jordan conspiracy theories surrounding the vaccines are rampant, and that the government is often not the public’s primary source of information.
- The survey data also indicates that COVID has exacerbated issues of income inequality and unemployment. Few respondents indicated they lost their jobs because of COVID-related lockdowns, although many did experience a temporary job interruption. Women and migrant labor in general suffered greater consequences.
Government responses
Adding to the statistics related to government response to COVID, Abouzzouhour commented that governments overpromised and underdelivered. The first wave saw major lockdowns and task forces with health experts, leading to a comparatively strong performance. However, the initial best cases (Tunisia and Jordan) failed to follow through on their success because they favored opening up for their economies. Additionally, relief packages and strong vaccination drives often faltered, despite government promises. In general, countries that previously underinvested in healthcare (as a percentage of their GDP) suffered high mortality rates.
Two interesting cases emerged from her story. Once again, Morocco was underlined as a strong performer in vaccination compared to its neighbors. Algeria is less clear-cut. It has some of the lowest infection rates in the region. However, its mortality rate is comparatively high, indicating that case numbers are likely underreported more than in other countries. Algeria was also criticized for failing to set up significant relief packages, despite the nation’s hydrocarbon resources.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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